EU Member State Participation in Military Operations

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Abstract

Contrary to what Europe's image as a civilian or soft power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000 – 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home countries for most of the post-Cold War period. Although the vast majority of these troops was active in operations with a strong European presence, the member states' patterns of military engagement varies considerably. What explains this variation? What conditions motivate and block EU member state contributions to military operations? This dissertation addresses these research questions. More specifically, it aims to arrive at a generalizable and parsimonious explanation for the member states' differing levels of contribution to five military operations: EUFOR RD Congo, the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, EUFOR Chad/RCA, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Building on Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this study tests the explanatory value of conditions derived from research on military burden sharing, democratic peace, third-party intervention in internal conflicts and participation in peacekeeping operations.

The main body of the dissertation consists of five articles. The first, co-authored with Alrik Thiem, presents an analysis of the determinants of member state contributions to two CSDP operations: EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The subsequent three articles respectively aim to explain the pattern of contributions to the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, the 2011 air campaign over Libya, and the airstrikes against IS. The fifth article examines member states' contributions across the five operations.

The results of the articles suggest that member states were inclined to participate in the five operations under investigation if sizeable military resources were combined with country-specific benefits related to regional trade, geographic proximity or the threat posed by foreign fighters. In addition, states with a high level of prior involvement in UN peacekeeping operations were inclined to participate in operations deployed in support of the UN peacekeeping system, irrespective of their military resources. However, actual contributions only materialized in the absence of significant competing deployments, while proximate elections and parliamentary veto power, in turn, resulted in lower levels of military support. Finally, depending on the goals of an operation and the national interests at stake, the ideological orientation of the member states' governments also had an impact on their military commitments.

Abstract (Dutch)

In tegenstelling tot wat Europa's imago als civiele macht doet vermoeden, zijn de lidstaten van de Europese Unie bijzonder actief in militaire operaties. Sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog waren er bijna voortdurend 50,000 tot 100,000 Europese troepen ontplooid buiten de grenzen van de Europese Unie. Er zijn echter grote verschillen tussen de militaire engagementen van de EU lidstaten. Zo namen Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië de leiding over de militaire interventie die in 2011 het Qaddafi-regime ten val bracht, waaraan belangrijke lidstaten als Polen en Duitsland niets bijdroegen. Duitsland en Frankrijk leverden dan weer het merendeel van de troepen voor de EU-geleide operatie die in 2006 in Congo werd ontplooid, waaraan Groot-Brittannië enkel met twee stafofficieren deelnam. Twee jaar later besloten zowel Duitsland als Groot-Brittannië om niet deel te namen aan de EUFOR Tsjaad operatie, waaraan kleinere lidstaten Ierland en Oostenrijk respectievelijk 400 en 180 soldaten bijdroegen. Wat verklaart deze verschillen? Onder welke omstandigheden neemt een EU-lidstaat deel aan een militaire operatie? Dit doctoraatsonderzoek zoekt een antwoord op deze vragen. De empirische focus ligt op vijf recente operaties: EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Tsjaad, de versterking van de UNIFIL-operaties, de militaire interventie in Libië en de luchtaanvallen tegen de zogenaamde Islamitische Staat. Met behulp van "Qualitative Comparative Analysis" tracht dit doctoraal proefschrift de verschillende bijdragen van de EU-lidstaten aan deze operaties te verklaren.

Het proefschrift bestaat uit vijf wetenschappelijke artikels. Het eerste artikel focust op twee operaties ontplooid onder het Gemeenschappelijk Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid van de EU: EUFOR Congo en EUFOR Tsjaad. De daaropvolgende drie artikels onderzoeken de bijdragen van de lidstaten aan de versterking van de UNIFIL-operatie, de militaire interventie in Libië en de luchtaanvallen tegen de Islamitische Staat. In het laatste artikel worden de militaire bijdragen van de lidstaten aan de vijf operaties vergeleken in één analyse.

De resultaten van de artikels geven aan dat lidstaten deelnamen aan de onderzochte operaties als ze over redelijke militaire middelen beschikten en economische belangen hadden in de ruime regio van de operatie. Specifiek voor de interventies in Libië en de luchtaanvallen tegen de Islamitische Staat speelden respectievelijk ook de geografische ligging van de lidstaten en de potentiële dreiging van terugkerende Syriëstrijders een rol. Verder namen de lidstaten die traditioneel veel bijdragen aan VN-vredeshandhaving deel aan de operaties die een VN-vredesoperatie ondersteunden. Lidstaten droegen daarentegen niet bij aan operaties

als een groot deel van hun troepen al ontplooid was in andere militaire missies. Afhankelijk van de specifieke doelstellingen van een operatie, speelde ook de ideologie van de regeringen van de lidstaten een rol. Ten slotte, zorgden parlementaire betrokkenheid bij beslissingen over militaire ontplooiing en nabije verkiezingen voor een lagere bijdrage aan militaire operaties.

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Contents

Part 1

Introduction

1
Introduction

When looking at the record of European troop deployments, it becomes apparent that Europe is anything but a postmodern paradise with an "aversion to the exercise of military power" (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004; Kagan, 2002: 10). As shown in Figure 1, the EU member states consistently had between 20,000 and 80,000 troops deployed outside of their home countries during the last two decades. Over the last ten years, member states made sizeable contributions to the NATO-led Kosovo Force, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the US-led coalition of the willing in Iraq and the 2006 enhancement of the United Nations peacekeeping operation (UNPO) in Lebanon. On top of that, the EU launched eleven military operations under the aegis of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),[1] while several member states participated in the air strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) and the military intervention that ended Qaddafi's repression of the Libyan uprising.

Although the bulk of the member states' deployed forces operated alongside troops from other member states, there is considerable variation in the member states' military commitments. The 2011 air campaign over Libya, for example, exposed major differences between the member states' willingness to deploy military force. While France and the United Kingdom took the lead of the international coalition that would eventually cause the fall of the Qaddafi regime, other key member states like Poland and Germany did not deploy any military assets in support of the military campaign. Likewise, the majority of troops deployed in the 2006 CSDP operation in Congo was provided by France and Germany, while the UK only participated with two staff officers in this operation. Two years later, both Germany and the UK decided not to contribute to EUFOR Chad, in which member states Ireland and Austria participated with 400 and 180 troops respectively. What explains these differing levels of contribution? Under which conditions do member states participate in military operations?

[1] The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed to "Common Security and Defence Policy" in the Treaty of Lisbon. The new name is used throughout this dissertation.

Figure 1. Troops Deployed by EU-28, 1995-2014



Research Question

This dissertation focusses on the variation in the member states' military commitments. The general research question of the present study can be summarized as follows:

What conditions motivate and block EU member state contributions to military operations?

More specifically, this dissertation aims to arrive at a generalizable and parsimonious explanation for the member states' differing levels of contribution to five military operations: EUFOR RD Congo, the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, EUFOR Chad/RCA, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against IS.[1] To address this research question, plausible explanatory conditions are

[1] EUFOR RD Congo will be abbreviated to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad/RCA to EUFOR Chad. The reinforcement of UNIFIL is also referred to as UNIFIL II, while the NATO code name "Operation Unified Protector" is used to refer to the 2011 air campaign over Libya and

derived from the scholarly literature on military burden sharing, third-party intervention, peacekeeping operations and democratic peace. Subsequently, the explanatory value of these conditions is tested by systematically comparing member states' contributions to the operations under investigation with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

By addressing the research question, this study contributes to the extant scholarly research on European security. The latter has devoted little attention to the conditions that motivate or block member state contributions to military operations (cf. infra). This constitutes an important gap in the literature on European security policy, not least because close cooperation between the member states is generally considered to be indispensable for Europe to meet the continuous demand for military crisis management (Biscop, 2015: 181). Moreover, by systematically testing the explanatory value of the conditions offered by the research on military burden sharing, third-party intervention, peacekeeping operations and democratic peace, this study adds to this vast body of scholarly work.

Outline Dissertation

The dissertation addresses the research question in five articles which examine the member states' contributions to the operations under investigation. These articles are preceded by an introductory part and followed by a concluding chapter.

The remainder of this introduction is constituted of three chapters. Chapter two situates the topic of this study in the relevant research field and surveys the academic literature for plausible explanations for the variation in member states' military commitments. This literature review starts with a concise overview of the academic research that specifically focusses on the EU member states' military engagements. The subsequent sections discuss relevant strands of academic research and assess whether these provide plausible explanations for member states' differing military commitments. This results in a wide range of plausible explanatory conditions, which provide the ingredients for the causal frameworks of the empirical analyses presented in the articles.

The third chapter defines the empirical scope of the study. The first section describes the universe of European military operations and justifies the case selection. The following sections offer an overview of the member states'

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the US' operational code name "Operation Inherent Resolve" to refer to the air strikes against IS.

contributions to the operations under investigation and discuss their planning, launch and overall objectives. This provides the necessary empirical background to the study, which could not be discussed in the articles due to space constraints.

The fourth chapter presents the methodology and research design of the dissertation. The empirical analyses presented in this study are based on QCA. This methodological approach is concisely introduced in the first part of this chapter, after which the research design and the structure of the dissertation are justified.

The second part of this dissertation is composed of five articles, which present analyses that aim to explain member state contributions to the operations under investigation. Each of the articles builds on QCA to systematically compare the member states' contributions to the operations. The first, co-authored with Alrik Thiem, presents an analysis of the determinants of member state contributions to two CSDP operations: EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The subsequent three articles respectively aim to explain the pattern of contributions to the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, the 2011 air campaign over Libya, and the airstrikes against IS. The fifth article examines member states' contributions across the five operations. Table 1 provides an overview of the five articles in this dissertation.

The last part of this dissertation aims to draw general conclusions on the research question. First, the results of the five articles are interpreted against the backdrop of the plausible explanations discussed in the literature review. The second section reflects on the contribution of this research to the relevant strands of academic research and its relevance beyond academia. The final section discusses the most important limitations of this dissertation and suggests areas for further research.

Table 1. Overview articles

	Title	Status
1	Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations (co-authored with Alrik Thiem)	Under review in *Foreign Policy Analysis*
2	Democratic Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations-A Two-Step Fuzzy Set QCA of UNIFIL II	Published in Romanian Journal of Political Science
3	NATO Burden Sharing in Libya - A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis	Published in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*
4	Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes against Islamic State - a Qualitative Comparative Analysis	Forthcoming in *Foreign Policy Analysis*
5	EU Member State Participation in Military Operations -A Configurational Comparative Analysis	Under review in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*

2

Literature Review

The extant research on European security has devoted little attention to the conditions that motivate and block EU member states' contributions to military operations. Nevertheless, a number of studies on the security and defence policies of the EU and its member states provide relevant insights on the issue. Furthermore, the scholarly literature on military burden sharing, third-party intervention, peacekeeping operations and democratic peace offers a wide range of plausible explanations for the member states' varying levels of military engagement. This chapter first provides a concise overview of the academic research that specifically focusses on the member states' military engagements. The subsequent sections discuss relevant strands of academic research and assess whether these provide plausible explanations for the member states' differing military commitments. As such, this literature review has a twofold objective. First, it situates the dissertation in the relevant strands of academic research. Second, the review derives plausible explanations for the member states' differing levels of contribution to military operations, which provide the key ingredients for the theoretical frameworks that are tested in the articles.

European Military Deployment

Scholarship and policy analysis has produced an extensive literature on the security and defence policies of the EU and its member states. The bulk of the research that examines the member states' military engagements focusses on the CSDP and the military operations deployed under its aegis. Most earlier work on the subject is descriptive, providing detailed analyses of the planning, conduct and impact of CSDP operations (cf. Asseburg & Kempin, 2009; Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2008). More recently, a number of studies has examined which conditions determine whether or not a CSDP operation is launched (Engberg, 2014; Haesebrouck, 2015a; Pohl, 2014a). Since the preferences of the member states are crucial determinants of the launch of CSDP operations, these works provide some insights into the motives and interests that spur European military engagements (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012: 61). Furthermore, a recent article of Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) examines the member states' contributions to CSDP

operations from the perspective of collective action theory, and a number of case studies examines the decisions of one or two member states (not) to participate in a specific CSDP operation (Brummer, 2013; Koivula & Sipilä, 2011; Schmitt, 2012). However, a systematic analysis of the determinants of contributions to CSDP operations has not yet been produced.

The operations deployed under the CSDP framework only account for a small portion of European troop deployments (Menon, 2009: 243). In fact, the majority of externally deployed European forces was active under other institutional frameworks, like NATO and the UN, as part of coalitions of the willing, or in unilateral operations (Haesebrouck & Van Meirvenne, 2015: 268-273). Yet, few studies on European military deployments do not narrowly focus on the CSDP. Two notable exceptions are a RAND study on the record of European-led nation-building operations (Dobbins, 2008a; 2008b) and a monograph by Mattelaer (2013) on the impact of friction on the strategies of European crisis response operations. However, explaining the differing levels of member state contributions to the operations under investigation falls beyond the scope of both studies. Other studies on European troop deployments generally focus on a single operation or only examine a limited number of member states. Davidson (2011), for example, compares the contributions of the UK, France and Italy to seven US-led interventions; an edited volume of Matlary and Petersson (2013: 7) analyses the "political willingness and military ability" of seven member states to use force within the context of NATO and Rathbun (2004) examines the responses of the UK, France and Germany to the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo. The most comprehensive analysis of the member states' varying military engagements is presented in a study of Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009: 794). However, the latter only demonstrates that the pattern of the member states' military commitments does not correspond to expectations of the pure public goods model and that NATO members are more likely to contribute to NATO and US-led operations (cf. infra).

A systematic and comprehensive investigation into the determinants of the member states' contributions to military operations has not yet been produced. Nevertheless, the aforementioned works, as well as the more general research on European Security Policy, do offer interesting insights into the subject. The following sections build on these insights to assess whether the variables invoked in other relevant strands of academic research constitute plausible explanations for the member states' military commitments.

Military Burden Sharing and Collective Action Theory

The rich body of scholarly work on military burden sharing constitutes a first area of academic research that postulates hypotheses that are relevant to the present study. Burden sharing can be defined as "the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal" (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 1). Military deployment produces significant financial and political costs, which are closely connected to the level of military support a state provides to an operation. In consequence, theories on burden sharing offer valuable insights into the determinants of contributions to military operations. Following a seminal study by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), burden sharing research has been dominated by collective action theory. The first empirical tests of collective-action-based models focussed on the NATO allies' varying levels of defence spending. More recently, insights from collective action theory have also been used to explain diverging contributions to military operations. This section first discusses the main arguments that have been put forward in this line of work, after which their potential for explaining the member states' differing military commitments is assessed.

Collective Action Theory and NATO Burden Sharing

Research on military burden sharing has been dominated by quantitative studies that test whether collective action theory explains the NATO allies' varying levels of defence spending. The first collective-action-based models characterized defence as a pure public good, marked by non-excludable and non-rival benefits (Hartley & Sandler, 1999: 666; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 267). The former implies that non-contributors cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of a public good, the latter that consumption by one actor does not diminish the benefits available to anyone else. The pure public goods model predicts that larger, wealthier allies will bear a disproportionately large share of the burden of collective defence efforts (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). Because larger allies place a higher absolute value on additional units of the good, they are expected to satisfy the amount desired by the smaller allies (Sandler & Hartley, 1999: 31). In consequence, small allies should spend very little on the good, relying instead on the amount that spills over from the larger allies (Sandler & Murdoch, 2000: 301).

Collective action theory thus expects small states to attempt to take a free ride on the efforts of large states if military action mainly produces public benefits. Without any doubt, this so-called "exploitation hypothesis" constitutes the single most important collective-action-based explanation for military burden sharing.

During the Cold War period, the hypothesis was generally tested by assessing whether the NATO members' GDP was correlated to the share of GDP they devoted to defence. In line with the expectations of the pure public goods model, most studies found a significant correlation up until 1967 (see inter alia Khanna & Sandler, 1996; Oneal, 1990; Sandler, 1993: 447; Sandler & Forbes, 1980). After NATO's military doctrine changed from "Mutually Assured Destruction" to "Flexible Response" at the end of the 1960s, military expenditures no longer produced only alliance wide public benefits of deterrence, they also yielded impurely public and ally-specific benefits (Sandler & Hartley, 1999: 37-40). To account for these changes, researchers developed an alternative to the pure public goods model: the joint products model. This assumes that defence activities produce multiple outputs, which provide purely public as well as impurely public and private benefits (Sandler, 1993: 447). Impure public defence outputs occur when benefits are at least partially excludable by the provider, private benefits when a defence output only helps the providing ally. If the ratio of private benefits to total benefits is high, the joint products model expects contributions to collective defence efforts to correspond to the expected benefits rather than the size of the (potential) contributor (Sandler, 1993: 447; Sandler & Murdoch, 2000: 302).

Burden Sharing in Military Operations

During the Cold War period, the bulk of the research on military burden sharing focussed on explaining the variation in NATO allies' levels of defence spending. As the importance of peacekeeping operations increased at the beginning of the 1990s, scholars started focussing on the division of the burden of military operations. A first strand of scholarship tests which collective-action-based model provides the best explanation for the distribution of the aggregated financial costs of the peacekeeping operations that were deployed in a given year. In line with the public goods model, many of the benefits of successful peacekeeping are non-excludable and non-rival (Khanna & Sandler, 1997: 113). Peacekeeping aims to achieve greater worldwide peace and stability, which benefits all nations, regardless of whether they contribute to operations. Peacekeeping also produces some country-specific benefits such as "(1) status enhancement for a contributing country; (2) greater stability for neighbouring countries and (3) economic benefits for trading partners" (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). Nevertheless, the bulk of the empirical studies demonstrate that larger states tend to carry a disproportionately large share of the burden of peacekeeping operations, hereby confirming the public goods

model (e.g. Khanna & Sandler, 1997; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010).

Following an article by Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994) on the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a number of studies has examined military and financial contributions to single operations. Rather than narrowly focussing on collective action theory, these studies combine international and domestic level variables into sophisticated integrated models. The bulk of these frameworks include a variant of the exploitation hypothesis generally referred to as the "collective action hypothesis" (Oma, 2012: 563). Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997: 346) conclude that this hypothesis correctly predicted that the US would make a disproportionately large contribution to the Desert Storm Coalition, but failed to explain why any of the other states participated in the operation. Since the US was capable of achieving the goals of Operation Desert Storm without the help of the other allies, the latter could have gained the public benefits of this operation without contributing. In an in-depth analysis of the contributions of South Korea, Turkey and Germany to the 2003 Iraq War, Baltrusaitis (2010) arrives at the same conclusion: collective action theory erroneously predicted that all other states would take a free ride on the US. Such anomalous lack of free riding is the central research puzzle of Davidson (2011: 5), whose main objective is to explain why "America's allies make rather costly contributions when they could have taken a free ride off American military might".

Studies that focus on specific operations thus suggest that the collective-action-based exploitation hypothesis explains the disproportionately large contribution of the US, but does not account for the behaviour of other states. Since the US is generally capable of successfully conducting an operation by itself, the efforts of the other allies are not expected to produce more collective benefits, which, in turn, provides them the opportunity to take a free ride on the US. Mello (2014) does suggest that collective-action-based arguments can account for more than only the US' contribution to multinational operations. More specifically, his research demonstrates that military power was linked to a state's level of participation during the NATO-intervention in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Mello, 2014: 187). Similarly, Auerswald (2004) concludes that the strong support of both the US and the UK for the military intervention in Kosovo corresponds to the expectations of collective action theory. However, Auerswald (2004:657) argues that the UK's large contribution is best explained by its desire to secure the collective good of NATO viability, which confirms theories on alliance politics rather than the collective action hypothesis (cf. infra).

Collective Action Theory and Member State Military Deployment

The single most important hypothesis of the literature that examines military burden sharing from the perspective of collective action theory is that small states will attempt to free ride on the efforts of large states if collective military action produces purely public benefits. Two recent articles present empirical tests that assess whether this exploitation hypothesis explains the variation in the member states' military engagements. First, in a study on burden sharing in EU security governance, Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009) assess whether this hypothesis explains the variation in the member states' deployed troops. Although their analysis shows that the member states' troop commitments are correlated to their GDP, Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009: 802) conclude that the exploitation hypothesis is not confirmed by their data. More specifically, they argue that the found correlation mainly reflects the "higher willingness of the newer NATO members to contribute to NATO missions", since it is not robust when the EU15 and the ten states that joined the EU in 2004 are analysed separately.

In an article that applies collective action theory to the CSDP, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014:96) also does not provide convincing evidence in support of the exploitation hypothesis. In fact, his empirical analyses demonstrate that, except for France, the large EU member states "all contribute less than their 'fair' share of troops" to CSDP operations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014: 96). The evidence for the exploitation hypothesis as an explanation for the member states' diverging military contributions thus seems mixed at best. On top of that, member states are included in many of the studies that invoke the collective action hypothesis to explain contributions to single operations, which generally call into question its value for explaining anything but the disproportionately large contribution of the US (cf. supra).

However, there are three good reasons not to rule out the exploitation hypothesis as a potential explanation for the member states' contributions to the operations under investigation. First, previous studies that test whether collective action theory explains contributions to single operations generally focus on military interventions that were dominated by the US. Given the US' abundant military resources, it is generally capable of achieving the goals of an operation without any military support. In consequence, all other states have the opportunity to take a free ride, irrespective of their military capabilities. However, the US did not participate in three of the operations that are examined in the present study and limited its military role in a fourth, the air campaign over Libya (cf. infra). In consequence, the collective action hypothesis is a more likely explanation for the member states'

differing contributions to the operations examined here, than for the operations that were the subject of earlier research.

Second, there are reasons to believe that the military operations to which the EU member states contribute mainly produce EU-wide benefits. Biscop and Coelmont (2013:16), for example, argue that EU member states no longer have national vital interests, but instead share the same vital interests. Moreover, given the political and economic interdependence within the EU, a threat to one member state inevitably threatens all member states (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794). As a result, member states are likely to try to ride cheap on other member states' efforts to balance these threats, hoping they "will do the job" without their support (Lepgold, 1998: 87).

Third, the member states "vary greatly in their ability to contribute" to operations (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794). The UK and France, for example, account for over 40% of EU defence spending (Menon, 2011: 40). In consequence, their involvement can determine the effectiveness of European military action, which denies them the opportunity to take a free ride if they want to gain the benefits of an operation (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794). In contrast, the smaller member states do have the opportunity to take a free ride if an operation mainly produces EU-wide public benefits, since they can only have a modest impact on the provision of these benefits and cannot be excluded from enjoying them (Mello, 2014: 42; Ringsmose, 2010: 324).

In conclusion, the collective-action-based expectation that large member states should be more inclined to contribute to military operations seems a plausible explanation for the member states' varying military commitments. However, scholars have also argued that differing security concerns and economic interests cause the private benefits from military operations to vary considerable between the member states (cf. infra). Consistent with the joint products model, this would imply that contributions should correspond with expected benefits rather than the size of the (potential) contributor. The next section discusses plausible sources of private incentives, which might motivate member state participation in military operations.

Direct and Indirect Benefits of Military Engagements

In addition to the literature on military burden sharing, there is a vast body of scholarly research on the determinants of third-party intervention in civil war and participation in peacekeeping operations. In line with the joint products model, this work provides evidence that military deployments are linked to the benefits nations

(hope to) gain by participating in operations. These benefits can be structured in two main categories: (1) security and economic benefits that directly follow from successful military operations and (2) more indirect benefits, such as the ones produced by an alliance with a powerful state or the status enhancement that follows from contributing to peacekeeping operations. This section first discusses the most important direct and indirect incentives for participating in military operations, after which their potential for explaining the variation in member states' military commitments is assessed.

Security Concerns and Economic Benefits

Scholarship provides extensive evidence that military engagements are linked to security concerns and economic interests. Studies that build on integrated models to explain burden sharing in military operations generally invoke the "balance-of-threat hypothesis" (Oma, 2012: 564). In line with Stephen Walt's (1987) neorealist theory of alliance formation, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997: 10-11) expected the states that were threatened by Iraq's offensive military capabilities to carry a high share of the burden of the Desert Storm Coalition. Davidson (2011: 16-17) builds on a more comprehensive definition of "threat" that encompasses threats to "the state's territorial integrity or its citizens, the state's economy (including significant economic interests abroad), or a natural resource of economic or security significance". His study provides strong support for the explanatory value of such threats, which were the most important determinants of participation in US-led operations (Davidson, 2011: 174).

Research on third-party intervention in violent conflict and personnel contributions to peacekeeping operations has tested the explanatory value of more specific variables related to economic benefits and security concerns. First, a state with a high level of bilateral trade with the country at war should have a strong incentive to intervene, since conflicts have the potential to disrupt trade relations (Fordham, 2008: 745). However, empirical support for the link between bilateral trade and military commitments is mixed. On the one hand, Rost and Greig (2011: 179-180) show that non-major powers are more likely to send peacekeepers to countries with which they have strong trade relations, while Aydin (2008) provides evidence that third parties are more inclined to join interstate conflicts if they have a high level bilateral trade with one of the conflicting parties. On the other hand, Yoon (1997: 594) and Fordham (2008) conclude that economic interests do not increase the probability that the US will intervene in an internal crisis. Likewise, the study by Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 906) does not establish a strong link between trade ties

and contributions to peacekeeping operations. Kathman (2011: 864) even suggests that the likelihood of third-party intervention in a civil war decreases with higher levels of bilateral trade.

Second, the ramifications of civil wars are rarely confined to one state, as they generally also threaten the stability of the countries located in the civil war state's wider region (Kathman, 2011). In consequence, potential interveners cannot be expected to narrowly base intervention decisions on economic interests in the civil war country itself. Instead, they might be driven by "regional, more economically consequential, interests" (Kathman, 2011: 864). More specifically, a third party that has a high level of trade with the civil war state's wider region should be more likely to intervene, especially if there is a high risk of contagion. In one of the rare articles that test this conjecture, Kathman (2011: 865) provides extensive evidence that "third parties that are dependent upon the civil war state's region for its [sic] economic well-being are increasingly likely to intervene as the risk of diffusion rises".

Third, prior research suggests there might be a link between military engagements and economically significant natural resources. Since oil is the most valuable commodity traded on international markets, the presence of oil reserves constitutes a potential incentive for military action (Colgan, 2013: 149). First of all, the opportunity to capture oil reserves constitutes a plausible motivation for territorial conquest. However, in a comprehensive overview of scholarship on the link between oil and conflict, Colgan (2013: 155) contends that systematic empirical evidence for the frequency of such "resource wars" is lacking. Second, states might intervene in international or domestic conflicts to ensure the continuing functioning of the global oil market and avoid supply disruptions. Colgan (2013:157) contends that this was one of the reasons for the US-led interventions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris (2015) provide more systematic evidence for this conjecture. More specifically, their analysis demonstrates that third parties are more likely to intervene in an internal war if the country at war has large oil reserves, the potential intervener has a higher demand for oil, and the level of bilateral oil exports from the conflict state to the potential intervener is high.

A fourth plausible motivation for military deployments is the "perceived national security interest" in countering terrorist activities (Choi & James, 2014: 2). Especially after 9/11, western military interventions have been justified as an indispensable response to terrorist threats (Azam & Thelen, 2010: 239). However, scholarship provides only limited evidence that terrorist threats actually incite military deployments. The analysis of Choi and James (2014: 11) suggests that US

military campaigns are more likely in "countries where extensive and international terrorism is thriving", but that this correlation does not hold against a range of model specifications. Azam and Thelen (2010), in turn, conclude that US military interventions are not mainly motivated by the war on terror, while Auerswald and Saideman (2014: 16) contend that a country's experience with terrorist attacks is not at all correlated with the extent to which NATO-allies control their contingents in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. In contrast, the study of Sandler and Shimizu (2014: 57) on NATO burden sharing does show that "terrorism motivates the most-at-risk allies to spend more on defense".

Finally, scholarship provides extensive evidence that there is a strong correlation between geographic proximity and military engagements. Geographically close countries are more likely to experience the negative externalities of nearby conflict, such as increased refugee flows and the disruption of supply lines, which provide them with an incentive to support military operations (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). Extensive research demonstrates that countries in a conflict's vicinity are indeed more inclined to participate in military operations. The studies by Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 905) and Uzonyi (2015: 751) provide statistically robust evidence that distance is negatively related to contributions to peacekeeping operations. Likewise, Mullenbach and Matthews (2008: 42) demonstrate that the US is more likely to intervene in geographically proximate countries, while the analysis of Kathman (2011: 863) shows that third parties that share a border with a civil war state are more likely to intervene.

Alliance Value and UN Peacekeeping Tradition

The previous sections focussed on contributor specific benefits that directly follow from successful military operations. However, contributions to military operations have also been linked to more indirect motives, such as securing the benefits produced by an alliance with a powerful state or the status enhancement that follows from large contributions to peacekeeping operations.

A large number of studies has invoked theories of alliance politics to explain contributions to US-led and NATO operations (Oma, 2012: 565). Integrated burden sharing models generally build on Glenn Snyder's secondary "alliance security dilemma" (1984) to formulate expectations on the link between alliance politics and contributions to multilateral operations. This postulates that members of military alliances face two countervailing pressures: fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. The former involves the risk of being deserted by an ally; the latter of being entangled in a conflict central to the ally's interests, but peripheral to one's

own. A state's choices in the alliance security dilemma are primarily determined by its relative dependence on the respective ally. The more a state depends on the ally for assistance against future security threats, the more likely it is that the costs of abandonment will outweigh the costs of entrapment (Snyder, 1984: 471-472). Several scholars have argued that alliance dependence provides the best explanation for the lack of chronic free riding in US-led military operations. Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994: 72), for example, conclude that American leaders pre-empted free riding during the Persian Gulf War by exercising leverage over the coalition partners; while Baltrusaitis (2010: 205) contends that alliance dependence was one of the most important determinants for burden sharing outcomes during the 2003 Iraq War. Similarly, Kupchan (1988: 330-334) concludes that European concerns about abandonment from the US explain why they cooperated with Washington to address the security problems in the Persian Gulf at the beginning of the 1980s.

More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not constitute the only reason for states to support an ally. Davidson (2011: 15) prefers the term "alliance value" over "alliance dependence", because states "may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does not necessarily entail dependence". More specifically, he argues that alliance value also depends on the expected influence on an ally, which determines whether they will be "able to leverage their ally's power into outcomes in their favor". Ringsmose (2010: 330-331) agrees with this line of reasoning by arguing that there are two groups of NATO allies with a particularly strong interest in a good relationship with the US: "Article 5ers" and "Traditional Atlanticists". The first group comprises the states that focus on NATO's collective defence principle, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In line with the alliance dependence hypothesis, it comprises states that perceive a resurging Russian threat and "realize their security comes in the shape of American security guarantees" (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010: 331). "Atlanticists", in turn, are allies who perceive themselves as states with a special relationship with Washington, which they consider "an important key to their security and their political clout on the international scene" (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). States might thus value their alliance with the US because they are dependent on the US' security guarantee or perceive a special relationship with Washington. While "Article 5ers" perceive contributions to NATO or US-led operations as "a fee to obtain American protection", "Atlanticists" consider it "the price of political influence" (Ringsmose, 2010: 332).

Research on burden sharing in UNPOs also refers to benefits that are not directly related to the goals of an operation. A frequently invoked private incentive

to participate in UNPOs are the status gains from being recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997: 729; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 182). Although these gains are available to all potential contributors, states that invested a large amount of resources to support the UN peacekeeping system in the past can reasonably be expected to accord more importance to these benefits. This corresponds to the expectations of Lebovic (2004: 915), who argues that "institutional involvement is self-perpetuating, that an act of participation commits a state […] to further action by creating and reinforcing roles, rules, and expectations". Moreover, states with a strong tradition of participating in peacekeeping operations may also participate more because they "have already built up the infrastructure to do so" (Gaibulloev et al., 2015: 733; Uzonyi, 2015: 749). Prior peacekeeping involvement should thus have a positive impact on a state's propensity to further contribute to UNPOs. Scholarship on troop contributions to UNPOs provides strong evidence for this expectation. The analysis of Lebovic (2004: 928), for example, demonstrates that a country's level of previous commitment to UNPOs is a significant determinant of future participation, while Bobrow and Boyer (1997: 731) conclude that peacekeeping "activism can become a habit".

Country-Specific Benefits and Member State Military Deployment

To sum up, scholarly research provides evidence that military engagements are related to the extent to which the target of an intervention poses a threat to a state's economic or security interests and to more indirect benefits, like alliance dependence and peacekeeping tradition. None of the targets of recent European military deployments had the military capabilities or intention to directly threaten member states. In consequence, the balance of threats hypothesis, as originally formulated by Walt (1987), does not provide a plausible explanation for the member states' varying military engagements. In contrast, variation in less existential threats to member states' economic and security interests does constitute a plausible cause of the divergence in the member states' military commitments. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014: 91), for example, argues that the member states are not equally affected by threats arising from political instability in Europe's wider neighbourhood. "Due to geography, trade patterns and colonial ties, countries such as Spain or France are more likely to benefit from successful action to stem political unrest in North Africa, whereas East European states have a vested interest in ensuring stability in the Balkan" (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014: 91-92). Similarly, Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009: 794) argue that "the line between threats against a core national interest as opposed to a core EU interest is ambiguous and contestable", while Dyson

(2013b: 428) contends that differences in geographical position and energy dependency have important implications for the member states' defence policies.

The member states' varying contributions to military operations might also be explained by the different value they accord to indirect benefits. First of all, the relative importance accorded to the relationship with the US varies considerably amongst the member states (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 389-390; Dyson, 2013a: 389; Meyer, 2006: 169). The East-European countries, for example, accord a relatively high value to good relations with Washington because they are dependent on the US to balance the potential threats of a resurging Russia (Ringsmose, 2013: 411). Countries like Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, in turn, perceive a special relationship with the US, which they consider "an important key to their security and their political clout on the international scene" (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). In line with theories on alliance politics, these member states can be expected to have an incentive to participate in NATO operations and US-led coalitions of the willing.

Likewise, the Scandinavian and "neutral" member states are consistently mentioned in the literature on peacekeeping burden sharing as states with a tradition of strongly supporting the UN peacekeeping system and can thus be expected to be more inclined to participate in UNPOs (Devine, 2011: 341; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 182; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). A strong peacekeeping tradition can also be expected to matter for operations that were deployed in support of UNPOs, like EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. This corresponds to an argument presented in Pohl's (2014b) study on the drivers behind CSDP operations, which links the significant engagement of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden in EUFOR Chad to their national foreign policy traditions of strongly contributing to UN peacekeeping operations (Pohl, 2014a: 138-141; Pohl, 2014b: 200).

Domestic-Level Variables and Resource Constraints

Different strands of scholarship invoke domestic-level variables to explain military deployments. Research on military intervention provides ample evidence that domestic factors have an impact on decisions to resort to the use of force (Aubone, 2013: 291-294; Fordham, 1998; Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008: 28). Likewise, studies that build on integrated burden sharing models generally conclude that domestic-level variables are important determinants of contributions to multinational operations (Oma, 2012: 566). Finally, a recent strand of democratic peace research provides strong evidence that domestic differences between democracies influence their propensity to resort to military force (cf. inter alia

Hegre, 2014; Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Mello, 2012). These partially overlapping areas of academic research offer a number of plausible domestic determinants of the member states' varying levels of military engagement, which can be structured in four categories: institutional constraints, election cycle, public opinion and partisan politics. In addition, this line of research suggests that a state's inclination to participate in military operations can be inhibited by resource constraints, which originate both at the domestic and international level. This section first discusses these domestic-level variables and resource constraints, after which their potential for explaining the member states' varying levels of military engagement is assessed.

Institutional Constraints

A vast number of studies has established a strong link between the varying institutional constraints on executive action and military deployment decisions (Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626; Prins & Sprecher, 1999). This line of research generally builds on the structural model of democratic peace, which "views the constitutional and legal constraints on executive action as a key to understanding how governments act in their international politics" (Hegre, 2014; Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626). A more recent direction in democratic peace research emphasises the significant variation in the institutional constraints on democratic leaders and expects this to affect their international behaviour (e.g. Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Prins & Sprecher, 1999). First of all, democratic leaders were expected to be far less constrained in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, since executives are far more dependent on support from the legislature in the latter (Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626). However, quantitative studies did not confirm this conjecture. Neither Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824), nor Leblang and Chan (2003: 394) conclude that presidential regimes were significantly more likely to get involved in conflict.[1]

Scholars did establish convincing evidence for the impact of a second institutional variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in decision-making on the use of force. Legislative involvement is expected to open up governmental

[1] Moreover, except for France, all EU members either have a parliamentary regime or semi-presidential regime dominated by parliament, which suggests that the presidential-parliamentary distinction explains little of the variation in member state military engagements (Armingeon et al., 2015).

decision-making to public scrutiny, forcing "governments to give reasons for political decisions" (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2008: 4). In consequence, strong parliamentary involvement should significantly restrict a government's freedom of action. A study of European involvement in the 2003 Iraq intervention by Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2015) confirms that high parliamentary war powers are associated with weak degrees of war involvement. Similarly, the study by Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative constraints "are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force" and Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824) conclude that greater legislative controls over foreign policy are associated with lower propensity to initiate conflicts.

The level of constraints on the chief executive is also determined by the nature of the ruling coalition (Reiter & Tillman, 2002: 814). Minority governments are generally considered the most constrained cabinet structures, since the parliament is always a potential veto player if the executive does not control a majority of parliamentary seats (Ireland & Gartner, 2001: 548-558). Multi-party coalition governments, in turn, should be more constrained than single-party majority governments, since they require members of multiple parties to agree on military contributions. The studies by Palmer, London and Regan (2004: 16) and Ireland and Gartner (2001: 561) convincingly demonstrate that minority governments are the least likely to get involved in militarized disputes. In contrast, research does not consistently support that coalition governments are less likely to get involved in international conflict. On the one hand, a study by Auerswald (1999: 498) suggests that coalition governments are less likely to use force, while Saideman and Auerswald (2012: 82) argue that they tend to impose more caveats on their deployed troops. Likewise, Palmer, London and Regan (2004: 16) conclude that governments with multiple pivotal parties are less likely to become involved in international disputes. In contrast, Leblang and Chan (2003: 397) and Ireland and Gartner (2001: 561) suggest that there is no distinction between single party and coalition governments, while Prins and Sprecher (1999: 285) even conclude that coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate military disputes.

The previously discussed domestic constraints are based on the assumption that the probability of military engagement is negatively related to the number of actors involved in the decision-making process on the use of force. Mello (2014: 34-36) draws attention to a more structural and rigid constraint: constitutional restrictions. Democracies show substantial differences in the type of military operations they are legally permitted to participate in. Constitutional restrictions can prohibit participation "(a) on the ground of international law, (b) outside certain

organizational frameworks, (c) beyond a set of permissible tasks" (Mello, 2014: 36). Mello (2014: 185-186) provides strong evidence for the importance of this determinant: his analysis shows that the absence of constitutional restrictions was a necessary condition for democratic participation in the military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Election Cycle

Two diametrically opposed expectations have been postulated on the impact of electoral cycles on the decision to send armed forces abroad (Aldrich et al., 2006: 494-495; Williams, 2013: 450). Research that builds on the "diversionary theory of war" predicts that executives will be more inclined to initiate conflict at the end of an electoral cycle, since this constitutes an opportunity to create a rallying around the flag effect, thereby improving their prospect of re-election (cf Meernik & Waterman, 1996; Ostrom & Job, 1986). Theories on casualty aversion and democratic peace, on the other hand, expect governments to be careful not to upset the public before an election by engaging in costly military adventures (cf. Auerswald, 1999; Gaubatz, 1991).

Very few empirical studies support the diversionary war hypothesis (cf. Fordham, 1998; Stoll, 1984). In contrast, there is extensive evidence that executives are reluctant to resort to the use of force when elections are forthcoming. Gaubatz (1991: 232), for example, shows that democracies are less likely to start a war in the pre-election period, while Williams (2013: 459) concludes that governments behave less aggressively when an election is imminent, and Tago (2009) contends that democracies were more likely to withdraw from the US-led coalition in Iraq at the time of national elections. Kisangani and Pickering (2007: 281-282) differentiate between socioeconomic and politico-strategic military interventions. The former are "essentially benevolent missions launched for low politics issues", such as humanitarian interventions, missions to safeguard minorities or military deployments over economic issues; the latter are belligerent operations over high politics issues that are considered central to national power and prestige. Contrary to their theoretical expectations, Kisangani and Pickering's empirical analysis shows that democratic leaders are less likely to launch both types of interventions during election campaigns (Kisangani & Pickering, 2007: 289). In sum, empirical evidence suggests that military deployments are less, rather than more, likely if national elections are looming.

Public Opinion

One of the core assumptions of the democratic peace theory is that democracies are more peaceful because public opposition to military deployment can restrain "the war-making proclivities of leaders" (Holsti, 1992: 440). Since "public opinion is central to representation, democratic accountability and decision-making", it should be self-evident that it has an impact on the contributions of democracies to multinational operations (Aldrich et al., 2006: 477; Mello, 2014: 40-41). Nevertheless, many scholars are sceptical on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. In a comprehensive review of scholarly research on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, Holsti (1992) argues that public opinion was regarded as highly volatile, incoherent, and not very important for foreign policy decisions during the first two decades after World War II.

Since the end of the 1960s, an increasing number of scholars has challenged this pessimistic view. Ostrom and Job (1986: 556-557) and James and Oneal (1991), for example, show that public aversion to war is negatively related to the probability of the use of force. Similarly, Baum (2004: 221) concludes that public opinion had a constraining effect on the policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations during the crisis in Somalia. Other recent studies, however, conclude that public opinion had a very limited impact on military deployment. Kreps (2010: 191), for example, contends that "public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan", while Auerswald and Saideman (2014: 21, 213) argue that public support does not covary with the pattern of participation in the operations in Afghanistan and Libya.

Risse-Kappen (1991: 480-486) steers a middle ground between the sceptic and optimistic view on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. Rather than assuming that "the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy-making process" or, conversely, that "popular consensus is a function of the elite consensus", he argues that domestic structures and coalition-building processes must be taken into account to understand the impact of public opinion. More specifically, Risse-Kappen (1991: 480-486) maintains that public demands have more impact in states with "fragmented political institutions", where executive power is not centralized in the hands of one decision-maker. In line with this assertion, Mello (2014: 41) expects the combination of public opposition and parliamentary veto rights to constitute a veto point. Similarly, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997: 17-20; 348-350) conclude that public opposition only constrains less-autonomous executives. Davidson (2011: 19), in turn, expects democratic leaders to refrain from acting against public opinion when this could have electoral

ramifications. The latter will be the case when elections are scheduled in "the near-to-median future" and opposition parties offer the public an alternative policy option. However, Davidson (2011) argues that governments will rarely face an electorally relevant public, since government and opposition seldom disagree on contributions to multinational operations.

Partisan Politics

A rich body of literature discusses the link between government ideology and the foreign policies of established democracies. In a comprehensive study on the creation of European security institutions outside NATO, Hofmann (2013: 204), for example, demonstrates that a government's preferences with regards to security are structured by their ideological orientation. Likewise, studies that examine the link between government ideology and military intervention consistently conclude that political partisanship matters for military deployments. Palmer, London and Regan (2004) assume that political leaders, above all, want to remain in office. Since the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than those of left-leaning parties, right-wing governments should be more likely to resort to the use of force. The analysis by Palmer, London and Regan (2004), as well as the successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009), confirms this inference. Likewise, the study of Koch and Sullivan (2010) suggests that leaders whose base of support is on the left of the political spectrum are more constrained by the costs of war fighting, Stevens (2015) demonstrates that supporters of right-leaning parties are indeed less likely to disapprove of war, and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war.

Given the great variety in military operations, the one-dimensional distinction between the pro-military right and pro-peace left might oversimplify the link between government ideology and military deployment. In this connection, several scholars have argued that the impact of ideology on foreign policy preferences depends on the context of the intervention (Martini, 2015: 432; Mello, 2014: 39; Rathbun, 2004). Brian Rathbun (2004), for example, develops an elaborate three-dimensional model. This expects leftist parties to be more antimilitaristic, to prefer pursuing their interests through multilateral frameworks, and follow a more inclusive conception of the national interest, which comprises the promotion of the welfare of other countries (Rathbun, 2004: 18-21). Humanitarian interventions confront leftist parties with a value conflict between their preference for antimilitarism and their inclusive conception of national interests. Rathbun (2004: 27-30) argues that a country's historical experience is critical for how this value

conflict is resolved and expects the left-wing parties of countries with a "positive experience with the use of force" to support humanitarian interventions. Rightist parties have a more narrow conception of the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in international relations, and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral institutions. In consequence, Rathbun (2004) only expects right-wing governments to support military crisis management if they believe this enhances narrow national interests.

Recent research suggests that, depending on the level of legislative involvement in military deployment decisions, the ideological orientation of a country's parliament might also have an impact on military deployment decisions. Williams (2014: 120), for example, argues that opposition parties are more likely to challenge ideologically dissimilar governments, while Choi (2010: 441) contends that the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive have different ideological orientations. Likewise, Mello (2012: 427) integrates hypotheses on partisan politics and institutional structures in a sophisticated multi-causal model, which expects only the combination of parliamentary veto power and a left parliament to create an effective veto point against military deployment. In contrast, a study by Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) on Turkey's involvement in the 2003 Iraq war shows that a parliament can constitute an effective veto point even if a single party government enjoys a parliamentary majority. This finding resonates with the research of Auerswald (1999: 475-480), who argues that executives will be reluctant to use force if their decision can be hindered or overturned by the legislature, irrespective of "the convergence or divergence of executive-legislative preferences".

Resource Constraints

Military deployment requires the unexpected allocation of two kinds of resources: "military manpower and a special budget for sending and maintaining troops abroad" (Tago, 2014: 268). Even the resources of states with substantial military capabilities can be stretched too thin to allow for new military engagements (Aubone, 2013: 291). In consequence, participation should be less likely if military resources are already in short supply due to simultaneous engagements. First of all, military forces committed to concurrent operations are unavailable for other uses (Bove & Elia, 2011: 705; Fordham, 1998: 576). Moreover, additional military engagements would make the remaining military assets harder to use if other, perhaps more pressing, demands should arise. Several studies back this expectation with empirical support. Victor (2010: 223, 225) and Lebovic (2004), for example,

conclude that states that are engaged in external conflicts are less likely to participate in peacekeeping operations. Likewise, Ostrom and Job (1986: 556) and Fordham (1998: 584) show that the US is less likely to resort to the use of force during an on-going war; the research of Bove and Elia (2011: 707) indicates that the number of concurrent operations is a significant obstacle to additional contributions to peacekeeping operations and Gaibulloev et al. (2015: 738) conclude that a country reduces it deployments in UNPOs as it participates in more non-UN peacekeeping missions.

Budget deficits might also have a negative impact on a state's propensity to decide on new troop deployments. Since defence is "the component of the budget with the greatest flexibility to accommodate fiscal pressure", it is more sensitive to domestic fiscal pressures than other spending categories (Su, Kamlet & Mowery, 1993: 225-227). Previous research has shown that budget deficits indeed restrain military spending (Kamlet & Mowery, 1987: 162). Similarly, Tago (2005: 588) has argued that US presidents facing budget constraints will be more likely to consider burden sharing with allies in order to accommodate the costs of military operations. In a more recent study, Tago (2014: 275) demonstrates that states facing significant challenges in their domestic economy will hesitate to contribute to coalition operations.

Domestic-Level Variables and Member State Military Deployment

To sum up, different strands of academic research have established strong evidence that military deployments are linked to domestic-level variables. Research on European security suggests that many of these domestic conditions provide plausible explanations for the member states' differing levels of contribution to military operations. First of all, the studies of Meyer (2006: 11; 148) and Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas (2013) demonstrate that the member states' governments face varying levels of institutional constraints when deciding on military intervention. Pohl (2013a: 180), in turn, concludes that the member states' positions towards a CSDP operation generally correspond "to domestic considerations and priorities". Likewise, Rathbun (2004) provides strong evidence that government ideology was an important determinant of the reactions of the UK, France and Germany to the Balkan wars. Matlary and Petersson (2013) conclude that ideology has a considerable and direct impact on European contributions to NATO operations, but argue that states with more strategic "military cultures", like France and the UK, are less influenced by political factors. In contrast, Davidson (2011) contends that domestic variables are not decisive for European military engagements. More specifically, his

study concludes that domestic-level conditions only mattered in two of his twenty-one cases of European (non-) participation in US-led interventions.

Resource constraints also constitute a plausible explanation for member states' varying military commitments. For most of the last decade, European states have had at least 50,000 troops deployed at any given time. Since this corresponds to the EU capability target set during the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the member states cannot be expected to have had a large reserve of uncommitted deployable military forces (Biscop, 2015: 174; Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009, 794). Likewise, the decline in European defence spending after the 2007 financial crisis suggests that member states that are faced with tight budgets allocate their scarce resources to other policy areas than defence (Giegerich & Nicoll, 2012: 53).

Strategic Culture

The literature on strategic culture offers a last plausible explanation for the variation in the member states' military commitments. The concept of strategic culture was introduced in modern security studies by Jack Snyder (1977) with a study about the Soviet Union's nuclear strategy. Lacking a unitary definition, strategic culture is generally used to refer to the shared norms, beliefs and ideas within a society on the appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 12; Lantis, 2009: 38-39; Meyer, 2006: 20). The concept thus suggests that "different security communities think and behave somewhat differently when it comes to strategic matters" (Gray, 2009: 226). These differences stem from a wide range of material and ideational factors, like historical experiences, geographical positions and national mythologies (Lantis, 2009: 40). Since elites embedded in different strategic cultures can be expected to react differently to similar situations, strategic culture constitutes a plausible explanation for differing contributions to military operations (Gray, 2009: 226; Johnston, 1995: 35).

A vast body of scholarly research examines European security cooperation from a strategic culture perspective. Several scholars have examined whether and to what extent the EU is developing its own strategic culture (Chappell & Petrov, 2014; Cornish & Edwards, 2005: 820; Schmidt & Zyla, 2011: 489). Although most studies conclude that there are several shared norms, ideas and beliefs on the appropriate means and ends of the CSDP, there is a broad consensus that an "EU strategic culture" is unlikely to replace the strategic cultures of the member states. Scholars that examine these national cultures consistently conclude that there are persistent

differences between the member states' norms, ideas and beliefs regarding the use of force. Writing in the aftermath of the European divisions over the 2003 Iraq War, Hyde-Price (2004: 324) argued that "European attitudes towards the use of force are characterized by considerable heterogeneity", which reflects the diversity of their strategic cultures. Rather than being directly related to material power capabilities, these different European strategic cultures are rooted in the second half of the 20th century and reflect the member states' diverging experiences during World War II and the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 2004: 325). Similarly, Howorth (2007: 179) maintains that it would only be a slight exaggeration to contend that there are 27 distinct strategic cultures within the EU. Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas (2013) arrive at similar conclusions. In an edited volume that presents country studies of the (then) 27 member states, they conclude that there are remarkable commonalities amongst the member states' strategic cultures, but that "persistent differences are just as, if not more, frequent".

One of the most rigorous academic analyses of the member states' strategic cultures is presented in a book length study by Christoph Meyer (2006), who examines whether the strategic cultures of France, Germany, the UK and Poland have converged since 1989. Meyer (2006:76) agrees with Hyde-Price (2004) that "collective memories of events of the first half of the 20th century still shape threat perceptions". Nevertheless, the results of his study suggest increasing convergence on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, a stronger role for the EU as a framework for security and defence policy, the desirability of UN authorization, a growing concern for domestic authorization, the de-prioritization of territorial defence and the appropriateness of using force to tackle security threats (Meyer, 2006: 11, 169, 185). However, Meyer (2006: 11) emphasizes that convergence implies that cross-national differences have narrowed, not that national beliefs have become fully compatible. Moreover, his analysis also suggests long-time incompatibility between the member states' strategic cultures on the appropriateness of using force to advance economic and political interests, for the purpose of pre-emption, and in high risk situations. Meyer (2011: 680) provides evidence for a "relatively narrow European strategic culture as only a small set of norms is fully shared" amongst France, Germany, the UK and Poland.

Many of the previously discussed works refer to the member states' behaviour in military operations to illustrate the differences in their strategic cultures. Very few studies, however, aim to explain member state contributions to military operations from a strategic culture perspective. Schmitt (2012) examines Germany's decision to participate in EUFOR Congo and not in EUFOR Chad, but his case studies mainly

describe how Germany's political leaders used facets of their strategic culture to legitimize decisions made for other reasons. Davidson (2011) makes a similar argument in his study on European contributions to US-led operations (cf. supra). Although the latter builds on a neoclassical realist framework, one of his alternative hypotheses expects that consistency between a state's identity and the "case of intervention" makes military participation more likely (Davidson, 2011: 27). This proposition is not convincingly supported by Davidson's case studies, which do show that governments use identity and normative rhetoric to justify their decisions and disarm domestic opposition to military contributions (Davidson, 2011: 177).

Other studies provide more compelling evidence for the importance of strategic culture. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2005: 340), for example, discusses the impact of two competing schools of thought within Germany's strategic culture on its policy towards post-Cold War military operations, and "its categorical 'no' to participation in potential military actions against Iraq". Her detailed analysis suggests that Germany's strategic culture determines which type of military engagements do not provoke domestic resistance. In his work on the drivers behind CSDP operations, Pohl makes an argument that is similar to cultural explanations. More specifically, Pohl (2013a: 317) contends that the main drivers behind CSDP operations are governmental interests in "demonstrating that they are capable of influencing international events in line with domestic values and priorities". In later articles, Pohl more explicitly refers to the explanatory power of cultural approaches, by arguing that the "CSDP is driven apart by diverging national preferences rooted in idiosyncratic political cultures" (Pohl, 2013b: 368) and that "national foreign policy traditions play an important role in explaining EU foreign policy" (Pohl & van Willigen, 2015: 181).

Scholars that examine the member states' strategic cultures thus consistently conclude that there are considerable and persistent differences between the member states' norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the goals for which the use of force is considered appropriate or legitimate (Meyer, 2006: 11). Moreover, research provides evidence that strategic cultures have an impact on military engagements. In combination, this suggests that differences in the member states' strategic cultures, rooted in their different national histories, constitute a plausible explanation for their varying levels of military engagement.

Conclusion Literature Review

This literature review started by arguing that a systematic analysis of the variation in the member states' military commitments has not yet been produced. The chapter continued with a discussion of the relevant strands of academic research and assessed whether these provide plausible explanations for member states' differing military commitments. The collective-action-based exploitation hypothesis suggests that smaller member states will take a free ride on large member states if military operations mainly produce public benefits. Contrary to this pure public goods model, and in line with the alternative joint product model, studies on third-party intervention and contributions to peacekeeping operations link military engagements to the direct and indirect benefits nations (hope to) gain by participating in operations. In addition, different strands of scholarship have established a link between military commitments and domestic and resource constraints. Finally, a vast body of academic research draws attention to the persistent differences in the member states' strategic cultures, which might explain their differing military commitments.

The explanations provided by the discussed theories are not necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive. Prior research suggests that military contributions result from a complex interplay between conditions derived from different theoretical traditions. Studies that build on integrated models, for example, indicate that external benefits "fare pretty well in explaining political leaders' incentives to contribute", but need to be combined with domestic-level variables to account for a state's ability to contribute (Oma 2012, 565). In spite of having a strong incentive to participate, an executive might, for example, refrain from contributing because of a potential parliamentary veto, constitutional restrictions, or forthcoming elections. Moreover, whether specific incentives lead to actual contributions might be contingent on the ideological preferences of the government or parliament.

Because a member state's decision (not) to participate in an operation is expected to result from a complex interplay between conditions derived from different theories, the articles combine insights from these different lines of academic research to arrive at a more complete understanding of the determinants of the member states' military commitments. However, one plausible explanation is not taken into account in the empirical part of this dissertation: none of the articles that compose the second part of this thesis test whether the differences between the member states' strategic cultures explain their varying military engagements. Although strategic culture approaches are definitely valuable and might provide

useful insights into the member states' military commitments, there are several problems with applying cultural arguments in the present research. Most importantly, this dissertation aims to arrive at a general and parsimonious explanation for the member states' military commitments. Many cultural theorists, however, do not seek to establish generalizations, but rather aim to explain or understand particular events or foreign policy decisions (Desch, 1998: 152-155; Glenn, 2009: 536-541). Perspectives on strategic culture that do attempt to produce general explanations for state behaviour still tend to focus on the particularities of different strategic cultures, which makes it difficult to operationalise and systematically compare cultural variables across the EU member states.

In consequence, this dissertation assesses to what extent it is possible to explain the variation in the member states' military commitments without taking the differences in their strategic cultures into account. If each member state's military commitments are primarily determined by its specific strategic culture, current attempt to arrive at a parsimonious and generalizable explanation could only result in failure. However, as argued by Colin Gray (2009: 226), one of the leading scholars on strategic culture, those "who wear the badge of the "culturalist" are not claiming that culture is always, or even necessarily often, the prime determinant of decision and action". In consequence, it should be possible to establish a clear cross-case pattern without taking the differences in the member states' strategic culture into account. Moreover, some of the conditions that are examined in this study are closely related to cultural explanations. The bulk of the scholars that examine the member states' strategic cultures, for example, emphasise the difference between "Atlanticists" and "Europeanists", which is reflected in conditions related to alliance politics (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Cornish & Edwards, 2001; Meyer, 2006). Similarly, scholarship on strategic cultures draws attention to the different norms with regard to the domestic authorisation required for the use of force, which are closely connected to variables related to institutional constraints. Finally, a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs might reflect a distinct foreign policy tradition of supporting multilateralism and the UN (Pohl, 2014a: 138-141).

3
Empirical Domain

This dissertation focusses on five military operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 air campaign over Libya and the air strikes against IS. The first section of this chapter describes the universe of European military operations and explains the criteria that guided case selection. The subsequent sections provide an overview of member states' contributions to the operations under investigation and discuss their planning, launch and overall objectives.[1]

Population and Case Selection Criteria

As argued at the outset of this study, the EU member states had a large number of troops deployed outside of their home countries for the last two decades (cf. supra). Table 2 lists thirty-five operations that were launched between 1995 and 2015 and involved at least 500 troops of the current 28 member states.[2] The table indicates that the bulk of the externally deployed European forces operated in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan. The largest operations were deployed under the aegis of NATO, but member states also deployed troops under the aegis of the CSDP and the UN, as part of ad hoc coalitions and in unilateral operations. The EU members participated in a wide variety of operations, ranging from military training missions (e.g. EUTM Mali) and traditional peacekeeping operations (e.g. UNIFIL II), over more robust peace enforcement operations (e.g. EUFOR Chad), to intense

[1] The sections on EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad build on parts of the appendix of Article 1, which was co-written with Alrik Thiem.

[2] This table updates the operations selected by Giecherich and Nicoll, who list twenty-two military operations that were launched between 1995 and 2008 and deployed at least 500 European troops (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008a: 17). On top of the operations listed in Table 2, several member states deployed a sizeable number of troops in operations that had been launched before 1995, like the UNPOs UNTSO and UNIFIL, and the French operations Boali in the Central African Republic and Epervier in Chad. Moreover, the EU members also launched several smaller operations under the aegis of the CSDP, like EUFOR Concordia and EUTM Somalia.

Table 2. Member State Participation in Military Operations

Country	Operation	Start - End Date	Framework
Croatia	UNCRO	03/1995-01/1996	UN
	Belgium (669), Czech Republic (170), Denmark (18), Finland (55), Ireland (18), Netherlands (19), Poland (21), Portugal (20), Slovakia (609), Sweden (109) and UK (29)		
	UNTAES	01/1996-01/1998	UN
	Austria (10), Belgium (826), Czech Republic (41), Finland (15), Ireland (18), Netherlands (6), Poland (62), Slovakia (583), Sweden (44) and UK (1)		
Macedonia	UNPREDEP	03/1995-02/1998	UN
	Belgium (2), Czech Republic (2), Denmark (45), Finland (370),Ireland (2), Poland (2), Portugal (1) and Sweden (107)		
	Essential Harvest/Amber Fox	08/2001-12/2002	NATO
	Denmark (40), France (210), Germany (560), Netherlands (400) and Poland (25)		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	IFOR	12/1995-12/1996	NATO
	Belgium (420), Czech Republic (850), Denmark (907), Finland (450), France (7,500), Germany (4,000), Greece (1,000), Hungary (450), Italy (2,200), Netherlands (2,000), Poland (660), Portugal (900), Spain (1,400), Sweden (500) and UK (10,500)		
	SFOR	12/1996-12/2004	NATO
	Austria (203), Belgium (550), Bulgaria (25), Czech Republic (636), Denmark (662), Estonia (46), Finland (480), France (3664), Germany (2,748), Greece (250), Hungary (310), Ireland (50), Italy (2500), Latvia (97), Lithuania (140), Luxembourg (25), Netherlands (1,220), Poland (450), Portugal (350), Romania (208), Slovakia (29), Slovenia (158), Spain 1600), Sweden (510) and UK (5,408)		
	Althea	12/2004-ongoing	EU
	Austria (360), Belgium (52), Bulgaria (197), Czech Republic (90), Estonia (33), Finland (184), France (477), Germany (1167), Greece (157), Hungary (170), Ireland (64), Italy (955), Latvia (3), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (434), Poland (244), Portugal (237), Romania (120), Slovakia (45), Slovenia (182), Spain (512), Sweden (77) and UK (862)		

Table 2. (continued)

Country	Operation	Start - End Date	Framework
Albania	Alba	04/1997-08/1997	Coalition
	Austria (100), Denmark (60), France (1,000), Greece (600), Italy (2,972), Spain (333) and Romania (390)		
	AFOR	04/1999-09/1999	NATO
	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy (2,531), Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and UK (130)		
Kosovo	Allied Force	03/1999-06/1999	NATO
	Aircraft: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK		
	KFOR	06/1999-ongoing	NATO
	Austria (623), Belgium (1,010), Croatia (28), Czech Republic (501), Denmark (900), Estonia (98), Finland (820), France (5,200), Germany (5,300), Greece (1,700), Hungary (484), Ireland (233), Italy (6400), Latvia (19), Lithuania (36), Luxembourg (20), Netherlands (1450), Poland (763), Portugal (340), Romania (226), Slovakia (196), Slovenia (389), Spain (1,300), Sweden (760) and UK (3,900)		
Sierra Leone	Palliser	05/2000-06/2000	British
	UK (1,200)		
Afghanistan	Enduring Freedom/ISAF	10/2001-12/2014	Coalition/ NATO
	Austria (60), Belgium (577), Bulgaria (597), Croatia (317), Czech Republic (694), Denmark (750), Estonia (162), Finland (195), France (3,932), Germany (5,150), Greece (158), Hungary (507), Ireland (11), Italy (4,213), Latvia (175), Lithuania (250), Luxembourg (11), Netherlands (2,160), Poland (2,580), Portugal (229), Romania (1,947), Slovakia (326), Slovenia (130), Spain (1,537), Sweden (614) and UK (9,500)		
	Resolute Support	12/2014-ongoing	NATO
	Austria (10), Belgium (43), Bulgaria (110), Croatia (107), Czech Republic (236), Denmark (120), Estonia (4), Finland (80), France , Germany (850), Greece (4), Hungary (97), Ireland (7), Italy (740), Latvia (25), Lithuania (70), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (83), Poland (180), Portugal (10), Romania (618), Slovakia (39), Slovenia (7), Spain (20), Sweden (32) and UK (450)		

Table 2. (continued)

Country	Operation	Start - End Date	Framework
Mediter-ranean	Active Endeavor	10/2001-ongoing	NATO
	Ships: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and UK		
	EUNAVFOR Med	06/2015-ongoing	EU
	Ships: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Spain and UK		
Iraq	Iraqi Freedom	03/2003-12/2011	Coalition
	Bulgaria (500), Czech Republic (300), Denmark (517), Estonia (45), Hungary (500), Italy (3,100), Latvia (145), Lituania (90), Netherlands (1,100), Poland (3,200), Portugal (128), Romania (860), Slovakia (104), Spain (1,300) and UK (11,000)		
Côte d'Ivoire	Licorne	09/2002-01/2015	French
	France (5,000)		
Congo	Artemis	05/2003-09/2003	EU
	Austria (3), Belgium (66), France (1673), Germany (7), Greece (2), Hungary (1), Ireland (5), Italy (1) Netherlands (1), Spain (1), Sweden (81), UK (97)		
	EUFOR RD Congo	07/2006-11/2006	EU
	Austria (3), Belgium (59), Finland (11), France (975), Germany (745), Greece (1), Italy (56), Luxembourg (1), Netherland (44), Poland (125), Portugal (53), Slovenia (1), Spain (132) and Sweden (50)		
Liberia	UNMIL	09/2003-ongoing	UN
	Croatia (5), Denmark (2), Finland(2), France (1), Ireland (471), Netherlands (266), Sweden (233) and UK (3)		
East Timor	UNMISET	05/2002-05/2005	UN
	Denmark (2), Ireland (2), Portugal (639) and Slovakia (36)		
Lebanon	UNIFIL II	08/2006-ongoing	UN
	Austria (167), Belgium (375), Bulgaria (130), Croatia (1), Cyprus (2), Denmark (134) Estonia (67), Finland (205) France (1,867), Germany (903), Greece (228), Hungary (4), Ireland (426), Italy (2,446), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (161), Poland (492), Portugal (146), Slovenia (14), Spain (1,277) and Sweden (68)		

Table 2. (continued)

Country	Operation	Start - End Date	Framework
Chad/CAR	EUFOR Tchad/RCA	01/2008-03/2009	EU
	Austria (169), Belgium (64), Bulgaria (2), Croatia (15), Cyprus (2), Czech Republic (2), Finland (62), France (1770), Germany (4), Greece (4), Hungary (3), Ireland (447), Italy (104), Lithuania (2), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (71), Poland (421), Portugal (30), Romania (2), Slovakia (1), Slovenia (14), Spain (112), Sweden (120) and UK (4)		
	MINURCAT	09/2007-12/2010	UN
	Austria (126), France (822), Finland (75), Ireland (418), Poland (325), and Sweden (2)		
Horn of Africa	EUNAVFOR Atalanta	12/2008-ongoing	EU
	Ships: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and UK		
Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean	Ocean Shield	08/2009-ongoing	NATO
	Ships: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and UK		
Libya	Odessay Dawn/ Unified Protector	03/2011-10/2011	Coalition/ NATO
	Aircraft: Belgium, France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and UK; Ships: Bulgaria and Greece.		
Mali	Serval	01/2013-08/2014	France
	France (2800)		
	EUTM Mali	02/2013-ongoing	EU
	Austria (8), Belgium (95), Bulgaria (4), Czech Republic (38), Estonia (8), Finland (12), France (207), Germany (209), Greece (4), Hungary (13), Ireland (8), Italy (15), Latvia (7), Lithuania (4), Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (1), Poland (20), Portugal (7), Romania (1), Slovenia (3), Spain (118), Sweden (16) and UK (40)		
	MINUSMA	04/2013-ongoing	UN
	Belgium (3), Denmark (17), Estonia (2), Finland (5), France (29), Germany (59), Italy (2), Netherlands (515), Portugal(2), Romania (1), Sweden (138), and UK (2).		

Table 2. (continued)

Country	Operation	Start - End Date	Framework
Sahel	Barkhane	08/2014-ongoing	France
	France (3,500)		
CAR	Sangaris	12/2013-ongoing	France
	France (2,000)		
	EUFOR RCA Bangui	04/2014-03/2015	EU
	Austria (6), Estonia (55), Finland (30), France (250), Germany (4), Italy (49), Latvia (40), Lithuania (1), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (1), Poland (50) and Spain (99)		
Iraq/Syria	Operation Inherent Resolve	08/2014-ongoing	Coalition
	Aircraft: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and UK Troops: Belgium (25), Finland (49), France (95), Germany (100), Hungary (116), Italy (120), Netherlands (130), Portugal (30), Spain (301) and UK (250)		

Based on SIPRI (2015); UNDPKO (2015) and IISS "Military Balance 1995-2015".

counterinsurgency operations (e.g. ISAF) and offensive air campaigns (e.g. Unified Protector). On top of that, European warships patrolled the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to repress piracy, and the Mediterranean to neutralize refugee smuggling routes and deter terrorist activity.

Table 2 estimates the maximum contribution of the member states to every operation. The data shows that the member states hardly ever participate with large numbers in operations to which other EU members do not make significant contributions. France did launch several unilateral interventions in Africa, and the UK also deployed one unilateral military mission, Operation Palliser. However, the other member states generally provided logistical support to such unilateral deployments and participated in missions set up to assist these operations.[1] Although the bulk of the member states' armed forces was deployed alongside troops

[1] Two recent examples are EUFOR RCA and EUTM Mali, which supported the unilateral French operations Sangaris and Serval.

from other member states, their specific contributions to several multinational operations varied significantly. The US-led intervention in Iraq probably revealed the deepest divisions amongst the EU members (Schuster & Maier, 2006). While member states like France, Germany and Belgium vehemently opposed the intervention, Denmark, Poland, the UK and many other member states provided strong military support. In 2011, the air campaign over Libya again exposed significant differences between the member states' willingness to deploy military force. While France and the UK took the lead of the international coalition that would eventually cause the fall of the Qaddafi regime, other key member states like Poland and Germany did not deploy any military assets in support of the air campaign. Likewise, contributions to the CSDP operations in Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic and the enhancement of the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon varied significantly amongst the member states.

This study examines five of the thirty-five operations listed in Table 2: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve.[1] The following criteria guided the selection of these cases. First, only operations that were launched between 2005 and 2015 are included in the dissertation. The study thus focusses on the military operations that were most recent at the time of writing. This should increase the generalizability of the study's findings for future operations, as well as enhance the comparability of the operations by keeping some background conditions constant. Most importantly, all operations under investigation took place after the EU and NATO's "big bang" enlargement of the first half of the 2000s, during which some of the accession states might have had "a strong incentive to prove their 'reliability' in terms of contributing to their future alliance partners" (Mello, 2014: 181).

Second, the selected operations required the member states' governments to decide on new military engagements, rather than enhancing or extending earlier commitments.[2] This criterion excludes the gradual increase in European troop numbers in the ISAF operation; as well as EUFOR Althea and MINURCAT, which

[1] UNIFIL II refers to the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL; "Operation Unified Protector" is the NATO code name for the 2011 air campaign over Libya; and "Operation Inherent Resolve" the US' operational code name to refer to the air strikes against IS (cf. footnote 2).

[2] Three member states did have troops in UNIFIL before its enhancement: France (210), Italy (52) and Poland (214). However, given the sizeable increase in troop numbers of these countries and the change of the operation's overall goals, it is appropriate to consider UNIFIL II a new operation.

mainly involved troops that had already been deployed in the preceding SFOR and EUFOR Chad operations (Keohane, 2009: 214; Korski, 2009; Mattelaer, 2013: 59). Explaining the evolution of troop commitments throughout the course of an operation, or after a change in its operational framework, constitutes an interesting objective for future research, but falls beyond the theoretical and empirical scope of this study (for recent research on this question, see: Koch & Sullivan, 2010; Mello, 2016; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004; Tago, 2009).

Third, each of the selected operations involved at least five member states, which either deployed fighter jets that participated in offensive operations or, together, at least 2,000 ground forces. By focussing on the most sizeable deployments, the selected operations can be expected to have offered a majority of the member states the opportunity to make a significant contribution. Military interventions conducted by single member states are not included in the analysis, since the outcome of interest, i.e. military participation, was not probable for the member states that did not initiate the intervention. Therefore, unilateral operations would mainly add irrelevant cases to the population (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004).

The member states' contributions to the five operations that meet these three criteria vary considerably, with a large share of the EU members refraining from deploying any troops in the area of operations. This variation makes the operations particularly relevant for the purpose of this study, but is not fully representative of the complete universe of operations that deployed a significant number of European troops. In fact, nearly every member state made a substantial contribution to three of the largest operations involving European forces: SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan.[1] Another limitation to the representativeness of the selected operations is that some of the most significant European troop deployments of the last twenty years are not included. Most importantly, the study does not examine the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are not only the largest, but also the most intense and risky military operations to have involved European ground forces.[2] In addition to the fact that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan do

[1] However, especially in the ISAF operation, there was significant variation in the relative burden each member state carried and in the caveats their governments imposed on the deployed troops (Ringsmose, 2010: 332-335; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012).

[2] The EU member states suffered 849 and 228 military fatalities during the operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq respectively (www.icasualties.org, accessed 29/02/2016). In contrast, there are no reported military casualties amongst EU member states' troops during EUFOR Congo, Operation Unified Protector or Operation Inherent Resolve. Two French soldiers

not meet the aforementioned case selection criteria, these have been thoroughly examined in other studies, which provides a pragmatic reason not to include them in the present study (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014; Mello, 2012; Mello, 2014; Schuster & Maier, 2006; Siegel, 2009). Notwithstanding these limitations, the most important frameworks for European troop deployments are represented amongst the selected operations. Moreover, there are substantial differences between the goals, mandates, size, strategy and intensity of the five operations, which should enhance the inferential value of the analyses.

EUFOR Congo

EUFOR Congo was set up in response to a written request by UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehénno, sent to the EU's British presidency on 27 December 2005 (Engberg, 2014: 95). In this request, the UN invited the EU to deploy a military force during the elections in Congo to support the MONUC peacekeeping operation. The Council Secretariat started drafting an option paper for a possible operation at the beginning of January and EU fact finding missions were sent to Kinshasa and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York (Brummer, 2013: 399; Hagemann, 2010: 40). On 23 January, French President Chirac and German Chancellor Merkel indicated that they were willing to participate in an EU-led operation in Congo (Schmitt, 2012: 68). However, Merkel insisted that this operation was to be "truly multinational", and required substantial contributions from the other member states (Engberg, 2014: 99; Tull, 2009: 44).

Two interrelated problems hampered the further planning of the operation: the designation of the operational headquarters (OHQs) and the lack of clear troop pledges from member states other than France and Germany. Since the EU does not have permanent OHQs, one of the member states had to agree to take the lead of the operation by making its national headquarters available.[1] Five member states have indicated that they dispose of a sufficiently equipped OHQ that is available for EU-

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died during EUFOR Chad and the UN reports a total of seven fatalities caused by malicious actions in the UNIFIL operation after its enhancement (in addition to 22 fatalities caused by accidents) (Chivviss, 2014; Seibert, 2010; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2016).

[1] Alternatively, the member states can use NATO's OHQ, as specified under the Berlin-plus agreement. However, this option was never really on the table for EUFOR Congo.

led operations: the UK (Northwood), France (Mont Valérien), Greece (Larissa), Italy (Rome) and Germany (Potsdam) (Simón, 2010: 15). After the former four declined, Germany came under increasing pressure to lead the operation (Major, 2008: 25). However, Germany refused to assume any responsibility before the other member states made significant troop pledges (Engberg, 2014: 99-100). High Representative Solana started an ad hoc force generation process, but this did not result in firm commitments from the member states. Only after an informal planning conference was organized in Berlin on 20 March, did Germany gain the necessary reassurances to provide Potsdam as the operation's OHQ. Three days later, the Council of Ministers formally approved the launch of the operation. On 3 and 10 May, two formal force generation conferences were organized in Potsdam. After these conferences, shortfalls remained in the area of strategic and tactical air transport capabilities, which were only filled after France and Germany agreed to contribute the bulk of the missing capabilities (Engberg, 2014: 102; Hagemann, 2010: 45).

In spite of the delays caused by Germany's hesitance to take the lead and the lack of firm troop commitments from the member states, the planning process was concluded in time (Simón, 2010: 34). EUFOR Congo was deployed for four months, starting from the first round of the presidential elections on 30 July (Major, 2009: 315). The force had been authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1671 and aimed to deter potential spoilers from undermining the electoral process, support MONUC, contribute to the protection of civilians, and protect Kinshasa airport (Major, 2008: 18). EUFOR Congo was composed of three pillars: an advanced element in Kinshasa (1), an on-call force stationed in Gabon (2) and a strategic reserve in Europe (3). Pillars 1 and 2 consisted of around 2,400 forces, roughly one third of which was stationed in Kinshasa, while the strategic reserve was composed of 1,500 troops (Brummer, 2013: 9; Major, 2009: 314).

France and Germany contributed two thirds of the required military capabilities. France deployed 1,090 troops and provided the bulk of the strategic reserve in Europe. Germany participated with around 780 troops, most of which were stationed in Gabon (Schmidt, 2011: 574). Spain deployed 130 troops, which were deployed in Kinshasa and composed EUFOR's rapid reaction capability. Poland contributed 130 military police, which were in charge of the protection of the operation's headquarters in Kinshasa. The Netherlands participated with 50 troops, comprising an infantry platoon and a medical unit (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007). Belgium contributed four unmanned aerial vehicles and approximately 50 supporting personnel (Verbraecken, 2006). Italy contributed a C-130 transport plane, with around 65 supporting personnel (Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2007).

Sweden participated with 55 troops, most of which were special forces. Portugal participated with a special operations unit of 33 marines and a C-130 aircraft with 17 air force personnel (Palma, 2009: 13). Finland seconded two surgeons and three medical teams of three persons each (Handolin & Elomaa, 2007). Greece allocated one C-130 military air transport plane. Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK only contributed staff members to the operational and/or force headquarters; Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Romania did not participate.

UNIFIL II

The enhancement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was a response to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Mattelaer, 2013: 80). This so-called "Summer War" started in July, after Hezbollah militiamen killed three Israeli soldiers and kidnapped two others during a raid on Israeli territory (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 59). Israel reacted with an intensive air campaign, followed by a ground offensive on 19 July (Mattelaer, 2013: 83). On 11 August, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1701, which called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities and authorized a significant reinforcement of the UNIFIL operation (Mattelaer, 2013: 85). UNIFIL had been deployed in Lebanon since 1978, after Israeli defence forces had invaded Southern Lebanon to establish a geographic security buffer against the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Mattelaer, 2013: 81). By July 2006, UNIFIL had been transformed into an observer mission with a troop strength of 2,000. With resolution 1701, the UN Security Council authorized augmenting the operation's troop numbers to 15,000.

The reinforced UNIFIL was tasked with monitoring the cessation of hostilities, confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, assisting the Lebanese armed forces in regaining control over the south of Lebanon, preventing illegal arms trafficking, and ensuring that the area of operations was not used for hostile activities (Mattelaer, 2013: 86; Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 62). UNIFIL II aimed to achieve these general objectives by performing three broad functions: providing a military buffer between Israel and Hezbollah, de-escalating any potential confrontation between the Israeli Defence Force and Lebanese Armed Forces, and enabling the reconstruction of the area by repairing damaged infrastructure, demining, and training the Lebanese Armed Forces (Mattelaer, 2013: 96-100; UN Security Council, 2006). The UNIFIL force was divided over two sectors, Sector West and Sector East, which were supported by a rapid reaction force. In addition, a

Maritime Task Force (MTF) was deployed in Lebanon's territorial waters to counter maritime arms smuggling (Mattelaer, 2013: 86-90). While the MTF was being prepared, an Interim Maritime Task Force (IMTF) was deployed.

The reinforcement of UNIFIL was made possible by the substantial contributions of the member states, which provided more than half of the required forces (Mattelaer, 2013: 80, 88). The Council of Ministers and the member states had become involved in diplomatic initiatives at an early stage of the conflict. The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), for example, issued a resolution on 17 July that called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, Italy co-chaired an international conference on the crisis in Rome on 26 July, and together with the US, France had initiated the draft on which resolution 1701 was based (Engberg, 2014: 62-81; Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 64). During an extraordinary GAERC meeting on 1 August, the member states indicated that they were ready to contribute to an operation in support of a political settlement of the conflict. The Council remained involved after the adoption of Resolution 1701. Most importantly, the member states formalized their troop contributions during an extra GAERC meeting, attended by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (Gowan, 2007: 70; Mattelaer, 2013: 88).

The member states contributed over 7,600 troops to UNIFIL II. The bulk of the European forces were provided by Italy, France and Spain. At the end of 2006, the Italian contingent amounted to 2,400 troops (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 79). Italy took the lead of Sector West, to which it contributed two of the five battalions. Italy participated in the IMTF and, after 2008, in the MTF. France was participating with around 1,600 troops at the end of 2006 (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 79). More specifically, it provided UNIFIL's quick reaction force and one of the four battalions of Sector West. Spain participated with around 1,200 troops by the end of 2006 (Ronzitti & Di Cammillo, 2008: 79). It took the lead of Sector East and, after 2008, participated in the MTF.

At the end of 2006, seven other member states were also contributing ground forces to the operation. Belgium participated with around 350 troops, which were primarily tasked with mine clearance. In 2008 and 2009, Belgium also contributed a frigate to the MTF. Ireland contributed an infantry company of 165 troops, which operated as the protective unit of a Finnish engineering company of 200 troops (Defence Forces Ireland, n.d.; Finnish Defence Forces, 2015). Portugal participated with an engineering unit of around 140 troops (Armed Forces Supreme Commander, n.d.). Poland, which had been involved in the UNIFIL operation since 1992, augmented its troop numbers to approximately 320. Slovenia participated with

12 troops, while Luxembourg and Hungary each contributed two troops. Six member states (initially) only contributed to the Maritime Task Force. Germany took the lead of the MTF, in which it participated with eight ships and around 900 crew. In November 2006, Bulgaria and Greece were participating with a frigate (with around 220 and 130 crew respectively), Denmark with a corvette and a patrol boat (80 crew) and Sweden with a corvette (40 crew) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007: 233).[1] The Netherlands started participating with a frigate (150 crew) in December 2006 (Ministerie van Defensie, 2008). The other member states, initially, did not contribute to the reinforcement of the UNIFIL operation.[2]

EUFOR Chad

The idea of deploying a European military operation in Chad was first mentioned in a diplomatic cable of the French ministry of foreign affairs, which was sent to its European counterparts on 21 May 2007 (Mattelaer, 2013: 41). Although the other member states reacted rather unenthusiastically to the French idea, the incoming Portuguese EU Presidency placed the idea on the Council's agenda (Pohl, 2014a: 129). On 23 July, the Council authorized the Council Secretariat to start planning a possible operation in Chad. France volunteered to make its OHQ in Mont Valérien available, which officially gained planning authority on 10 September (Dijkstra, 2010: 398; Mattelaer, 2013: 51). An informal force generation conference was organized at the end of September, but apart from France, no member state offered meaningful contributions (Mattelaer, 2013: 53). This was the beginning of a lengthy force generation process, which required five formal conferences to generate the necessary capabilities. Especially tactical air transport, medical facilities, reconnaissance assets and other logistical support units turned out to be in short supply (Dijkstra, 2010; Pohl, 2014a: 400). Most of these capability gaps were eventually filled in by France during the last force generation conference (Mattelaer, 2013: 63).

The Council formally launched EUFOR Chad on 28 January 2008, which was deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic from March 2008 till March

[1] Greece also participated with a frigate in the IMTF. Denmark deployed a logistics company of 135 between 2009-2011.

[2] The UK did participate in the IMTF; Austria started participating in UNIFIL with around 160 troops in 2011; while an Estonian detachment of 40 troops was integrated in the Finnish contingent in 2015 (Finnish Defence Forces, 2015).

2009 (Mattelaer, 2013: 64). With 3,700 troops, it is the largest autonomous CSDP operation to date (Mattelaer, 2013: 42). The force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1778 and tasked with contributing to the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting the civilian UN force MINURCAT (Mattelaer, 2013: 64). EUFOR Chad was conceived as a one year bridging operation, after which a military UNPO would take over (Styan, 2012: 664).[1]

France was by far the biggest contributor to EUFOR Chad, providing around 1,800 of the 3,700 troops (The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008). Although it initially only wanted to provide one third of the required forces, France hereby accounted for over 50% of the required forces (Dijkstra, 2010: 399; Pohl, 2014a: 134). Poland and Ireland each contributed 400 soldiers (The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008). The Polish and Irish battalion were each responsible for one of the three major operational zones (Mattelaer, 2013: 60). Sweden participated with up to 200 troops, which were deployed in Chad for six months (Pohl, 2014a: 138; The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008). Additionally, it supplied special forces to the initial entry force, which prepared the arrival of the main force (Seibert, 2010: 21). The Austrian contribution comprised 160 troops, including special forces that participated in the initial entry force, logistics experts, and field hospital medical staff (Brettner-Messler, 2008: 86).

Finland contributed around 60 soldiers, which were tasked with force protection and convoy escort (Government of Finland, 2007: 14). Belgium deployed 70 troops, which were responsible for logistics, transport protection and intelligence (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2008). The Netherlands contributed a reconnaissance unit and a logistical element, accounting for around 70 troops (Ministerie van Defensie, 2009: 7). Slovenia participated with 13 troops, while Italy supplied a field hospital with around 105 supporting personnel (Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2009). Spain contributed two C-295 transport aircraft, supported by around 100 crew and maintenance personnel. Portugal and Greece each participated with a C-130 aircraft and, respectively, 30 and 40 accompanying personnel (Gros-Verheyde, 2008b). Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia and the United Kingdom only contributed staff

[1] MINURCAT managed to take over after EUFOR Chad's one-year mandate ended. However, such a handover was anything but guaranteed at the launch of the operation (Dijkstra, 2010: 402-404; Pohl, 2014a: 143).

members to the operation and/or force headquarters; Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta did not participate.[1]

Operation Unified Protector

The Libya crisis began in mid-February 2011, when the (seemingly) successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt inspired protests in the east-Libyan city of Benghazi. Within a few days, rebels had secured control over the city and the revolt spread across the country. The Qaddafi regime, which had been ruling Libya for over forty years, responded with brutal repression. Regime forces managed to push the rebels back and, by 14 March, had started advancing on Benghazi. On 17 March, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 (Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 844-845). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council demanded "the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians" (United Nations Security Council, 2011: 2). Moreover, the resolution authorized the UN member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack, established a no fly zone over Libya, and refined the arms embargo it had imposed in an earlier resolution.

Military action to enforce resolution 1973 began two days after the resolution was adopted (Chivviss, 2015). The operation started as an ad hoc coalition, but NATO took command of the operation ten days after its launch (Chivviss, 2014: 87-88). The central element of "Operation Unified Protector" was an air campaign that targeted the Qaddafi regime's military capabilities. In addition, a maritime operation was deployed to enforce the arms embargo and a small number of special forces provided support to the rebels. In the first days of the operation, Qaddafi's air defence systems were attacked with air- and sea-launched weapons, while coalition air strikes managed to stop the advance of regime forces on Benghazi (Chivviss, 2014: 81). By the end of July, the rebels began advancing on Tripoli, which they entered on 21 August. On 20 October, rebel fighters captured and executed Qaddafi. Eleven days later, NATO officially ended its seven-month military campaign.

The United States dominated the first phase of operation, flying over half of all air sorties and nearly 50% of the strike sorties (Chivviss, 2014: 89). However, Washington reduced its contribution of strike assets after NATO took command and, in result, only flew around 27% of the air sorties during the NATO phase of the

[1] Romania had initially pledged 120 soldiers, but backtracked on this commitment in July 2008 (Gros-Verheyde, 2008a; The European Security and Defence Assembly, 2008).

operation. Although the US kept providing critical military enablers, capability shortfalls caused the operation to slack after the US had reduced its role (Chivviss, 2014: 110-116). At a meeting of NATO's defence ministers on June 9, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates lamented that many of the NATO allies lacked the political will or the military capabilities to participate in the operation. However, he also noted that states like Belgium and Denmark punched well above their weight and made major contributions to the strike missions.

Several member states played an important role in the international response to the crisis in Libya. As the Qaddafi regime cracked down on the protesters, French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Cameron became the leading voices in favour of military intervention (Chivviss, 2014: 34-37; Davidson, 2013). After the adoption of resolution 1973, several member states made vital military contributions to the operation. France was one of the major contributors to the intervention (Davidson, 2013). It participated with more than 40 aircraft, 30 helicopters and a dozen warships in the intervention (Grand, 2015: 191; Willett, 2012: IX). French aircraft flew nearly 5,600 sorties, accounting for 25% of the total sorties, 35% of the offensive missions and 20% of the air strikes. French attack helicopters provided close combat support to Libyan rebels and French ships participated in the enforcement of the naval embargo, fired at land targets and conducted reconnaissance missions (Chivviss, 2014: 126-130; Grand, 2015: 198). A limited number of French special forces was deployed to support rebel fighters and collect intelligence (Chivviss, 2014: 155). The UK deployed 37 aircraft in the operation (Chivviss, 2015: 14; Davidson, 2013: 320). These flew over 3,000 sorties, more than 2,000 of which were strike sorties (Taylor & Smith, 2011: 24). British fighter jets hereby achieved around 11% of the overall sorties and 20% of the strike sorties. The UK also deployed five Apache attack helicopters and had special forces on the ground. Additionally, British vessels participated in the naval embargo, launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at regime capabilities, and played a central role in mine clearance (Davidson, 2013: 321; Goulter, 2015: 182; Willett, 2012).

Italy initially tried to maintain its longstanding relationship with the Qaddafi regime, but eventually made a significant military contribution to the operation that ended its 42-year rule of Libya (Lombardi, 2011: 31). Italian fighter jets were first not authorized to bomb ground targets, but these restrictions were lifted at the end of April (Alegi, 2015: 221). Italian aircraft achieved around 10 per cent of the strike missions during the NATO phase of the operation (Chivviss, 2014: 90). Italy also made seven bases available for the operation, which supported around 200 aircraft throughout the operations (Alegi, 2015: 206). Moreover, it participated with sixteen

warships and two submarines in the naval operations and had special forces in Libya (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015: 8; Chivviss, 2014: 155). Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands participated with six F16 fighter jets, each flying around 600 sorties (Anrig, 2015: 301). While Belgian and Danish F16s participated in strike operations, Dutch fighter jets were not authorized to conduct air-to-ground strikes. Belgium and the Netherlands also deployed two minesweepers in the naval operations (Johnson & Mueen, 2012: X). Sweden participated with eight Griffin aircraft (Egnell, 2015). Swedish jets flew tactical reconnaissance missions and patrolled the no-fly zone, but were not allowed to strike ground targets. Spain contributed to the air operations with two support planes and four F18 fighter jets, which did not participate in strike operations (Dicke et al., 2013: 42; Johnson & Mueen, 2012: xi). Additionally, It supplied two submarines and three frigates to the naval operations and made two air bases available. Greece contributed one Embraer EMB-145H, which flew 173 early warning missions; participated with one frigate in the naval operations, and made two air bases available (Johnson & Mueen, 2012). Bulgaria and Romania each participated with one frigate in the naval operations. Aside from their membership in NATO, none of the other EU member states were involved in military operations in Libya.

Operation Inherent Resolve

The origin of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is generally situated in the aftermath of the 2003 US intervention in Iraq, when al-Zarqawi declared his allegiance to Bin Laden and changed the name of his "Jama'at al-Tawhidw'al-Jihad"-group to "al Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) (Cronin, 2015: 89; Laub & Masters, 2015). The death of Zarqawi in 2006 and the reconciliation of Sunni tribes with Iraq's central government significantly weakened AQI, which rebranded itself to the "Islamic State of Iraq" and later, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) (Laub & Masters, 2015). Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIL benefited from the Syrian civil war and came to dominate territory in Syria's northeast. In Iraq, it took advantage of the weakness of the central Maliki government, which had alienated Shiite Arabs by pursuing a divisive pro-Sunni agenda. ISIL captured the Iraqi cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in January 2014, and, by the end of June, had begun moving towards Bagdad (Cronin, 2015: 89).

Meanwhile, an estimated number of 15,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters had travelled to Syria, a large share of which is thought to have joined IS (Lister, 2014: 94; Zelin, 2013). The vast majority of recruits came from the Arab world, but according

to estimates of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), almost 4,000 foreign fighters had travelled from Western European countries to Syria and Iraq by the second half of 2014 (Neumann, 2015).[1] In May 2014, a returned foreign fighter linked to IS killed four people at the entrance of the Jewish museum in Brussels. This was the first of a number of terrorist plots linked to IS, including the November 2015 Paris attacks and the March 2016 Brussels bombings (Hegghammer & Nesser, 2015: 32; Schmidt & Tinnes, 2015).

The US launched its first air strikes against the Islamic State on 8 August 2014, after IS forces began to pose an immediate threat to the Kurdish capital Erbil and created a humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq by carrying out horrific attacks on Christian and Yezidi towns (Stansfield, 2014: 1337-1338; Zapfe, 2014: 2). Strike operations were initially limited to Iraq, but on 23 September the US also started carrying out air strikes over Syria. Unlike the Iraqi government, the Syrian regime did not consent to the operation. Since there was no UN Security Council mandate for the operation, this raises serious questions about the legality of the airstrikes over Syria. The US air strikes against IS, code-named "Operation Inherent Resolve", started as a unilateral intervention. Towards the end of August, the Obama administration began mobilizing a broad coalition of allies (Landler & Cooper, 2014). At the time of writing in February 2016, this "global coalition to degrade and defeat ISIL" consists of sixty-six partners, but only twelve of these have actually participated in offensive air operations (U.S. Department of State, 2016). As a result, the US carried out almost 8,000 of the 10,000 air strikes (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016).

Except for Malta, all EU member states are listed as members of the anti-IS coalition. At the time of writing, only five have participated in the strike operations. France was the first country to join the US in conducting air strikes (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015: 12). The French "Opération Chammal" deploys fifteen to twenty fighter jets, a refuelling plane and a maritime patrol aircraft (Howorth, 2015). Between February and April 2015, and again starting from November 2015, France also deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the region, with an additional twenty-six fighter aircraft (McInnis, 2015: 4). Initially restricting its participation to

[1] Estimates of the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria vary considerably and have continued to rise since the start of the military operation against IS (Schmidt & Tinnes, 2015). In December 2015, Schmidt and Tinnes (2015: 27) estimate that the foreign fighters from Europe and other Western democracies number between 5,000 and 7,000.

Iraq, France started conducting airstrikes in Syria on 27 September 2015 (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015: 12). By January 2016, French aircraft had flown 2,839 sorties and conducted almost 400 airstrikes (Etat-major des armées, 2016). In addition, France provides around 200 military advisors to train Kurdish and Iraqi forces. The British parliament voted in favour of air strikes in Iraq in September 2014 (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015: 27-42). The UK initially participated with eight Tornado jets, one air-to-air refuelling and surveillance aircraft and an unspecified number of Reaper drones. In December 2015, air operations were extended to Syria and the UK deployed eight additional combat jets. By the end of 2015, the UK had conducted 1,632 sorties, including 380 airstrikes. The UK also deployed a training contingent of 275 personnel in Iraq.

Belgium participated in the airstrikes on IS in Iraq from September 2014 till July 2015 (Lievens, 2015). Six Belgian F16s conducted 796 sorties, 163 of which resulted in airstrikes. Belgium also deploys 45 instructors to train Iraqi forces. Since October 2014, the Netherlands has participated with between six and eight F16 fighter jets in the strike operations over Iraq (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015). In February 2016, Dutch F16s also started conducting strike operations in Syria. Moreover, the Netherlands deploys 130 officials to train local forces. Denmark deployed seven F16s, which conducted airstrikes over Iraq between October 2014 and October 2015, and up to 120 troops to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces.

Six member states have made non-offensive contributions to the fight against IS. Since October 2014, Italy has deployed four aircraft for reconnaissance and surveillance, one refuelling aircraft, and a contingent of up to 350 personnel to train local security forces (McInnis, 2015: 14). German paratroopers have been training Kurdish Peshmerga forces since October 2014 (Mills, Smith & Brooke-Holland, 2015: 17). On 5 December 2015, the German Parliament authorized the deployment of 6 Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, refuelling aircraft, and up to 1,200 military personnel. Sweden, Finland, Portugal and Spain have contributed to the training of Iraqi and/or Kurdish forces (McInnis, 2015: 14). At the time of writing, the other member states have not participated in the military operations against IS.

Conclusion

The member states' contributions to each of the five operations varied considerably. While some EU member states made significant contributions, others did not contribute in any way to many of the operations under investigation. The latter is especially striking given the capability shortfalls that hampered the planning and course of the five operations. The planning process of EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad suffered from force generation problems, which can to a large extent be attributed to the reluctance of the member states to commit forces to the operations. Likewise, capability shortfalls caused the Libyan air campaign to slack after the US had reduced its role. Moreover, the infamous goodbye address of Robert Gates made clear that there was pressure on several member states to start participating in or augment their contribution to the operation. Similarly, as of the end of 2015, US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter has argued on several occasions that many members of "our so-called coalition" against IS have not been doing enough, that he had hoped the European countries would "do more than they had done so far" and that "all the Europeans" needed to contribute to the fight against IS (Agence-France Presse, 2016). Given these capability shortfalls and explicit requests for increased European participation, the disproportionately low contribution of many member states to the operations under investigations cannot be straightforwardly attributed to a lack of demand for additional contributions, which makes them especially relevant cases for the purpose of this dissertation.

4

Methodology and Research Design

The empirical analyses presented in this study are based on Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA refers both to a research approach and a set of analytical techniques. This section starts by concisely introducing the main features of QCA and justifying the choice for this method. This is followed by a brief discussion of the three QCA-variants that are applied in the articles and an introduction of the main steps of the QCA-procedure. The final section elaborates on more general research choices.

Main Features of QCA

QCA was originally developed by Ragin (1987: 83-85) as a middle way between case-oriented (or qualitative) and variable-oriented (or quantitative) approaches to comparative research. In line with quantitative approaches, QCA allows researchers to compare "more than a few cases", arrive at parsimonious explanations, and produce (modest) generalizations (Ragin, 1987: 83-84; Rihoux, 2003: 352-356; Rihoux & Marx, 2013: 168). Moreover, results produced with QCA are based on rigorous and replicable analytical techniques. QCA also embodies some key characteristics of qualitative, case-oriented approaches. First of all, each individual case is examined as a complex whole, as a specific combination of an outcome and plausible explanatory conditions. Second, in contrast to variable-oriented approaches, QCA does not examine the average effect of independent variables (Mello, 2014: 50). Instead, it aims to identify the specific (combinations of) conditions under which an outcome occurs.

QCA is geared towards establishing set-theoretic connections between one case property, defined as the outcome, and other properties, defined as the causal conditions (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010: 380). As extensively demonstrated by Ragin (2000: 203-260; 2008: 13-28) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 56-91), set-relations are intimately linked to the notions of sufficiency and necessity. A condition is sufficient if the outcome is always present when this condition is present. In consequence, a set defined by a sufficient condition constitutes a subset of the set defined by the outcome. Inversely, a condition is necessary if it is always present when the outcome is present. Therefore, a set defined by a necessary

condition constitutes a superset of the set defined by the outcome. The distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions suggests a complex conception of causal relations, generally referred to as "multiple conjunctural causation" (Rihoux, 2003: 353). Multiple causation or equifinality implies that there are several paths towards the same outcome, conjunctural indicates that these paths consist of combinations of conditions. Multiple conjunctural causation thus suggests that multiple combinations of conditions can be sufficient for a given outcome. As a set-theoretic method, QCA is particularly apt to unravel these types of complex causal relations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77).

The present research builds on QCA to examine which combinations of conditions are consistently linked to (large) military commitments. QCA was preferred over other methods because there are good reasons to believe that contributions to military operations result from complex causal relations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 276). In line with the notion of equifinality, member states can contribute to operations for different, mutually non-exclusive, reasons. While some member states might participate because they have close relations with the target of the intervention, others can decide to contribute because they are situated close to the area of operations, and still others because they believe it is necessary to continue receiving the benefits produced by their strong relationship with the US. In line with the notion of conjunctural causation, these incentives might only lead to contributions in the absence of institutional constraints or upcoming elections.

A secondary, more pragmatic, reason for using QCA is that it is one of the few methods that is able to systematically compare an intermediate number of cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 12). In contrast to case-oriented approaches, QCA's analytical techniques allow for a rigorous, replicable analysis of the contributions of all member states. Unlike quantitative methods, QCA allows to examine the member states' contributions to each operation in a separate analysis. Given the considerable differences between the operations, this constitutes a significant advantage over analytical techniques that require larger datasets (Mello, 2014: 49). A downside of conducting a separate analysis of each operation is that this makes it more difficult to arrive at clear conclusions on the pattern of contributions across the five operations. Section 4.3 elaborates on how this dissertation deals with this trade-off between accounting for the significant differences between the operations and producing results that apply across the five operations.

Variants, Instruments and Main Steps of QCA

QCA is an umbrella term that entails different analytical techniques (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 13-16). The three main QCA-variants are crisp set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) and multi-value QCA (mvQCA). The crisp set version of QCA operates on conventional sets, in which an element is either present or absent. In consequence, variables can only be assigned a score of 1 (variable present) or 0 (variable absent). This constitutes an important limitation of csQCA, since many social science concepts vary by level or degree. Ragin (2000) addressed this shortcoming by introducing the more sophisticated fuzzy set version of QCA. Membership scores in fuzzy sets can fall anywhere between full membership (value of 1) and full non-membership (value of 0), depending on the degree to which a variable is present in a given case. The qualitative status of a case depends on its position towards the 0.5 anchor, which indicates whether a variable is either more present or more absent in a given case.

Multi-value QCA is capable of processing multiple-category variables (Cronqvist, 2003; Cronqvist & Berg-Schlosser, 2009). In mvQCA, each category of a multichotomous variable is represented by a natural number. In contrast to fuzzy membership scores, these values do not represent the extent to which a condition is present in a given case, but rather whether a specific category of a condition is present (Haesebrouck, 2016a: 3). Several leading methodologists have taken a sceptical stance on the added value of mvQCA and question its status as a set-theoretic method (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 258-263; Vink & van Vliet, 2009; Vink & van Vliet, 2013). However, recent work of Thiem (2013; 2014: 315; 2015) provides convincing arguments that mvQCA is a valuable technique for comparative analysis, which should not be regarded as a QCA-variant "of doubtful set-theoretic status".

The choice between these three QCA-variants mainly depends on the nature of the conditions and the outcome. fsQCA should generally be preferred over csQCA, since fuzzy sets contain more information than crisp sets. However, fsQCA cannot be applied if the phenomenon under investigation presents itself in a dichotomous form, since a binary outcome cannot be integrated into this QCA variant (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 277). mvQCA is preferable when dealing with categorical base-variables or when the intermediate category of a condition can have a different impact than both its full presence and its full absence (Haesebrouck, 2016a). Finally, a more pragmatic reason to use mvQCA is that multichotomous conditions can be combined with binary outcomes. In consequence, mvQCA

provides a strategy to preserve some of the variation of continuous base-variables if the concept under investigation presents itself in dichotomous form.

Notwithstanding their differences, the three main QCA-variants basically follow the same steps. First, the researcher has to construct a data table, in which each case is assigned a value on the conditions and the outcome. This process is called calibration. In csQCA, every case is assigned a score of 0 or 1, depending on whether the variable is absent or present. In fsQCA, cases are assigned a score that ranges from 0 to 1, depending on the degree to which the variable is present. In mvQCA, each case is assigned the natural number that represents the category of the variable that applies to the case.

Subsequently, the empirical evidence for necessity and sufficiency can be assessed. Two parameters are used to evaluate both types of causal relations: consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms sufficiency or necessity, the latter reflects the relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency approaches unity as the data provides stronger support for sufficiency or necessity, coverage does so as a sufficient or necessary condition becomes more relevant.

The analysis of sufficiency is based on the "Truth Table Algorithm" (Ragin, 2008: 124-144). A truth table contains a row for every possible combination of conditions. Each case is attributed to the row corresponding to the specific combination that characterises the case. Generally, not all logically possible combinations of conditions correspond to empirical cases. In consequence, a truth table usually contains rows without empirical cases, which are called logical remainders. Attributing cases to truth table rows is relatively straightforward in csQCA and mvQCA, since the values that can be assigned to the cases are represented in the truth table. The fsQCA-procedure is somewhat more complicated, since fsQCA builds on a binary truth table, but allows for every possible membership score between 0 and 1. In fsQCA, assigning cases to truth table rows first requires calculating the cases' membership scores in the combinations of conditions with logical AND. Cases can have partial membership scores in several rows, but their membership score will only exceed 0.5 in one row. Since the latter signals that a case is a good instance of the corresponding combination, the cases are attributed to this row. After each case has been attributed to a truth table row, an outcome value is assigned to the rows that include empirical cases. A row is assigned a score of 1 if it corresponds to a sufficient combination. The extent to which the empirical data confirms the sufficiency of a truth table row can be assessed with the

consistency measure, but also depends on the type of cases that violate the statement of sufficiency (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 278-279).

Once every row is assigned an outcome value, Boolean Algebra is used to minimize the truth table. Minimization involves removing redundant conditions from the solution. Depending on the logical remainders that are incorporated in the minimization procedure, Boolean minimization can result in different types of solutions (Ragin, 2008: 145-177). First, the complex (or conservative solution) results if no remainders are incorporated. Second, the parsimonious solution results if all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated. This solution only includes the conditions that distinguish truth table rows that correspond to sufficient combinations from those that do not. In consequence, "the ingredients from the parsimonious solution can be considered the core causal factors" (Ragin & Fiss, 2008: 202). Finally, minimization results in the intermediate formula if only the remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated. Conditions added in this solution can only be removed using difficult counterfactuals: assumptions about logical remainders that are at odds with theoretical or substantive knowledge. In line with the suggestion of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 279), most QCA applications focus on the latter solution. However, Baumgartner (2015: 840) recently demonstrated that intermediate solution formulas cannot be causally interpreted, and argues that resource must be made to the parsimonious formula if QCA is applied to test causal hypotheses (Baumgartner, 2015: 854).

Research Design and Structure

This dissertation aims to arrive at general conclusions on the determinants of member state contributions across the five operations under investigation. However, there are substantial differences between the goals, mandates, size, strategy and intensity of the five operations. This makes it difficult to compare the member states' contributions across the selected operations, let alone arrive at a parsimonious explanation that applies to all five cases.

First of all, each operation required different types of military contributions. While Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve deployed fighter jets that carried out offensive air operations; EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and UNIFIL II mainly consisted of ground forces that carried out peacekeeping tasks. Moreover, the size of the operations varies considerably. By contributing 400 troops, Ireland and Poland were the second and third largest contributors to EUFOR Chad. In contrast, the top three contributors to UNIFIL II all deployed over a 1,000 troops

in the area of operations. Given these differences, comparing the member states' contributions across the selected operations seems somewhat like comparing apples and oranges (Berg-Schlosser & de Meur, 2009: 20). At the very least, it requires an outcome-variable that can be applied to each of these operations, which necessarily results in a substantial loss of information.

On top of that, several of the explanations discussed in the literature review are not equally plausible for all five operations. Alliance value, for example, is a plausible explanatory condition for the air strikes against IS, but not for the reinforcement of UNIFIL or the two CSDP operations. Conversely, contributions to the latter operations might be related to a state's tradition of participating in UNPOs, which is unlikely to have an impact on the air operations over Libya and against IS. Similarly, spatial proximity might explain the varying contributions to the air campaign over Libya, which was deployed in the EU's immediate vicinity, but is unlikely to matter for more distant operations like EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. Likewise, other direct incentives, like foreign fighters and trade ties, cannot be expected to have an (equal) impact on contributions to all five operations. Moreover, given the substantial differences in size, intensity and perceived legitimacy of the operations, domestic-level conditions like electoral distance and parliamentary involvement cannot be assumed to have the same impact across the operations. Likewise, partisan differences might be less relevant for a small crisis management operation like EUFOR Congo than offensive air campaigns like Operations Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve.

Given these substantial differences, the operations might be too dissimilar to compare in a single analysis (Mello, 2014: 8). As argued above, one of the reasons for using QCA is that it allows one to conduct a separate analysis of each operation and thus take the cross-case differences into account. Unfortunately, this will reduce the coherence of the study and make it even more difficult to arrive at clear conclusions on the determinants of member state contributions across the five operations. The study aims to strike a balance between accounting for the cross-case differences and arriving at coherent cross-case conclusions. It primarily focusses on comparing the member states' contributions within each operation. However, to increase the coherence and the generalizability of this study's results, a final analysis compares the member states' contributions across all five operations. The analyses are presented in five articles. The first article, co-authored with Alrik Thiem, examines the varying military commitments to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. These operations share enough background characteristics to compare the member states' contributions in a single analysis (Styan, 2012: 656). More specifically, both

operations were deployed in Sub-Sahara Africa, under the aegis of the CSDP and in support of a UNPO. Each of the subsequent three articles focusses on a single military operation, respectively the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, the 2011 air campaign over Libya and the airstrikes against IS. Finally, the fifth article examines the pattern of contributions across the five operations.

Every article has a similar objective, i.e. explaining contributions to military operations, and builds on the same analytical technique, QCA. Nevertheless, a number of differences between these articles, related to condition selection, operationalization and case-selection, requires further explanation.

First, there are differences in the explanatory conditions that are tested in each article. The literature review resulted in an abundant number of plausible explanatory conditions. This constituted a challenge to the present research, given that the number of conditions in a QCA should be kept at a moderate level (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 276).[1] The theoretical frameworks of the articles include the conditions that were expected to be most relevant for the examined operation(s), based on empirical knowledge of these operations and conclusions of the relevant literature. In line with the iterative logic of QCA, the selection of conditions was subject to change throughout the research (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 14). Based on the results of preliminary analyses, conditions were dropped and added to the theoretical models in order to arrive at the model that best explained the variation in the outcome. In consequence, the first four articles do not test the relevance of every plausible explanatory condition. This provided an additional reason to conduct the last analysis, which tests the explanatory value of the conditions across all operations. To reduce the number of conditions included in the QCA, the fifth article applies a systematic technique for condition selection: MDSO/MSDO (De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1994).

A second difference between the articles is related to the operationalization of the conditions and the outcome. To account for the differences between the types of

[1] Depending on the quantity and diversity of the selected cases, four to seven conditions can be included in a QCA (Berg-Schlosser & de Meur, 2009: 28). Two of the articles of the second part of this dissertation apply a strategy to increase the number of conditions in the analysis. In the first article, a large number of analyses is conducted with different combinations of conditions, from which the best-fitting models are distilled and interpreted. The second article applies two-step QCA, which allows to take into account a greater number of conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006). Nevertheless, even these articles do not take into account every single condition.

military contributions that were deployed in the examined operations, different outcome-indicators were used across the articles. EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and UNIFIL II mainly required ground forces. Therefore, the outcome of the first three articles is based on an indicator that primarily focusses on the number of contributed troops, relativized by an indicator that reflects the member states' capability to carry this contribution. The most important difference between the member states' contributions to Operation Unified Protector was whether or not they participated in the air operations, and if so, whether their fighter jets were allowed to attack ground targets. Therefore, the membership scores in the outcome of the fourth article are based on this qualitative difference. The variation in contributions to the operation against IS was best captured by a dichotomous variable, since there were no important differences between the member states that carried out air strikes. Finally, the fifth article required an outcome-variable that could be applied to the five operations. Therefore, a binary outcome was used, which straightforwardly reflects whether or not a state participated in the operation.

A last difference between the articles is related to the population of cases examined in the presented analyses. While the first, second and fifth article focus exclusively on the member states, the third and fourth article also include other states. The motivation for widening the population of the latter two articles is twofold. First of all, both articles are situated in a specific strand of academic research. The third article is situated in the scholarly literature on NATO burden sharing, the fourth in the academic debate on democratic peace. In order to increase the inferential leverage for the main hypotheses of these strands of academic research, the population of these studies respectively include all NATO allies and all relevant democratic members of the coalition against IS. A second, more opportunistic, reason for widening the population is that examining a larger number of cases was expected to make the articles more publishable. To preserve the coherence of this study's conclusions, the final article presents empirical tests that focus exclusively on the member states' contributions to each of the selected operations.

Part 2

Articles

5

Article 1: Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Status: in co-authorship with Alrik Thiem and currently under review in *Foreign Policy Analysis*

Abstract

Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, money and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU member states have carried higher shares of the burden of CSDP operations than others is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. Employing a two-stage design, we address this gap by analyzing determinants of divergent levels of contributions to CSDP operations. First, we identify a joint-product model to be the best description of burden-sharing patterns. Second, and on the basis of this finding, we conduct configurational analyses of factors hypothesized to influence these patterns. Our results indicate that EU countries contribute in positive disproportion with their capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. In contrast, they undercontribute in the absence of large trade volumes with the area of operations and a strong peacekeeping tradition.

Introduction

Military burden sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and *ad hoc* coalitions has long been a subject of intense debates among political scientists and economists. In particular, questions of contribution equitability in terms of men, money and materiel have produced a rich body of literature to date.[1] However, as far as the group of international organizations is concerned, NATO and the UN are not the only game in town anymore. In the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the European Union (EU) concluded an ambitious security and defense roadmap that has developed by now into its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).[2] After almost two decades of fits and starts, the CSDP, eventually, "is no longer an aspiration; it is a reality" (Council of the European Union, 2009).

No less a reality is the fact that the CSDP has regularly experienced serious difficulties in staffing its military operations. Given the multitude of strains contributors have to cope with, the recurrence of burden-sharing problems may not be surprising. Nevertheless, some EU member states did contribute more than proportionately to CSDP operations, whereas others' input was unexpectedly meager, and still others' contributions commensurate with their capabilities. How can these patterns be explained? In contrast to the sizeable number of studies on burden sharing in NATO, the UN and *ad hoc* coalitions, previous attempts at answering this question for the case of the CSDP have tended to stop at the stage of empirical exploration. This lack of knowledge constitutes a major gap in the literature on European defense cooperation, not least because appropriate contributions have been considered decisive by the EU itself in realizing its ambition

[1] For comprehensive reviews of the literatures on NATO and *ad hoc* coalition burden sharing, see Sandler (1993) and Oma (2012). To our knowledge, no separate reviews of UN peacekeeping operations exist, but major works that include the UN are Bove and Elia (2011), Gaibulloev, Sandler and Shimizu (2009), Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1998), Lebovic (2004) and Shimizu and Sandler (2002)

[2] The *European Security and Defense Policy* has been renamed to *Common Security and Defense Policy* in the Treaty of Lisbon. The new name is used throughout this article.

to act as an effective crisis manager of global reach across the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks.[1]

In this article, we provide the first systematic analysis of military burden sharing within the CSDP on the basis of operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR.[2] The theoretical component of our analysis is informed by collective action theory and integrated regularity theories of military burden sharing. While traditional variants of collective action theory regard the provision of defense as a non-excludable and non-rival good, joint product models allow for the presence of private products. We provide evidence for the appropriateness of a joint product model but, in contrast to studies on NATO, the UN and *ad hoc* coalitions, our results show that larger states have occasionally ridden cheap on the contributions of smaller ones. Across operations and different indicators, however, the hypothesis that either group has benefitted at the other's expense cannot be corroborated.

Integrated regularity theories of military burden sharing combine domestic and international factors to provide more accurate explanations, and they posit implicational instead of covariational relations between these factors and military contributions (Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994). We not only draw on integrated theories to accommodate joint products that have been shown to matter to their beneficiaries on different levels of analysis in previous work, but we also base our model on a logic of implicational regularity as outcomes are analyzed through complex co-occurrences of conditions. We find that contributions are insufficient when trade volumes with the area of operations are small and a country's peacekeeping tradition is weak, when competing deployments are significant, or when public support is low. In contrast, large trade volumes matter to states for contributing in proportion with their capabilities, unless they simultaneously face a combination of competing deployments, significant parliamentary powers, high budget constraints, nearby elections and a left-leaning executive. Lastly, relatively large contributions result when a strong peacekeeping tradition combines with a large election distance.

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[1] The Petersberg tasks include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

[2] EUFOR RD Congo will be abbreviated to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad/CAR to EUFOR Chad.

The article is structured around four parts. In the first section, we justify our operation selection criteria, define the target population, introduce the study's research design, and mention our data sources. In the second section, we first analyze the distribution of burden shares to ascertain the most appropriate model of collective action theory. On this basis, we develop the theoretical component underlying the second stage of the analysis in the third section. Subsequently, the operationalization and calibration of the variables is discussed in the fourth section. In the fifth and final section, the results are presented and interpreted before we recapitulate the argument in the conclusions.

Operation and Country Selection Criteria, Method and Data

Despite its short lifespan, the CSDP has already experienced difficulties in staffing its military operations. Before troops can be deployed, agreement about the designation of leading positions and issues of force generation is required. Two operations afflicted by problems in this regard were EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The former was officially launched on 12 June 2006 and primarily charged with protecting civilians and supporting MONUC; the latter on 28 January 2008 with the main objective of creating a secure environment for 170,000 displaced persons and 240,000 refugees from Darfur, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting personnel of the UN's civilian mission MINURCAT.[1]

Our analysis focuses on EUFORs Congo and Chad because the other five EU military operations involving the deployment of ground forces exhibited three characteristics that justify their exclusion.[2] First, operations Concordia, EUTM Somalia and the EU support mission to AMIS demanded only token commitments.[3] Second, operation Artemis followed a request by the UN which was filed only after Jacques Chirac had assured Kofi Annan that France would lead the operation, long before the issue was raised within the CSDP. Third and finally, operation Althea took over from NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR), 80% of whose personnel were already European. As most EU contributors remained in Bosnia, their soldiers merely replaced SFOR by EUFOR insignia (Keohane, 2009: 214). Hence, it follows

[1] A detailed description of these burden-sharing problems is provided in the appendix.

[2] We focus on ground-troop missions because all member states possess the capabilities to contribute, unlike the naval assets required for EU NAVFOR Atalanta, for example.

[3] Military personnel in Concordia was 350, in EUTM - a military training mission for Somali security forces- 45, and in the EU support mission to AMIS only 17.

that EUFORs Congo and Chad were the only two missions in which governments had to decide on new commitments of a non-trivial size.

The target population of the analysis is given by all EU member states that have been formal parties to the CSDP at the time of the Council decision officially launching an operation, and that could have contributed to one or both operations. These criteria exclude Denmark due to its opt-out from the CSDP and external contributors such as Albania, Russia and Turkey. As Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, they enter the target population as potential contributors only for EUFOR Chad. In sum, 24 member states could have contributed to EUFOR Congo, 26 to EUFOR Chad.

Methodologically, we employ an innovative two-stage, multi-method approach. In the first phase, we ascertain whether the public good or the joint product model is the more appropriate variant of collective action theory by means of non-parametric rank tests. Informed by the results of these tests, we import a set of nine purported determinants of burden sharing from previous work on burden sharing. Drawing all possible subsets of these factors of a constant cardinality that are consistent with the results of the first phase, we identify the best fitting among all competing models in the second phase. Identification is achieved by employing a generalization of multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), an as yet rarely used technique in configurational comparative research.[1] Detailed descriptions of our data sources, base variables, target factors and calibration procedures are provided in the article's appendix.

Burden sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Contributions to military operations create a variety of burdens. For instance, sustaining soldiers and equipment in the area of operations may strain defense budgets, particularly those of smaller states. While EUFOR Congo's price tag was relatively small at about €100m, EUFOR Chad already cost its participants €1bn (Helly, 2009: 339). Not to be underestimated, either, are the political risks military operations in far-flung areas create. Political leaders have to justify to their constituencies why soldiers' lives are put in danger, and at their country's own cost at that. Virtue may be its own reward, at best, electoral punishment at worst,

[1] For more details on mvQCA, see Thiem (2013). To our knowledge, the only study so far that has made use of QCA in the context of European security and defense cooperation is Thiem (2011).

especially when the benefits of an operation are not immediately visible or when it is perceived at home as a failure. Participating states may also incur image costs by provoking negative international reactions. These ramifications are further aggravated if a state occupies the limelight by assuming leadership positions (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 22).[1]

In this section, we analyze the distribution of burdens in order to test whether CSDP military operations follow a public good rather a joint product model of collective action theory.[2] In brief, the former builds on Olson and Zeckhauser's (1966) economic theory of alliances, at whose core are the so-called "exploitation hypothesis", which predicts that the larger countries will shoulder much of the burden for the smaller ones, and the "suboptimality hypothesis", which says that the provision level of a public good will be too low. The joint product model has been introduced as an alternative, more general approach to understanding collective action, which it assumes to be driven by a mix of purely public, impurely public and private goods. When only private goods matter, the level of provision will be optimal and no cheap-riding occurs. With exclusively purely public goods, the model degenerates to the classical public good model.

Studies suggest that international peacekeeping and crisis management operations, if not financially or militarily coordinated by a central authority, follow the public good model (e.g. Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 794; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009: 849; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 665). Testing which one of the two models provides a better fit is important insofar as the subsequent identification of explanatory factors closely hinges on the distributional pattern of burden shares. At least with respect to the issue of suboptimality, the public good model seems more applicable since the optimal number of troops that was requested by the operations commander in EUFOR Chad had to be cut by about 20% for lack of sufficient pledges. Yet, the more important question is whether the exploitation hypothesis also holds.

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[1] For example, some high-ranking officials in the German defense ministry privately feared that if Germany took on the leading role in EUFOR Congo and the mission would fail for reasons of insufficient strength, they would have to endure Washington's scornful laughter (Von Szandar, 2006).

[2] We do not summarize the tenets of either model herein as this has been done in previous work. See Hartley and Sandler (1999: 666-668); Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1998: 181-183); Sandler (1993: 448-474), Sandler and Murdoch (2000: 300-304), Shimizu and Sandler (2002: 655-657) and Shimizu and Sandler (2010: 1480-1481).

For assessing the distribution of military burden, three variables are relevant: the indicator that operationalizes the burden, the indicator used to relativize the burden measure, and the method employed in testing their relation. Notwithstanding that different measures and methods have led to partly conflicting evidence, a high degree of concept-indicator consistency should be of primary importance. Following Beeres and Boger's (2012: 4-7) two-tiered production process framework of armed forces performance, we situate burden sharing in CSDP military operations at the input side of the crisis response sub-process, focusing on the number of deployed units. The number of sustained units is irrelevant because both operations had a clear mandate known and adhered to by all participants.

Under the EU framework of CSDP rules established in 2004, only certain "common costs" are paid for out of the central budget provided by the Athena mechanism, but all other costs related to the operation, usually about 90%, are borne by the individual states in the form of their actual contributions. Unlike in the case of UN peacekeeping operations, we can therefore be confident that the size of a deployed contingent in a certain troop category mirrors a state's financial contribution. Although troop numbers and financial contributions have been the most widely-used indicators, an increasing number of scholars have begun to criticize these measures as deficient (Beeres & Bogers, 2012: 13-14; Oma, 2012: 570). Three further aspects have stood out: risk exposure, headship responsibility and mission duration.

Unequal risk exposure rates are experienced by different unit types (*UT*). Thus, we complement the baseline dimension of troop numbers (*TN*) by distinguishing between staff, medical, logistic and combat unit-dominated contingents on a risk exposure dimension.[1] On the dimension of headship responsibility, we take into account whether a country took on a leading role (*LR*) on the strategic or tactical level by providing the chief or deputy operations commander or/and the chief or deputy force commander. Filling either of these posts places a considerable burden on governments because if things go awry, the blame is quickly laid on them. An operation's mandate (*OM*) feeds into the size of the burden on the dimension of mission duration. Arguably, the longer troops have to be sustained, the

[1] See the appendix for details. In the context of the Iraq War, Mello (2012) also takes account of the deployment phase. This criterion is irrelevant for our purposes because the only major situation of a late deployment or an early redeployment occurred when Sweden pulled most its troops out of EUFOR Chad before the end of the mandate.

larger the burden that has to be carried, not least because mission-bound contingents cannot be earmarked for parallel, possibly more urgent operations elsewhere.[1]

So as to allow for variability in dimension significance, a two-component weighting scheme is applied. The contribution component captures the quantity as well as the quality of the burden, while the time component accounts for the period over which this burden is carried. So as to reflect their importance, troop numbers enter the contribution component at 60%, unit types at 30% and leadership roles at 10%. On the unit-type dimension, we assign different risk exposure coefficients: 4 for combat units; 3 for logistic units, 2 for medical units and 1 for staff. With respect to headship responsibility, the coefficients are 2.5 if a country provided the operations or force commander and the deputy operations or deputy force commander, 2 if it provided either the operations or force commander, 1.5 if it provided the deputy operations or deputy force commander, and 1 otherwise.[2] The time component uses a unit weighting because mission duration as its only dimension is already measured by the relative mandate of the mission set. The size of the burden each country i carries in mission set M of k missions with n internal contributors is then given by Equation (1):

$$BU_{i,M}=\sum_{j=1}^{k}\frac{OM_m}{\sum_{j=1}^{k}OM_j}\left(\frac{TN_i^{\alpha_1}UT_i^{\alpha_2}LR_i^{\alpha_3}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n+e}TN_i^{\alpha_1}UT_i^{\alpha_2}LR_i^{\alpha_3}}\right), \quad (1)$$

where α_1, α_2 and α_3 are the respective dimension weights, and e is a correction factor for external contributors.[3] In line with previous studies on military burden sharing, we compute Kendall rank coefficients (τ) to test the following null hypothesis (H_0) against its two-sided alternative (H_A):[4]

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[1] We use the official start of the mandate as stipulated in the Council Joint Actions rather than the date of initial or full operational capability since troop mobilization and transportation already add to a country's burden.

[2] Other schemes may be applied but we consider the present one a realistic baseline.

[3] Turkey contributed 16 troops to EUFOR Congo, Albania and Russia 130 troops to EUFOR Chad.

[4] Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009), Khanna and Sandler (1996), Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1998), Shimizu and Sandler (2002), Shimizu and Sandler (2010) and Siegel (2009).

H_0: The relative burden resulting for a state from its contribution to a CSDP mission set is commensurate with its relative capability to carry it.

H_A: The relative burden resulting for a state from its contribution to a CSDP mission set is incommensurate with its relative capability to carry it.

We use the three most common relativity indicators of a country's capabilities: its share of total GDP, its share of the total population, and its share of an equally weighted percentage average of the former two. Table 1 reports simple as well as partial τs for each mission set. For the latter, the share of armed forces personnel is held constant. Positive coefficients indicate distributions to the disadvantage of larger states, negative coefficients distributions to the disadvantage of smaller states. Substantively small coefficients signal an absence of cheap-riding on either part.

The results show that contributions to CSDP operations are consistent with the public good model in the case of EUFOR Congo for all indicators of capability, but the association is of only moderate strength when GDP is used to measure capability, and rather weak when population replaces GDP. For EUFOR Chad and across both operations, the results are inconsistent with the public good model. Its core prediction not just fails in the case of EUFOR Chad, but is actually turned on its head. When capability is based on population, larger states have ridden cheap on the contributions of smaller ones. The magnitude of inequitable burden sharing to the disadvantage of smaller states proves weak to moderate when both missions are assessed in combination. Thus, if larger states seek to argue in public that they have been contributing more than their fair share to CSDP operations, their assessment can be expected to be based on GDP, whereas smaller states could argue likewise on the basis of population size. In sum, our results show little support for the public good model. Instead, they suggest the existence of joint products. In the next section, we introduce the exogenous factors that will inform our integrated regularity model.

In contrast, Sandler and Murdoch (2000) and Sandler and Shimizu (2014) use Spearman coefficients, while Solomon (2004) conducts Wilcoxon rank tests. As to software, we use *R* and the *ppcor* package by Kim (2011).

Table 1. Kendall rank correlation coefficients

Mission Set		Relativized Burden Indicator		
		BU / % GDP	BU / % population	BU / ((% GDP + % population) / 2)
Congo	$\tau^{a}_{1,2}$	0.260	0.138	0.214
	$\tau^{b}_{1,2;3}$	0.150	0.026	0.102
Chad	$\tau^{a}_{1,2}$	−0.012	−0.074	0.006
	$\tau^{b}_{1,2;3}$	0.076	−0.020	0.104
Combined	$\tau^{a}_{1,2}$	0.062	−0.040	0.062
	$\tau^{b}_{1,2;3}$	0.119	−0.012	0.117

[a] simple Kendall rank coefficient

[b] partial Kendall rank coefficient, controlling for total armed forces personnel

An Integrated Regularity Model of Burden Sharing

This section introduces the components of our integrated regularity model, which incorporates two particularities. First, as we have shown military burdens not to be inequitably shouldered by larger states, the joint product rather than the public good variant of collective action theory informs the factor selection. Joint products in the context of CSDP operations result from a mixture of different goods that produce public and/or private benefits, which can, in turn, either be positive and/or negative. The former create incentives to contribute, whereas the latter inhibit contributions by producing disincentives.

Second, we draw on integrated regularity theories of military burden sharing to identify the location of these four types of benefits. Benefits located on the domestic level are private to the contributor but usually public within it (Mello, 2012; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). International-level benefits are public within the global community of states, but may or may not generate second-order benefits that are private to the contributor (Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994; Davidson, 2011).[1] Based on this two-by-two structure of the type and ownership of benefits, the set of factors we draw from in trying to explain contributions to CSDP operations is provided in Table 2.

[1] A state with a long tradition of international peacekeeping provides a public good to the global community of states but may derive private benefits through its reputational status within that community (Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1481)

Table 2. Condition factors by benefit type and ownership

	Benefit type	
Ownership	Positive	Negative
Public	peacekeeping tradition	competing deployments
Private	trade volume public support	budget constraints election distance parliamentary powers
	executive and legislative partisanship	

Positive Public Benefits

EUFORs Congo and Chad were both assistance missions set up within the framework of a UN peacekeeping operation. It has repeatedly been shown that these operations conform to the traditional public goods model of collective action theory (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). States supporting them should thus be expected to value worldwide stability, trade, democracy or human rights enough to be prepared to contribute to their production at least in proportion with their private resources.

Lebovic (2004: 915), for example, reasons that if nations have invested sizeable amounts of resources over a long time in an international institution they also have more to lose should it break down. During the planning phases of EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, warnings about overstretch and underperformance of the UN peacekeeping system were indeed high on the agenda, and countries with deep prior involvement in UN peacekeeping operations should therefore have had strong incentives to contribute to these missions (Jones, Gowan & Sherman, 2009).

A country would only be expected to champion the cause of free trade, democracy and human rights if its own record in these areas was impeccable. Andersson (2002) as well as Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 899) argue on this assumption that not past investments in the UN peacekeeping system are directly relevant but their actual sources. More precisely, Andersson (2002: 379) holds that democracies are imbued with a desire for spreading their norms and values, and presents results that 'must be described as providing unambiguous support for the hypothesis' that democracies commit more than non-democracies to UN

interventions. Perkins and Neumayer (2008) extend this line of reasoning by arguing that both democratic polities and polities that highly value human rights are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Among their twelve explanatory variables, the authors find these two factors to be the third and sixth most important determinants of peacekeeping contributions. As adhering to certain standards of democratic governance is a fundamental prerequisite for becoming an EU member state, any variation above which should be explanatorily irrelevant, we expect contributions to CSDP missions to be influenced by the degree to which a state has previously sought to provide a public good to the global community by diffusing its own values through the UN system via contributions to peacekeeping operations.

Negative Public Benefits

Out-of-area operations of the kind increasingly conducted since the end of the Cold War by *ad hoc* coalitions, the EU, NATO and the UN often take place simultaneously and at great distances to the contributing states. For example, when EUFOR Congo was launched in 2006, NATO's KFOR and ISAF missions were still active, as were Operation Iraqi Freedom and several UN peacekeeping operations. Since all states face military resource constraints, considerations regarding their contribution to an operation-in-planning are likely to be negatively affected by present commitments, less so if a future operation is to follow hard on the heels of a completed one, but very much so if ongoing operations to which they have already contributed would continue to run in parallel. Simultaneous commitments are unproblematic as long as sufficient resources exist, but they impact a state's capacity to contribute once forces begin to operate at full stretch.

Committing resources to an operation also makes them harder to use when other, possibly more important, demands for military crisis management arise (Fordham, 1998: 575). Member states whose available assets already ran short due to other missions might not have been willing to further constrain their future freedom of action by committing resources to EUFOR operations. British and German officials, for instance, justified their non-participation in EUFOR Chad by pointing to the distraction of forces from more important commitments in Afghanistan (Pohl, 2014b: 201).

Positive Private Benefits

Studies suggest that geographical distance is negatively related to the size of private benefits gained from regional stability in an area of operation (Bove & Elia, 2011; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008). EUFORs

Congo and Chad both had the goal of restabilizing the situation on the ground, but while spatial proximity may matter for adjacent countries at risk of experiencing negative externalities, it is implausible that refugee inflows, let alone conflict spillover, impacted the calculations of EU member states. Instead of spatial proximity, we consider relational proximity in terms of trade volumes as appreciably more relevant. Several authors have hypothesized that economic interests drive countries to commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009: 833; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008: 903; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1479).[1] Anecdotal evidence for the significance of trade motives also exists for EUFOR Congo. The UK has only little economic stakes in the country and did not contribute, whereas France has strong interests in uranium abstraction, and was the largest contributor to the operation (Cumming, 2011: 566-567).[2]

The second factor in the set of positive private benefits is public support, whose impact has been a major area of research at the intersection of foreign policy and democratic representation.[3] The core argument is that decision-makers monitor public opinion to adjust their behavior at the margin in order to avoid political predicaments. For example, policy executives may come to copper over the human costs of a military engagement for which their publics have lost enthusiasm, if they have ever shown any in the first place. Although the literature on the nexus between EU military operations and public opinion is not nearly as extensive as that for US military interventions, its findings call for more attention to this factor. For instance, Pohl (2014b: 193-195) argues that CSDP policies are the consequence of political ambition under domestic constraints. In contributing to EU military operations political leaders seek to demonstrate their ability to influence international events in line with public opinion without creating the risk of having to pay a disproportionate price.

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[1] In contrast, Andersson (2002: 380), doubts that trade considerations have influenced commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, and Gegout (2009: 204) concludes that French trade interests have been irrelevant in EUFOR Congo.

[2] Decisions to contribute can also be based on current expectations of future trade opportunities. For example, conservative parliamentarians in the German Bundestag argued that participation was important as Congo possessed some of the largest copper and tantalite reserves worldwide. See *Bundestag* plenary protocol 16/36, 19 May 2006, p. 3105.

[3] For a review of the extensive literature in this area, see Aldrich et al. (2006).

Negative Private Benefits

Negative private benefits are incurred by the effect of a contribution on a government's budget situation. The price a government is willing to pay for an operation can therefore be expected to also depend on the budget situation. Governments that face budgetary constraints should not yield in the negotiating process as readily as those not facing such constraints.[1] CSDP military operations are of a size which does not significantly affect the budget of most states, but the possibility that financial considerations have fed into a country's decision cannot be ruled out *a priori*.

Decisions on contributions to an operation involve political calculations at the highest level in all EU member states. As has been argued above, public support may provide a legitimizing argument for governments to deploy troops, but research also shows a hostile public to influence the size and type of contributions. For instance, Isernia (2000) traces Italy's political behavior during the Kosovo Crisis. When NATO air attacks were launched against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, the Italian government was forced to tread a tightrope in assuring the US of its alliance commitment while appeasing public opposition to the raids at home. Similarly, Saideman and Auerswald (2012: 78-80) argue that President Chirac sought to minimize the risk of domestic criticism to France's ISAF contribution by restricting the largest and most visible part of its forces to the safe area around Kabul. However, in spite of negative popular sentiments in Italy and France, these countries still contributed towards the Kosovo bombing campaigns and Operation Desert Storm. Baltrusaitis (2010: 214), Tago (2009) and Williams (2013) argue that the temporal distance of a country's general election helps explain this seeming instability in the effect of public opinion because political executives only become responsive towards the end of an electoral cycle.

Besides election distance, the effect of public opinion on the type and size of military contributions to international peacekeeping operations is moderated by the scope of the executive's discretion vis-à-vis the legislature. Parliamentary powers in this area vary considerably among EU member states, in some of which foreign policy is the exclusive prerogative of the executive, whereas the legislature enjoys far-reaching competencies of co-decision and oversight in others (Dieterich, Hummel &

[1] In contrast, Domke (1991) argues, based on data for six advanced industrial democracies over the years 1955-1985, that a state's budget situation does not influence its defense spending.

Marschall, 2008). Parliamentary powers, however, only form a legal frame that requires activation to become effective.

A significant body of work has also addressed the reasons of opposition towards military deployments, both at the legislative and executive ends of government, and should thus not be neglected, in particular because it infuses the bare institutional relations between different branches of government with concrete explanatory meaning. On the basis of the tested assumption that the electoral platforms of right parties are more pro-military than those of left parties, Palmer, London and Regan (2004) conclude that governments from right parties are more likely to resort to the use of force in their external policies, but the orientation of parties by itself does not influence contributions directly. Its impact is conditional on the branch of government that parties dominate and the institutional rules under which they operate. These interrelations are captured in the as yet most differentiated model of domestic factor interaction proposed by Mello (2012) in the context of contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mello (2012) finds that, provided no constitutional restrictions exist, large contributions result when a right executive is either unconstrained by parliamentary war powers or forms a unified right government with parliament in the presence of such powers, or when the executive leans to the left and parliament enjoys considerable veto rights.[1]

In summary, research offers alternative explanations for disproportionately low or/and constrained contributions. If elections are nearby or parliament enjoys considerable influence over deployments, negative public opinion is expected to constrain contributions. Furthermore, left-leaning executives are expected to face a greater risk at electoral punishment and therefore less inclined to contribute at the end of an election cycle, whereas left-leaning parliaments are more likely to veto military deployment decisions. In contrast, the extensive work by Auerswald and Saideman supports the hypothesis that the cause of limited involvement is the presence of institutionally weak executives, who are reluctant to advocate the deployment of military forces abroad for fear of future punishment for failure, irrespective of public opinion or partisan politics (see Auerswald, 1999; Auerswald, 2004; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012).

[1] Constitutional restrictions are irrelevant in the context of the CSDP, since all EU member states participate, except Denmark.

Synthesis

When the relevant components of these different models of military burden sharing are synthesized, complex interactions between positive and negative benefits on both the private-domestic and public-international level are to be expected. For example, a right executive governing a country with close trade relations to the target country should have strong incentives to contribute, but it will be constrained if confronted with a left parliament that is vested with extensive war powers. The share of the burden a state is willing to carry thus becomes a function of domestic-level factors that yield positive and negative private benefits as well as international-level factors that produce positive and negative public benefits.

Yet, for burden shares to acquire a substantive meaning in debates on the equity of distributions and regularity theories of burden sharing, the relative size of contributions first has to be associated with concrete labels. We divide the factor relative size of contributions into three distinct levels to this end. Underprovision refers to negatively disproportional contributions, equiprovision is present when contributions are proportional, and overprovision implies positively disproportional contributions. Before specific configurational functions for each provision level are derived in the second phase of our analysis, we briefly explain the operationalization of the base variables and the calibration of the target factors.[1]

Operationalization of Base Variables and Calibration of Target Factors

The multivalent outcome factor *contributor status* (CS) comprises three levels: *underprovider* (u), *equiprovider* (e), and *overprovider* (o). Membership in each set formed by these factor levels is assigned as follows. First, we compute the base variable as the ratio between a country's expected burden share and its observed burden share. A ratio below unity signals underprovision, one above unity overprovision, and unity indicates equiprovision. Second, we apply two thresholds to calibrate factor levels on the basis of ranges in burden ratios. A country is categorized as a member in the set of underproviders if it contributes at least a third less than expected. Taking the reciprocal value as the second threshold, it is categorized as a member in the set of overproviders if contributions are at least 50% above expectations. If a country contributes roughly in accordance with expectations

[1] Detailed descriptions are provided in the appendix.

as demarcated by these two values, it is classified as an equiprovider. Figure 1 visualizes the distribution of countries for each level of the outcome factor by mission set and capability indicator.

Positive public benefits from contributing to CSDP operations result from a country's *peacekeeping tradition* (PT), which can be *strong* (s) or *weak* (w).[1] Operationalization of the base variable and calibration was performed as follows. We first calculated a country's relative total personnel contributions to all UN peacekeeping operations since 1991 before relativizing these contributions by a dispersion factor to obtain a reflection of "tradition" as consistent engagement rather than single bouts of activity. These scores were then weighted by a country's relative capability to participate in such operations. If the resulting ratio was at least unity, the country was categorized as having a strong peacekeeping tradition.

Negative public benefits are generated by *competing deployments* (CD), with *significant* (s) and *insignificant* (i) as its two levels. In order to reflect the impact of a set of simultaneous commitments on military stretch, we divide a country's deployed units in all military operations other than EUFOR missions during their first year by its deployable units. Set in relation to NATO's force usability targets, which have also been adopted by the EU, countries with at least 15% stretch are categorized as having significant competing deployments(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008a: 13). [2]

Positive private benefits to a country from contributing involve two condition factors: *trade volume* (TV) and *public support* (PS). The former has two levels: *large* (l) and *small* (s). We used information on bilateral export and import statistics, expected costs of contribution and estimated mission costs for operationalizing the base variable.[3] Countries whose average trade volume prior to an operation amounted to at least 50% of the respective costs expected from contributing were categorized as having a large trade volume. The two levels of public support are *high* (h) and *low* (l). Operationalization of net public support as the base variable was achieved by subtracting the percentage of Eurobarometer survey respondents who either opposed or had no opinion on the CSDP from the percentage of respondents

[1] For binary factors, each level represents the Boolean negation of the other level.

[2] NATO usability targets for ground forces consist of a 40% deployability target and an 8% sustainability target.

[3] For operation EUFOR Chad, trade volume figures take into account exports and imports for both Chad as well as the Central African Republic.

Figure 1. Observed and Expected Burden Shares



who expressly supported it. Countries with a net rate of at least 30% were categorized as having high public support.

The class of negative private benefits comprises three condition factors: *budget constraints* (BC), *election distance* (ED) and *parliamentary powers* (PP). Budget constraints can be *high* (h) or *low* (l). This factor takes into account the limits on deficit and debt ratios stipulated by the EU for both Euro-zone members and non-members back to three years prior to the year in which the operation was launched. If the deficit or debt ratio limit had been breached in the year before an operation, the country was categorized as having a highly constrained budget. The two levels of election distance are *large* (l) and *small* (s). Its base variable is defined as the time between an operation, as referenced through the date between the first mentioning of its possibility and the official adoption date of the launching Council Joint Action, and the next general election. If the reference date is more than one year away from the next general election, the country is categorized as having elections at large distance. Parliamentary powers as the third factor has two levels: *significant* (s) and *insignificant* (i). Assignment to these sets is based on the extent to which war powers were vested in the legislature and the status of the government. If not only information or consultation, but explicit parliamentary approval was required for military deployment, or if the country had a minority government at the time when contributions to an operation were discussed, a country was categorized as having significant parliamentary war powers.

Positive or negative private benefits may result from *legislative* (LP) or *executive partisanship* (EP), which can either be *right* (r) or *left* (l). Drawing on the ParlGov database, we measured the ideological orientation of either branch by summing up individual party positions on a left-right scale before relativizing by the proportion of the total number of seats (Döring & Manow, 2012). Due to considerable variation in the distribution of ideological orientations, we categorized a parliament as right if it scored at least 5.25 on the ideology scale, a government as right if it scored at least 5 on the same scale.

Results and Interpretation

The joint product model of collective action theory was identified as preferable. Each set of factors subjected to model testing in the second stage should thus involve a combination of public and private benefits. As nine condition factors yield a disproportionate property space in relation to the number and diversity of cases, we limit the size of any analyzed frame to five factors. The number of frame

combinations is $\binom{9}{5} - \binom{7}{5} = 105$ since public benefits are generated by two factors, and at least one factor that belongs to the class of public benefits, positive or negative, must be included. Based on the minimization results of each frame, we distil the best-fitting models inasmuch as they meet standards for minimum inclusion scores, show no model ambiguities, and hold up to further within-case analysis. We use *R* in conjunction with the package *QCA* to perform the Boolean minimization process (Duşa & Thiem, 2014; R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013).

Our interpretation of the results focuses on GDP as the capability indicator because it is the single most widely-used measure in academic and policy debates about burden sharing. To test the robustness of these findings, cross-checks are conducted with the other two indicators. Table 3 lists the results for GDP and population, respectively, Table 4 for the combined measure.

Table 3 shows that countries have contributed more than expected when they combined a strong peacekeeping tradition with distant elections. For GDP, the first path adds large trade volumes and high public support to this combination, suggesting that immediate private benefits exert a positive impact on the contribution level as long as a country generates positive public benefits. General public approval of the CSDP alone thus seems too ambiguous to spur disproportionate contributions to specific operations (Brummer, 2007). Large trade volumes alone did not induce large contributions, either, but they certainly had an amplifying impact in some of the overproviders, notably France, which was often accused of trying to bolster its economic interests in contributing disproportionately to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad (Bono, 2011; Koepf, 2012).

While the first combination accords closely with our theoretical expectations, the absence of large trade volumes and public support in the second path does not. However, the group of countries covered by this path commands attention in this connection. It only includes contributions to EUFOR Chad by the so-called 'neutral' EU member states, *viz*. Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Finland (Devine, 2011). Although public opinion about the CSDP in these four countries was amongst the least enthusiastic of all states, such reservations did not seem to have inhibited contributions (Brummer, 2007: 190). In fact, the neutrals declared that the operation in Chad represented an opportunity to demonstrate that the primary objectives of CSDP were about peacekeeping and supporting the UN, and thus entirely in accordance with their national foreign policy traditions' (Pohl, 2014b: 200). The absence of large trade volumes with the area of operations is an advantage for these

Table 3. Results for individual capability indicators

Indicator	GDP									Population								
Outcome	CS{u}					CS{e}		CS{o}		CS{u}					CS{e}		CS{o}	
	Path					Path		Path		Path					Path		Path	
Condition	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	1	2
PT{s}	⊗			⊗	●		⊗	●	●	⊗						●	●	●
CD{s}		●		⊗	●	⊗	●				●	●			⊗	●	⊗	
TV{l}			●	⊗	⊗	●	●	●	⊗			⊗	⊗	●	●	●		⊗
PS{h}	⊗	●	⊗		●		●	●	⊗	⊗	●	●	⊗					
BC{h}																		
ED{l}								●	●						●			●
PP{s}						●	⊗								●	⊗		
LP{r}		⊗	●	●							⊗		●	●				
EP{r}																	●	●
Cases Congo	2	3	2	1	2	6	0	3	0	2	3	4	3	2	4	1	1	0
Cases Chad	2	3	0	4	4	1	1	1	4	2	3	7	8	0	1	0	3	5
Inclusion	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.80	0.83	0.86	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.91	0.82	1.00	0.80	1.00	1.00	0.80
Coverage (r)	0.16	0.20	0.08	0.16	0.20	0.60	0.10	0.27	0.27	0.14	0.21	0.36	0.32	0.07	0.50	0.13	0.29	0.29
Coverage (u)	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.27	0.27	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.14	0.04	0.50	0.13	0.21	0.21
Incl. Total	0.889					0.875		1.000		0.913					0.833		0.875	
Cov. Total	0.640					0.700		0.533		0.750					0.625		0.500	

Note: ●/⊗ Condition present/absent; Incl. = inclusion; Cov. = coverage; (r) = raw; (u) = unique.

Table 4. Results for combined capability indicator

Outcome	CS{u}					CS{e}		CS{o}	
	Path					Path		Path	
Condition	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	1	2
PT{s}	⊗			⊗	●				
CD{s}		●		⊗	●	⊗	⊗		
TV{l}			●	⊗	⊗			●	⊗
PS{h}	⊗	●	⊗		●			●	⊗
BC{h}						⊗	⊗		⊗
ED{l}						⊗	●		
PP{s}								⊗	●
LP{r}		⊗	●	●					
EP{r}						●	⊗		
Cases Congo	2	3	2	1	2	1	2	4	0
Cases Chad	2	3	0	4	4	0	1	2	2
Inclusion	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.80	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Coverage (r)	0.15	0.23	0.08	0.15	0.23	0.14	0.43	0.35	0.12
Coverage (u)	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.15	0.08	0.14	0.43	0.35	0.12
Incl. Total			0.94			1.00		1.00	
Cov. Total			0.65			0.57		0.47	

Note: ●/⊗ Condition present/absent; Incl. = inclusion; Cov. = coverage; (r) = raw; (u) = unique.

contributors since close trade ties may endanger an operation's neutrality, one of the guiding principles of UN peacekeeping.

In summary, our results on the basis of GDP as the capability indicator suggest that a strong peacekeeping tradition constitutes the most important incentive for contributing in positive disproportion to CSDP operations. The results for population as the capability indicator not only reinforce these conclusions but also correspond to theoretical expectations on the impact of competing deployments and executive ideology: the absence of simultaneous military engagements and the presence of a right-leaning executive are associated with overprovision.

However, as Table 4 shows, the best-fitting model for overprovision with the combined capability indicator does not include peacekeeping tradition. The first path, which combines large trade volumes, high public support and institutionally weak parliaments, provides a particularly convincing explanation for some of the

cases it covers. Especially the overprovision to EUFOR Congo by Belgium, a country that largely retreated from peacekeeping since the disastrous events of 1994 in Rwanda, squares with its economic ties: almost a third of the DRC's exports are attributable to Belgium, which actively rallied for support to launch the CSDP operation (Gegout, 2009: 239; Nasra, 2011: 172).

The second path, covering the Swedish and Irish contribution to EUFOR Chad, however, creates a puzzle for all existing theories of burden sharing. On the one hand, low budget constraints should indeed have a positive impact on the level of contributions, but on the other, small trade volumes, low public support and significant parliamentary powers are all expected to combine in inhibiting contributions. The seeming irrelevance of peacekeeping tradition thus renders this explanation of sizeable contributions by the neutral countries to EUFOR Chad implausible. We cannot determine at this stage of research whether this finding is simply an artefact of the capability indicator or due to another, substantive source.

The analysis of equiprovision indicates that large trade volumes were consistently associated with commensurate contributions when specific combinations of negative benefits were absent. The two paths for GDP-based equiprovision associate large trade volumes with proportional contributions, but only if a state's available resources are not stretched and parliament has significant war powers, or if its resources are stretched but parliament is not involved in decisions on the use of force and public support for the CSDP is high. Case-based evidence supports the interactive effect of these paths. For instance, in its final evaluation of the mission, the Netherlands alluded to the economic priority the Great Lakes area enjoys, which seems to have at least partly influenced its decision to contribute (Ministerie van Defensie, 2007: 5). Germany's contribution to EUFOR Congo, in contrast, exemplifies the difficulties of making disproportionately large contributions if parliament must be involved. Several authors have argued in this respect that the German government could not dismiss the *Bundestag*'s concerns about troop safety, in consequence of which it had to restrict involvement (Brummer, 2013: 13; Schmitt, 2012: 69).

In accordance with the analysis of GDP-based overprovision, results on the basis of the population indicator confirm that large election distance affects a state executive's ability to contribute. One of the cases included in the first path emphasizing this condition is Germany's contribution to EUFOR Congo. Schmitt (2012: 66), for instance, argues that, because of its recent election, the German government's internal position was very secure when decisions on troop contributions were made, making substantial contributions less risky. The best-

fitting model for the combined indicator mainly draws attention to the absence of significant competing deployments and high budget constraints. Furthermore, it shows that right-leaning governments are inclined to contribute even if elections are nearby while their left-leaning counterparts only participate if elections are far away.

The results of the analysis of GDP-based underprovision confirm that states refrain from contributing in the absence of large trade volumes and a strong peacekeeping tradition. This is most clearly demonstrated by the fourth path, which indicates that states lacking both these conditions refrained from participation, even if they had no competing deployments. The first path, covering the second largest set of countries, suggests that for states without a peacekeeping tradition, the absence of a favorable public opinion inhibits contributions. This path, which covers the UK's role in both operations, lends further support to the argument presented by Pohl (2014b: 201), who has attributed the lukewarm attitude towards EUFOR Chad to the British public's Euro-skepticism, and Gross (2009: 88), who has argued that because 'the ESDP operation in DRC was not an easy sell domestically […] preference was for others to undertake the mission'.

While popular opposition towards the CSDP can thus act as a constraint on contributions, paths two and five indicate that popular support alone is insufficient to spur contributions. These paths reveal that the benefits derived from such support do not cause states whose military capabilities are already stretched by simultaneous deployments to participate in an operation. The cases covered by these paths are the member states from Central and Eastern Europe, which at the time preferred deploying their available troops in the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013). Romania even had to backtrack on its commitment of 120 troops to EUFOR Chad because it lacked the capabilities for new engagements on top of its ongoing ones in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Further analyses with alternative capability indicators stand in no opposition to these interpretations. The results for the combined capability indicator are identical with those based on GDP. Only paths four and five for population-based underprovision diverge from the other results: neither includes a condition that was expected to have a negative impact on underprovision.

Conclusions

In this article, we have presented the first systematic investigation into the determinants of contribution patterns in CSDP operations. Building on insights from collective action theory and integrated regularity models of burden sharing

with respect to NATO, UN and *ad hoc* coalition operations, we have arrived at conclusions that complement, reinforce, but also partly contradict those of previous research. In the first stage of our two-stage design, we assessed whether patterns of burden distributions would confirm predictions from collective action theory-based models applied to other institutions of international military cooperation. In opposition to predictions of pure public good models, which would have been expected *ex ante* to be more appropriate in the case of the CSDP, our results did not indicate that burdens were consistently distributed to the disadvantage of larger states. Rather, a joint product model was identified as more appropriate, implying that both private and public benefits must be taken into account for explaining divergent contribution levels in CSDP operations. In the second stage, integrated models of military burden sharing have then been drawn on to identify nine types of benefits, public and private, that have been found to matter in previous research. By means of a novel generalization of mvQCA we have been able to derive differentiated results with respect to three levels of contributions.

Countries that have been overproviders have made relatively large contributions to CSDP operations. We found that these contributions occur when a strong peacekeeping tradition is combined with distant elections. In contrast, large trade volumes are consistently associated with proportional contributions if a combination of competing deployments, parliamentary powers, high budget constraints, nearby elections and/or a left-leaning executive does not generate negative benefits outweighing the positive ones. Lastly, contributions have been found to be relatively low when trade volumes are small and a country's peacekeeping tradition is weak, competing deployments are significant or public support is low.

These results have been generated by employing an innovative two-stage design, in which an appropriate variant of collective action theory was identified in the first phase, and subsequently served as the basis for an ensuing configurational analysis of different contribution levels in the second phase. Besides presenting new substantive findings with regard to the CSDP, our study has thus also demonstrated how different tools of analysis usually employed in isolation in neighboring fields of research can be combined in order to generate richer explanations of burden-sharing patterns in international military operations.

Appendices: Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Outcome Factor: Contributor Status (CS)

Factor levels: underprovider (u), equiprovider (e), overprovider (o)
Base variable: burden share ratio (*bsr*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

Burden sharing in military missions has been analyzed in terms of "what is and what ought to be" (Hartley & Sandler, 1999: 668). More specifically, the ratio between a country's actual contribution of resources to a common effort and its ability to contribute has been widely considered the most appropriate index of equity measurement. But while the theoretical structure of this index has been uncontroversial, the operationalization of its two dimensions, actual contributions and ability to contribute, has been much debated. A significant part of this debate has centered on the type of the common effort towards which contributions were to be assessed among a group of countries.

During the Cold War, the focus was on territorial defense within the framework of NATO, and equity was evaluated on the basis of overall military spending, armed forces personnel or military-industrial output. However, when the number of out-of-area peace-keeping operations sharply rose during the 1990s, this conceptual basis was subjected to increased scrutiny. In line with the earlier literature, a country's burden continued to be assessed through the ratio of its actual contributions to its capabilities, but the former was now operationalized by mission or institution-specific contributions rather than aggregate measures of overall defense investments. In particular, financial and/or troop contributions were considered the most appropriate indicators of a country's absolute costs (see, for example, Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Bove & Elia, 2011; Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1999; Lebovic, 2004; Siegel, 2009).

Undeniably, financial and military commitments are the two most relevant measures of the absolute size of a country's carried burden, be it within the framework of NATO, the UN, an *ad hoc* coalition or the CSDP. EUFORs Congo and Chad had estimated price tags of around €100m and €1bn, respectively (Helly, 2009: 339; Major, 2009: 315). Notwithstanding their popularity, however, these two

measures have been criticized as insufficient to reflect the multidimensional nature of the burden generated by out-of-area operations, in contrast to territorial defense endeavors where they may be fully appropriate. Most importantly, political risks have been suggested as a further significant factor (Beeres & Bogers, 2012: 14; Ringsmose, 2010: 328; Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). The costs from these risks are incurred in two ways. First, participation in military operations carries the danger of negative domestic ramifications when troops get involved in deadly combat actions. And second, the assumption of operation leadership not only creates expectations but also shifts responsibility for mission accomplishment to the lead nation(s) (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 22). If these expectations are not met or the operation is perceived as a failure, either in full or parts, decision-makers may have to face political repercussions, and criticism or even ridicule may affect a country's standing within the international community.[1] As an improvement over previous ways of capturing absolute burden, we thus take into account not only financial and military costs, but also the political dimension of a country's participation in an international peacekeeping operation.

We assess financial and military contributions to both EUFORs solely by means of contributed troops. A separation is unnecessary since, unlike UN missions for which financial contributions do not necessarily mirror personnel contributions as these operations are financed out of a central budget with fixed assessments for each member state, the institutional rules of the CSDP framework tie them closely together by the principle of "costs lie where they fall". This means that a country's military and financial burdens strongly correlate. The remaining costs of an operation – the so-called "common costs" – are covered by the EU's Athena mechanism.

In order to assess the equity of burden-sharing, absolute costs have to be relativized by an indicator of a country's ability to contribute. Two indicators lend themselves to this end: wealth and population.[2] The former measures the amount of accrued material resources whereby contributions could be financed, whereas the latter sets absolute costs in relation to the amount of human resources from which a country could potentially draw. Table 1 provides our data on the number of

[1] For example, high-ranking German officials were particularly afraid of US American mockery before the launch of EUFOR Congo (Von Szandar, 2006).

[2] Both have been widely used. See, for example, Andersson (2002), Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009), Lebovic (2004), Shimizu and Sandler(2002), and Siegel (2009).

contributed troops, GDP and population.[1] Data on troop contributions were retrieved from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) multilateral peace operations database, unless stated otherwise, including troop contributions in theatre, as well as staff contributions to the operation and force headquarters. Data on GDP and population size were retrieved from the World Development Indicators

Conventional troops-to-GDP and troops-to-population indices do not take into account the distribution of political risks among participating states. The extent to which a state exposes itself to political risk in CSDP missions depends on the operational role(s) it assumes and the probability of its troops getting involved in, possibly deadly, combat actions. In the following two paragraphs, we list our data and their sources for each operation with respect to the main type of troops seconded as well as the operational role a country assumed.

EUFOR Congo's main task was to stabilize the region during the country's election, and if necessary to intervene, which it eventually did on three occasions (Hagemann, 2010: 41; Major, 2008: 20). Eleven states seconded military personnel to the area of operation.[2] Two of these made large contributions and also assumed a leading role: France provided the force commander and Germany the operations commander as well as the headquarters (Major, 2009: 315). Four other countries contributed troops that could participate in interventions if the need for the use of force arose, namely Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Portugal (Engberg, 2011: 108-137; Hagemann, 2010; Ministerie van Defensie, 2007; Palma, 2009: 63). Furthermore, Poland contributed 130 military police, which were charged with the protection of EUFOR facilities (Major, 2008: 18).

Four EU member states contributed personnel to the area of operations that did not risk getting involved in combat. Belgium participated with four unmanned surveillance airplanes and around 50 soldiers (Verbraecken, 2006). Italy contributed one C-130 military air transport and also around 50 soldiers (Stato Maggiore della

[1] Figures on armed forces personnel have been added for comparison.

[2] Additionally, seven nations only contributed staff members to the operation and/or force headquarters: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia and the United Kingdom (Major, 2009: 311).

Table 1. Dimensions of burden indicator and capability indicators

	Congo				Chad			
Country	Troops[a]	Armed F.[b]	Populat.[c]	GDP[d]	Troops[a]	Armed F.[b]	Populat.[c]	GDP[d]
Austria	3	40.0	8228	208744	169	35.0	8301	224424
Belgium	59	37.0	10479	251841	64	39.0	10626	266011
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	2	75.0	7660	19106
Cyprus	1	10.8	1033	10921	2	10.8	1063	11955
Czech Rep.	0	28.0	10236	71857	2	27.0	10334	81312
Estonia	0	8.0	1346	8018	0	7.0	1342	9489
Finland	11	31.0	5246	138681	62	32.0	5289	152523
France	975	359.0	63176	1436256	1770	353.0	64012	1505322
Germany	745	285.0	82469	1943341	4	244.0	82266	2081124
Greece	1	168.0	11104	151655	4	161.0	11193	165670
Hungary	0	44.0	10087	56885	3	37.0	10056	59170
Ireland	2	10.0	4160	124072	447	10.0	4357	137433
Italy	56	445.0	58607	1159362	104	436.0	59375	1204797
Latvia	0	5.0	2301	11610	0	17.0	2276	14331
Lithuania	0	29.0	3414	16640	2	24.0	3376	19711
Luxembourg	1	1.5	465	24154	2	1.5	480	27017
Malta	0	2.0	404	4137	0	2.0	409	4410
Netherlands	44	60.0	16320	411168	71	41.0	16382	441792
Poland	125	162.0	38165	199364	421	142.0	38121	226149
Portugal	53	93.0	10549	122236	2	91.0	10608	126939
Romania	-	-	-	-	2	153.0	21547	55927
Slovakia	0	20.0	5387	36495	1	17.0	5397	43691
Slovenia	1	12.0	2000	23867	14	12.0	2018	26998
Spain	132	220.0	43398	681374	112	222.0	44879	733821
Sweden[e]	50	28.6	9030	282365	120	17.6	9148	304259
UK	0	217.0	60224	1707602	4	160.0	60987	1815652

[a] SIPRI (2013a)

[b] Armed forces personnel total in thousands; World Development Indicators 2005 (Congo), 2007 (Chad) http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

[c] Population in thousands; World Development Indicators 2005 (Congo), 2007 (Chad) http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

[d] Millions of constant 2000 US$; World Development Indicators 2005 (Congo), 2007 (Chad) http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

[e] According to SIPRI, Sweden only contributed 10 troops to EUFOR Chad. However, initially it contributed 120 troops, but these were largely withdrawn after operational capacity was reached (Seibert, 2010: 126).

Difesa, 2007). Finland seconded two surgeons and three medical teams of three persons each (Finish Ministry of Defense, 2006). Greece allocated one C-130 military air transport (Hellenic National Defense Staff, n.d.). The remaining states did not participate in the operation or only contributed staff members. As the only non-EU member state, Turkey contributed a C-135 cargo plane with 15 crew members (Turkish Armed Forces, n.d.).

With respect to EUFOR Chad, twelve countries seconded military personnel to the area of operations. Three of them took on a leading role. France provided the operation headquarters and the force commander, and was responsible for the Central and the Birao Zone. Ireland provided the operations commander and was responsible for the Southern Zone. Poland provided the deputy operations commander and was responsible for the Northern Zone (Assemblée Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense, 2008: 10-11).

The arrival of the main force was prepared by an initial entry force, which was composed of special forces from France, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland and Austria (Mattelaer, 2008: 24-25; Seibert, 2010: 18). These forces had a high risk of combat involvement. After having reached full operational capacity, the goal of the operation was to patrol the area and protect the population (Brettner-Messler, 2008). Besides the soldiers from the countries that comprised the initial entry force, Polish, Finnish, Slovenian and Dutch forces also participated in these patrols, and thus risked combat involvement (Government of Finland, 2007; Ministerie van Defensie, 2009).

Four countries provided only logistical support or medical units. Greece and Portugal contributed a C-130 military air transport each (Palma, 2009: 14; Hellenic National Defense Staff, n.d.). Italy set up a field hospital with 105 personnel and Spain participated with two C-295 aircraft and around 100 soldiers tasked with air transport logistics (Stato Maggiore della Difesa, 2009). Three non-EU countries also seconded a substantial number of troops. Russia sent four helicopters with around 70 accompanying personnel. Albania contributed around 60 troops who were tasked with guarding two camps (Gros-Verheyde, 2008c; 2008d). Croatia contributed 15 special forces that also participated in patrols (Parlov, 2009: 31). Table 2 lists the unit types, leadership roles and burden rankings for each country and operation. Observed rankings result from a country's score on the burden index, whereas expected rankings are calculated on the basis of GDP, population and the averaged percentage share combination of GDP and population.

Table 2. Dimensions of burden indicator and burden shares

	Dimension Indicators				Burden Shares											
	Unit Type		Leadership role [a]		Observed [b]			Expected; GDP [b]			Expected; population [b]			Expected; combined [b]		
Country	Congo [c]	Chad [d]	Congo [c]	Chad [d]	/	/		/	/		/	/		/	/	
Austria	staff	staff	-	-	0.006	0.066	0.048	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.020	0.020	0.021
Belgium	logistic	logistic	-	-	0.046	0.037	0.040	0.028	0.027	0.028	0.023	0.022	0.023	0.025	0.024	0.025
Bulgaria	NA	NA	NA	-	NA	0.003	NA	NA	0.002	NA	NA	0.016	NA	NA	0.009	NA
Cyprus	staff	staff	-	-	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Czech Rep.	-	-	-	-	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.022	0.021	0.022	0.015	0.015	0.015
Estonia	-	-	-	-	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002
Finland	medical	medical	-	-	0.015	0.036	0.030	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013
France	combat	combat	FC/DOC	FC	0.298	0.289	0.292	0.158	0.154	0.157	0.138	0.130	0.138	0.148	0.142	0.147
Germany	combat	combat	OC/DFC	-	0.254	0.005	0.077	0.214	0.213	0.214	0.180	0.167	0.179	0.197	0.190	0.197
Greece	logistic	logistic	-	-	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.024	0.023	0.024	0.020	0.020	0.021
Hungary	-	-	-	-	0.000	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.022	0.020	0.022	0.014	0.013	0.014
Ireland	staff	staff	-	OC/DFC	0.004	0.129	0.093	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.011	0.011	0.012
Italy	logistic	logistic	-	-	0.045	0.040	0.041	0.128	0.123	0.126	0.128	0.121	0.128	0.128	0.122	0.127
Latvia	-	-	-	-	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.003
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.005
Luxembourg	staff	staff	-	-	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Malta	-	-	-	-	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Netherlands	combat	combat	-	-	0.042	0.039	0.040	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.036	0.033	0.036	0.040	0.039	0.040

[a] (D)F/OC: (deputy) force/operations commander; [b] mission set: EUFOR Congo / Chad / combined; [c] mandate: 5.5 months; [d] mandate: 13.5 months

Table 2. (continued)

Country	Dimension Indicators				Burden Shares											
	Unit Type		Leadership role [a]		Observed [b]			Expected; GDP [b]			Expected; population [b]			Expected; combined [b]		
	Congo [c]	Chad [d]	Congo [c]	Chad [d]	/	/		/	/		/	/		/	/	
Poland	Combat	combat	-	DOC	0.079	0.119	0.107	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.083	0.078	0.083	0.053	0.050	0.053
Portugal	Combat	combat	-	-	0.047	0.004	0.017	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.023	0.022	0.023	0.018	0.017	0.018
Romania	NA	staff	NA	-	NA	0.003	NA	NA	0.006	NA	NA	0.044	NA	NA	0.025	NA
Slovakia	-	staff	-	-	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.011	0.011	0.012	0.008	0.008	0.008
Slovenia	Staff	combat	-	-	0.003	0.015	0.011	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.004
Spain	Combat	logistic	-	-	0.082	0.047	0.057	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.095	0.091	0.096	0.085	0.083	0.086
Sweden	Combat	combat	-	-	0.046	0.054	0.051	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.020	0.019	0.020	0.025	0.025	0.026
UK	-	staff	-	-	0.000	0.005	0.003	0.188	0.186	0.188	0.132	0.124	0.132	0.160	0.155	0.160

[a] (D)F/OC: (deputy) force/operations commander; [b] mission set: EUFOR Congo / Chad / combined; [c] mandate: 5.5 months; [d] mandate: 13.5 months

Calibration of Target Factor

The outcome factor *contributor status* (CS) comprises three levels that constitute the outcome sets: *underprovider* ($CS^{\{u\}}$), *equiprovider* ($CS^{\{e\}}$) and *overprovider* ($CS^{\{o\}}$). The base variable underlying the calibration of these sets is the burden share ratio (*bsr*) between a country *i*'s expected burden share, as given by its capability indicator ci_i, and its observed burden share, as given by its burden indicator bu_i, in relation to all contributors *n*. It is given in equation (1):

$$bsr_i = \frac{bs_{i;expected}}{bs_{i;observed}} = \frac{ci_i / \sum_{j=1}^{n} ci_j}{bi_i / \sum_{j=1}^{n} bi_j}. \quad (1)$$

Table 3 lists all burden share ratios for each mission set and capability indicator. We apply two thresholds to calibrate the three outcome sets on the basis of ranges in burden ratios. A country is categorized as a member in the set of underproviders if it contributes at least a third less than expected. Taking the reciprocal value as the second threshold, it is categorized as a member in the set of overproviders if contributions are at least 50 percent above expectations. If a country contributes roughly in accordance with expectations as demarcated by these two yardsticks, it is classified as an equiprovider. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Condition Factor: Peacekeeping Tradition (PT)

Factor levels: strong (s) / weak peacekeeping tradition (w)
Base variable: prior peacekeeping involvement (*ppi*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

EUFORs Congo and Chad were both deployed in support of a UN peacekeeping operation (UNPO). While supporting the UN is a declared goal of all EU member states, some have shown a higher commitment to such activities than others. We measure prior peacekeeping involvement using the relative size of personnel contributions to UNPOs and the degree to which these contributions were dispersed over different UNPOs. Accounting for dispersion is important insofar as high nominal contributions can be caused by large contributions to only one or two missions, indicating bouts of peacekeeping activity rather than a genuine

Table 3. Burden share ratios

	Mission Set and Capability Indicator								
	Congo			Chad			Combined		
Country	GDP	Pop.	Comb.	GDP	Pop.	Comb.	GDP	Pop.	Comb.
Austria	0.243	0.311	0.273	2.862	3.897	3.300	2.096	2.693	2.357
Belgium	1.674	2.028	1.835	1.348	1.700	1.504	1.433	1.724	1.566
Bulgaria	NA	NA	NA	1.548	0.195	0.346	NA	NA	NA
Cyprus	2.405	1.282	1.672	2.474	1.401	1.789	2.453	1.313	1.710
Czech Rep.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.364	0.144	0.207	0.264	0.096	0.141
Estonia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Finland	0.983	1.310	1.123	2.307	3.351	2.733	1.931	2.617	2.222
France	1.888	2.163	2.016	1.872	2.217	2.030	1.860	2.109	1.977
Germany	1.187	1.410	1.289	0.022	0.027	0.024	0.358	0.429	0.390
Greece	0.241	0.166	0.196	0.376	0.281	0.321	0.337	0.235	0.277
Hungary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.638	0.189	0.292	0.444	0.126	0.196
Ireland	0.321	0.482	0.385	9.181	14.58	11.27	6.683	10.06	8.032
Italy	0.353	0.352	0.352	0.324	0.331	0.327	0.329	0.323	0.326
Latvia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Lithuania	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.501	0.441	0.682	1.112	0.292	0.462
Luxemburg	1.087	2.847	1.574	1.095	3.104	1.619	1.097	2.912	1.593
Malta	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Netherlands	0.938	1.191	1.049	0.864	1.174	0.995	0.882	1.128	0.990
Poland	3.620	0.953	1.508	5.114	1.528	2.353	4.728	1.293	2.031
Portugal	3.526	2.060	2.600	0.324	0.195	0.244	1.260	0.728	0.923
Romania	NA	NA	NA	0.529	0.069	0.122	NA	NA	NA
Slovakia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.447	0.182	0.259	0.333	0.121	0.178
Slovenia	1.100	0.662	0.827	5.337	3.596	4.297	4.180	2.594	3.201
Spain	1.094	0.866	0.966	0.627	0.517	0.567	0.759	0.597	0.668
Sweden	1.474	2.324	1.804	1.719	2.879	2.153	1.643	2.599	2.013
UK	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.025	0.037	0.030	0.017	0.025	0.020

peacekeeping tradition. Absolute prior peacekeeping involvement (*appi*) is calculated as given in equation (2):

$$\text{appi}_i = \frac{\text{pc}_i(1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M} \text{pp}_m^2)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} (\text{pc}_i(1 - \sum_{m=1}^{M} \text{pp}_m^2))}, \quad (2)$$

where pc_i is the total number of country i's personnel contributions and pp_m is the proportion of personnel contributed to operation m = 1, 2,…, M, which is used to capture the degree of dispersion.[1] The more contributions are spread across different operations, the higher the value. Absolute contributions have to be relativized by an indicator of a country's ability to contribute. This is accomplished by dividing the absolute contribution of each case by its share of total GDP of all cases during the timeframe that is taken into account as given in equation (3):

$$\text{ppi}_i = \frac{\text{appi}_i}{(\text{GDP}_i / \Sigma\text{GDP}_i)}, \quad (3)$$

Personnel contribution to UNPO's since 1991 until the year before the planning of the operation started are taken into account (2005 for EUFOR Congo, 2006 for EUFOR Chad).[2] The indicator was first constructed for each year separately, after which the average yearly value was calculated so that the indicator also takes into account the number of years troops were deployed in operations. Personnel contributions are based on the contributions in December of each year, based on data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2013).

[1] In essence, this is the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which was originally developed to measure the concentration of companies in a market. The formula has also been used in political science for measuring the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a country and the fragmentation of party systems.

[2] For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, only personnel contributions since one year after their independence in 1995, 1993, 1992, 1992, 1995 and 1992, respectively, are recorded.

Calibration of Target Factor

In order to calibrate the set of states with a strong peacekeeping tradition, we set the threshold to 1, since countries with a score below unity contribute less to UNPOs than would be expected on the basis of their GDP. Table 4 lists the base variable values. Table 15 at the end of this appendix lists all set membership values.

Table 4. Scores for prior peacekeeping involvement

	Congo	Chad
Country	*ppi*	*ppi*
Austria	4.82	4.54
Belgium	0.36	0.36
Bulgaria	NA	5.99
Cyprus	0.00	0.00
Czech Republic	1.07	0.99
Estonia	0.60	0.51
Finland	6.34	5.99
France	1.08	1.07
Germany	0.12	0.14
Greece	0.29	0.32
Hungary	3.13	2.93
Ireland	5.49	5.41
Italy	0.36	0.43
Latvia	0.00	0.00
Lithuania	0.06	0.05
Luxembourg	0.00	0.00
Malta	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	0.58	0.57
Poland	10.47	9.95
Portugal	1.54	1.68
Romania	NA	3.61
Slovakia	21.80	19.78
Slovenia	0.63	0.70
Spain	0.24	0.26
Sweden	1.81	1.75
UK	0.58	0.55

Condition Factor: Competing Deployments (CD)

Factor levels: significant (s) / insignificant competing deployments (i)
Base variable: military capability stretch (*mcs*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

When a country has already committed troops to other operations, contributions to EUFOR missions will be negatively affected if it is close to overstretching its resources. Competing deployments have often been operationalized with binary indicators of concurrent mission involvement (see, for example Fordham, 2004; Lebovic, 2004; Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008). These indicators, however, do not reflect the impact of a set of parallel operations on a country's resources available for other missions. Many countries have long participated in multiple international operations at any given time.

In order to construct a more accurate indicator of military stretch, the size of a country's parallel deployments and military capabilities must be set in relation to each other. We operationalize the former as the number of troops committed to operations other than EUFORs Congo and Chad during their first year. With respect to military capabilities, these have often been measured through military spending (Fordham, 2004: 635). However, military spending is uninformative with respect to the output of the defense production process that generates the type of resources usable for CSDP missions (Beeres & Bogers, 2012) In order to increase the consistency of the indicator of a country's military capabilities with respect to out-of-area operations, we use deployable troop numbers as our measure. The ratio between deployed and deployable troop numbers (*tn*) then provides an indicator of military capability stretch (*mcs*) for country *i*. This is computed as given in equation (4):

$$\mathrm{mcs}_i = \frac{\mathrm{tn}_{i;\mathrm{deployed}}}{\mathrm{tn}_{i;\mathrm{deployable}}} \tag{4}$$

Data for deployed and deployable troop numbers as well as the resulting scores for military capability stretch are given in Table 5.

Table 5. Military capability stretch

	Congo			Chad		
Country	De/ed [a)]	De/ble [b)]	*mcs*	De/ed [c)]	De/ble [d)]	*mcs*
Austria	1230	2050	60.00	1150	2100	54.77
Belgium	753	6984[e)]	10.79	1200	6984	17.19
Bulgaria	494	NA	NA	789	5205	15.16
Cyprus	0	238[e)]	0.00	2	239	0.84
Czech Rep.	899	4566	19.69	858	8474	10.13
Estonia	221	563	39.26	197	644	30.60
Finland	706	6000	11.77	616	2300	26.79
France	9871	91000	10.85	10577	90000	11.76
Germany	7275	63004[e)]	11.55	6280	69591	09.03
Greece	1757	22182	7.93	1133	22182	5.11
Hungary	705	2122	33.23	862	2480	34.76
Ireland	624	850	73.42	174	850	20.48
Italy	5023	54800	9.17	7409	59000	12.56
Latvia	165	947[e)]	17.43	96	830	11.57
Lithuania	222	1140	19.48	243	1345	18.07
Luxemburg	37	311	11.90	34	241	14.11
Malta	0	149	0.00	0	159	0.00
Netherlands	2205	17724	12.45	1905	19054	10.00
Poland	4200	24300	17.29	2474	25100	9.86
Portugal	726	7168	10.13	670	6862	9.77
Romania	NA	NA	NA	1545	10244	15.09
Slovakia	633	641	98.76	509	2347	21.69
Slovenia	312	1579	19.76	485	1850	26.22
Spain	1877	39617	4.74	2946	44784	6.58
Sweden	792	3122	25.37	581	4422	13.14
UK	16509	74570	22.14	12978	77287	16.80

[a)] Source: International Institute Strategic Studies (2008a: 14) Troops deployed in EUFOR Congo and UNIFIL II have been subtracted from deployed units. UNIFIL II is not included because the conflict that caused this operation erupted after EUFOR Congo had reached full operational capability.

[b)] European Defence Agency (2008)

[c)] Source: Giegerich and Nicoll (2012: 60). Troops deployed in EUFOR Chad according to International Institute Strategic Studies (2009) are subtracted from deployed units.

[d)] Source: European Defence Agency (2009: 39)

[e)] As data for 2006 was incomplete, data for 2007 was used to fill the gaps.

Calibration of Target Factor

We use the official usability targets of NATO in order to calibrate the target set. At the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO countries agreed on a deployability target for ground forces of 40 percent and a sustainability target of 8 percent. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has also used these figures for internal assessments of all participating member states (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008a: 13). Based on this assessment, countries with at least 15 percent of its forces deployed and sustained in parallel are categorized as having significant competing deployments. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Condition Factor: Trade Volume (TV)

Factor levels: large (l) / small trade volume (s)
Base variable: trade volume relevance (*tvr*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

EUFORs Congo and Chad both had the objective of stabilizing the area of operations. In this connection, several studies in the burden-sharing literature have suggested that geographical distance is negatively related to the size of private benefits received from regional stability in the target area (Bove and Elia, 2011; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Perkins and Neumayer; 2008). However, while spatial proximity may matter for adjacent countries at risk of experiencing negative externalities created by social instability, all potential EUFOR troop contributors were so far away from the two areas of operation that conflict spillover or large refugee inflows did not impact their benefit calculations. Beyond a certain point of indifference to geographical distance, which seems to have been passed by all states without exception, any remaining variation becomes explanatorily irrelevant.[1]

[1] We did not find any evidence in parliamentary debates that increased refugee inflows to a particular country were a concern, although it was occasionally mentioned in conjunction with importing terrorism to Europe as a whole.

Instead of spatial proximity, we consider relational proximity in terms of trade interests a positive private benefit that is appreciably more relevant.[1] Several authors have hypothesized that economic interests drive countries' decisions to commit troops to peacekeeping operations (Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009: 833; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008: 903; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1479).[2] With respect to CSDP military missions, the maritime operation NAVFOR Atalanta has been mentioned as an illustrative case in point. Although the protection of humanitarian aid deliveries to Somalia in response to a request by the UN has been cited by the EU itself as its main motivation, some argue that the operation was set up primarily to defend European trade interests.[3] Anecdotal evidence for the significance of trade motives also exists for EUFOR Congo. While the UK has only little economic stakes in the DRC, and indeed did not contribute at all to the operation, France has strong interests in uranium abstraction and is the third largest exporter to the country (Cumming, 2011: 566-567).[4] We thus expect positive private benefits to result from troop contributions to one or both EUFORs, either by maintaining existing levels of trade relations or by increasing the probability for their future intensification.

The relevance of the trade volume for a country, however, is not only determined by absolute numbers. If the expected cost of contributing to an operation significantly outweighs the trade volume between a potential contributor and the country of operation, private benefits will be lower as when the trade volume was significantly higher than expected costs. The largest part of the data for bilateral

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[1] This does not exclude the case mentioned by Shimizu and Sandler (2002: 656), when trade flows are enhanced by stability in the proximity of states. We do not consider non-contributions to generate negative private benefits from ensuing reductions in trade flows.

[2] In contrast, Andersson (2002: 380), doubts that trade considerations have influenced commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, and Gegout (2009: 204), concludes that French trade interests have been irrelevant in EUFOR Congo.

[3] Article 1, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 12.11.2008, L301/33–L301/37. Germany, France, the Netherlands and Spain, a large part of whose international trade passes through the Gulf of Aden, are permanent contributors to the operation, with 4-7 surface combat vessels and 2-3 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.

[4] Decisions to contribute can also be based on current expectations of future trade opportunities. For example, conservative parliamentarians in the German *Bundestag* argued that participation was important as Congo possessed some of the largest copper and tantalite reserves worldwide. See *Bundestag* plenary protocol 16/36, 19 May 2006, page 3105.

trade figures have been obtained from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).[1] Gaps in the data were filled using other sources.[2] The base variable of trade volume relevance (*tvr*) is calculated as given in equation (5).

$$tvr_i = \frac{\sum_{t=-1}^{-6} \left(exp_{i,t} + imp_{i,t} \right) \sum_{j=1}^{n} GDP_j}{6 co_m GDP_i} \quad (5)$$

where *exp* is the export volume and *imp* the import volume between an EU member state and the country of operation, and co_m is the estimated total cost of the mission. For operation EUFOR Chad, the trade volume takes into account exports and imports for both Chad and the Central African Republic.

Calibration of Target Factor

Countries whose average trade volume prior to an operation amounts to at least 50 percent of the respective costs expected from contributing are categorized as having a large trade volume. Trade volume figures and the resulting figures for the relevance of the trade volume are presented in Table 6. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

[1] http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921.

[2] The figures for Lithuania and Latvia have been obtained by e-mail contact from the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Lithuania, 27 March 2013, and the Ministry of Economics of the Republic of Latvia, 3 April 2012.

Table 6. Trade volume relevance

Country	Congo			Chad		
	Average Trade Volume [a]	GDP Share [b]	*tvr*	Average Trade Volume [a]	GDP Share [b]	*tvr*
Austria	1.4	0.023	0.28	3.5	0.023	0.17
Belgium	851.4	0.028	140.73	85.5	0.027	3.53
Bulgaria	NA	NA	NA	0.3	0.002	0.19
Cyprus	0.1	0.001	0.34	0.2	0.001	0.18
Czech Rep.	1.4	0.008	0.79	2.4	0.008	0.32
Estonia	0.1	0.001	0.76	0.0	0.001	0.00
Finland	120.7	0.015	36.24	2.0	0.016	0.14
France	151.0	0.158	4.38	160.6	0.154	1.17
Germany	71.6	0.214	1.53	45.1	0.213	0.24
Greece	0.5	0.017	0.14	0.1	0.017	0.01
Hungary	0.5	0.006	0.39	0.4	0.006	0.08
Ireland	13.2	0.014	4.42	0.6	0.014	0.05
Italy	45.1	0.128	1.62	20.5	0.123	0.19
Latvia	0.1	0.001	0.18	0.1	0.001	0.07
Lithuania	0.3	0.002	0.83	0.0	0.002	0.01
Luxemburg	1.0	0.003	1.80	0.1	0.003	0.06
Malta	0.0	0.000	0.05	0.2	0.000	0.40
Netherlands	54.2	0.045	5.49	33.1	0.045	0.82
Poland	4.6	0.022	0.96	2.1	0.023	0.10
Portugal	23.4	0.013	7.97	46.1	0.013	3.99
Romania	NA	NA	NA	0.2	0.006	0.04
Slovakia	0.3	0.004	0.32	0.7	0.004	0.18
Slovenia	0.1	0.003	0.20	0.7	0.003	0.30
Spain	15.8	0.075	0.96	18.3	0.075	0.27
Sweden	10.5	0.031	1.55	8.8	0.031	0.32
UK	21.0	0.188	0.51	36.4	0.186	0.22

[a] in million US$; [b] share of GDP among EU member states.

Condition Factor: Public Support (PS)

Factor levels: high (h) / low public support (l)
Base variable: net public support (*nps*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

Condition membership is dependent on the public net support rate for the CSDP closely before the official request for participating in a possible operation has been issued. It is reasonable to assume that governments base their decision to issue a request themselves, or respond to one either positively or negatively, on the most recent information available to them. EUFOR Congo was set up in response to a written request by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, sent to the EU's presidency on 27 December 2005.[1] The first mentioning of a possible operation in Chad can be found in a diplomatic cable of the French ministry of foreign affairs, sent to all EU foreign ministries on 21 May 2007. With regards to EUFOR Congo, we thus use public opinion figures which have been published in Eurobarometer 63.4 (September 2005). With respect to operation EUFOR Chad, we use public opinion figures from Eurobarometer 65.2 (January 2007).

Public net support scores are based on the percentage figure for those respondents being for ESDP (*F*) minus the percentage figure for those being against it (*A*).[2] Questions on specific military operations or questions regarding conditional support have neither been asked in the standard nor special Eurobarometer surveys. Although general support for ESDP did not directly measure support for any military operation in particular, we assume that endorsement implies approval with regards to the general principles of CSDP as set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS), including conflict prevention in weak states or regions of states.[3]

We adjust these scores by an indicator of non-substantive responses (NSR). These may stem from various sources, including indifference to, lack of knowledge

[1] See UN Security Council Document S/2006/219 "Letter dated 12 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council" and UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006).

[2] The specific question asked was "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: A common defence and security policy among European Union Member States".

[3] See Solana (2003) for the original document. More detailed analyses of the ESS are provided by Rehrl and Weisserth (2010: 20-23) and Biscop (2005).

of or conflicting attitudes towards the issue being asked about, or even cost considerations on the part of the respondent (see, for example Berinsky, 2008; Francis & Busch, 1975; Gilljam & Granberg, 1993; Sicinski, 1970). Irrespective of their source, however, NSRs do not induce policy-makers to act either way. Net public support rates can be of the same magnitude, but at different ends of the continuum. A net public support rate of 20 percent may result from 25 percent positive and 5 percent negative responses or from 60 percent positive and 40 percent negative responses. Thus, ignoring NSRs in this example conceals the fact that in the former case, 70 percent of all respondents convey no information to policy-makers respecting the direction of action to take, whereas in the second case directional information is at a maximum. A low NSR rate in the case of a positive net support rate should therefore put more pressure on decision-makers to participate in a joint mission, whereas the same rate in the case of a negative net support rate should put more pressure on decision-makers to reject participation. In contrast, a high NSR rate in either case leaves room for decisional discretion on the side of executives. In order to factor in the degree to which policy-makers are confronted with directed public opinion, we subtract from the net support rate the figure for the share of respondents who answered "Don't know" (*DK*) in relation to their support for ESDP. In summary, net public support scores are arrived at according to equation (6).

$$nps=F-(A+DK) \tag{6}$$

Calibration of Target Factor

We assume that there is a magnitude continuum of net public support over which the propensity of governments to act in accordance with the direction of opinion increases. At the lower end, policy-makers prefer to allocate their limited resources of attention to issues where the corridor of action is narrower and ignore public opinion on CSDP. Such issues often include more pressing domestic concerns. However, as public opinion moves towards the mid-point of the continuum, governments register the issue as increasingly salient, and decide that it warrants closer attention. At larger magnitudes, governments cannot afford to remain inactive on the issue any longer. A clear majority for one direction exists, the policy corridor is narrow and any proposal for action seems unlikely to produce electorally unfavorable outcomes. Based on this presumed relation between public opinion and CSDP policy, countries with a net rate of at least 30 percent are categorized as having high public support. The resulting net public support scores

are given Table 7. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Table 7. Net public support

	Congo [a]				Chad [b]			
Country	*F*	*A*	*DK*	*nps*	*F*	*A*	*DK*	*nps*
Austria	61	29	11	21	55	32	13	10
Belgium	89	10	2	77	85	13	1	71
Bulgaria	NA	NA	NA	NA	70	8	21	41
Cyprus	94	4	3	87	87	4	9	74
Czech Rep.	86	9	5	72	87	8	5	74
Estonia	87	5	9	73	78	8	14	56
Finland	63	33	5	25	61	32	7	22
France	81	12	7	62	80	13	6	61
Germany	85	10	5	70	86	10	4	72
Greece	80	15	5	60	82	17	1	64
Hungary	83	9	8	66	81	8	11	62
Ireland	58	23	19	16	59	20	21	18
Italy	78	10	12	56	74	13	13	48
Latvia	85	5	10	70	81	8	11	62
Lithuania	76	6	18	52	75	7	17	51
Luxembourg	87	9	4	74	82	9	9	64
Malta	61	15	24	22	55	18	27	10
Netherlands	81	16	3	62	78	17	5	56
Poland	86	6	8	72	85	8	7	70
Portugal	71	11	17	43	61	11	28	22
Romania	NA	NA	NA	NA	75	5	19	51
Slovakia	85	10	6	69	83	11	6	66
Slovenia	90	5	5	80	82	12	6	64
Spain	70	13	17	40	67	9	24	34
Sweden	58	36	6	16	59	33	8	18
UK	59	27	14	18	57	30	13	14

[a] European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer Survey 63.4 (Field Work: June/July 2005, Publication: September 2005). Brussels: European Commission.

[b] European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer Survey 65.2 (Field Work: March/May 2006, Publication: January 2007). Brussels: European Commission.

Condition Factor: Budget Constraints (BC)

Factor levels: high (h) / low budget constraints (l)
Base variable: budget constraint severity (*bcs*)

Operationalization of Target Factor

Fiscal policy is one of the main instruments available to governments to influence aggregate demand, which in turn affects interest rates and inflation. During the 1970s, many governments in Europe had to learn the hard lessons of letting inflation spiral out of control, and it was not until after the mid-1980s that inflation had been brought down again to a sustainable level. In consequence, the convergence criteria that have been laid out for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the Maastricht Treaty included a number of measures which would prepare states for monetary integration and macroeconomic alignment.[1]

Besides a common currency and a centralized monetary policy, the two most important components of EMU include the provisions stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for all Euro-zone members, and the multilateral surveillance system (MSS) as part of the SGP for all EU members (Nugent, 2010: 332-334).[2] Two elements from the set of convergence criteria form its basis, namely ceilings on deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios.[3] These have to be met by all prospective Euro-zone members and observed by all existing ones. The deficit reference value is set to 3 percent and the debt reference value to 60 percent.[4] While the objective of these criteria is to ensure prudent fiscal policies, a breach is not consequential if it is exceptional or temporary, or if these ratios have declined substantially and continuously in previous years.[5]

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[1] For more details on the economic background to EMU, see Levitt and Lord (2000: 29-42) and Chang (2009:15-44).

[2] The MSS is also referred to as the "preventive arm" of the SGP.

[3] Article 140(1), consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 9.5.2008, C115/108-C115/109. The former usually receives more weight than the latter.

[4] Protocol 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 9.5. 2008, C115/279-C115/280.

[5] Council Regulations (EC) No 1055/05 and (EC) No 1056/05, which entered into force in July 2005, have introduced more flexibility in interpreting the SGP. Generally, the excess of a government deficit is considered exceptional and temporary if it results from an unusual

As the MSS also extends to non-Euro-zone members, these states are obliged to submit a convergence program to the Commission on their budgetary situation and objectives each year, whereas Euro-zone members submit stability programs. Excessive deficits may lead to recommendations being issued by the Commission as to their correction and the opening of an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) by the Council.[1] Ultimately, if a state against which an EDP has been filed does not comply in due time, usually two years, the Council may decide to impose financial sanctions if non-compliance persists after a second notice has been issued. As the UK and Denmark have received opt-outs from stage three of EMU, the European Commission does not assess these two countries in its convergence reports and they are not subject to certain procedures, but an EDP can be opened if any one or both of the two relevant criteria are not met.[2] In 2003, Sweden decided by referendum to stay outside the Euro-zone.

Irrespective of these concrete yet rather soft brakes on spending, all governments are exposed to pressures for budgetary constraint because high government deficits and debt crowd out private investment, they send up interest rates and fuel inflation, the two last factors of which also form part of the convergence criteria. Thus, the score a country receives in the set of budget-constrained states are dependent on three factors: the country's status with respect to EMU, the record of the government's budgetary situation over previous years, and the expected budgetary position in the year the operation was launched. Since EUFORs Congo and Chad took place before the economic and financial crisis hit the EU in 2008, a temporary justification for a sustained or new breach of the reference values did not exist during the concerned time period.

Establishing reasonable thresholds above and below which any variation on these factors becomes irrelevant should be relatively uncontroversial. Clearly, states that expected a deficit of less than 3 percent for the next reference date and financial liabilities of less than 60 percent of GDP, and that remained below the reference values in the previous three years should be considered as fully out of the set of budget-constrained states, irrespective of whether they already participated in EMU,

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event outside the control of the state with a major impact on the financial position of the government, and the excess is projected to subside following the end of such an event. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.

[1] The EDP is also referred to as the "corrective arm" of the SGP.

[2] The UK has twice been the subject of an EDP, first in January 2006 and again in July 2008. Since Denmark has also opted out of CSDP, its status with respect to EMU is irrelevant.

were to enter it in the future or had decided not to enter at all. Similarly, status is irrelevant for permanent fiscal transgressors. States with an expected deficit-to-GDP ratio of more than 3 percent and an expected debt-to-GDP-ratio of 60 percent forecast for the next reference date at the time when decisions on troop contributions were made are coded as full members in the set of budget-constrained states if the figures for these two criteria have also exceeded the reference values in the previous three years, meaning that the state had been subject to an EDP for quite some time and was likely to face intensified repudiation.

Since EDP sets in, however, once any one or both of the reference values have been exceeded, the status of a state with respect to EMU matters in all other scenarios. Most fundamentally, a hierarchy can be established whereby the gravity of the financial excess is reflected. EU member states with an EMU opt-out arrangement, albeit bound by the EDP, neither face the same formal consequences as participating states nor are they exposed to the same environment of peer pressure for due correction and the risk of losing their moral credibility, as happened in 2005 when Germany–the most demanding member state with regards to the establishment of the convergence criteria–continued to defy meeting the very fiscal discipline it insisted on in the first place and orchestrated a revision of the SGP in collaboration with France. Future members are most seriously affected by non-compliance because they are more closely monitored by the European Commission and the European Central Bank, and their governments have to show to their electorates a serious commitment to fulfilling their promise of taking the country into the "Euro-club".[1] Thus, prospective membership incurs higher costs for states in cases of non-compliance than existing membership, which itself incurs higher costs in such cases than non-membership with no obligation to change this status.

Based on these arguments, our calibration scheme for the set of states with high budgetary constraints takes into account a country's budgetary history, its expected budget situation, its status with respect to EMU and whether the deficit or

[1] Overall, a majority of citizens in the ten central and eastern European countries which acceded in 2004 and 2007 were in favor of the Euro at that time. The only four countries where opinion was negative were Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. See *Flash Eurobarometer 214* "*Introduction of the Euro in the New Member States*", November 2007, for detailed figures. The Accession Treaties stipulate the duty to join the Eurozone once all convergence criteria have been met. Opt-outs such as those received by Denmark and the UK are not possible for the Central and East European member states.

the debt criterion or both were concerned. The calibration scheme is summarized in Table 8 below.

Calibration of Target Factor

The budget performance figures and resulting scores for budget constraint severity based on the scheme presented in Table 8 are provided in Table 9. If the deficit or debt ratio limit had been breached in the year before an operation, the country was categorized as having a highly constrained budget. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Table 8. Measurement scheme for budget constraint severity

Criteria	*bcs*
No breach of deficit or debt ratio limits in preceding three years	0.00
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached once but not in preceding year	0.10
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached once but not in preceding year	0.20
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached twice but not in preceding year	0.30
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached twice but not in preceding year	0.40
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached in year before operation	0.50
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached in year before operation	0.60
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached twice in preceding years	0.70
Deficit and debt ratio limit breached twice in years before operation	0.80
Deficit or debt ratio limit breached continuously in preceding three years	0.90
Deficit and debt ratio limits breached continuously in preceding years	1.00

Table 9. Budget performance and budget constraint severity

		deficit				debt				bcs	
Country	EMU	2003[a)]	2004[a)]	2005[a)]	2006[a)]	2003[a)]	2004[a)]	2005[a)]	2006[a)]	Congo	Chad
Austria	1999	-0.7	-4.4	-1.7	-1.5	65.3	64.7	64.2	62.3	0.90	0.90
Belgium	1999	-0.1	-0.1	-2.5	0.4	98.4	94.0	92.0	88.0	0.90	1.00
Bulgaria	pros	-0.4	1.9	1.0	1.9	44.4	37.0	27.5	21.6	NA	0.00
Cyprus	2008	-6.6	-4.1	-2.4	-1.2	69.7	70.9	69.4	64.7	0.95	0.90
Czech Rep.	pros	-6.7	-2.8	-3.2	-2.4	28.6	28.9	28.4	28.3	0.50	0.10
Estonia	2011	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.5	5.6	5.0	4.6	4.4	0.05	0.00
Finland	1999	2.6	2.5	2.9	4.2	44.5	44.4	41.7	39.6	0.00	0.50
France	1999	-4.1	-3.6	-2.9	-2.3	62.9	64.9	66.4	63.7	0.90	1.00
Germany	1999	-4.2	-3.8	-3.3	-1.6	64.4	66.2	68.5	68.0	1.00	1.00
Greece	2001	-5.6	-7.5	-5.2	-5.7	97.4	98.6	100.0	106.1	1.00	1.00
Hungary	pros	-7.3	-6.5	-7.9	-9.4	58.6	59.5	61.7	65.9	0.95	0.90
Ireland	1999	0.4	1.4	1.7	2.9	30.7	29.5	27.3	24.6	0.00	0.00
Italy	1999	-3.6	-3.5	-4.4	-3.4	103.9	103.4	105.7	106.3	1.00	1.00
Latvia	pros	-1.6	-1.0	-0.4	-0.5	14.7	15.0	12.5	10.7	0.05	0.00
Lithuania	pros	-1.3	-1.5	-0.5	-0.4	21.0	19.3	18.3	17.9	0.05	0.00
Luxumb.	1999	0.5	-1.1	0.0	1.4	6.2	6.3	6.1	6.7	0.00	0.00
Malta	2008	-9.0	-4.6	-2.9	-2.7	66.0	69.8	68.0	62.5	0.95	0.90
Netherlands	1999	-3.1	-1.7	-0.3	0.5	52.0	52.4	51.8	47.4	0.10	0.00
Poland	pros	-6.2	-5.4	-4.1	-3.6	47.1	45.7	47.1	47.7	0.95	0.90
Portugal	1999	-3.7	-4.0	-6.5	-4.6	59.4	61.9	67.7	69.4	0.90	1.00
Romania	pros	-1.5	-1.2	-1.2	-2.2	21.5	18.7	15.8	12.4	NA	0.00
Slovakia[b)]	2008	-2.8	-2.4	-2.8	-3.2	42.4	41.5	34.2	30.5	0.05	0.50
Slovenia	2007	-2.7	-2.3	-1.5	-1.4	27.2	27.3	26.7	26.4	0.05	0.00
Spain	1999	-0.3	-0.1	1.3	2.4	48.8	46.3	43.2	39.7	0.00	0.00
Sweden	opt	-1.0	0.6	2.2	2.3	51.7	50.3	50.4	45.3	0.00	0.00
UK	opt	-3.4	-3.5	-3.4	-2.7	39.1	41.0	42.2	43.3	0.90	0.40

[a)] European Commission (2013), "Government Deficit and Debt", (Eurostat database) (Accessed on 14 November 2013 at. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/data/database).

[b)] Joined EMU in 2009, but was a prospective member at the time when the operations were planned.

[c)] Joined in January 2007. Adjustment on for EUFOR Congo.

Condition Factor: Election Distance (ED)

Factor levels: large (l) / small election distance (s)
Base variable: time from operation reference date until next election (*tre*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

The impact of electoral calculations on the decision to deploy troops has generated a rich body of literature, but considerable disagreement about the effect of electoral calculations on decisions to send armed forces abroad persists.[1] While supporters of diversionary theories of war expect political leaders to use the deployment of military force to draw the general public's attention away from domestic problems, literature on democratic peace and casualty aversion expects decision-makers to be careful not to upset the public by resorting to military means. With respect to EU peacekeeping operations, the latter theory appears to enjoy much higher applicability for two reasons. First, both operations involved the use of force on only a relatively small scale, large enough to draw public attention but insufficient for diversionary tactics (Fordham, 1998: 570). And second, although being in favor of CSDP, in most European countries the public has expressed skepticism towards the usefulness of military means, making electoral punishment more probable than rewards, even if an operation is perceived as successful (Brummer, 2007).

The political risks of contributing to an operation can therefore be assumed to outweigh its gains, possibly even to the extent that no electoral pay-offs exist at all at any stage of the electoral cycle. Right after a general election, we thus expect other factors than electoral ones to influence decisions on contributions to CSDP operations. However, towards the end of an electoral cycle, when there is nothing to gain but only much to lose in electoral terms from contributing to military adventures abroad, executives should attempt to keep the country's burden as low as possible, or even try and abstain altogether (Gaubatz, 1991; Nincic, 1990). The proximity of the next general election to an operation should thus affect a country's eventual contribution.

We consider two events important. First, between the initial mentioning of a possible operation and the adoption of a Council Joint Action policy-makers are under most pressure to reach a decision. We thus define this point as an operation's reference date. The crucial mentioning and adoption dates are 27 December 2005

[1] For a review of this literature, see Aldrich et al. (2006).

and 27 April 2006 for EUFOR Congo, and 21 May 2007 and 15 October 2007 for EUFOR Chad. Second, we use the *ParlGov* database to determine the date of a country's next general election (Döring & Manow, 2012). In order to determine the length of the period between these points, we simply take the time in days (*tre*) from the reference date d_{rd} to the date of a country *i*'s next election $d_{ne,i}$ as given by equation (7):

$$tre_i = d_{ne,i} - d_{rd}. \quad (7)$$

Calibration of Target Factor

If the reference date is more than one year away from the next general election, the country is categorized as having elections at large distance. The resulting figures are given in Table 10 below. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Condition Factor: Parliamentary Powers (PP)

Factor levels: significant (s) / insignificant parliamentary powers (i)
Base variable: parliamentary powers and government situation (*ppg*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

The condition factor *parliamentary powers* reflects the variance in parliamentary control over executive decisions on troop deployments (Wagner, 2006). Countries in which parliamentary approval was necessary prior to the deployment of troops abroad are assigned a base variable score above 0.5. However, these countries still vary in two important ways. First, parliaments that have to consent to an operation prior to the signing of a Council Joint Action are more powerful that parliaments for which this prerogative does not apply. Due to the difficulty for a government to repeal its pledges after having committed to a Joint Action, the latter are often confronted with a *fait accompli* (Born et al., 2008: 29; Wagner, 2006). And secondly, parliaments are expected to have more influence in countries governed by minority government because consent from parliamentarians of non-governmental parties is required.

Table 10. Base variable figures for election distance

Country	Next election EUFOR Congo	*tre*	Next election EUFOR Chad	*tre*
Austria	01/10/2006	218	28/09/2008	423
Belgium	10/06/2007	470	13/06/2010	1046
Bulgaria	NA	NA	05/07/2009	703
Cyprus	21/05/2006	85	22/05/2011	1389
Czech Rep.	03/06/2006	98	29/05/2010	1031
Estonia	04/03/2007	372	06/03/2011	1312
Finland	18/03/2007	386	17/04/2011	1354
France	10/06/2007	470	10/06/2012	1774
Germany	27/09/2009	1310	27/09/2009	787
Greece	16/09/2007	568	16/09/2007	45
Hungary	09/04/2006	43	25/04/2010	997
Ireland	24/05/2007	453	25/02/2011	1303
Italy	09/04/2006	43	13/04/2008	255
Latvia	07/10/2006	224	02/10/2010	1157
Lithuania	12/10/2008	960	12/10/2008	437
Luxemburg	07/06/2009	1198	07/06/2009	675
Malta	08/03/2008	742	08/03/2008	219
Netherlands	22/11/2006	270	09/06/2010	1042
Poland	19/10/2007	601	19/10/2007	78
Portugal	27/09/2009	1310	27/09/2009	787
Romania	NA	NA	30/11/2008	486
Slovakia	17/06/2006	112	12/06/2010	1045
Slovenia	21/09/2008	939	21/09/2008	416
Spain	09/03/2008	743	09/03/2008	220
Sweden	01/10/2006	204	19/09/2010	1144
UK	06/05/2010	1531	06/05/2010	1008

Parliaments can still play a constraining role in the absence of approval powers, namely when the executive is obliged to consult or inform about its decisions. Countries where this is the case are assigned a base variable score below 0.5. But again, parliaments in this second group are more powerful when facing a minority government. This measurement scheme is summarized in Table 11.

Calibration of Target Factor

Information on parliamentary powers is based on a survey of parliamentary war powers as of spring 2003 for the then 25 EU member and accession states (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010). This information was supplemented with three more recent sources to account for later developments (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008; Peters, Wagner & Deitelhoff, 2010). Information on Bulgaria and Romania was also retrieved from these publications. The *ParlGov* database was used to assess whether a country was governed by a minority government (Döring & Manow, 2012). The country data are provided in Table 12. If not only information or consultation, but explicit parliamentary approval was required for military deployment, or if a minority government was in place at the time when contributions to an operation were discussed, the country was categorized as having significant parliamentary war powers. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Table 11. Measurement scheme for parliamentary powers and government situation

Classification	Main Criterion	*ppg*
Approval required before Joint Action and minority government	Prior approval required	1.0
Approval required before Joint Action or minority government		0.8
Approval required before troop deployment and majority government		0.6
Consultation parliament required and minority government	Information or consultation rights	0.4
Consultation parliament required and majority government		0.2
No role parliament	No formal role	0.0

Table 12. Parliamentary powers and government situation

Country	Prior Approval	Before Joint Action	Consultation	Minority Government	
				Congo	Chad
Austria	×		×	×	
Belgium			×		×
Bulgaria				NA	
Cyprus	×		×		
Czech Rep.	×		×		×
Estonia	×		×		
Finland	×	×	×		
France			×		
Germany	×		×		
Greece					
Hungary			×		×
Ireland	×		×		
Italy	×		×		
Latvia	×		×	×	
Lithuania	×		×		×
Luxembourg	×	×	×		
Malta	×		×		
Netherlands	×		×		
Poland			×	×	
Portugal			×	×	×
Romania				NA	×
Slovakia	×		×	×	
Slovenia			×		
Spain	×		×	×	×
Sweden	×	×	×	×	
UK			×		

Condition Factor: Executive Partisanship (EP)

Factor levels: right (r) / left executive partisanship (l)
Base variable: executive ideological orientation (*eio*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

The calculation of executive ideological orientation draws on the *ParlGov* database, which measures party positions on a scale from 0 to 10 based on the mean values of information from party expert surveys (Döring & Manow, 2012). In line with previous studies, we aggregate all government party positions (*n*) into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation (*eio*) by summing up each party's (*j*) ideological position on the left-right scale (*pp*), weighted by its proportion of the total number of seats (*s*), as specified in equation (8) (Mello, 2012: 436; Palmer, 1990: 486).

$$\mathrm{eio}_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{s_j \mathrm{pp}_j}{n}. \qquad (8)$$

Calibration of Target Factor

We categorize an executive as right if it scores at least 5 on the ideology scale. The base variable values resulting from the application of equation (8) are given in Table 13. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all set membership values.

Condition Factor: Legislative Partisanship (LP)

Factor levels: right (r) / left legislative partisanship (l)
Base variable: parliamentary ideological orientation (*pio*)

Operationalization of Base Variable

The calculation of parliamentary ideological orientation draws on the *ParlGov* database, which measures party positions on a scale from 0 to 10 based on the mean values of information from party expert surveys (Döring & Manow, 2012). In line with previous studies, we aggregate all party positions (*n*) into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation (*pio*) by summing up each party's (*j*) ideological position on the left-right scale (*pp*), weighted by its proportion of the total number of seats (*s*), as specified in equation (9) (Mello, 2012: 436f; Palmer, 1990: 486).

Table 13. Executive ideological orientation

Country	Congo	Chad
Austria	6.80	5.08
Belgium	4.99	5.12
Bulgaria	NA	4.10
Cyprus	2.46	2.72
Czech Rep.	3.98	6.99
Estonia	5.37	7.47
Finland	4.84	6.14
France	7.40	7.50
Germany	5.06	5.06
Greece	6.70	6.70
Hungary	3.01	2.90
Ireland	6.27	5.89
Italy	7.31	2.58
Latvia	6.73	6.96
Lithuania	3.71	5.38
Luxemburg	5.26	5.26
Malta	5.70	5.70
Netherlands	6.29	4.98
Poland	7.70	7.02
Portugal	4.00	4.00
Romania	NA	6.07
Slovakia	4.29	4.51
Slovenia	6.81	6.81
Spain	3.70	3.70
Sweden	3.40	7.21
UK	4.40	4.40

$$pio_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{s_j pp_j}{n}. \quad (9)$$

Calibration of Target Factor

We categorize a parliament as right if it scores at least 5.25 on the ideology scale. The base variable values resulting from the application of equation (9) are given in Table 14. Table 15 at the end of this document lists all membership values.

Table 14. Parliamentary ideological orientation

Country	Congo	Chad
Austria	5.28	5.30
Belgium	5.67	5.67
Bulgaria	NA	5.15
Cyprus	4.30	4.81
Czech Rep.	6.32	4.70
Estonia	5.09	6.19
Finland	6.14	5.29
France	4.63	5.66
Germany	5.55	4.63
Greece	4.71	5.55
Hungary	5.63	4.65
Ireland	5.45	5.69
Italy	5.63	4.68
Latvia	5.09	5.90
Lithuania	5.46	5.36
Luxemburg	5.00	5.46
Malta	5.16	5.01
Netherlands	6.12	4.81
Poland	4.76	6.12
Portugal	5.46	4.76
Romania	NA	4.96
Slovakia	5.45	5.62
Slovenia	4.90	5.44
Spain	5.29	5.45
Sweden	5.28	5.22
UK	5.67	5.29

Table 15. Summary of Condition and Outcome Membership by Capability Indicator (GDP, population, percent average GDP and population)

	Outcome		Condition Factors																	
	CS{·}		PT{·}		CD{·}		TV{·}		PS{·}		BC{·}		ES{·}		PP{·}		EP{·}		LP{·}	
Case	CO [a]	CH [b]	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH
Austria	u, u, u	o, o, o	s	s	s	s	s	s	l	l	h	h	s	l	s	s	r	r	r	r
Belgium	o, o, o	e, o, o	w	w	i	s	l	l	h	h	h	h	l	l	i	i	l	r	r	r
Bulgaria	–	o, u, u	–	s	–	s	–	s	–	h	–	l	–	l	–	i	–	l	–	l
Cyprus	o, e, o	o, e, o	w	w	i	i	s	s	h	h	h	h	s	l	s	s	l	l	l	l
Czech Rep.	u, u, u	u, u, u	s	w	s	i	l	s	h	h	h	l	s	l	s	s	l	r	l	l
Estonia	u, u, u	u, u, u	w	w	s	s	l	s	h	h	l	l	l	l	s	s	r	r	r	r
Finland	e, e, e	o, o, o	s	s	i	s	l	s	l	l	l	h	l	l	s	s	l	r	l	r
France	o, o, o	o, o, o	s	s	i	i	l	l	h	h	h	h	l	l	i	i	r	r	r	r
Germany	e, e, e	u, u, u	w	w	i	i	l	s	h	h	h	h	l	l	s	s	r	r	l	l
Greece	u, u, u	u, u, u	w	w	i	i	s	s	h	h	h	h	l	s	i	i	r	r	r	r
Hungary	u, u, u	u, u, u	s	s	s	s	s	s	h	h	h	h	s	l	i	i	l	l	l	l
Ireland	u, u, u	o, o, o	s	s	s	s	l	s	l	l	l	l	l	l	s	s	r	r	r	r
Italy	u, u, u	u, u, u	w	w	i	i	l	s	h	h	h	h	s	s	s	s	r	l	r	l
Latvia	u, u, u	u, u, u	w	w	s	i	s	s	h	h	l	l	s	l	s	s	r	r	r	r
Lithuania	u, u, u	o, u, e	w	w	s	s	l	s	h	h	l	l	l	l	s	s	l	r	l	r
Luxembourg	e, o, o	e, o, o	w	w	i	i	l	s	h	h	l	l	l	l	s	s	r	r	r	r
Malta	u, u, u	u, u, u	w	w	i	i	s	s	l	l	h	h	l	s	s	s	r	r	l	l
Netherlands	e, e, e	e, e, e	w	w	i	i	l	l	h	h	l	l	s	l	s	s	r	l	l	l

[a] EUFOR Congo; [b] EUFOR Chad/CAR.

Table 15. (continued)

	Outcome		Condition Factors																	
	CS{-}		PT{-}		CD{-}		TV{-}		PS{-}		BC{-}		ES{-}		PP{-}		EP{-}		LP{-}	
Case	CO [a)]	CH [b)]	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH	CO	CH
Poland	o, e, o	o, o, o	s	s	s	i	l	s	h	h	h	h	l	s	i	i	r	r	r	r
Portugal	o, o, o	u, u, u	s	s	i	i	l	l	h	l	h	h	l	l	i	i	l	l	l	l
Romania	–	u, u, u	–	s	–	s	–	s	–	h	–	l	–	l	–	i	–	r	–	l
Slovakia	u, u, u	u, u, u	s	s	s	s	s	s	h	h	l	h	s	l	s	s	l	l	r	r
Slovenia	e, u, e	o, o, o	w	w	s	s	s	s	h	h	l	l	l	l	i	i	r	r	r	r
Spain	e, e, e	u, u, u	w	w	i	i	l	s	h	h	l	l	l	s	s	s	l	l	r	r
Sweden	e, o, o	o, o, o	s	s	s	i	l	s	l	l	l	l	s	l	s	s	l	r	l	l
UK	u, u, u	u, u, u	w	w	s	s	l	s	l	l	h	l	l	l	i	i	l	l	r	r

[a)] EUFOR Congo; [b)] EUFOR Chad/CAR.

6

Article 2: Democratic Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations - A Two-Step Fuzzy Set QCA of UNIFIL II

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Abstract

Why did some democracies carry a disproportionately large share of the burden of the 2006 reinforcement of UNIFIL, while others hardly contribute at all? Although the division of the burden of UN peacekeeping operations has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention, neither the impact of domestic variables, nor the interaction between the domestic and international determinants of peacekeeping contributions has been systematically analysed. This article aims to fill this gap in academic research. First, insights from research on peacekeeping burden sharing, democratic peace theory and integrated decision models are combined in a multi-causal framework. Subsequently, two-step fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used to assess whether this model explains diverging contributions to the 2006 enhancement of the UNIFIL operation. The results of this analysis show that contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. Two combinations of international level conditions allowed for large contributions. In the absence of significant military engagements, military capable states and states with a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs had an incentive to participate. Actual contributions, however, only materialized if such a conductive international context was combined with favourable domestic conditions: only states governed by a left-leaning government that was not constrained by either proximate general elections or a right-leaning parliament with extensive veto powers participated in the operation.

Introduction

Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was reinforced significantly. The EU member states carried the brunt of the burden of this reinforcement. However, while many member states made sizeable personnel contributions, others did not contribute at all. This article aims to explain the pattern of contributions to UNIFIL II. Hereby, it addresses a substantial gap in the academic literature on peacekeeping burden sharing (e.g. Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). The bulk of the research on the subject consists of empirical tests of collective-action-based models. Scarce studies that do take into account a wider range of conditions almost exclusively focus on international-level determinants. Hereby, the impact of domestic-level conditions remains largely unexamined.

A rare exception to this fixation on external explanations are the many studies that establish a link between a states' level of democracy and its propensity to contribute to (UN) peacekeeping operations. Several scholars have posited that democracies are more likely to contribute personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPOs) than non-democracies (e.g. Andersson, 2002; Lebovic, 2004; Victor, 2010: 226). Explanations for this correlation generally build on the normative model of democratic peace: democracies are more inclined to participate in UNPOs because the latter's goal of promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict corresponds to their domestic political norms. More recently however, democratic peace research has emphasized the significant variation across democratic political systems, which, in turn, affects their international behaviour (e.g. Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Prins & Sprecher, 1999). Based on this logic, the domestic differences between democracies can be expected to affect their propensity to contribute to UNPOs. Unfortunately, previous studies have not systematically explored the impact of cross-democratic domestic variation on contributions to UNPOs.

The lack of attention to domestic conditions not only contrasts sharply with recent democratic peace research, but also with studies that build on integrated models to explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994). The latter consistently conclude that contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. However, such integrated models have been exclusively used to explain diverging contributions to operations conducted by coalitions of the willing or under the aegis of NATO or the EU. In consequence, a structured analysis that links cross-democratic domestic variation to participation in UNPOs, let alone examines the

complex interplay between domestic and international conditions, has not yet been produced.

This study aims to fill this gap. It combines international and domestic conditions in an integrated model that aims to explain varying contributions to UNPOs. It focusses on the 2006 reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) because this is one of the few recent UNPOs to which traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions. In consequence, it constitutes a particularly suited case for testing a model that aims to explain varying democratic contributions to UN-peacekeeping. Two-step fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is used to examine whether the model can explain the varying contributions to this operation. The results of the analysis reveal that personnel contributions to UNIFIL II indeed depend on a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions. Contributions are only possible if the absence of military stretch is combined with either a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs or sizeable military capabilities. However, for large contributions to materialize, these international level conditions must be combined with favourable domestic conditions, more specifically with a left-leaning executive that is neither constrained by proximate elections or a right-leaning parliament with extensive veto powers.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive literature on peacekeeping burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an integrated model that aims to explain diverging contributions to UNPOs. The next section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and discusses the operationalization of the condition and the outcome. The third section presents the results of the analysis, before the conclusions recapitulate the study's major findings.

Democratic Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

I build on three partially overlapping areas of academic research to develop an integrated model for explaining democratic contributions to UNPOs. First, I derive plausible international level explanations from previous research on peacekeeping operations. Subsequently, I draw on democratic peace theory to identify cross-democratic differences that could be relevant for explaining varying contributions to UNPOs. Lastly, I build on integrated decision models to formulate hypotheses on how contribution decisions are produced by specific combinations of international and domestic conditions. Although the resulting framework integrates hypotheses

from the prevailing theories on military burden sharing and democratic peace, it does not incorporate all explanatory variables raised in previous research. Most importantly, the quality of a state's democracy is not included in the framework, since this study aims to explain the contributions of states that adhere to the fundamental standards of democratic governance, any variation above which should be explanatorily irrelevant. In consequence, an assessment of the impact of democratic quality on a state's propensity to participate in UNPO's is beyond the scope of this study.

International Level Explanations

The rich literature on UN peacekeeping offers a range of plausible international level determinants for contributions to UNPOs. The vast majority of academic research focusses on testing public goods theory (e.g. Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). Peacekeeping produces a variety of public benefits. At the most general level, UN peacekeeping aims to achieve greater worldwide peace and stability, which benefits all nations, regardless of whether they contribute to operations. A testable implication of the public goods model is that peacekeeping burdens are expected to be shared unevenly. More specifically, because the contributions of larger states are expected to satisfy the amount of peacekeeping desired by smaller states, the former are expected to shoulder a disproportionately large share of the burden of UNPOs (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 655).

A number of empirical studies demonstrates that larger states indeed carry a disproportionately large burden of peacekeeping operations, hereby confirming public goods models (e.g. Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). Recent research suggests that public benefits are especially important for UN-financed operations, which are expected to be less driven by self-interest than non-UN operations (e.g. Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). This is in line with studies that examine the pattern of UN involvement in violent conflicts, which generally conclude this closely reflects the degree to which a conflict poses a threat to international peace and security, not the "parochial" interests of the members of the UN Security Council (e.g. Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003).

Although empirical tests of public goods models generally focus on financial burden sharing, public goods theory is expected to have explanatory value for personnel contributions to specific operations. More specifically, states without sizeable military capabilities are unlikely to contribute solely to secure public

benefits, since they can only hope to have a marginal impact on the total available amount of benefits, which, if public, cannot be denied to them if they do not participate (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 20). Previous research suggests that military capabilities are indeed positively correlated with personnel contributions. In a study of African contributions to peacekeeping operations, Victor (2010: 225), for example, concludes that "states with larger armed forces tend to deploy more peacekeepers". Similarly, the study of Bove and Elia (2011: 712) convincingly demonstrates that "the size of a state's military predicts the contribution to UN peacekeeping". States with large *military capabilities* can thus be expected to have an incentive to contribute to secure the public benefits of UNPOs.

While empirical evidence supports public goods models, previous research suggests that two country specific benefits also increase the likelihood and/or size of personnel contributions. First of all, several studies demonstrate that geographic proximity to the target country increases a state's inclination to contribute to a peacekeeping operation (e.g. Bove & Elia, 2011; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008). This correlation can be attributed to the specific benefits peacekeeping produces for states situated closer to a conflict, such as reduced refugee inflows, more secure supply lines, enhanced trade flows following the return of regional stability etc. (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 182; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1480). *Geographic proximity* can therefore be expected to provide states an incentive to contribute to UNPOs.

A second contributor specific benefit are the status gains from being recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 182). Although these gains are available to all potential contributors, states that invested a large amount of resources to support the UN peacekeeping system in the past can reasonably be expected to attach more importance to its benefits. This corresponds to the conclusion of Bobrow and Boyer (1997: 731) that peacekeeping "activism can become a habit" and Lebovic (2004: 928), whose findings indicate that a country's level of previous commitment to UNPOs is a significant determinant of future participation. In consequence, *prior peacekeeping involvement* is expected to have a positive impact on a state's propensity to contribute to UNPOs.

Previous research thus suggests several possible international incentives for contributing to UNPOs. However, conditions situated at the international level can also constrain a state's ability to contribute. A particular important constraint is the extent to which a state's military capabilities are stretched by engagements in other operations. Evidently, troops deployed in parallel operations can impossibly participate in a UNPO. Furthermore, states whose available military resources are

already strained might not be willing to further constrain their future freedom of action by committing resources to a UNPO (Bove & Elia, 2011; Lebovic, 2004: 915). Victor (2010: 223, 225) and Lebovic (2004), for example, conclude that states that are engaged in external conflicts are less likely to participate in peacekeeping operations, Bove and Elia (2011) draw similar conclusions on the impact of the number of operations sustained at the same time as the UNPO. *Military stretch* can thus be expected to constrain a state's ability to contribute personnel to UNPOs.

Domestic Level Explanations

In contrast to the extensive research on the international determinants of peacekeeping contributions, few studies have examined the impact of conditions situated at the domestic level. A state's level of democracy is one of the few domestic factors that is consistently linked to peacekeeping contributions. The results of Andersson (2002), for example, reveal that democracies are significantly more committed to UN interventions than anocracies and autocracies. Similarly, Lebovic (2004: 933) demonstrates that a state's level of democracy "accounts for whether and how much countries contributed personnel"; while Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 710) show that it is "one of the most influential determinants governing the probability of country participation".

The link between democracy and peacekeeping contributions parallels the strong academic consensus that democracies behave different from non-democracies in international relations (cf. inter alia Hegre, 2014; Maoz & Russett, 1993). Studies on the subject generally focus on examining whether and why democracies are less war-prone than non-democracies (Hegre, 2014: 624). A more recent strand of democratic peace research, however, emphasizes the significant differences between democracies, which, in turn, affects their propensity to resort to military force (cf. e.g. Ireland & Gartner, 2001; Mello, 2012; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004). Based on this logic, domestic differences between democracies can also be expected to affect contributions to UNPOs. However, previous studies have not systematically explored the link between cross-democratic domestic variation and participation in UNPOs.

A first set of cross-democratic differences that might have an impact on peacekeeping contributions is the variation in institutional constraints on executive action. Building on the structural model of democratic peace, several scholars showed that states in which parliament has a veto on military deployments are less likely to resort to the use of force. Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824), for example, conclude that "greater legislative controls over foreign policy […] is associated with

lower propensity to initiate disputes", while Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative constraints "are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force". Similarly, Auerswald (1999) concludes that executives are more reluctant to use force if parliaments can overturn its decision to do so. Evidently, parliaments with extensive war powers can also constitute a veto point against contributions to a UNPO, and consequentially, prevent states from participating. The level of *parliamentary veto powers* is therefore expected to affect whether states contribute to UNPOs.

A second, possible, domestic determinant of democratic contributions to UNPOs is the temporal distance towards the next general election. Since governing parties might fear suffering at the polls for resorting to the use of force, several studies expect that democratic leaders will not initiate international conflict when elections are nearby (Auerswald, 1999: 474; Gaubatz, 1991). In contrast, research building on "diversionary theory of war" predicts that executives will be more inclined to initiate conflict at the end of an electoral cycle, since this constitutes an opportunity to create a rallying around the flag effect and, hereby, improve their prospects for re-election (Meernik & Waterman, 1996). However, UNPOs cannot reasonably be expected to create such an effect, since there are generally no distinct adversaries in these operations. In contrast, governing parties might fear the negative electoral ramifications of contributing to UNPOs, which their domestic constituencies might consider superfluous. Therefore, *electoral proximity* is expected to have a negative impact on a political leader's inclination to contribute.

Lastly, several studies have examined the impact of party politics on the foreign policy of established democracies. Building on evidence that the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than the elctoral platforms of left-leaning parties; Palmer, London and Regan (2004: 2) assert that the former should be more inclined to support the use of force in international relations. Their results confirm this inference. Similarily, Stevens (2015) asserts that supporters of right-leaning parties are less likely to disapprove war and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq-war. Unlike the operations examined in the afore-mentioned studies, UNPOs are however "deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement" and guided by three basic principles: "consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force". In consequence, the distinction between the pro-military right and pro-peace left seems inadequate to explain participation in UNPOs.

Rathbun (2004) offers a more elaborate three-dimensional model on the link between ideology and the use of military force. This not only expects leftist parties to be more antimilitaristic, but also to prefer pursuing their interests through

multilateral frameworks and to follow a more inclusive conception of the national interest, which comprises the promotion of the welfare of other countries (Rathbun, 2004: 18-21). Rightist parties on the other hand, have a more narrow conception of the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in international relations and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral institutions.

Rathbun's model induces the expectation that leftist parties will be more supportive of UNPOs than of other military operations. The general goal of promoting peace and stability corresponds to their inclusive conception of national interests, supporting the UN peacekeeping system complies with their preference for multilateralism. Moreover, contributing to UNPOs does not contradict their averseness to the use of military means. Leftist parties are antimilitaristic because they consider the use of force an act of subordination, which strengthens inequality between nations (Rathbun, 2007). This is however not the case for UNPOs, since consent of local actors is a fundamental principle of UN Peacekeeping. Given their exclusive conception of national interests, rightist leaders will be less inclined to support UNPOs solely for securing the public good of greater worldwide stability. On top of that, they have less "trust" in multilateral institutions, which makes them more susceptible to the fear that others will free-ride on their efforts (Rathbun, 2011: 245, 254-255). Therefore, a history of contributing to UNPOs is not expected to induce support from rightist parties. Right-leaning parties can however be expected to participate in UNPOs when their state risks being affected by the negative externalities of a conflict, which depends on the spatial distance towards the target conflict.

Integrated Decision Model

Starting with a seminal article of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994), several scholars have developed integrated decision models to explain contributions to collective military operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010). The latter generally incorporate both international and domestic conditions, and formulate hypotheses on how specific combinations of domestic and international conditions produces contribution decisions. In line with these studies, personnel contributions to UNPOs can be expected to result from a complex interplay between the aforementioned conditions.

States with a high level of prior involvement in UN peacekeeping, sizeable military capabilities, or situated close to the area of operations are expected to have an incentive to make large personnel contributions; but only if their capabilities are

not stretched by other military engagements. The impact of these international level conditions is however expected to depend on domestic conditions. Whether a specific incentive leads to actual contributions is contingent on the ideological preferences of the relevant actors. Whereas left-leaning parties are expected to support contributing to UNPOs to continue their state's peacekeeping tradition or to provide the public good of greater world-wide stability, right-leaning parties will only contribute if it is deployed to mitigate the negative externalities of nearby conflict.

Party politics not only interact with international level incentives, but also with parliamentary veto power. Choi (2010: 441) contends that the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012: 427) maintains that only the combination of a left-leaning parliament with extensive war powers could create an effective veto point against a right-leaning executive's decision to participate in the Iraq war. Parliamentary veto power can thus only constrain contributions if the legislative and executive branch have a different ideological orientation.

Several causal paths towards large personnel contributions can be derived from the above discussion. These are summarized in the integrated model presented in Figure 1. In the absence of military stretch, states with large military capabilities or a high level of past involvement in UNPOs are expected to have an incentive to contribute. In combination with a leftist government, that is neither constrained by upcoming elections or a right parliament with extensive veto powers, this is expected to cause large personnel contributions. States without significant competing deployments and situated closely to the area of operations, in turn, are expected to participate if they are governed by a right-leaning executive that is not constrained by upcoming elections or a left parliament with veto power over military deployment.

Figure 1. Integrated Decision Model



Research Design

Empirical Domain

The empirical focus of the study is on the 2006 enhancement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Although this operation has been deployed in Lebanon since 1978, its troop levels were augmented significantly following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Engberg, 2014). This reinforcement provides a rare opportunity for testing a model that aims to explain democratic contributions to UNPOs, since it is one of the few recent UN operations to which traditional Western democracies made pivotal troop contributions (Bellamy & Williams, 2009: 43). Due to their long-established tradition of democracy, the latter can be expected to most closely resemble "ideal type" cases for testing the domestic side of the integrated model (Goertz, 2006: 83).

The brunt of the reinforcement's burden was carried by the European Union member states, who contributed around 80% of the required forces. This significant European contribution was a consequence of Israel's insistence on the participation of European troops and the direct involvement of the European Council in the planning of the operation (Mattelaer, 2009). The resulting pressure on the EU member states produced considerable personnel contributions from, inter alia, France, Italy, Poland and Belgium (Engberg, 2014: 78). Other member states, however, did not contribute to the operation at all. Since the EU members are all full-fledged democracies, UNIFIL's reinforcement constitutes a most likely case of democratic contributions to UNPO's. In consequence, the diverging contributions to the reinforcement of UNIFIL constitutes a particularly suited population for this research, including both positive and relevant negative cases of democratic contributions to UNPOs.[1]

[1] Three EU members are excluded from the analysis: Cyprus because the role of its armed forces is exclusively limited to the defence of its territorial security; Malta because its limited military capabilities and pacifist constitution prevent it from participating in military operations abroad and Denmark because comparable data on its deployable forces is not available due to its opt out from the European Defence Agency (Pace, 2013; Samokhvalov 2013).

Methodological Approach

Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of contribution to UNIFIL II is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an analytical technique geared towards establishing set-theoretic connections between one case property -defined as the outcome- and other properties -defined as the causal conditions (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010: 380). Such set-theoretic connections can be interpreted in terms of sufficient and/or necessary causes. The assessment of necessity and sufficiency is based on two parameters of fit: consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms sufficiency or necessity, the latter indicates the empirical relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency approaches unity as the data provides stronger evidence for sufficiency or necessity, coverage as a condition becomes more relevant.[1]

QCA can however be used to examine a more complex form of causality, generally captured under the expression "multiple conjunctural causation". This implies that there can be multiple paths towards the same outcome, each of which might consist of a specific combination (or conjunction) of conditions (Rihoux, 2003: 353; Wagemann & Schneider, 2010: 383-385). QCA's ability to deal with this complex conception of causality makes it particularly apt to test the integrated model. This comprises several pathways towards making large contributions, which each consist of a specific combination of international and domestic conditions.

This study applies the fuzzy set variant of QCA (fsQCA), which allows to account for differences-in-kind between cases (qualitative difference) as well as difference-in degree (quantitative difference) between qualitatively identical cases. Fuzzy membership scores vary between 1 and 0, depending on the degree to which a case belongs to a set (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 28). The qualitative status of a case depends on its position towards the 0.5 anchor, which constitutes "the threshold between membership and non-membership in a set – the qualitative distinction that is maintained in fuzzy sets". (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 28). The assignment of fuzzy membership scores, or calibration, is of utmost importance in fsQCA and is detailed in the next section.

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[1] Consistency and coverage are respectively calculated with the formula $\sum(\min(Xi,Yi)/\sum(Xi)$ and $\sum(\min(Xi,Yi)/\sum(Yi)$, in which X denotes the membership scores in the alleged subset and Y the scores in the alleged superset.

Calibration

With the exception of parliamentary veto power, the conditions and the outcome were calibrated using the direct method of calibration (Ragin, 2008: 85-94). This was carried out with the fsQCA 2.5 software, which employs a logistic function to fit raw data between three qualitative breakpoints: full membership (1), the cross-over point (0.5) and full non-membership (0) (Ragin & Davey, 2014). The following paragraphs discuss the base variables and qualitative breakpoints that were used to calibrate the conditions. The base variables, membership scores and qualitative breakpoints are respectively presented in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 1. Base variables

	Outcome	Conditions						
cases	LC	MC	MS	PI	GP	LE	LP	ED
AT	0	2050	60	4.82	2128.81	-2.89	-10.24	68
BE	1.71	6984	10.79	0.37	2957.74	-16.98	-12.24	320
CZ	0	4566	19.69	1.27	2164.32	-10.87	0.67	1404
DE	0.6	63004	12.73	0.12	2381.23	11.81	6.36	1160
EE	0	563	39.26	0.6	2841.88	1.66	2.79	222
ES	1.98	39617	5.07	0.25	2623.43	-12.39	-2.83	593
FI	1.87	6000	11.77	6.35	2934.18	-16.3	-14.03	236
FR	1.35	91000	11.35	1.08	2433.55	-7.73	-9.92	320
GB	0	74570	22.14	0.58	3319.78	-3.09	3.07	1381
GR	1.63	22182	7.93	0.3	717.25	-17.59	-13.44	418
HU	0.04	2122	33.23	3.13	1795.41	10.68	-3.82	1354
IE	1.4	850	73.42	5.49	3863.67	-6.58	-9.98	303
IT	2.25	54800	9.17	0.36	1650.23	-17.71	11.71	1719
LT	0	1140	19.48	0.07	2307.73	10.27	5.22	822
LU	0.09	311	11.9	0	2921.26	-18.79	-17.21	1048
LV	0	947	17.43	0	2434.19	1.52	-0.73	74
NL	0	17724	12.7	0.58	3002.86	12.6	6.4	120
PL	1.79	24300	17.29	10.47	1922.55	-1.14	-0.47	451
PT	1.39	7168	10.84	1.54	3728.24	-10.56	-6.85	1160
SE	0.2	3122	25.37	1.81	2812.02	-18.32	-4.33	54
SI	0	1579	19.76	0.63	2090.48	-3.66	-5.08	789
SK	0	641	98.76	22.03	1907.34	-11.01	-4.7	1418

LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance.

Table 2. Fuzzy membership scores

	Outcome	Conditions							
cases	LC	MC	MS	PI	GP	LE	LP	ED	PV
AT	0.05	0.05	1	1	0.32	0.7	0.96	0.02	1
BE	0.89	0.51	0.06	0.02	0	0.99	0.98	0.91	0.2
CZ	0.05	0.22	0.48	0.69	0.27	0.96	0.45	1	0.8
DE	0.23	0.96	0.1	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.13	1	0.8
EE	0.05	0.02	0.95	0.08	0.01	0.38	0.3	0.66	0.8
ES	0.95	0.86	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.98	0.7	1	1
FI	0.93	0.42	0.08	1	0	0.99	0.99	0.71	0.8
FR	0.74	0.99	0.07	0.56	0.07	0.91	0.95	0.91	0
GB	0.05	0.98	0.58	0.07	0	0.72	0.28	1	0
GR	0.87	0.71	0.03	0.01	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98	0
HU	0.05	0.05	0.88	1	0.65	0.04	0.76	1	0.8
IE	0.77	0.02	1	1	0	0.88	0.95	0.88	0.8
IT	0.98	0.94	0.04	0.02	0.74	1	0.03	1	0.4
LT	0.05	0.03	0.46	0	0.14	0.04	0.17	1	1
LU	0.06	0.02	0.08	0	0	1	0.99	1	0.8
LV	0.05	0.02	0.32	0	0.07	0.39	0.55	0.03	1
NL	0.05	0.65	0.1	0.07	0	0.02	0.13	0.12	0.8
PL	0.91	0.73	0.31	1	0.56	0.58	0.54	0.99	0.2
PT	0.76	0.51	0.06	0.83	0	0.96	0.89	1	0.2
SE	0.08	0.1	0.69	0.92	0.01	1	0.79	0.01	0.8
SI	0.05	0.04	0.48	0.1	0.37	0.75	0.82	1	0.2
SK	0.05	0.02	1	1	0.57	0.96	0.8	1	0.8

LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

The ratio between the number of troops contributed to UNIFIL II and a state's GDP was used as base variable for the outcome, *large contribution* (in line with Bobrow & Boyer, 1997: 731-736; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). This was calculated according to the following equation (1):

$$lc_i = \frac{(PC_i/\Sigma PC_i)}{(GDP_i/\Sigma GDP_i)} \quad (1)$$

Table 3. Thresholds calibration

	Outcome	Conditions						
cases	LC	MC	MS	PI	GP	LE	LP	ED
1	2	60,000	40	2	1,000	-10	-10	365
0.5	1	6,500	20	1	2,000	0	0	180
0	0	2,000	10	0.5	2,500	10	10	90

LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance.

where PC_i is the total number of a country's active personnel in UNIFIL II in November 2006, when the mission reached full deployment, and GDP_i a country's GDP in 2006 (Engberg, 2014: 78).[1] The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this interval-level variable: the threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 2, corresponding to contributions twice the size of what could be expected by a state's GDP; the crossover threshold at 1, corresponding to contributions fully proportional to a state's GDP; the threshold for full non-membership at 0, corresponding to the absence of personnel contributions.

The base variable for *military capabilities* is the number of deployable forces, retrieved from the European Defence Agency (2008).[2] The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this interval-level variable. The threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 60,000, separating the three large EU members, France, the UK and Germany, from the other cases (Brummer, 2006). The threshold for full exclusion was fixed at 2,000, in the significant gap between Austria and Slovenia. The crossover threshold was set to 6,500. This value corresponds to the median and is located in the significant gap between Belgium and Finland.[3]

[1] Personnel contributions are derived from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_ archive.shtml; data on GDP was retrieved from IMF (2013)

[2] As data for 2006 was incomplete, data for 2007 was used to fill the gaps

[3] To test the robustness of the results, I assessed whether the solution would be the same if another breakpoint was used for full inclusion in the set "Military Capabilities" (cf. Skaaning,

The base variable for prior *peacekeeping involvement* takes into account the size of past contributions to UNPOs and the dispersion of these contributions across operations (in line with Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2014). The latter is accounted for because high absolute contributions can be a consequence of extraordinary large contributions to a single operation, which could be motivated by immediate security interests. In line with Thiem and Haesebrouck (2014), the dispersion parameter D_i was calculated according to the following equation (2):

$$D_i = 1 - \sum P_j^2 \tag{2}$$

where P_j is the proportion of personnel contributed to operation j = 1, 2,…, k.. Subsequently, the level of prior involvement was calculated and relativized by GDP according to the following equation (3):

$$ppi_i = \frac{(P_i * D_i / \sum (PC_i * D_i))}{(GDP_i / \Sigma GDP_i)} \tag{3}$$

where P_i is the absolute personnel contribution to UNPOs.[1] The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this indicator: the threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 2, corresponding to a level of prior contributions twice the size of what could be expected by a state's GDP; the crossover threshold at 1, corresponding to a level of contributions fully proportional to a state's GDP; the treshold for full exclusion at 0.5, corresponding to a level of prior contributions half of what would be expected by its GDP.

The operationalization of *high geographic proximity* builds on the minimum-distance measure, which calculates the distance between the two closest physical locations of a country dyad (Gleditsch & Ward, 2001; Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch, 2010). The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate this indicator: the

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2011). The result of this robustness check, presented in the appendix, demonstrate that changing this breakpoint does not have a significant impact on the results.

[1] Personnel contributions of the fifteen years preceding the reinforcement of UNIFIL are taken into account. For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, only personnel contributions since one year after their independence in 1995, 1993, 1992, 1992, 1995 and 1992, respectively, are taken into account. Personnel contributions are based on the contributions in December of each year, based on data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/ statistics/ contributors_archive. shtml; data on GDP was retrieved from IMF (2013).

threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 1,000 km, corresponding to Gleditsch and Ward's assertion that states "that are more than 1,000 km apart can hardly be considered geographically close" (Gledtisch & Ward, 2001: 745). The crossover threshold is fixed at 2,000 km; the threshold for full exclusion at 2,500 km.

To accurately reflect the impact of simultaneous military deployments on the resources available to contribute, the base variable for *military stretch* takes into account the size of a country's parallel deployments and its total available resources. In line with Thiem and Haesebrouck (2014), this was accomplished by setting the cases' deployed troops in 2006 (DT) in relation to their total deployable troops (DAT), according to the following equation (4):[1]

$$ms_i = \frac{DT_i}{DAT_{i,}} \tag{4}$$

The following qualitative anchors were used to calibrate the indicator. The anchor for full inclusion was fixed at 40%. This corresponds to the deployability target for ground forces to which the NATO countries agreed at their 2004 Istanbul Summit. Since this target is also used by the European Defence Agency for internal assessments, it constitutes an appropriate threshold for assessing the extent of military stretch of the EU member states (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008a: 13). The crossover threshold and threshold for full exclusion at respectively half (20%) and a quarter of this target (10%).

The base variable for the *ideological orientation* of the cases' government (right executive) and legislature (right parliament) draws on the Right-Left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project, which is based on quantitative content analyses of election programmes (Volkens et al., 2013). In line with previous studies (Mello, 2012: 436-437; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004), party positions (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party's (i) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation (5):

1 Data on deployed forces was retrieved from International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008a: 14), troops deployed in UNIFIL II have been subtracted.

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{s_i rl_i}{s}. \quad (5)$$

Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by summing up each party's (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). The following thresholds were used to calibrate the indicators for legislative and executive ideology: the crossover threshold was fixed at 0, since this score corresponds to parties that make an equal amount of right and left statements in their manifestos; the threshold for full inclusion in left executive/parliament was fixed at -10, the anchor for full exclusion at 10.

Large Electoral Distance was calculated by measuring the timespan between the decision on troop contributions and the date of the next general election. The reference date for the former is July 25th 2006, the first informal meeting of prospective troop contributors.[1] The following thresholds were used to calibrate the resulting indicator. Since the research of Gaubatz (1991) has demonstrated that electoral considerations are expected not to matter if the next general elections are still over a year away, the threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 365 days. On the basis of the tested assumption that electoral considerations matter most during electoral quarters, the threshold for full exclusion is fixed at 90 days (Meernik & Waterman, 1996: 580; Ostrom & Job, 1986: 534). The crossover threshold is fixed at 180 days, situating governments that face elections within half a year more in than out of the set.

The calibration of the condition *parliamentary veto power* is based on categorical differences between the cases.[2] Since an ex ante veto is generally considered the strongest form of parliamentary oversight, cases were assigned a score above 0.5 if parliamentary consent was required before troop deployments (Mello, 2012: 432). Such cases still vary in two important ways. First, parliaments are

[1] Electoral dates were retrieved from the 'parlgov database' (Döring & Manow, 2012) To account for early elections, which could not have been anticipated at the time contribution decisions were made, the actual date of the next general election was only used if it was less than one year away. Otherwise, the length of an electoral cycle was added to the date of the last election.

[2] A detailed description of the cases' parliamentary war powers is available in the appendix.

expected to have a stronger veto if prior legislative approval constitutes a legal obligation rather than an unwritten rule (Hänggi, 2004: 14). Second, parliaments have more influence if consent from non-governmental parties is required, which is the case for countries governed by minority governments (Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2014). A score of 1 was assigned to cases that meet both requirements, a score of 0.8 to cases that meet one requirement and a score of 0.6 to cases with an ex ante parliamentary veto that meet neither of the two requirements. A score of 0.4 was assigned to cases where parliamentary approval was required after troops are deployed, since the military, strategic and reputational costs of calling troops back render such an ex post veto far less effective than an ex ante parliamentary veto (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 19). Cases where the executive was only obliged to consult or inform parliament about its decisions were assigned a score of 0.2. A score of 0 was assigned to states where the legislature hardly played any role in military deployment decisions.

Analysis and Results

This section presents the results of the analysis, which was carried out with the fsQCA 2.5 software. The analysis of sufficiency builds on the truth table algorithm (Ragin, 2008: 124-144). A truth table lists all possible combinations of conditions and the associated outcomes. The cases' membership scores in the truth table rows are calculated with Boolean multiplication. Every row that contains at least one case with a membership score above 0.5 is assigned an outcome value, based on its consistency as a sufficient condition for the outcome. The remaining rows are considered logical remainders; combinations of conditions without members. Such remainders are problematic because, depending on the choices made during the analysis, they can either render the results too complex to interpret in a theoretically meaningful way or, conversely, oversimplify them (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006: 758).

To dramatically reduce the number of logical remainders, this study follows the two-step approach suggested by Schneider and Wagemann (2006). In two-step QCA, conditions are divided into remote and proximate conditions. Only the former are included in the first step of the analysis. This results in combinations of remote conditions that make the outcome possible, which are considered "outcome-enabling contexts". In the second step, each of these outcome-enabling contexts is analysed together with the proximate conditions, in order to find the specific combinations of domestic conditions that are sufficient in each context. In this

study, the international level conditions are expected to constitute outcome-enabling contexts, since states are expected not to contribute in the absence of international level incentives. Therefore, they are modelled as the remote conditions. Domestic factors are modelled as the proximate conditions, since actual contributions are only expected if there is a match between them and the international context.

Necessity

The results of the analysis of necessity, presented in Table 4, reveal that three conditions are necessary. The consistency scores of two conditions exceed the recommended 0.9 threshold: left executive and large electoral distance (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 278). With a consistency of 0.87, the absence of military stretch only nearly misses this threshold. The coverage of the three necessary conditions is however quite low, which suggests they might be trivial necessary conditions.

Table 4. Results necessity LC

	Consistency	Coverage
MC	0.709342	0.694915
~MC	0.432526	0.285171
MS	0.250288	0.247153
~MS	**0.870819**	**0.571104**
PI	0.516724	0.477103
~PI	0.579008	0.398097
P	0.313725	0.558522
~GP	0.764706	0.387040
LE	**0.933103**	**0.529797**
~LE	0.164937	0.212481
LP	0.806228	0.494342
~LP	0.324106	0.357506
ED	**0.960784**	**0.483740**
~ED	0.103806	0.188285
PV	0.500577	0.328788
~PV	0.652826	0.643182

"~" indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

The relevance of the (alleged) necessary conditions is further assessed by constructing xy-plots. Figure 2, 3 and 4 show the scores of the cases on the outcome and respectively large electoral distance, left executive and absence of military stretch. Cases are generally situated close to the vertical right axis in all three xy-plots, but especially in the plot of large electoral distance (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 146). This indicates the latter is strongly present in most cases, irrespective of whether they display the outcome, which further suggests large electoral distance constitutes a trivial necessary condition (Ragin, 2008: 60). The xy-plot of "absence military stretch" shows that one of the cases is a true logically contradictory case: Ireland has a score of 0 on the causal condition and a score of 0.77 on the outcome. This strongly disconfirms the necessity of the absence of military stretch, since it indicates that the outcome can be strongly present in the absence of the condition.

Figure 2. Large Electoral Distance



Figure 3. Left Executive



Figure 4. ~Military Stretch



Step One Sufficiency: International Level Conditions

Only the international level conditions are included in the first step of the two-step procedure. Table 5 represents the truth table, with each case located in the row where its membership exceeds 0.5. The consistency cut-off point, which separates truth table rows that correspond to outcome-enabling combinations from those that do not, was fixed at 0.6. This low threshold is acceptable because the analysis is expected to result in outcome-enabling, not sufficient combinations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006: 771; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 254). The cut-off point was established by looking for a gap in the distribution of the consistency scores. Taken into account that a consistency below 0.5 indicates that there is more evidence against the claim of sufficiency than in favour of it, there are four gaps that might be useful for establishing the threshold: between row 2 and 3, row 3 and 4, row 4 and 5 and row 5 and 6 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). The cut off point was established in the last gap because row 5 contains two cases that have a membership score above 0.5 in the outcome. This nurtures the expectation that it corresponds to an outcome-enabling (although not sufficient) combination.

Table 5. Truth table international conditions LC

	Conditions					Outcome	
Row	MC	GP	PI	MS	Consistency	LC	Cases
1	1	1	0	0	0.91	1	GR, IT
2	1	0	1	0	0.91	1	FR, PT
3	1	1	1	0	0.83	1	PL
4	0	0	1	0	0.68	1	CZ, FI
5	1	0	0	0	0.61	1	BE, DE, ES, NL
6	1	0	0	1	0.49	0	GB
7	0	0	1	1	0.39	0	AT, IE, SE
8	0	0	0	0	0.32	0	LT, LU, LV, SI
9	0	1	1	1	0.27	0	HU, SK
10	0	0	0	1	0.23	0	EE

MC: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Subsequently, Boolean minimization was used to remove logically redundant conditions from the rows above the threshold. Depending on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. If no remainders are included, it results in the conservative solution; if all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are included, it results in the parsimonious solution. While the former tends to be overly complex, the latter risks resting on untenable assumptions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 175, 279). Therefore, this study focusses on the intermediate solution, which results when only remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are included in the minimization process.[1]

The intermediate solution is presented in the first column of Table 6. The formula suggests two outcome-enabling combinations, which correspond to the first two pathways of the international-level-side of the model. The first confirms that the absence of military stretch combined with sizeable military capabilities is a conductive context for contributing to UNIFIL II. The second reveals that the absence of military stretch combined with a high level of participation in UN peacekeeping also constitutes an outcome-enabling context. High geographic proximity is not included in any of the causal paths, suggesting that it is not relevant

[1] The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution: the absence of military stretch and the presence of military capabilities, prior peacekeeping involvement and high geographic proximity were assumed to contribute to the outcome. The conservative and parsimonious solutions of the analyses are presented in the appendix. When Schneider and Wagemann (2006) introduced the two-step approach to QCA, they recommended using the parsimonious formula in the first step of the analysis and use the conservative formula in the second step. However, the intermediate formula was not available when they introduced two-step QCA. Moreover, in later work, Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 279) argued that the "intermediate formula should be at the center of the substantive discussion". A detailed discussion of the most appropriate formula for a two-step QCA is beyond the scope of this article. Since the intermediate and the parsimonious solution are identical in the first step of current analysis and the intermediate and conservative solution are identical in the second step, the discussion is irrelevant for this article's empirical conclusions.

Table 6. Intermediate solution LC

	International Conditions	Coverage		Consis-tency	Domestic Conditions	Coverage		Consis-tency	Cases
		Raw	Unique			Raw	Unique		
1	MC*~MS	0.694	0.396	0.749	MC~MS *ED*LP*LE	0.517	0.112	0.885	FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT
					MC~MS*ED*~PV*LE	0.476	0.072	0.857	FR, IT, GR, BE, PL, PT
					Total	0.588		0.869	
2	PI*~MS	0.390	0.171	0.784	PI~MS*ED*LP*LE	0.334	0.334	0.843	PT, FI, FR, PL
	Total	0.785		0.715	Total	0.625		0.878	

"~" indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication "*" refers to conjunction of conditions; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

for explaining contributions to UNIFIL II.[1] This explains the necessity of "left executive", since right-leaning leaders are only expected to support UNPOs if these are deployed in conflicts that pose a threat to their national interests.

Step Two Sufficiency: Domestic Level Conditions

In the second step of the analysis, the two outcome-enabling contexts are linked to specific domestic conditions. Since the goal is to identify sufficient combinations, the consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the minimal advisable threshold (Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012, 279). However, the truth table rows above this value only contain cases that are good instances of the outcome. This indicates that these rows do not cover true logical contradictory cases and, hereby, provides further support for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 185).[2]

The truth table of the analysis with the context "military stretch absent - military capabilities present" is presented in Table 7, the resulting intermediate solution is in the second column of Table 6.[3] It reveals that, in the presence of this context, the combination of large electoral distance, left executive and either parliamentary veto absent or left parliament is sufficient for the outcome. The truth table that results from the analysis with the context "military stretch absent – prior peacekeeping involvement present" is presented in Table 8. The intermediate solution corresponds to one sufficient path which combines the presence of the context with large electoral distance, left executive and left parliament.

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[1] To test the robustness of this finding, I changed qualitative breakpoints that were used to calibrate high geographic proximity and conducted a new analysis (cf. Skaaning, 2011). The result of this robustness check, presented in the appendix, strongly disconfirm that states that were situated closer to Lebanon were more inclined to participate in UNIFIL II.

[2] To illustrate that the rows with a consistency value above 0.75 do not contain true logical contradictory cases, I plotted the membership scores in these rows against the membership scores in the outcome. The resulting XY-plots are presented in the appendix. Because none of the outcome-enabling contexts includes geographic proximity, the presence of left executive and parliament was expected to contribute to the production of the outcome, as were the presence of large electoral distance and the absence of parliamentary veto power.

[3] Since none of the remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations lead to a less complex solution if included in the minimization process, the intermediate solution of the analysis of the proximate conditions equals the conservative solution.

Table 7. Truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*MC

	Conditions					Consis	Outcome	
row	~MS*MC	LE	LP	PV	ED	-tency	LC	Cases
1	1	1	1	1	1	0.92	1	ES
2	1	1	1	0	1	0.86	1	BE, FR, GR, PL, PT
3	1	1	0	0	1	0.75	1	IT
4	0	1	1	0	1	0.62	0	SI
5	1	0	0	1	1	0.54	0	DE
6	0	1	1	1	1	0.53	0	FI, IE, LU, SK
7	0	1	0	1	1	0.47	0	CZ
8	0	1	0	0	1	0.47	0	GB
9	0	0	1	1	1	0.4	0	HU
10	0	0	0	1	1	0.32	0	EE, LT
11	0	1	1	1	0	0.28	0	AT, SE
12	0	0	1	1	0	0.24	0	LV
13	1	0	0	1	0	0.17	0	NL

MS: Military Stretch; MC: Military Capabilities; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

The results confirm the theoretical model. First of all, only states governed by left-leaning governments made a large contribution to the operation. Since high geographic proximity was not a relevant condition, this is in line with theoretical expectations on the impact of party politics on participation in UNPOs. Second, the results indicate that left-leaning governments were only able to contribute if the combination of a rightist parliament and parliamentary veto power did not constitute a veto point against personnel contributions. Lastly, large electoral distance is included in every solution term, which suggests that states only participate in UNPOs if elections are still far away.

Analysis Absence Outcome

Standards of good practice dictate that the outcome and its absence should be dealt with in separate analyses (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). The analysis of necessity, presented in Table 9, shows that the consistency values of the conditions do not exceed the 0.9 threshold, indicating that none of them is necessary for the outcome's absence.

Table 8. Truth table domestic conditions - ~MS*PI

	Conditions					Consis	Outcome	
row	~MS*PI	LE	LP	PV	ED	-tency	LC	Cases
1	1	1	1	0	1	0.9	1	FR, PL, PT
2	1	1	1	1	1	0.76	1	FI
3	0	1	1	0	1	0.67	0	BE, GR, SI
4	0	1	0	0	1	0.55	0	GB, IT
5	1	1	0	1	1	0.54	0	CZ
6	0	1	1	1	1	0.53	0	ES, IE, LU, SK
7	0	0	1	1	1	0.41	0	HU
8	0	0	0	1	1	0.29	0	DE, EE, LT
9	0	0	1	1	0	0.24	0	LV
10	0	1	1	1	0	0.23	0	AT, SE
11	0	0	0	1	0	0.16	0	NL

MS: Military Stretch; MC: Military Capabilities; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

The sufficiency of the international and domestic level conditions was assessed separately, since both the absence of the outcome-enabling international conditions, as the absence of the proximate domestic conditions are expected to be sufficient for the outcome's absence. Table 10 represents the truth table of the international level conditions. In line with the analysis of the outcome's presence, the consistency cut-off point is fixed at the 0.75 threshold.

The intermediate solution is presented on the left-hand side of Table 11.[1] The results show that three combinations of international-level conditions are sufficient for the outcome's absence. In line with theoretical expectations, the presence of military stretch, and the absence of prior peacekeeping involvement, military capabilities and high geographic proximity are associated with the absence of large contributions. In contrast to the results of the presence of the outcome, the results thus suggest that geographic proximity matters for contributions to UNIFIL II.

[1] The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution: the presence of military stretch and the absence of military capabilities, prior peacekeeping involvement and geographic proximity were assumed to contribute to the outcome.

Table 9. Results necessity ~LC

	Consistency	Coverage
MC	0.294824	0.444068
~MC	0.797449	0.808365
MS	0.574644	0.872437
~MS	0.504126	0.508321
PI	0.430608	0.611289
~PI	0.631658	0.667724
GP	0.212303	0.581109
~GP	0.838710	0.652656
LE	0.602401	0.525868
~LE	0.461365	0.913819
LP	0.621155	0.585573
~LP	0.463616	0.786260
ED	0.335334	0.507955
~ED	0.764441	0.771970
PV	0.339085	0.547879
~PV	0.762941	0.739636

"~" indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

However, this might be an artefact of the theoretical assumptions made for the production of the intermediate solution, as it is not included in the parsimonious solution (presented in the appendix).

Table 10. Truth table international conditions ~LC

	Conditions					Outcome	
row	MC	GP	PI	MS	Consistency	~LC	Cases
1	0	0	0	1	0.99	1	EE
2	1	0	0	1	0.99	1	GB
3	0	1	1	1	0.92	1	HU, SK
4	0	0	0	0	0.88	1	LT, LU, LV, SI
5	0	0	1	1	0.78	1	AT, IE, SE
6	0	0	1	0	0.64	0	CZ, FI
7	1	0	0	0	0.65	0	BE, DE, ES, NL
8	1	1	1	0	0.53	0	PL
9	1	0	1	0	0.51	0	FR, PT
10	1	1	0	0	0.34	0	GR, IT

"~" indicates the absence of the outcome; MC: Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Table 12 represents the truth table of the international level conditions. The consistency cut-off point is fixed at the 0.75 threshold. The intermediate solution is presented on the right-hand side of Table 11.[1] The results show that two combinations of domestic-level conditions are sufficient for the outcome's absence. In line with theoretical expectations, the presence of parliamentary veto, the absence of left executive and the absence of distant elections are associated with the absence of large contributions.

[1] The absence of left executive and parliament was expected to contribute to the production of the outcome, as were the absence of large electoral distance and the presence of parliamentary veto power.

Table 11. Intermediate solution ~LC

International Conditions					Domestic Conditions				
	Coverage		Consis-			Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	*Cases*		Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
MS*~MC	0.524	0.299	0.876	EE, IE, SK, HU, AT, SE	PV*~LE	0.407	0.242	0.973	LT, DE, HU, NL, EE, LV
~GP*MS	0.475	0.065	0.862	IE, EE, SE, AT, GB					
~GP*~PI*~MC	0.410	0.185	0.908	LU, LV, EE, LT, SI	PV*~ED	0.310	0.145	0.939	AT, LV, NL, SE
Total	0.760		0.870		Total	0.551		0.946	

"~" indicates the absence of a condition; LC: Large Personnel Contributions; MC: Military Capabilities; MS: Military Stretch; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; GP: High Geographic Proximity; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; ED: Large Electoral Distance; PV: Parliamentary Veto.

Table 12. Intermediate solution ~LC

	Conditions				Consis-	Outcome	
row	LE	LP	PV	ED	tency	~LC	Cases
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	NL
2	0	1	1	0	1	1	LV
3	0	0	1	1	0.96	1	DE, EE, LT
4	0	1	1	1	0.95	1	HU
5	1	1	1	0	0.92	1	AT, SE
6	1	0	1	1	0.72	0	CZ
7	1	0	0	1	0.67	0	GB, IT
8	1	1	1	1	0.63	0	FI, ES, IE, LU, SK
9	1	1	0	1	0.48	0	FR, PL, PT, BE, GR, SI

"~" indicates the absence of the outcome; LE: Left Executive; LP: Left Parliament; PV: Parliamentary Veto; ED: Large Electoral Distance; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Conclusion

What explains democratic participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations? Although the division of the burdens of UN peacekeeping has attracted a considerable amount of academic attention, neither the impact of domestic conditions, nor whether specific conjunctions between domestic and international conditions explain contribution decisions had been systematically analysed. This study set out to fill this gap in academic research. Insights from studies on peacekeeping burden sharing, democratic peace theory and integrated decision models were combined in a multi-causal framework, which was tested on the 2006 enhancement of the UNIFIL operation.

The results revealed that a complex interplay between domestic and international conditions accounts for different levels of engagement in UNIFIL II. Two combinations of international level conditions allowed for large personnel contributions: in the absence of military stretch, states with sizeable military capabilities or a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs had an incentive to contribute. Actual contributions, however, only materialized if a state was governed by a left-leaning government that was not constrained by either proximate elections or a right-leaning legislature with extensive veto powers. Contrary to prior research, this study did not suggest that geographic proximity to the target conflict is relevant for explaining participation in peacekeeping operations.

More generally, this study confirms that domestic conditions must be taken into account to fully understand the circumstances under which democracies contribute to UNPOs. Furthermore, its results show that the impact of executive ideology depends on the type of military operation. While prior research suggests that right-leaning governments are more likely to support military engagement, this study shows that leftist executives are actually more inclined to participate in peacekeeping operations. These conclusions can however not easily be generalized, since this study examines only one operation. Future analysis should therefore assess the impact of domestic conditions on contributions to a larger population of peacekeeping operations. Prospective studies could specifically focus on states that have narrow interests at stake in the target conflict of a UNPO, in order to assess whether this affects the propensity of right-leaning leaders to support the operation.

Appendices: Democratic Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations - A Two-Step Fuzzy Set QCA of UNIFIL II

Appendix 1 Parliamentary Veto Power

This appendix provides a description of the parliamentary involvement on decisions on contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. It reflects the situation on July 25th 2006, the date of the first informal meeting of prospective troop contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 101).

In **Austria,** the deployment of troops required the prior approval of the main committee of the parliament (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008). This was composed of 32 of the 183 members of the parliament, reflecting the composition of the entire parliament (Kammel, 2013). Therefore, Austria was considered a country with legal ex ante parliamentary veto power. Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.[1]

Belgium was a country with weak parliamentary war powers (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 53). The decision to send armed forces abroad was exclusively in the hands of the executive (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 34). The government only had to inform parliament, but not seek its prior or ex post approval (Biscop, 2013: 36). In line with the coding scheme, Belgium was assigned a score of 0.2.

In the **Czech Republic,** troop deployment required ex ante parliamentary approval. However, if the deployment was part of a peace operation following a decision of an international organization of which the Czech republic was a member, the government could decide on the troop deployments for up to 60 days (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 50; Jires, 2013: 76). Asking prior parliamentary approval was however an unwritten norm in the Czech Republic (Jires, 2013: 76). Since it was governed by a minority government, the Czech Republic was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Estonia,** parliamentary approval was required before troop deployment, without any exception (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 17; Salu & Männik,

[1] Based on Döring and Manow (2012), reflects situation on 25 July 2006.

2013: 107). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Finland,** the government had to consult prior to each decision to deploy military forces abroad with the parliament's foreign affairs committee, which had to approve or reject this decision (Seppo & Forsberg, 2013). According to Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2010: 20), this corresponds to a legal ante veto power. Since it was not governed by a minority government, Finland was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **France**, there was no need for securing parliamentary approval, nor for informing the parliament when it decided to contribute to UNIFIL (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 65; Irondelle & Schmitt, 2013: 129). In consequence, it was assigned a score of 0.

In **Germany,** prior parliamentary approval was required for all deployments of the armed forces (Dieterich, Hummel & Marcshall, 2010: 22; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 55). The German parliament had "far-reaching rights in mandating, mandate renewals, and the withdrawal of German troops participating in international missions abroad" (Junk & Daase, 2013: 142-143). It was not governed by a minority government. In line with the coding scheme, Germany was therefore assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Greece,** the government had almost total control over the deployment of armed forces (Economides, 2013: 157). Parliamentary approval was not required, the government was not even obliged to inform parliament (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 66; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 57). In consequence, it was assigned a score of 0.

In **Hungary**, participation in UN peacekeeping operations required prior parliamentary approval (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 18; Tálas & Csiki, 2013: 174; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 58-59). Since it was not governed by a minority government, Hungary was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Ireland,** parliament had an ex ante veto on participation in military operations abroad, without exceptions (Keohane, 2013; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 61). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Italy**, parliamentary competences for troop deployments were not clearly defined, resulting in competing views of the legal procedures for participation in military operations (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 63).The Italian government had many ways to deploy troops, some of which exclude parliamentary involvement. Consequently, there exists disagreement on parliamentary involvement on decisions on the use of force, with assessments ranging from very strong over medium to

inconclusive (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 19; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 26; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 64). According to Marrone and Di Camillo (2013: 197), "international deployment authorisation is usually based on a decree law issued by the government and adopted as law by parliament within the 60-day period foreseen in the legislation". The use of such degree laws limited the parliament's role, which gives ex post endorsement by approving these laws. Furthermore, according to Born, Fuior and Lazzarini (2008: 19), parliamentary debates usually took place after troops are deployed. Italy was therefore considered a state with an ex post parliamentary veto; and assigned a score of 0.4.

In **Latvia**, the decision to participate in military operations had to be taken by the parliament, which thus had a strong ex ante veto (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 29; Rikveilis, 2013: 210-211). Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

Lithuania's parliament had an ex ante veto on the use of the armed forces beyond Lithuanian borders (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 30; Šešelgytơ, 2013: 224). Since Lithuania was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

In **Luxembourg**, prior parliamentary approval was required for participation in all operations (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 5; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 33; Lorenz, 2013: 233-235). Since it was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In the **Netherlands**, the parliament did not have a veto on military deployments, but the government was obliged to inform the legislature before any military operation abroad (Noll & Moelke, 2013: 260; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 74-75). In spite of the absence of a formal veto, "political reality, however, requires government to obtain a majority to support its plans" (Noll & Moelke, 2013: 260). The Netherlands was therefore considered a country with an informal ex ante veto. Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

Poland's parliament did not have a veto to block its governments decisions on the deployment of armed forces, it only has to be informed once a deployment decision has been made (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 18; Terlikowski, 2013: 276-279; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 81). In line with the coding scheme, Poland was therefore assigned a score of 0.2.

Portugal's parliament did not hold a veto position on external deployment of Portuguese forces, but had the right to be informed (Cardoso Reis, 2013: 283; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 60; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 83). In consequence, Portugal was assigned a score of 0.2.

The **Slovak Republic's** parliament had to consent prior to external military deployment, except when troops were dispatched for a for a maximum period of 60 days and the deployment was part of an obligation resulting from international treaties on common defence (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 51). The reinforcement of UNIFIL did not correspond to such an exception. Since the Slovak Republic was not governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In **Slovenia**, the parliament only held a veto in cases of "all-out war" (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 86). Other decisions on the use of force were taken by the government, which only has to inform the parliament (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 18; Malešič, 2013: 323). In line with the coding scheme, Slovenia was therefore assigned a score of 0.2.

In **Spain**, prior authorization of parliament was mandatory for all operations not linked to the defence of Spain or its vital interests (Arteaga, 2013: 336; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 19). Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 1.

In **Sweden,** prior parliamentary approval was required for the use of military force in missions abroad, but deployments of less than 3000 soldiers to peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN were exempt from this obligation (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 47). However, government had a tradition of consulting with the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs in these cases and since parliament is in charge of budget control, the latter still has indirect control over these operations (Ruffa, 2013: 347). Consequently, Sweden can be considered a country with an informal ex ante parliamentary veto on military deployments. Since it was governed by a minority government, it was assigned a score of 0.8.

In the **United Kingdom**, parliament had no power to participate in decision making on the deployments of troops (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 69). In consequence, the UK was assigned a score of 0.

Appendix 2. QCA Results

This appendix presents supplementary material for the QCA presented in the main manuscript. The first section presents two robustness checks. The second section presents the XY-plots of the truth table rows that were coded 1 in the second step of the two-step analysis. The third section presents the conservative and parsimonious solutions.

Robustness Tests

This section presents the results of two robustness tests, in which the calibration of two conditions was changed.

Robustness Test 1

In the first test, the threshold for full inclusion in the set "Military Capabilities" was changed from 60,000 to 50,000, so that it includes Italy, the fourth largest EU member state in terms of military capabilities. Table 1 presents the fuzzy membership scores in MC'. The same consistency threshold and directional expectations were used as in the original analysis. The truth table and outcome enabling combinations of international-level conditions that result from this analysis (presented in Table 2 and Table 3 below) are identical to the solutions that resulted from the original analysis, although the consistency scores are slightly higher in the new analysis.

Table 1. Calibration MC'

	MC	MC'
AT	0.05	0.05
BE	0.51	0.51
CZ	0.22	0.22
DE	0.96	0.98
EE	0.02	0.02
ES	0.86	0.91
FI	0.42	0.42
FR	0.99	1
GB	0.98	0.99
GR	0.71	0.75
HU	0.05	0.05
IE	0.02	0.02
IT	0.94	0.97
LT	0.03	0.03
LU	0.02	0.02
LV	0.02	0.02
NL	0.65	0.68
PL	0.73	0.77
PT	0.51	0.51
SE	0.1	0.1
SI	0.04	0.04
SK	0.02	0.02

MC: Fuzzy Membership scores in original analysis; MC': Fuzzy membership scores in robustness check

Table 2. Truth table MC'

	Conditions					Outcome	
Row	MC'	GP	PI	MS	Consistency	LC	Cases
1	1	1	0	0	0.92	1	GR, IT
2	1	0	1	0	0.91	1	FR, PT
3	1	1	1	0	0.83	1	PL
4	0	0	1	0	0.67	1	CZ, FI
5	1	0	0	0	0.61	1	BE, DE, ES, NL
6	1	0	0	1	0.49	0	GB
7	0	0	1	1	0.38	0	AT, IE, SE
8	0	0	0	0	0.30	0	LT, LU, LV, SI
9	0	1	1	1	0.25	0	HU, SK
10	0	0	0	1	0.22	0	EE

MC': Military Capabilities; GP: High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Table 3. Intermediate solution robustness test 1

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
MC'*~MS	0.71	0.41	0.75	FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
PI*~MS	0.39	0.17	0.74	FI, PT, PL, FR, CZ
Total	0.80		0.72	

Robustness Test 2

The goal of the second robustness test is to assess the robustness of the finding that geographic proximity is not relevant for explaining contributions to UNIFIL II. A possible reason for this finding is that membership scores in high geographic proximity are generally rather low. Therefore, the threshold for full inclusion the set geographic proximity is changed from 1,000km to 2,000km, the crossover threshold from 2,000km to 2,500km and the threshold for full exclusion from 2,500km to 3,000km. This results in a significant rise in the membership scores in this condition.

Table 4. Calibration GP'

	GP	GP'
AT	0.90	0,90
BE	0.06	0,06
CZ	0.88	0,88
DE	0.67	0,67
EE	0.11	0,11
ES	0.32	0,32
FI	0.07	0,07
FR	0.60	0,60
GB	0.01	0,01
GR	1	1
HU	0.99	0,99
IE	0	0
IT	0.99	0,99
LT	0.76	0,76
LU	0.07	0,07
LV	0.60	0,60
NL	0.05	0,05
PL	0.97	0,97
PT	0	0
SE	0.13	0,13
SI	0.92	0,92
SK	0.97	0,97

GP: Fuzzy Membership scores in original analysis; GP': Fuzzy membership scores in robustness check

The same consistency threshold and directional expectations were used as in the original analysis. The truth table and outcome enabling combinations of international-level conditions that result from this analysis are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. The inclusion of the absence of GP in the intermediate solution strongly disconfirms that states that were situated closer to Lebanon were more inclined to participate in UNIFIL II. This further strengthens the assertion that geographic proximity did not spur contributions to UNIFIL's enhancement.

Table 5. Truth table GP'

	Conditions					Outcome	
row	MC	MS	PI	GP'	Consistency	LC	Cases
1	1	0	1	0	0.93	1	PT
2	1	0	1	1	0.90	1	FR, PL
3	1	0	0	1	0.83	1	DE, GR, IT
4	0	0	1	0	0.81	1	FI
5	1	0	0	0	0.67	1	BE, ES, NL
6	0	1	1	0	0.58	0	IE, SE
7	0	0	1	1	0.54	0	CZ
8	1	1	0	0	0.51	0	GB
9	0	0	0	0	0.42	0	LU
10	0	0	0	1	0.37	0	LT, LV, SI
11	0	1	0	0	0.31	0	EE
12	0	1	1	1	0.21	0	AT, HU, SK

MC: Military Capabilities; GP': High Geographic Proximity; PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement; MS: Military Stretch; LC: Large Personnel Contributions.

Table 6. Intermediate solution robustness test 2

	Coverage		Consistency	
	Raw	Unique		cases
~MS*MC	0.69	0.40	0.75	FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*PI*~GP'	0.29	0.09	0.85	FI, PT
solution	0.79		0.74	

XY-Plots Analysis Sufficiency

This section presents the XY-plots of the truth table rows that were coded as sufficient conditions in the second step of the two-step analysis. These XY-plots demonstrates that none of the rows cover true logically contradictory cases. There are no cases in the lower right quadrant of the XY-plots, which indicates that none of the cases with a membership above 0.5 in the rows has a membership lower than 0.5 in the outcome.

Figure 1. XY-plot Row 1 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*MC



Figure 2. Row 2 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*MC



Figure 3. Row 3 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*MC



Figure 4. Row 1 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*PI



Figure 5. Row 2 Truth Table Domestic Conditions - ~MS*PI



Conservative and Parsimonious Solutions

Table 7. Conservative solution international conditions

	Coverage		Consist	
	Raw	Unique	ency	cases
~MS*MC	0.69	0.40	0.75	FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*PI*~GP'	0.29	0.09	0.85	FI, PT, FR, CZ
solution	0.79		0.74	

Table 8. Parsimonious solution international conditions

	Coverage		Consist	
	Raw	Unique	ency	cases
~MS*MC	0.69	0.40	0.75	FR, IT, DE, ES, NL, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*PI	0.39	0.17	0.78	FI, PT, PL, FR, CZ
solution	0.79		0.71	

Table 9. Conservative solution domestic conditions - ~MS*MC

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
~MS*MC*LE*~PV*ED	0.52	0.11	0.88	FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT
~MS*MC*LE*LP*ED	0.48	0.07	0.86	FR, IT, GR, BE, PL, PT
solution	0.59		0.87	

Table 10. Parsimonious solution domestic conditions - ~MS*MC

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
~MS*MC*LE	0.65	0.65	0.89	IT, FR, ES, GR, BE, PL, PT
Solution	0.65		0.89	

Table 11. Conservative solution domestic conditions - ~MS*PI

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
~MS*PI*LE*LP*ED	0.33	0.33	0.84	PT, FI, FR, PL
Solution	0.33		0.84	

Table 12. Parsimonious solution domestic conditions - ~MS*PI

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
~MS*PI*LP	0.37	0.37	0.79	FI, PT, FR, PL
Solution	0.37		0.79	

Table 13. Conservative Solution International Conditions ~LC

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
MS*~GP	0.47	0.06	0.86	IE, EE, SE, AT, GB
~MC*~PI*~GP	0.41	0.18	0.91	LU, LV, EE, LT, SI
~MC*MS*PI	0.36	0.30	0.83	IE, SK, HU, AT, SE
Solution	0.76		0.87	

Table 14. Parsimonious solution international conditions ~LC

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
MS	0.57	0.35	0.87	AT, IE, SK, EE, HU, SE, GB
~MC*~PI	0.45	0.22	0.89	LT, LU, LV, EE, SI
Solution	0.80		0.85	

Table 15. Conservative solution domestic conditions ~LC

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
~LE*PV	0.41	0.30	0.97	NL, DE, HU, LT, EE, LV
~ED*LP*PV	0.23	0.12	0.93	SE, AT, LV
Solution	0.52		0.95	

Table 16. Parsimonious solution domestic conditions ~LC

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	cases
~LE	0.46	0.28	0.91	NL, DE, HU, LT, EE, LV
~ED	0.33	0.15	0.93	SE, AT, LV, NL
Solution	0.62		0.90	

7

Article 3: NATO Burden Sharing in Libya - A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

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Abstract

This study aims to explain the pattern of contributions to NATO's military campaign in Libya. It combines collective action theory with hypotheses on balance of threat, alliance politics, and domestic constraints in a multicausal framework, which is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results suggest novel inferences on the interactions between partisan politics, and the benefits states wish to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to support Operation Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. Whereas left-wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute significantly to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-wing governments only contributed if their countries' interests were threatened by the crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation's success.

Introduction

"While every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission" Robert Gates (2011)

As illustrated by this quote from Robert Gates' farewell address as the US Secretary of Defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s operation in Libya revealed major differences between the member states' willingness and ability to deploy military force. Unsurprisingly, the diverging levels of support to Operation Unified Protector revamped debates on NATO burden sharing. Over the years, the division of the burden of NATO's collective defense efforts incited an extensive body of academic literature.[1] While this research almost exclusively focused on defense budgets during the Cold War period, the division of the burden of out-of-area operations has come under an increasing level of academic scrutiny since the 1990s. However, despite Unified Protector's considerable political ramifications and assertions that it reflected a whole "new transatlantic burden sharing model" (Chivviss, 2014: 4-5; Hallams & Schreer, 2012: 88), the pattern of contributions to the operation has not yet been systematically analyzed.

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the distribution of the burden of Operation Unified Protector. This is accomplished by combining collective action theory with hypotheses on balance of threats, alliance politics, and domestic constraints in a multicausal framework, which is tested with fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (for a similar research design, see Haesebrouck, 2015b; Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015). The results of the analysis suggest novel inferences on the specific interactions between partisan politics and the benefits states wish to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to support Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. Whereas left-wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute significantly to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-

[1] For a comprehensive review of this literature, see, for example, Sandler (1993), Oma (2012) and Sandler and Shimizu (2014) and Haesebrouck (forthcoming-a).

wing governments only contributed if their countries' interests were threatened by the crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation's success.

The structure of this article is as follows. The first section describes how the division of the burden of the Libya campaign deviates from NATO's previous out-of-area missions. The second section builds on the comprehensive body of literature on military burden sharing to develop an integrated model for explaining the diverging levels of support to the operation. The third section introduces QCA as an appropriate method to test this model and discusses the measurement of the variables. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis, which are interpreted against the backdrop of the theoretical model in the fourth section.

NATO Burden Sharing and Operation Unified Protector

In many respects, the Libya campaign deviates from NATO's previous out-of-area operations. Up till Unified Protector, the United States had taken the lead and carried the brunt of the burden of all the alliance's major combat operations (Michaels, 2011: 57). It contributed the bulk of the necessary capabilities and flew over 65 percent of the strike operations during NATO's first major combat operations: Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 135). The operation in Afghanistan did not suggest a more equitable burden sharing relationship. Not only did the United States contribute 60 percent of the deployed units, many of the allies placed significant caveats on the use of their armed forces (Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). The United States carried an even larger share of the burden when it took the lead of a coalition of the willing. For example, it contributed around 70 percent of the military resources of the 1991 Desert Storm coalition and conducted 90 percent of air strikes during the first three months of the 2014 operation against Islamic state (Cohen & Scheinmann, 2014).[1]

The disproportionately large contributions of the United States to NATO's out-of-area operations is in line with collective action theory, which has been dominating research on military burden sharing ever since the seminal article of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). The latter introduced the "exploitation hypothesis", which expects "the 'larger' members [...] to bear a disproportionate share of the burden" (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). The underlying assumption is that

[1] The European allies did provide the brunt of the postconflict peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and Bosnia (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 130).

military operations produce public benefits from which non-contributors cannot be excluded. Given the United States' overwhelming military power, it is generally capable of achieving the goals of an operation without the help of the other allies (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72). Since the latter cannot be denied the benefits of a successful operation, they have an opportunity to ride free on the United States' efforts. While the exploitation hypothesis accounts for the disproportionally large contributions of the United States, previous studies concluded that it cannot explain why "America's allies make rather costly contributions when they could have taken a free ride off American military might" (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72; Davidson, 2011: 5). Such anomalous lack of free riding is generally explained by the alliance-dependence hypothesis, which contends that states contribute to US-led operations because they are dependent on the United States' security guarantee and fear abandonment from Washington if they do not contribute.

The burden sharing dynamics of the Libya operation can be expected to deviate from this general pattern. Although the United States dominated the first ten days of the operation, it withdrew its fighter aircraft after barely two weeks (Chivviss, 2014: 65). The United States kept providing critical military capabilities to the operation, but the other allies had to shoulder a far larger share of its burden compared to previous NATO operations (Chivviss, 2014: 89, 190-191; Hallams & Schreer, 2012: 321). Furthermore, Washington did not take the lead of the operation. In consequence, the other NATO allies were less likely to assume that the United States' security guarantee depended on participation in the operation. Moreover, the Libya operation ran parallel with NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. Therefore, the allies that are most dependent on the United States' security guarantee had already fulfilled their alliance obligations as well as stretched their military resources. In consequence, the Libya operation constitutes a least-likely case for the alliance-dependence hypothesis.

While deviating from previous cases of NATO burden sharing, the Libya campaign might constitute a more representative case of future operations. Given the United States' intention to "rebalance" Asia, it will be increasingly reluctant to assume a leading role in operations in and around Europe(Biscop, 2015: 170).[1] In

[1] While the United States' reaction to Russia's interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the first half of 2014 shows that Washington "remains committed to collective defence under NATO's Article 5" (Biscop, 2015: 150), it can no longer be expected to "automatically take the lead in addressing non-Article 5 security issues around Europe".

consequence, the operation constitutes a valuable case for arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of alliance burden sharing. Unfortunately, previous research on the Libya campaign has mostly been limited to atheoretical case studies of a small number of NATO allies, which do not systematically relate back to the rich theoretical literature on military burden sharing.

Integrated Model NATO Burden Sharing

This section introduces the study's theoretical framework, which builds on the sizable academic literature on military burden sharing. The latter has been dominated by quantitative studies that assess the explanatory value of two competing collective action based theories: the pure public goods model and the joint product model (e.g. Sandler, 1993; Sandler & Shimizu, 2014). Following the research of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994), an increasing number of case-oriented studies developed integrated decision models to explain contributions to specific out-of-area operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004; Baltrusaitis, 2010; Davidson, 2011). Although these studies relate back to collective action theory, they consistently conclude that contributions result from a complex interplay between domestic and international variables.

Collective Action

The first theoretical accounts of military burden sharing characterized defense as a public good and, therefore, expected "the 'larger' members [...] to bear a disproportionate share of the burden" of collective defense efforts (cf supra; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). Public good explanations are expected to be applicable to the Libya operation (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 48). One of the issues that pushed NATO to intervene was Qaddafi's atrocious repression of the popular uprising (Davidson, 2013: 311-312). All countries with an interest in enforcing the responsibility to protect (R2P) can be expected to benefit from stopping such mass atrocities, regardless of whether they participated in the operation (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 655). Since the R2P doctrine enjoys widespread support among the NATO members, the protection of the Libyan population represents an alliance-wide public benefit.[1]

[1] The European states belong to the most important supporters of the doctrine (Brockmeier, Kurtz & Junk, 2014: 429). The United States, on its part, subscribes to the main principles of responsibility to protect (R2P) and has "supported it [...] during the critical junctures of the

The majority of the studies that focus on specific operations refer back to the exploitation hypothesis, although they commonly refer to it as the "collective action hypothesis" (Oma, 2012: 563). However, these studies generally conclude that collective action theory only explains the disproportionately large contribution of the United States (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 21; Davidson, 2011: 2; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1997: 349). Since the latter is generally capable of successfully conducting an operation by itself, the efforts of the other allies are not expected to produce more collective benefits. Hereby, these studies imply a "threshold effect", which suggests that military operations are lumpy goods (Jones & Thompson, 1990: 463). In the case of lumpy goods, "a target or threshold (K) must be achieved for any member of a group to benefit from a collective effort, beyond that threshold, no member benefits from additional effort" (Thompson, 1987: 436).

Out-of-area operations indeed resemble lumpy goods: states only benefit if enough resources are applied to allow an operation to achieve its goals, additional contributions will not produce more benefits once the required resources are available. An actor is expected to contribute to the production of a lumpy good if the aggregation of the contributions of other actors does not make his or her donation unnecessary. Once Washington commits to an operation, other states have no incentive to contribute to secure public benefits because they can expect the United States to be able to achieve the operation's goals without their help (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72). However, if the United States limits its military role, as it did during the Libya operation, the lumpy goods condition predicts that other allies will increase their contribution to compensate for this reduction (Thompson, 1987: 442). An actor is expected to contribute to the production of a lumpy good if it is capable of making a contribution that increases the probability that the good will be produced, at a cost that does not exceed the good's expected benefits (Jones & Thompson, 1990: 475; Thompson, 1987: 436). In line with the exploitation hypothesis, allies with sufficient resources to contribute significantly to the fulfillment of the operation's mandate can thus be expected to compensate for the United States' reduced commitment by carrying a larger share of its burden. Smaller

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first decade of its existence" (Junk, 2014: 536). Canada, in turn, played an important role in the development of the principle, but the conservative Harper government has refrained from using R2P to justify its foreign policy decisions. However, it did justify the Libyan intervention as a reaction against the atrocities committed by the Qaddafi regime and, thus, can be assumed to value the public good of stopping these atrocities (Cooper & Momani, 2014: 178).

allies are still expected to take a free ride, since they can only have a modest impact on the probability that the operation will be successful.

Two general approaches have been used to define a country's ability to contribute. The first takes into account the total amount of material resources from which a country can potentially draw, generally equated with its economic size or gross domestic product (GDP); the second more narrowly focuses on military capabilities (Baltrusaitis, 2010; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 661). Although both measures are interrelated, they have different empirical implications and are therefore not fully interchangeable. Evidently, a country's military resources are a priori limited by its material resources. However, military capabilities also depend on the share of these resources devoted to defense. Many large NATO allies only spend a relatively small portion of their GDP on defense, whereas military expenditures amount to a considerable share of the GDP of some smaller member states (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 50). This study therefore considers economic size and military spending to be two distinct conditions, which allow to distinguish between their causal effects and determine the actual source of alliance free riding.

The **collective action hypothesis** expects countries with a high GDP and significant military spending to carry a high share of the burden of the Libya operation.

Balance of Threat

The "balance of threat hypothesis" offers a second plausible explanation for the division of the burden of out-of-area operations. Building on Stephen Walt's (1987) neorealist theory of alliance formation, several studies expect contributions to correlate with the extent to which the target of an operation poses a threat to the states' interests (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 18-19; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 42). Walt (1987: 21-27) argues that states enter alliances to balance against threat, which is determined by a threatening state's aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. However, the Qaddafi regime neither had the offensive military capabilities, nor had the intention, to directly threaten the NATO allies. In consequence, the balance of threat hypothesis, as originally formulated by Walt, does not provide a plausible explanation for the division of the burden of the Libya operation.

A more comprehensive definition of "threat" is provided by Davidson (2011: 16-17) who focuses on threats to "the state's territorial integrity or its citizens, the state's economy (including significant economic interests abroad), or a natural resource of economic or security significance". In the context of the Libya conflict,

Davidson (2013: 312) argues that a state "considering intervention will perceive refugee evasion of its border controls as a threat to its territorial integrity". The lack of interest of the Northern European Union members in formulating a common response to the potential refugee crisis indicates that the perception of this threat depends on the geographical distance to Libya (Lombardi, 2011: 40). In this connection, several studies suggest that the size of benefits received from out-of-area operations is related to spatial proximity (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002).[1]

Balancing against threats produces country-specific benefits, which are taken into account in an alternative to the pure public goods model: the joint products model. This assumes that military operations produce multiple goods, varying from purely public to country specific and private benefits. States that were threatened by the crisis in Libya had some excludable benefits at stake in the operation. First, they had a strong incentive to participate in order to build good relations with the rebel's national committee, in order to protect their interests after the fall of Qaddafi (Anrig, 2011: 93; Lombardi, 2011: 36). Furthermore, countries with specific interests in the crisis had an incentive to participate to gain some control over the operation, in order to ensure it was conducted in line with their interests (Chivviss, 2014: 73-74).

The **balance of threat hypothesis** expects NATO allies that are geographically close to Libya to carry a high share of the burden of the operation.

Alliance Politics

Theories of alliance politics offer a third explanation for burden sharing decisions. Studies building on integrated models generally draw on Glenn Snyder's secondary "Alliance Security Dilemma" (1984: 466-468), and expect states that are dependent on a powerful ally to carry a high share of an operation's burden (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 205; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72). In the case of NATO and US-led operations, states are expected to contribute if they are dependent on the US' security guarantee and fear abandonment from Washington. More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not constitute the only reason for states to value their relationship with the United States. Davidson (2011: 15), for

[1] The theoretical framework does not take into account the potential threats to the allies energy supplies. The only NATO ally that is strongly dependent on Libya energy is Italy. However, no supply problems were reported inside Italy during the crisis (2011: 4).

example, contends that states "may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does not necessarily entail dependence". Therefore, he prefers the term "alliance value" over "alliance dependence". Similarly, Ringsmose (2010: 330-331) demonstrates that both allies "whose security comes in the shape of American security garantees" as allies that consider their special relationship with Washington "an important key to their security and their political clout on the international scene" shouldered a disproportionate burden of NATO's ISAF operation. Alliance value produces excludable benefits: allies are expected to contribute to a mission, regardless of the direct incentives presented to them, if they believe the benefits produced by NATO or their relationship with the United States would otherwise be withheld (Ringsmose, 2010).

The Libya operation constitutes a least-likely case for hypotheses on alliance politics (cf. supra). According to Marton and Eichler (2013: 10), the NATO allies did not perceive the United States to attach "great importance to significant contributions" to the Libya campaign because Washington did not take the lead of the operation. However, Jakobsen and Møller (2012: 109, 112) argue that Denmark considered the war in Libya as an opportunity to demonstrate its "relevance and trustworthiness to its great power allies in NATO, especially the United States". Dicke et al. (2013: 52-53), in turn, found mixed support for the relevance of the NATO-allies political culture with regard to NATO, which provided a good indicator for the eventual contributions of Spain and Norway but failed to explain Poland's unwillingness to participate. By including a hypothesis on alliance politics, the analysis aims to reveal whether and under what conditions alliance value spurred contributions to the Libya operation.

The **alliance politics hypothesis** expects states that highly value their alliance with the United States to carry a high share of the burden of the operation.

Domestic Constraints

Studies building on integrated models indicate that external benefits "fare pretty well in explaining political leaders' incentives to contribute" (Oma, 2012: 565). However, they argue that domestic constraints need to be incorporated to account for a state's ability to contribute. First, previous research suggests that the ideological orientation of the executive affects decisions on the use of force. Building on evidence that the electorate of rightist parties is generally more promilitary than the electoral platforms of left parties, Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) demonstrate that governments of right parties are more likely to resort to military means. Likewise, Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more

inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war. Auerswald and Saideman (2014) draw similar conclusions with respect to the contributions to the ISAF operation. Strikingly however, their analysis of the Libya intervention did not consistently demonstrate that right-leaning parties were more eager to participate.

A possible explanation for the seeming instability in the effect of partisanship is that executives only become responsive to their constituencies toward the end of an electoral cycle. Since governing parties might fear suffering at the polls for resorting to the use of force, studies building on democratic peace theory expect governments to be more constrained in their foreign policy behavior if elections are imminent (Gaubatz, 1991; Williams, 2013: 459). In contrast, diversionary theories of war expect national leaders to be more likely to resort to the use of force at the end of an electoral cycle. The results of Kisangani and Pickering (2007, 290), however, show that democratic leaders are less likely to deploy armed force over low-politics issues like humanitarian suffering if elections are less than one year in the future. All else being equal, political leaders should thus be less likely to carry a high share of the burden of the Libya operation at the end of an electoral cycle. However, since the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are more promilitary, the electoral risks of going to war are lower for right-wing leaders.

The **domestic constraints hypothesis** expects right governments and governments that are not facing imminent elections to contribute to the operation.

Integrated Model for NATO Burden Sharing

The pattern of contributions to the Libya operation is expected to result from a complex interplay between the aforementioned determinants, which is summarized in Figure 1. Nations with sizable capabilities, produced by a combination of economic size and military spending, are expected to contribute because their contribution will strongly affect the probability that the operation achieves its goals. Allies that are geographically close to the area of operations or highly value their alliance with the United States, in turn, are expected to participate to secure excludable benefits. However, only countries governed by right-leaning executives or where elections are not imminent are expected to contribute.

Rather than constituting mutually exclusive explanations, the model thus assumes that sizable military capabilities and country-specific benefits, like alliance value and threats, are alternative paths to carrying a high burden. This corresponds to the conclusions of several studies that test collective-action-based models in the context of peacekeeping operations (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 188; Shimizu

Figure 1. Integrated Decision Model



& Sandler, 2002: 665). The latter found evidence that supported the exploitation hypothesis, which indicates that peacekeeping had a relatively large share of public benefits but conclude that nation-specific benefits explain why some smaller states did carry a high burden. However, this is only the case if the share of country-specific benefits is relatively low (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). By expecting both the most capable allies as the allies that experience the highest level of threat to carry a high share of the operation's burden, the model thus assumes that the operation produces joint products, but that the ratio of country specific to total benefits is relatively low.

Research Design

The theoretical framework is tested with fsQCA. QCA is generally used to establish set-theoretic connections between one case property, defined as the outcome, and other properties, defined as the causal conditions. Such set relations are generally interpreted in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions. The latter entail a complex conception of causality generally captured under the expression "multiple conjunctural causation" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). Conjunctural causation implies that phenomena are often produced by a combination of conditions, multiple causation that several of such combinations can be sufficient for the same outcome. QCA's ability to capture this complex form of causality in the presence of a relatively small number of cases makes it particularly apt for testing the model's ability to explain the diverging contributions to the Libya operation. In line with the notion of conjunctural causation, external pressures are only expected to spur sizable contributions in combination with the absence of domestic constraints. In line with multiple causation, the model implies several pathways toward carrying a high share of the operation's burden.

This study applies the fuzzy set variant of QCA, which allows to take into account the degree to which a variable is present in a case. Membership scores in a fuzzy set can vary between full membership (value of 1) and full nonmembership (value of 0; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 28). A score of 0.5 indicates the point of maximum ambiguity. Defining the location of this 0.5 anchor is crucial, since this determines whether a concept is either more present or absent in a given case. The assignment of fuzzy membership scores, or calibration, is described in the following subsections. Membership scores in the outcome and the condition alliance value are based on categorical differences between the cases. The calibration of the other

conditions builds on the method of transformational assignment which uses a continuous function to fit the raw data between three qualitative anchors: 1, 0.5, and 0 (Thiem & Duşa, 2013: 55).1 The calibration of the variables is described in the following subsections. The base variables and fuzzy membership scores are presented in Appendix 1.

High Burden

Although the debate on NATO burden sharing has been focused on expeditionary operations for over two decades, many studies continue to operationalize military burdens with indicators from the "outdated Cold War environment" (Forster & Cimbala, 2005: 8). In line with the standard burden sharing indicator of the Cold War period -percentage of GDP spent on defense- military burdens are generally measured by relativizing a country's share of the deployed troops to its GDP (see e.g. Shimizu & Sandler, 2010: 1482).[2] However, as NATO became involved in out-of-area operations, the risk of military casualties increasingly out-staged the relative size of contributions in NATO burden sharing debates (Ringsmose, 2010: 328). The potential image costs of causing collateral damage constitute another burden of military intervention. The continuous efforts to avoid civilian casualties throughout the air campaign demonstrate that contributing states were attentive to these costs during Unified Protector (Chivviss, 2014).

This study develops a coding scheme that emphasizes the division of risks. The allies that carried out strike operations are assigned a score above 0.5 in the set "High Burden", since these faced a higher risk of military casualties and the potential ramifications of causing civilian casualties. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States faced the highest risk at military casualties. They flew the highest number of sorties and conducted the first air strikes, when Libya's air defenses were still intact. Moreover, France and the United Kingdom deployed attack helicopters, which significantly increased the risk of civilian and military casualties (Anrig, 2011: 104; Chivviss, 2014: 126). Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway also carried out strike missions but flew a smaller number of sorties, only joined operations after a

[1] The calibration of the conditions was achieved with the calibrate function of the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013).

[2] Important exceptions are Mello (2012: 430-431); Ringsmose (2010); and Saideman and Auerswald (2012).

few days and did not deploy helicopters (Chivviss, 2014: 80-90). However, the number of air sorties and strike missions flown by these allies is at least proportional to their size.[1] In consequence, they are also assigned a score of 1. Italy, in turn, is assigned a score of 0.8. Although it flew around 10 percent of the strike operations (while only accounting for 6 percent of NATO's GDP), Italy only started attacking ground targets over one month after the beginning of the operation.

The Netherlands and Spain participated in the no-fly zone but refrained from attacking ground targets. In consequence, their units were only exposed to a limited risk of getting targeted and no risk of causing collateral damage. Therefore, they are assigned a score of 0.4, just below the crucial 0.5 anchor. Four states did not participate in the no-fly zone but contributed in other ways to the operation. Bulgaria and Romania each contributed a frigate to enforce the naval embargo. Greece contributed a frigate, an early warning and control aircraft and provided military bases. Turkey contributed four frigates, a logistics support ship, a submarine, and six F-16s in support of the naval operations (Müge & Aylin, 2013: 601-602). Further, the air base in Izmir was provided as one of the operational centers for the NATO mission. Although Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey, thus, made sizable contributions, the risk of getting involved in combat was practically nonexisting. Therefore, they are assigned a score of 0.2. The remaining NATO countries did not contribute to the operation and are assigned a score of 0.

Large Economy

Data on GDP in billion US dollar, obtained from the IMF (2013), is used as the base variable for calibrating Large Economy. The threshold for full inclusion is fixed at $1,000. This qualitative anchor is located between Spain and the Netherlands, which is traditionally considered the biggest of the middle-sized European states. The crossover threshold is fixed at US$312. This value corresponds to the median and is located in the middle of a notable gap in the raw data between

[1] Canada flew around 1,500, accounting for around 10 percent of the strike missions, while only accounting for 5 percent NATO's gross domestic product (Chivviss, 2014: 190-191). Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, respectively, flew around 620, 590, and 615 sorties and together account for 22 percent of the strike missions, while only accounting for 1.5 percent, 1 percent, and 1.4 percent of NATO's GDP (Chivviss, 2014: 190-191).

Denmark ($334) and Greece ($290) (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 42). The anchor for full exclusion is fixed at $210.

High Military Spending

Military capabilities are a function of past and current military spending (Fordham, 2004: 637). Therefore, the average share of GDP devoted to defense in the ten years preceding the Libya campaign is used as the base variable for high military spending.[1] The crucial 0.5 anchor is located at 1.99 percent. Hereby, countries that meet the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense are situated more in than out of the set. Allies that exceed this target by 0.5 percent are situated fully in the set. Countries whose military spending falls 0.5 percent below the 2 percent target are considered to be fully out of the set.

Spatially Proximate

Spatial proximity is operationalized with the minimum distance measure, which calculates the distance between the two closest physical locations of a pair of countries (Gleditsch & Ward, 2001; Weidmann, Kuse & Gleditsch, 2010). The threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 650 kilometer, in line with the fifth continuity category of the "Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data" (Stinnett et al., 2002). The crossover threshold is located at 1,000 kilometer, corresponding to Gleditsch and Ward's assertion that states "that are more than 1,000 km apart can hardly be considered geographically close" (2001: 745). The anchor for full exclusion is fixed at 1,500 kilometer.

Alliance Value

The coding of alliance value builds on the scholarly literature, which is very consistent on the NATO allies that show a particularly strong interest in a good relationship with the United States.[2] The East European states and Norway are

[1] Data on military expenditures was obtained from the SIPRI military expenditures database (2013b).

[2] Alliance value is, thus, operationalized with a binary condition, which can easily be integrated in fuzzy set QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 277). Since some of the consulted studies use a state's propensity to commit forces to United States or NATO-led operations as an indicator of its value for its alliance with the United States, coding alliance value on the basis of prior studies might seem to result in tautological reasoning. However,

assigned a score of 1, since they perceive a resurging Russian threat and are dependent on NATO's collective defense provision to balance it (Græger, 2005; Menon & Lipkin, 2003; Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010). Canada, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are also assigned a score of 1. Although they are not particularly dependent on the United States' security guarantee, these allies perceive themselves as particularly strong Atlanticists (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Græger & Haugevik, 2009; Howorth, 2007; Massie, 2014; Ringsmose, 2010).

Electoral Distance

The base variable for electoral distance estimates the time left in the constitutional interelection period on March 17, 2011, when the UN Security Council passed the resolution (1973) that authorized the use of force in Libya (Williams, 2013). To account for early elections, which could not have been anticipated at the time contribution decisions were made, the actual date of the next general election was only used if it was less than one year away. Otherwise, the length of an electoral cycle was added to the date of the last election.[1] The crucial 0.5 anchor is located at one year (365 days) till the next election (in line with inter alia Gaubatz, 1991; Kisangani & Pickering, 2007: 287). The thresholds for full exclusion and inclusions are fixed at, respectively, 180 days and 730 days.

Right Executive

In line with previous research that examines the link between partisan politics and military interventions (e.g. Arena & Palmer, 2009: 936; Koch, 2009: 806; Mello, 2012: 436-437), the assessment of the executive's ideological orientations draws on the right-left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Volkens et al., 2013). The CMP data are based on quantitative content analysis of parties' election programs. The RILE scale is constructed by subtracting the percentage of

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the consulted studies base a state's relationship with the United States on a wider set of indicators, like historical ties with the United States, the explicit identification of a special relationship with Washington, geographical location, or a preference for NATO over alternative security institutions.

[1] Electoral dates were retrieved from the "parlgov database" (Döring & Manow, 2012) and the European Election Database (www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database).

the total statements of an election program that are grouped in the left categories from the percentage grouped in the right category. Party positions (n) are aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party's (i) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{s_i rl_i}{s}.$$

The crossover threshold is located at 0, since this corresponds to parties that make an equal amount of right and left statements in their manifestos. The threshold for full inclusion is fixed at 5, the anchor for full exclusion at 5.

Analytical Results

The fsQCA procedure involves several stages, which were carried out with the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013). Necessary and sufficient conditions were assessed separately, with the analysis of the former preceding the analysis of the latter (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 278). Two descriptive measures are used to evaluate both types of causal relations: consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2008: 44-68). The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirm sufficiency or necessity, the latter reflects the relevance of a sufficient or necessary condition. Consistency approaches unity as the data provides stronger support for sufficiency or necessity, coverage as a condition becomes more relevant.[1]

The analysis of sufficiency is based on the "Truth Table Algorithm" (Ragin, 2008: 124-144; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 178-195). A truth table contains a row for every possible combination of conditions. At the first stage of the analytical procedure, each case's membership score in these rows is calculated with fuzzy multiplication. Rows without membership scores above 0.5 are considered logical remainders, combinations of conditions that lack good empirical instances. The other rows are assigned an outcome value based on their consistency as a sufficient

[1] Consistency and coverage are, respectively, calculated with the formula $\sum(\min(Xi,Yi)/\sum(Xi)$ and $\sum(\min(Xi,Yi)/\sum(Yi)$,in which X denotes the membership scores in the alleged subset and Y the scores in the alleged superset.

condition for outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). Subsequently, Boolean algebra is used to minimize the truth table (Ragin, 2008: 145-177). Depending on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. We focus on the intermediate formula, in line with Schneider and Wagemann's (2012: 279) recommendation that this solution "should be at the center of the substantive discussion". The intermediate solution results when only the remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated in the minimization process.[1] The following subsections present the results of the analyses of high burden and absence of high burden.

High Burden

The analysis of necessity reveals that none of the consistency values of the conditions exceed the recommended 0.9 threshold, indicating that none of them are necessary for the outcome.[2] Table 1 represents the truth table for high burden, with the cases presented in the rows where their membership score exceeds 0.5. The consistency cutoff point, which separates truth table rows that pass as sufficient from those that do not, is fixed at 0.77, well above the minimal advisable threshold of 0.75 (Ragin, 2009: 118; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). The rows above this threshold only contain cases that carried a high burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 185). However, Canada, which is a high contributor, is a member of a row with a consistency below the threshold (row 10). This row is not coded as sufficient for the outcome because its consistency of 0.610 is much lower than the minimum advisable threshold. Moreover, it also contains a case that did not carry a high share of the operations burden: Poland. In consequence, Canada will not be covered by the resulting solution.

[1] If no remainders are incorporated, minimization results in the 'complex solution'; if all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated, minimization results in the parsimonious solution. The latter are presented in Appendix 2.

[2] The consistency scores of the analysis of necessity are presented in Appendix 2.

Table 1. Truth table "High Burden"

	Conditions						Consis-	Outcome	
row	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED	tency	HB	cases
1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1.000	1	Norway
2	1	0	1	0	1	1	1.000	1	Italy
3	1	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	1	US
4	1	1	1	0	0	1	1.000	1	France
5	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.938	1	Belgium
6	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.909	1	UK
7	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.788	1	Denmark
8	1	0	1	0	0	0	0.769	0	Spain
9	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.654	0	Turkey
10	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.610	0	Canada, Poland
11	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.494	0	Greece
12	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.455	0	Bulgaria
13	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.408	0	Netherlands
14	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.312	0	Hungary
15	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.227	0	Portugal
16	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.152	0	Luxembourg, Slovenia
17	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.084	0	Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
18	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000	0	Croatia
19	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.000	0	Germany

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance

The intermediate solution is presented in Table 2.[1] Its high consistency of 0.917 confirms that it indeed corresponds to sufficient combinations. The solution's relatively low coverage of 0.59 is mainly caused by the fact that it does not cover the

[1] The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution. The presence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, alliance value, right executive, and electoral distance were linked to high burden. Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data (cf. Baumgartner and Thiem (2015) on such model ambiguities). The presented model was selected because it is the only model that does not include the absence of military spending, alliance value, or spatial proximity, which are highly unlikely to explain the presence of high burden

large contribution of Canada. The solution shows that four combinations of conditions consistently lead to contributing. The first combines large economy with high military spending and distant elections. This combination covers France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The second path combines large economy, spatial proximity, and electoral distance and covers Italy and France. The third combination shows that states with a large economy and distant elections carried a high share of the burden of the Libya operation, but only if they were governed by a left-leaning government. This path covers Belgium and Norway. The fourth path combines large economy, alliance value, and a left-leaning government and covers Denmark and Norway.

Table 2. Intermediate solution

	Solution	Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Coverage Unique	Cases
HB	LE *MS*ED	0.971	0.346	0.186	France, UK, US
	LE *SP*ED	0.885	0.220	0.040	France, Italy
	LE*ED*~RE	0.971	0.270	0.066	Belgium, Norway
	LE*AV*~RE	0.891	0.117	0.052	Denmark, Norway
	Solution	0.917	0.590		
~HB	~MS*~AV*~ED	1.000	0.066	0.032	Spain
	~MS*~AV*~SP*RE	1.000	0.092	0.062	Germany
	~LE	0.887	0.781	0.736	Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal, Greece
	Solution	0.898	0.875		

HB: High Burden, LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance; "~" indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication "*" refers to conjunction of conditions.

Absence of High Burden

The analysis of necessity reveals that none of the consistency values exceed the 0.9 threshold, indicating that there are no necessary conditions for the outcome's absence. Table 3 presents the truth table for "absence high burden". The consistency cutoff point is fixed at 0.75. The rows above this threshold only contain cases that did not carry a high burden, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 185). Three rows with a consistency below this threshold (row 10, 11, and 14) contain cases which did not carry a high burden in the operation: the Netherlands, Turkey, and Poland. However, these rows are not coded as sufficient for absence high burden because their consistency is far below the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. In consequence, these cases will not be covered by the solution for the outcome's absence.

Minimization of the truth table results in the intermediate solution presented in Table 2.[1] The consistency of the solution almost equals 0.9, strongly confirming that it indeed corresponds to a sufficient combination. Its coverage is well above 0.85. This indicates that the solution explains a large share of the outcome's absence, in spite of the noncovered cases. Three causal paths result from the analysis. The first two show that the absence of military spending and alliance value is sufficient in combination with either the absence of distant elections or the presence of aright-leaning executive and the absence of spatial proximity. These paths, respectively, cover Spain and Germany. The third path shows that the absence of a large economy is sufficient for not contributing, strongly confirming expectations from collective action theory.

[1] The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution: the absence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, right executive and electoral distance were assumed to contribute to the absence of high burden. Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented model was selected because it is the only model that does not include the spatial proximity, which is highly unlikely to explain the absence of high burden.

Table 3. Truth table "~High Burden"

	Conditions						Consis	Outcome	
row	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED	-tency	~HB	cases
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1.000	1	Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
2	0	1	0	0	1	0	1.000	1	Croatia
3	0	1	0	1	0	0	1.000	1	Portugal
4	0	1	1	1	1	1	1.000	1	Bulgaria
5	1	0	0	0	1	1	1.000	1	Germany
6	1	0	1	0	0	0	1.000	1	Spain
7	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.988	1	Greece
8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.848	1	Luxembourg, Slovenia
9	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.796	1	Hungary
10	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.714	0	Netherlands
11	1	1	1	0	0	0	0.472	0	Turkey
12	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.420	0	Belgium
13	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.406	0	France
14	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.390	0	Canada, Poland
15	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.339	0	Italy
16	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.212	0	Denmark
17	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.091	0	UK
18	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.000	0	Norway
19	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.000	0	US

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Aliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance

Interpretation

Arriving at minimal formulas and optimal parameters of fit are not the ultimate goals of QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 280). Instead, solutions must be related back to the cases and theoretical expectations (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 65). The results largely confirm the collective action, balance of threat, and alliance politics hypotheses. In contrast, the formulas contradict theoretical expectations on domestic constraints.

First, the results provide strong support for the collective action hypothesis. The presence of an large economy is part of every solution for the outcome's presence, while its absence is sufficient for the outcome's absence. Moreover, the

first sufficient combination for high burden shows that, if elections were not imminent, nations with a large economy and sizable military spending carried a large share of the burden of the Libya operation. This corresponds to collective action expectations for lumpy goods: the contributions of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States were critical for the operation's success, which denied them the opportunity to ride free if they wanted to gain the benefits of the operation.[1] Neither France nor the United Kingdom "was capable of executing the military campaign without the other" (Davidson, 2013: 317). Similarly, not contributing was not a viable option for Washington, since "approximately 90 percent of the military actions against the Libyan regime would not have been possible without the support of the US" (Koenig, 2012: 3).

Moreover, in line with the exploitation hypothesis, France and the United Kingdom carried a disproportionate share of the operation's burden. While only accounting for 8 percent and 7 percent of NATO's GDP, France, and the United Kingdom, respectively, conducted one-third and one-fifth of the strike operations. The United States, on its part, flew more sorties, and nearly as many strike missions, than the combined totals of the other members during the first ten days of the operation (Chivviss, 2014: 89). However, the exploitation hypothesis would have expected the United States to keep carrying a disproportionate share of the costs and risks, instead of reducing its role after barely two weeks. The latter reflected the United States' changed grand strategy, which aimed to force the other allies to contribute more to "achieving joint transatlantic security goals" (Chivviss, 2014: 199; Hallams & Schreer, 2012: 321). Moreover, US restraint was possible because France and the United Kingdom had taken a more forward-leaning stance in the run-up to

1 Germany could also have made a substantial contribution in the early stages of the campaign because it possesses advanced Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capabilities (Anrig, 2011: 93-94). Italy also possesses advanced SEAD capabilities, but did not deploy them in the opening of the campaign. However, the lack of these capabilities did not increase the risk at general failure to such an extent that it "prohibited the operation", in contrast to what would have been the case if the US withheld its essential capabilities or the UK and France did not carry a disproportionate large share of the operation's burden (Chivviss, 2014: 190). In fact, it was the French willingness to take the risk of opening the campaign with no dedicated SEAD aircraft and the participation of the US' F-16CJs that compensated for the lack of European SEAD capabilities (Anrig, 2011; Gelfand, 2011).

the operation, and the operation's difficulty was relatively low (Chivviss, 2014: 200).[1] Nevertheless, the United States was still to a large extent "prisoner to its size" (Ringsmose, 2010: 326). Even after limiting its role, it kept providing essential capabilities, flew the highest number of sorties, and contributed more aircraft than any other ally.

The balance of threat hypothesis is confirmed by the second path toward high burden, which combines a large economy and electoral distance with spatial proximity. This combination covers two cases: France and Italy. Case-based evidence suggests that the threat caused by geographical proximity was indeed important in both cases. Davidson (2013: 316), for example, argues that the "threat to France's borders posed by refugees fleeing violence in Libya" is an important factor to explain France's reaction to the crisis. Italy's contribution to the operation also seems grounded in narrow interests (Ceccorulli & Coticchia, 2015: 15). According to Lombardi (2011: 33, 42), Italy's main goals during the Libyan crisis were avoiding a large refugee influx and preserving its economic interests in the country. For this reason, it only decided to support the operation once it became clear Qaddafi's days were numbered and joining the coalition was the best way to preserve these interests. The hesitance of Italy suggests that the threats linked to geographic proximity do not always push governments toward intervention but rather incite contributions after it becomes clear that the intervention is inevitable and participating is the best way to preserve their interests.

Turkey's policy toward the intervention corresponds to the latter conjecture. Like Italy, Turkey is one of the NATO allies that was vulnerable to a potential regional blowback of the intervention (Chivviss, 2014: 75). Turkey was initially against the intervention and, eventually, only contributed noncombat assets. The Turkish reluctance to contribute can partially be explained by domestic political concerns and the approaching general elections (Müge & Aylin, 2013: 603). However, the inconsistency of Turkey's truth table row in the analysis of the outcome's absence suggests that electoral calculations are not sufficient for explaining its reluctance to contribute. The analysis, thus, confirms that spatial proximity has an impact on contributions to the Libya operation. However, the causal path that includes this condition covers the contribution of Italy, which was

[1] As convincingly argued by Chivviss (2014: 68) in his comprehensive history of the Libya intervention, it was the imminent threat to the Libya population, rather than pressure of the UK and France, that eventually led to the US' decision to intervene.

first very hesitant to participate in the operation. Together with the Turkish reluctance to contribute, this suggests that countries that face a threat from the target of the operation face countervailing pressures, which only incite contributions once states perceive participation as the best strategy to preserve their interests.

Third, although the United States did not take the lead of the operation, alliance value had a positive impact on contributions. While the first and second combination for the outcome's absence link the absence of alliance value to the absence of high burden, the third path to high burden suggests that alliance value spurred contributions to the operation. This path covers Denmark and Norway, whose contributions have been attributed to a desire to demonstrate their reliability and dedication to NATO (Dicke et al., 2013: 41; Jakobsen & Møller, 2012: 112). However, multiple sources also argue that the contribution of these countries was at least partially motivated by humanitarian concerns (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014: 211; Dicke et al., 2013: 40; Jakobsen & Møller, 2012: 115). Moreover, contrary to theoretical expectations, the solution suggests that alliance value only leads to contributions from countries that were governed by a non-right executive.

In contrast to the collective action, balance of threat and alliance politics hypotheses, the solutions do not confirm expectations on domestic politics. There is evidence that electoral distance had an impact on the outcome: its presence is part of three paths for the presence of high burden, while its absence is included in one sufficient combination for its absence. The results, however, clearly contradict the expectations on government ideology. Strikingly, the absence of a right executive is a causal condition in the third and fourth path toward high burden, whereas its presence is an ingredient of the second path toward its absence.

A very plausible explanation for these unexpected causal combinations is related to the nature of the Libya operation, which differs from the cases that are generally included in studies that link military deployment to government ideology. The latter generally focuses on militarized interstate disputes or on the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contrary to these operations, NATO pursued a humanitarian goal in Libya. Therefore, inferences based on the propeace attitude of leftist parties and promilitary attitude of rightist parties are less applicable. In a comprehensive study on the link between partisan politics and participation in peace enforcement operations, Rathbun (2004) argues that leftist parties are actually more likely to support humanitarian interventions, since they consider the promotion of welfare of other countries part of their national interest. Right-leaning parties, on the other hand, have a more exclusive conception of their national interest and, therefore, only

support crisis management operations if they believe these enhance more narrow national interests.

The third and fourth pathways toward high burden indicate that the pattern of contributions to the Libya operation confirms Rathbun's hypotheses. Auerswald and Saideman (2014: 211), for example, argue that the contributions of the left-leaning governments of Belgium, Denmark, and Norway were at least partially motivated by humanitarian concerns. In contrast, Italy's right-wing Berlusconi government, covered by the second sufficient combination, only participated to secure narrow national interests, not to enforce the R2P doctrine. Similarly, the second sufficient combination toward the absence of high burden combines the absence of spatial proximity with the presence of right executive. This path covers Germany, which was governed by a conservative-liberal government under the leadership of Merkel. According to Hansel and Oppermann (2014: 14), "the Merkel government has put a strong emphasis on the German national interest in explaining its nonparticipation in Libya" (see also Oppermann, 2012: 514), while Miskimmon (2012: 402)contends that "Germany saw no clear interest in becoming involved in the NATO-operation".

However, case-based evidence suggests important exceptions to the cross-case pattern that emerges on the link between executive ideology and contributions. First of all, there is no conclusive evidence that Germany's decision not to contribute is best explained by the combination of a right-leaning government and the absence of clear interests. No clear party lines were drawn in the debate on the Libya intervention and critique on the government's policy toward the crisis was not confined to left-leaning opposition parties (Miskimmon, 2012: 398-399). In fact, several members of parliament of Merkel's Christlich Demokratische Union-party were critical of the government's policy and implied they might have supported limited military involvement (Brockmeier, 2013: 82). Furthermore, Canada and Poland also combine a right-wing government with the absence of spatial proximity but are not covered by the solution for the outcome's absence. The nonparticipation of Poland confirms that right-wing executives are less likely to participate in humanitarian operations. Polish Prime Minister Tusk, furthermore, explained the decision not to participate by arguing that "the situation in Libya poses no threat to Poland's interests and Poland's security" (Dicke et al., 2013: 51). However, Canada was also governed by a right-wing government but nevertheless carried a high share of the operation's burden. Moreover, although the conservative Harper government did not refer to the R2P to justify its participation, it did package "the intervention on normatively oriented and value-based arguments in favor of democracy, freedom and human rights" (Cooper & Momani, 2014: 186). In sum, although left-leaning

governments were generally more likely to participate, the lack of clear party lines in Germany in the debate on the intervention and the large contribution of Canada's right-wing government, which was almost exclusively sold on value-based grounds, show that there are important exceptions to the general pattern of contributions.

Conclusion

Why did some NATO members carry a large share of the burden of the Libya operation while others hardly contributed at all? This study combined collective action theory with hypotheses on balance of threat, alliance politics, and domestic constraints into a multicausal model to explain the division of the operation's burden. Its results suggest innovative inferences on the interactions between partisan politics and the reasons states contribute to operations. While left-wing governments carried a high share of the burden if they had the capabilities to increase the probability that the goals of the operation would be achieved and either highly valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-wing governments only contributed if their country's interests were threatened by the crisis in Libya. NATO members whose military capabilities were critical for the operation's success constitute an important exception to these inferences. These participated irrespective of the ideological composition of their governments, indicating that partisan politics only matter for nonessential contributors.

These conclusions have significant implications for the division of the burden of future NATO operations. The Libya campaign suggests that the other capable allies can be expected to compensate if the United States reduces its role in an operation. However, this will only be the case if Washington makes clear from the outset that it is not willing to move forward without significant support. Furthermore, US restraint in the Libya operation was only possible because France and the United Kingdom had taken a more forward-leaning stance in the run-up to the operation and the operation's difficulty was relatively low. During the 2014 intervention against the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the United States only started mobilizing its allies a few weeks after it started offensive operations and was left carrying the brunt of the operation's burden. Although their "security interests should dictate an even more robust effort against ISIS than against the Qaddafi regime", France and the United Kingdom provided far less support to the operation against ISIS (Cohen & Scheinmann, 2014).

The results furthermore indicate that contributions to out-of-area operations depend on the interaction between domestic politics and the goals of an operation.

The greater inclination of left-leaning executives to participate in humanitarian operations should apply beyond the scope of the Libya campaign. Preliminary evidence from NATO's previous humanitarian intervention in Kosovo supports this inference. Rathbun (2004), for instance, concludes that the leftist parties of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom eventually supported the use of force in Kosovo. Moreover, most of the smaller allies that contributed to the air operations, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, and Portugal, were governed by a left-leaning government (Mello, 2014: 73-74). Prospective research could examine the interaction between the international incentives that spur contributions and party politics more systematically, to assess whether these inferences are generalizable beyond the Libya operation.

This study furthermore showed that QCA is a powerful tool for research on military burden sharing. Building on QCA allowed to establish innovative inferences on the specific interactions that determine the level of contributions to NATO's Libya operation. Employing this approach in future research would indubitably lead to a more holistic understanding of the burden sharing dynamics in multilateral operations.

Appendices: NATO Burden Sharing in Libya - A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Appendix 1 Base Variables and Fuzzy Membership Scores

Table 1. Base variables

cases	LE	MS	SP	RE	ED
Belgium	514.794	1.2	1879.05	-75.759	1184
Bulgaria	53.575	2.4	939.26	13.69	841
Canada	1,778.632	1.2	5511.57	9.091	46
Croatia	61.722	2	1084.54	21.857	253
Czech Republic	216.061	1.7	1725.67	79.669	1168
Denmark	333.696	1.4	2374.94	-9.897	182
Estonia	22.564	1.9	2755.85	3.199	1450
France	2,784.761	2.5	931.32	-114.492	415
Germany	3,631.435	1.4	1568.71	74.697	925
Greece	290.153	3	293.24	-9.5	932
Hungary	138.968	1.4	1447.57	-44.623	1121
Italy	2,196.334	1.9	445.99	11.633	758
Latvia	28.48	1.6	2554.26	11.6	1295
Lithuania	42.872	1.5	2336.46	105.231	575
Luxembourg	59.308	0.6	1857.15	-53.667	1178
Netherlands	833.519	1.5	2002.95	154.254	1180
Norway	490.661	1.7	2776.97	-302.554	912
Poland	515.667	1.9	1785.83	55.239	206
Portugal	237.875	2	1727.08	-44.977	80
Romania	182.611	1.8	1214.71	19.909	624
Slovakia	96.158	1.6	1663.45	119.904	1183
Slovenia	50.299	1.5	1374.3	-102.246	554
Spain	1,455.867	1.2	980.57	-232.242	358
Turkey	774.775	2.8	569.41	-89.738	87
UK	2,464.639	2.5	2156.16	155.248	1511
US	15,533.83	4	6640.27	11.14	596

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance.

Table 2. Fuzzy membership scores

	Outcome	Conditions					
cases	HB	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED
Belgium	1	0.65	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	1.00
Bulgaria	0.2	0.00	0.90	0.59	1	1.00	1.00
Canada	1	1.00	0.00	0.00	1	1.00	0.00
Croatia	0	0.00	0.51	0.42	0	0.69	0.20
Czech Republic	0	0.03	0.20	0.00	1	1.00	1.00
Denmark	1	0.52	0.00	0.00	1	0.00	0.01
Estonia	0	0.00	0.41	0.00	1	0.80	1.00
France	1	1.00	1.00	0.60	0	0.00	0.57
Germany	0	1.00	0.00	0.00	0	1.00	1.00
Greece	0.2	0.39	1.00	1.00	0	0.00	1.00
Hungary	0	0.00	0.00	0.05	1	0.05	1.00
Italy	0.8	1.00	0.41	1.00	0	1.00	1.00
Latvia	0	0.00	0.10	0.00	1	1.00	1.00
Lithuania	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	1	1.00	0.79
Luxembourg	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	0.4	0.88	0.00	0.00	1	1.00	1.00
Norway	1	0.63	0.20	0.00	1	0.00	1.00
Poland	0	0.65	0.41	0.00	1	1.00	0.07
Portugal	0	0.14	0.51	0.00	1	0.05	0.00
Romania	0.2	0.00	0.31	0.29	1	0.67	0.85
Slovakia	0	0.00	0.10	0.00	1	1.00	1.00
Slovenia	0	0.00	0.00	0.13	0	0.00	0.76
Spain	0.4	1.00	0.00	0.53	0	0.00	0.48
Turkey	0.2	0.84	1.00	1.00	0	0.00	0.00
UK	1	1.00	1.00	0.00	1	1.00	1.00
US	1	1.00	1.00	0.00	0	1.00	0.82

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance.

Appendix 2 QCA Results

Table 1. Necessary conditions "High Burden"

	Consistency	Coverage
LE	0.836	0.698
~LE	0.233	0.160
MS	0.491	0.531
~MS	0.560	0.324
SP	0.306	0.535
~SP	0.776	0.373
AV	0.490	0.320
~AV	0.510	0.455
RE	0.469	0.323
~RE	0.551	0.460
ED	0.694	0.367
~ED	0.362	0.477

Table 2. Complex solution "High Burden"

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	*Cases*
LE*~MS*~SP*AV*~RE	0.117	0.052	0.891	Norway, Denmark
LE*~MS*~SP*~RE*ED	0.172	0.107	0.960	Belgium, Norway
LE*MS*~SP*RE*ED	0.186	0.186	0.948	UK, US
LE*~MS*SP*~AV*RE*ED	0.060	0.060	1.000	Italy
LE*MS*SP*~AV*~RE*ED	0.098	0.098	1.000	France
Solution	0.568		0.947	

Table 3. Parsimonious solution "High Burden" [1]

	Coverage			
	Raw	Unique	Consistency	*Cases*
LE*~RE*ED	0.270	0.066	0.971	Belgium, Norway
LE*AV*~RE	0.117	0.052	0.891	Norway, Denmark
LE*SP*ED	0.885	0.220	0.885	Italy, France
LE*MS*ED	0.346	0.186	0.971	GB, US, France
Solution	0.590		0.917	

Table 4 Necessary conditions "~High Burden"

	Consistency	Coverage
LE	0.260	0.359
~LE	0.781	0.887
MS	0.293	0.524
~MS	0.738	0.705
SP	0.210	0.608
~SP	0.839	0.667
AV	0.630	0.680
~AV	0.370	0.545
RE	0.609	0.691
~RE	0.404	0.557
ED	0.759	0.663
~ED	0.275	0.597

[1] Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solution is the parsimonious solution from which the intermediate solution presented in the main article was derived.

Table 5. Complex solution "~High Burden"

	Coverage		Consis	
	Raw	Unique	-tency	Cases
~LE*~MS*~SP*AV*RE*ED	0.365	0.267	0.940	Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia; Hungary
~LE*~MS*~SP*~RE*ED	0.212	0.109	0.825	Luxembourg, Slovenia; Hungary
~LE*MS*~SP*~AV*RE*~ED	0.031	0.019	1.000	Croatia
~LE*MS*~SP*AV*~RE*~ED	0.041	0.031	1.000	Portugal
~LE*MS*SP*~AV*~RE*ED	0.049	0.037	0.988	Greece
~LE*MS*SP*AV*RE*ED	0.054	0.030	1.000	Bulgaria
LE*~MS*~SP*~AV*RE*ED	0.062	0.062	1.000	Germany
LE*~MS*~SP*~AV*~RE*~ED	0.032	0.032	1.000	Spain
Solution	0.698		0.939	

Table 6. Parsimonious solution "~High Burden" [1]

	Coverage		Consis	
	Raw	Unique	-tency	Cases
~LE	0.781	0.736	0.887	Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal, Greece
~MS*~SP*~AV*RE	0.092	0.062	1.000	Germany
~MS*~AV*~ED	0.077	0.032	1.000	Spain
Solution	0.876		0.898	

[1] Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solution is the parsimonious solution from which the intermediate solution presented in the main article was derived.

Appendix 3 Energy Dependence and Public Opinion

This appendix presents two alternative analyses for the paper "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis". In the first analysis, public support is added to the conditions included in the theoretical framework of the main text; in the second analysis, energy dependence is added to the theoretical framework.

Public Opinion

A plausible explanatory variable that is not included in the analysis presented in the main article is the level of public support for the intervention in Libya. Since "public opinion is central to representation, democratic accountability and decision-making", it should be self-evident that it has an impact on the contributions of democracies to multinational operations (Aldrich et al., 2006: 477; Mello, 2014: 40-41). Nevertheless, many scholars are skeptical on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. In a comprehensive review of scholarly research on the link between public opinion and foreign policy, Holsti (1992), for example, argues that public opinion was regarded as highly volatile, incoherent and not very important for foreign policy decisions during the first two decades after World War II. An increasing number of scholars challenges this pessimistic view. Results of Ostrom and Job (1986: 556-557) and James and Oneal (1991), for example, show that public aversion to war is negatively related to the probability of the use of force; Baum (2004: 221) concludes that public opinion had a constraining effect on the policies of the Bush and Clinton administration during the crisis in Somalia and Mello (2014:187) asserts that public support was vital for explaining contributions to the operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In consequence, the possibility that public opinion has an impact on contributions to Operation Unified Protector cannot be ruled out a priori.

Unfortunately, reliable and comparable public opinion data is missing for almost half of the NATO allies. The German Marshall Fund's 2011 Transatlantic Trends Survey provides the most comprehensive opinion poll on the Libya intervention (German Marshall Fund, 2011). This survey only covers 13 NATO allies. Moreover, the data is based on interviews that were conducted between May 25th and June 17th 2011, over a month after the start of the Libya operation. Any link between public opinion and participation could, thus, be a consequence of successful public relations efforts of the participating governments.

The calibration of public opinion is based on the method of transformational assignment, which was achieved with the calibrate function of the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013). The crucial 0.5 anchor was fixed at 50%, locating NATO allies in which the majority of the population approved military action over Libya more in than out of the set. The threshold for full membership is located at 75%, the threshold for full non-membership at 25%. Public opinion on the Libya intervention and the fuzzy membership scores are presented in Table 1.

Table 2 represents the truth table for high burden. The consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.77. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the analysis presented in the article and is located well above the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that carried a high burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations.

Table 1. Calibration public support

cases	Raw Data	Fuzzy Membership Score
Bulgaria	46	0.42
France	58	0.66
Germany	37	0.24
Italy	47	0.44
Netherlands	65	0.80
Poland	35	0.20
Portugal	57	0.64
Romania	39	0.28
Slovakia	30	0.10
Spain	54	0.58
Turkey	23	0.00
UK	53	0.56
US	59	0.68

Table 2. Truth table "High Burden"- Public Support

	Conditions							Consis	Outcome	
row	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED	PS	-tency	HB	
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1.000	1	Italy
2	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1.000	1	US
3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1.000	1	France
4	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.889	1	UK
5	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.769	0	Spain
6	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.627	0	Turkey
7	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.460	0	Bulgaria
8	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.460	0	Netherlands
9	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.227	0	Portugal
10	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.226	0	Romania, Slovakia
11	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.000	0	Germany
12	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.000	0	Poland

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, PS: Public Support

The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and intermediate solutions presented in Table 3 and Table 4.[1] For the production of the intermediate solution, the presence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, right executive, electoral distance and public support were assumed to contribute to the presence of high burden.

Table 3. Intermediate solution "High Burden" – Public Support

	Coverage			
	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Cases
LE*SP*RE*ED	0.148	0.072	0.800	Italy
LE*MS*RE*ED*PS	0.306	0.230	0.959	US, UK
LE*MS*SP*ED*PS	0.181	0.106	1.000	France
Solution	0.483		0.906	

[1] Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solutions were selected because they do not include the absence of alliance value, which is highly unlikely to explain the presence of high burden

Table 4. Parsimonious solution "High Burden" – Public Support

	Coverage			
	Raw	Unique	Consistency	Cases
LE*MS*ED	0.519	0.107	0.976	US, France, UK
LE*MS*PS	0.428	0.017	0.872	US, France, UK
LE*SP*ED	0.328	0.146	0.863	Italy, France
MS*ED*PS	0.485	0.074	0.848	US, France, UK
Solution	0.665		0.820	

Table 5 represents the truth table for "absence high burden". The consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the analysis presented in the article and to the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that did not carry a high burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations.

Table 5. Truth table "~High Burden"- Public Support

	Conditions							Consis	Outcome	
row	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED	PS	-tency	~HB	cases
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1.000	1	Romania; Slovakia
2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1.000	1	Portugal
3	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1.000	1	Bulgaria
4	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1.000	1	Germany
5	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1.000	1	Poland
6	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1.000	1	Spain
7	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.770	1	Netherlands
8	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.508	0	Turkey
9	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.357	0	Italy
10	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.111	0	UK
11	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.000	0	US
12	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.000	0	France

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, PS: Public Support

The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and intermediate solutions presented in Table 6 and 7.[1] For the production of the intermediate solution, the absence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, right executive, electoral distance and public support were assumed to contribute to the absence of high burden.

Table 6. Intermediate solution "~High Burden" – Public Support

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
~LE*~PS	0.420	0.088	1.000	Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria
~MS*~SP	0.637	0.226	0.924	Romania, Slovakia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands
~LE*~SP*~RE*~ED	0.133	0.049	1.000	Portugal
~MS*~AV*~RE*~ED	0.068	0.007	1.000	Spain
Solution	0.780		0.937	

Table 7. Parsimonious solution "~High Burden" – Public Support

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
~MS*~SP	0.637	0.195	0.924	Romania, Slovakia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands
~LE	0.538	0.189	0.911	Romania, Slovakia, Portugal, Bulgaria
~MS*~ED	0.230	0.007	1.000	Poland, Spain
Solution	0.833		0.888	

[1] Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. However, the other models each include the presence of public support and, thus, definitely do not support that popular opposition constraints governments.

When considering both the analysis of the outcome's presence and absence, it seems that empirical support for the impact of public opinion on the division of the burden of Operation Unified Protector is mixed at best. Public support is an element of the intermediate and parsimonious solutions for the outcome's presence. However, the paths that include this condition in the parsimonious solution are logically redundant prime implicants, paths towards the outcome that only cover cases that are also covered by other solutions. This indicates that public support was not decisive for carrying a high share of Operation Unified Protector's burden. The analysis of the absence of high burden confirms this conclusion. The absence of public support is included in the intermediate solution, but only in one of the three sufficient combinations. However, it is not included in the parsimonious solution, which indicates that its inclusion in the intermediate solution is a consequence of the directional assumptions made for the production of this formula. Therefore, it seems that public support is not a decisive determinant of the size of the NATO-allies' contributions to the Libya intervention.

Energy Dependence

A second plausible explanatory variable that is not included in the analysis presented in the main article is energy dependence. The uprising against the Qaddafi regime sharply reduced Libyan energy exports. These normally account for a substantial share of the oil and/or gas supply of some of NATO's European members (Libya Crisis Rocks Oil Markets 2011). In consequence, avoiding supply disruptions might have been an important incentive to contribute to the Libyan operation (Davidson, 2013; Dyson, 2013b).

The level of dependence on Libyan energy resources is determined by the share of domestic energy consumption that is provided by imports from Libya. Because Libya exports gas and oil to NATO member states, the sum of the import of these products was relativized by total domestic energy consumption. The base variable for High Energy dependence (HED) was calculated with the following formula:

$$ED=\frac{IP_g+IP_o}{C}$$

where IP_g is the import of Libyan gas, IP_o import of Libyan oil and C the total domestic energy consumption. Data for European states was retrieved from Eurostat (2013), data for Canada and the US from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013). This interval-level indicator was transformed to fuzzy data

with the method of transformational assignment, which was achieved with the calibrate function of the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013). The threshold for full inclusion was fixed at 10%. Hereby, only Italy is assigned a score of 1, a country consistently described as highly dependent on Libyan energy (Libya Crisis Rocks Oil Markets 2011; Farge and Lewis 2011). The crossover threshold is located at 5%. This corresponds to a significant gap in the data between Spain (5.65%) and France (3.84%). The anchor for full exclusion is fixed at 0%, locating countries that do not import energy from Libya fully out of the set. The base variable and the fuzzy membership scores for energy dependence are presented in Table 8.

Table 8. Calibration energy dependence

cases	raw data	fuzzy membership score
Belgium	0.46	0.05
Bulgaria	0	0
Canada	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	0	0
Estonia	0	0
France	3.84	0.38
Germany	2.17	0.22
Greece	9.95	0.99
Hungary	0	0
Italy	14.78	1
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Netherlands	1.56	0.16
Norway	0	0
Poland	0	0
Portugal	6.34	0.63
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	5.65	0.57
Turkey	0	0
UK	1.32	0.13
US	0.13	0.01

High Energy Dependence (HED) was added to the truth table, which is presented in Table 9. The consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.77. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the analysis presented in the article and is located well above the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that carried a high burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations.

Table 9. Truth Table "High Burden"- Energy Dependence

	Conditions							Consis	Outcome	
	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED	HED	-tency	HB	
1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1.000	1	Norway
2	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1.000	1	Italy
3	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1.000	1	US
4	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1.000	1	France
5	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.972	1	Belgium
6	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0.897	1	UK
7	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.788	1	Denmark
8	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.769	0	Spain
9	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.656	0	Greece
10	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.654	0	Turkey
11	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.610	0	Canada, Poland
12	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.455	0	Bulgaria
13	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.426	0	Netherlands
14	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.312	0	Hungary
15	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.152	0	Luxembourg, Slovenia
16	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.084	0	Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
17	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0.000	0	Croatia
18	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.000	0	Portugal
19	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.000	0	Germany

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, HED: High Energy Dependence

The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and intermediate solutions presented in Table 10 and Table 11.[1] For the production of the intermediate solution, the presence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, right executive, electoral distance and high energy dependence were assumed to contribute to the presence of high burden.

Table 10. Parsimonious solution "High Burden" – Energy Dependence

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
LE*~RE*ED	0.270	0.066	0.971	Belgium, Norway
LE*AV*~RE	0.117	0.052	0.891	Norway, Denmark
LE*SP*ED	0.220	0	0.885	Italy, France
LE*ED*HED	0.237	0	0.823	Italy
HED*RE	0.112	0	0.701	Italy
LE*MS*ED	0.346	0.186	0.971	UK, US, France
Solution	0.590		0.917	

Table 11. Intermediate solution "High Burden" – Energy Dependence

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
LE *MS*ED	0.346	0.243	0.971	France, UK, US
LE *SP*ED*HED*RE	0.082	0.040	0.800	Italy
LE*ED*~RE	0.270	0.066	0.971	Belgium, Norway
LE*AV*~RE	0.117	0.052	0.891	Denmark, Norway
Solution	0.590		0.919	

[1] Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solutions were selected because they do not include the absence of spatial proximity , which is highly unlikely to explain the presence of high burden

Table 12 represents the truth table for "absence high burden". The consistency cut-off point is fixed at 0.75. This corresponds to the consistency threshold of the analysis presented in the article and to the minimum advisable threshold of 0.75. Moreover, the rows above this threshold only contain cases that did not carry a high burden in the operation, providing additional evidence for the sufficiency of the corresponding combinations.

Table 12. Truth Table "~High Burden"- Energy Dependence

	Conditions							Consis	Outcome	
	LE	MS	SP	AV	RE	ED	HED	-tency	~HB	
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1.000	1	Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1.000	1	Croatia
3	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1.000	1	Portugal
4	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1.000	1	Bulgaria
5	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1.000	1	Germany
6	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1.000	1	Spain
7	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.984	1	Greece
8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.848	1	Luxembourg, Slovenia
9	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.796	1	Hungary
10	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.745	0	Netherlands
11	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.472	0	Turkey
12	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.398	0	Belgium
13	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.390	0	Canada, Poland
14	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.339	0	Italy
15	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.212	0	Denmark
16	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0.103	0	UK
17	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0.017	0	France
18	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.000	0	Norway
19	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.000	0	US

LE: Large Economy, MS: Military Spending, SP: Spatial Proximity, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, ED: Electoral Distance, HED: High Energy Dependence

The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious and intermediate solutions presented in Table 13 and Table 14.[1] For the production of the intermediate solution, the absence of large economy, military spending, spatial proximity, right executive, electoral distance and high energy dependence were assumed to contribute to the absence of high burden.

Table 13. Parsimonious solution "~High Burden" – Energy Dependence

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
~LE	0.781	0.736	0.887	Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal, Greece
~MS*~SP*~AV*RE	0.078	0.014	1.000	Germany
~MS*~HED*~AV*RE	0.092	0	1.000	Germany
~MS*~AV*~ED	0.077	0.032	1.000	Spain
Solution	0.878		0.897	

Table 14. Intermediate solution "~High Burden" – Energy Dependence

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
~LE*~HED	0.715	0.519	0.879	Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia; Croatia, Bulgaria; Luxembourg, Slovenia, Hungary
~LE*~AV*~RE	0.190	0.036	0.895	Greece, Luxembourg, Slovenia
~LE*~SP*~RE*~ED	0.096	0.030	0.765	Portugal
~MS*~AV*~RE*~ED	0.066	0.032	1.000	Spain
~MS*~SP*~AV*RE*~HED	0.078	0.048	1.000	Germany
Solution	0.862		0.897	

[1] Multiple models fared equally well in accounting for the data. The presented solutions were selected because they do not include the presence of spatial proximity or high energy dependence, which are highly unlikely to explain the absence of high burden

High energy dependence is an element of several paths towards high burden of the parsimonious solution. However, each of them only covers one case, Italy, which is also covered by the combination of large economy, spatial proximity and electoral distance. The paths that include high energy dependence are thus logically redundant, indicating that this condition is not decisive for explaining the division of the burden of the Libya operation. Similarly, the absence of high energy dependence is included in one path towards the outcome's absence of the parsimonious solution. This path only covers Germany, which is also covered by another path towards the outcome. In consequence, it seems appropriate to conclude that the level of energy dependence was not decisive for explaining the NATO-allies' contributions to the Libya intervention.

Article 4: Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes against Islamic State - A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Status: Forthcoming in *Foreign Policy Analysis*

Abstract

Although over sixty partners have joined the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS), only a handful of states was willing to carry out air strikes against IS-targets. This article aims to explain the pattern of democratic participation in the air campaign. It builds on the rich literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop a multi-causal model, which is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the pattern of participation in the air strikes results from a complex interplay between alliance politics, threat perception and domestic institutional constraints. The threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the US constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia's immediate vicinity refrained from participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the US' security guarantee. Lastly, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had an impact on participation in the air strikes.

Introduction

On August 7th 2014, the United States launched its first air strikes against the Islamic State (IS). Although "Operation Inherent Resolve" started as a unilateral intervention, the Obama administration began mobilizing a broad coalition of allies as the air campaign intensified. At first glance, its efforts seem very successful: Washington managed to enlist 58 countries as members of the "global coalition to degrade and defeat ISIL" (Allen, 2014). However, few allies actually committed military forces to the coalition. At the time of writing in July 2015, only thirteen countries have participated in offensive air operations. In consequence, the US kept playing a dominant role in the campaign, carrying out the brunt of the air strikes.

Many states contributed to the fight against IS in other ways, for example by sending arms, ammunition or military instructors to reinforce Iraqi and Kurdish forces. However, the financial and political costs of these contributions fall far below the burdens involved in participating in combat operations. The latter not only entail more sizeable financial costs, but also a considerable risk of negative domestic ramifications and electoral punishment by casualty-averse constituencies (Mello, 2014: 75). Considering these costs and risks, the meekness of most members of the anti-IS coalition might not be surprising. Nevertheless, several states did carry out air strikes, indicating that these costs were not necessarily insurmountable.

This article aims to explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS. It builds on the rich scholarly literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop a multi-causal model, which is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the US constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia's immediate vicinity refrained from participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the US' security guarantee. In contrast, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had an impact on participation in the air strikes.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section builds on the comprehensive research on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop an integrated model for explaining participation in the air strikes against IS. The second section justifies the case selection, introduces QCA as an appropriate method to test the model and discusses the measurement of the variables. The third section presents the results of the analysis, which are interpreted against the backdrop of the

theoretical model in the fourth section. Lastly, the study's major findings are recapitulated in the conclusions.

Theoretical Framework

The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS presents a puzzle for two of the major theories of multilateral military operations and armed conflict: collective action theory and democratic peace theory. Collective action theory has dominated research on military burden sharing ever since the seminal article of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). The latter characterized defence as a pure public good, which implies that non-contributors cannot be excluded from enjoying its benefits. In consequence, states have few incentives to contribute if a state with the formidable military might of the US is willing to unilaterally launch an operation. The disproportionately large contribution of the US to the combat operations against IS corresponds to expectations of the pure public goods model. However, the latter cannot explain why several other states contributed to the strike operations, instead of taking a free ride off the US.

Research on democratic peace examines the link between democracy and armed conflict. Democratic peace theory contends that there is "something in the internal make up of democratic states" that makes them less warlike than semi-democracies and autocracies (Maoz & Russett, 1993: 626). Although some studies have examined whether democracies have less frequent domestic armed conflicts, the brunt of democratic peace research focusses on the interstate democratic peace (Hegre, 2014: 624). This research almost consistently confirms that democracies rarely fight each other, but there is less compelling evidence that democracies are in general more peaceful. Since the vast majority of the anti-IS coalition are full-fledged democracies, the general hesitancy to participate in the air strikes suggests that democracies are indeed reluctant to deploy military means. However, the fact that several democracies did carry out air strikes suggests considerable variation among established democracies in their propensity to get involved in armed conflict.

This study builds on more recent strands of the literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace to explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes. After several authors convincingly argued that the public goods model does not fully account for burden sharing decisions, more general joint product and integrated multi-causal models were introduced to the study of burden sharing (see e.g. Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994; Sandler, 1977; Shimizu & Sandler, 2010). The former assumes that military operations produce multiple benefits, varying from

purely public to country-specific and private benefits; the latter that contributions to multilateral operations are caused by a complex interaction between international and domestic level variables. Insights from this line of research are complemented with insights from a recent direction in democratic peace research, which seeks to explain the varying conflict involvement of established democracies (Chan & Safran, 2006; Prins & Sprecher, 1999; Schuster & Maier, 2006).

Balance of Threats

Integrated models generally invoke the "balance-of-threats hypothesis" to explain contributions to multilateral operations (e.g. Auerswald, 2004: 639; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 42-44; Davidson, 2011: 174). This hypothesis builds on Stephen Walt's neo-realist theory of alliance formation, which contends that states enter alliances to balance against threats (Walt, 1987). In the context of military operations, the hypothesis expects states to contribute to operations that counter threats to their national interest. The benefits of balancing against threats are only gained by states to which the target of the intervention actually poses a threat. Such country-specific benefits are taken into account in an alternative to the pure public goods model: the joint products model (Sandler and Shimizu 2014: 46). This assumes that military operations produce multiple goods, ranging from purely public to country-specific and private benefits. If an operation mainly produces country-specific joint products, contributions are expected to match the operation's benefits. In line with the balance-of-threats hypothesis, the joint products model would thus expect states that faced the highest level of threat to participate in an operation.

The main threat posed by the rise of IS is the increased risk of terrorist attacks. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan and other recent targets of US-led interventions, IS-controlled territory risks becoming a safe haven and training ground for international Jihadists (Choi & James, 2014: 6, 9). Countries that have been hit hard by Islamic terrorist attacks in the past can be expected to be most responsive to this increased terrorist threat (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 50). Additionally, a state's concern with the rise of IS might be connected to the number of nationals that have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. Governments and intelligence officials have expressed concerns that these volunteers might return home and use their combat experience and battle training to carry out attacks in their home countries (Bakker, Christophe & Entenmann, 2013: 4). Although it has been argued that "the threat presented by foreign fighters has been exaggerated", research on the subject suggests that returning militants pose a risk to their home countries (Byman & Shapiro,

2014). Nearly 30% of the individuals involved in the twenty-six terrorist plots investigated by de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2014: 64) had been abroad for fighting or training. According to Hegghammer (2013: 11), over a quarter of all individuals involved in terrorist plots in the West are known to have experience as foreign fighters and forty-six per cent of all plots include at least one such veteran. Moreover, his data indicates that the presence of foreign fighters in a terrorist plot increases the probability that it will actually come to execution, as well as the probability that people will get killed in the attack.

Since the number of western foreign fighters active in Syria is unprecedented in modern history, the threat to their home countries should not be underestimated (Lister, 2014: 88). Recognizing this threat, however, does not automatically imply it constitutes an incentive to participate in the air strikes. In fact, the strike operations are likely to increase the probability that returning IS fighters attempt to carry out attacks in retaliation (Lister, 2014: 97). However, countries with a large number of foreign fighters are likely to perceive the costs of inaction as higher. Not only did they experience the problem first hand and, hereby, have undeniable evidence that their country is fertile recruiting ground for IS fighters, returning militants also play an active role in radicalising new Jihadists (Hegghammer, 2013: 12). In consequence, states with a large number of militants active in Syria have the greatest incentive to avoid that IS consolidates its territory, attracts more foreign fighters and, hereby, becomes an even greater threat to their national security.

Alliance Politics

Alliance politics are a second plausible explanatory variable for the pattern of participation in the air strikes (e.g. Baltrusaitis, 2010: 205; Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72). Integrated models generally build on Glenn Snyder's secondary "Alliance Security Dilemma" (1984) to formulate expectations on the link between alliance politics and contributions to multilateral operations. This postulates that members of military alliances face two countervailing pressures: fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. The former involves the risk of being deserted by an ally; the latter of being entangled in a conflict central to the ally's interests, but peripheral to one's own. A country's choices in the alliance security dilemma are primarily determined by its relative dependence on the ally. The more a state depends on the ally for assistance against future security threats, the more likely the costs of abandonment will outweigh the costs of entrapment (Walt, 1987: 471-472).

More recently, scholars have argued that alliance dependence does not constitute the only reason for states to provide support to an ally. Davidson (2011:

15) prefers the expression "alliance value" over "alliance dependence", because states "may value an ally for myriad reasons and value does no necessarily entail dependence". More specifically, he argues that alliance value also depends on the expected influence on an ally, which determines whether they will be "able to leverage their ally's power into outcomes in their favor". Ringsmose (2010: 330-331) agrees with this line of reasoning by arguing that there are two groups of NATO-allies with a strong interest in a good relationship with the US: "Article 5ers" and "Traditional Atlanticists". The first group comprises the states that focus on NATO's collective defence principle, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In line with the alliance dependence hypothesis, it comprises states that perceive a resurging Russian threat and "realize their security comes in the shape of American security guarantees" (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010: 331). Atlanticists, in turn, are allies who perceive themselves as states with a special relationship with Washington, which they consider "an important key to their security and their political clout on the international scene" (Ringsmose, 2010: 331).

States might thus value their alliance with the US because they are dependent on the US' security guarantee or perceive a special relationship with Washington. While "Article 5ers" perceive contributions to NATO or US-led operations as "a fee to obtain American protection", "Atlanticists" considerer it "the price of political influence" (Ringsmose, 2010: 332). Either way, alliance politics constitute a plausible explanation for why states participated in the airstrikes instead of taking a free ride off the US' military might. As argued by Ringsmose (2010: 325), security alliances produce excludable benefits: the US can "resort to the intra-alliance threats […], generating fear of abandonment and marginalization among the smaller powers". Even if an operation mainly produces purely public benefits, states might still decide to participate if its leading policy makers believe that other benefits produced by their alliance with the US would otherwise be withheld (Ringsmose, 2010: 330-331).

Domestic Constraints

Studies building on integrated models suggest that international-level variables like threats and alliance politics "fare pretty well in explaining political leaders' incentives to contribute" (Oma, 2012: 565). However, they consistently conclude that domestic-level conditions need to be incorporated to fully account for a political leader's ability to participate. Democratic peace research is highly informative on which domestic-level determinants can be expected to matter. A more recent direction in this line of research emphasizes the significant variation across democratic political systems, which, in turn, is expected to affect their

propensity to resort to the use of force (e.g. Prins & Sprecher, 1999). Several scholars have argued that executives should be more constrained in parliamentary than in presidential systems, while coalition governments should be more constrained than single party governments. However, quantitative studies generally did not confirm these conjectures (Leblang & Chan, 2003; Reiter & Tillman, 2002: 824).

Several scholars did find evidence for the impact of another institutional variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in decision-making on the use of force. Democratic parliaments are expected to open up governmental decision-making to public scrutiny, forcing "governments to give reasons for political decisions" (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2008: 4). In consequence, strong parliamentary veto powers should significantly restrict a government's freedom of military action. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) describe how the Turkish Grand National Assembly overturned its government's decision to permit using Turkey as a base for the US intervention in the 2003 Iraq war. Similarly, Reiter and Tillman (2002: 824) conclude that "greater legislative controls over foreign policy […] is associated with lower propensity to initiate disputes", while Choi (2010: 438) shows that legislative constraints "are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force".

Recent work on parliamentary war powers has examined the differences "among democracies in their respective institutional arrangements regarding parliamentary participation in foreign military and security policy" (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 4). Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2010: 9-13) distinguish four power resources of parliaments regarding security policy making: legislative, control, communication and dismissal resources. In a study of European involvement in the 2003 Iraq intervention, they find a strong association between high parliamentary war powers and weak degrees of war involvement (Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 71). Wagner, Peters and Glahn (2010: 18) focus on one aspect of parliamentary control: "can parliament veto a deployment that is being planned by the executive?". Although they recognize that such an ex ante veto is not the only resource through which parliaments can exert control, Wagner, Peters and Glahn (2010: 19) rightfully contend that no other instrument is likely to be as effective.

Partisan politics constitute a second source of cross-democratic variation. Since political parties are an essential part of the domestic politics of mature democracies, political partisanship can be expected to impact their foreign and security policy (Mello, 2014: 37). In a comprehensive study on the creation of a European security institution outside NATO, Hofmann (2013: 204) demonstrates that ideological orientations structure government preferences in security policy.

Studies that scrutinize the link between government ideology and military intervention also conclude that political partisanship matters for military deployment decisions. Palmer, London and Regan (2004) assume that political leaders, above all, want to remain in office. Since the electoral platforms of right-leaning parties are generally more pro-military than the electoral platforms of left-leaning parties; the former are expected to be more inclined to support the use of force. Their results, as well as the successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009), confirm this inference. Similarly, the study of Koch and Sullivan (2010) suggests that leaders whose base of support is on the left of the political spectrum are more constrained by the costs of war fighting, Stevens (2015) demonstrates that the potential audience costs of war are greater for left-wing than for right-wing governments and Schuster and Maier (2006) conclude that rightist parties were more inclined to support the 2003 Iraq war. States governed by a right-leaning executive can thus be expected to be more likely to participate in the air strikes against IS.

Several recent studies suggest that partisan politics and parliamentary veto power should be analysed in conjunction, rather than independently. Williams (2014: 120), for example, argues that opposition parties are more likely to challenge ideological dissimilar governments, while Choi (2010: 441) contends that the level of parliamentary constraints only increases if legislative veto players and the executive have different ideological orientations. Similarly, Mello (2012: 427) integrates hypotheses on partisan politics and institutional structures in a sophisticated multi-causal model, which only expects the combination of parliamentary veto power with a left parliament to create an effective veto point against military deployment. In contrast, the study of Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) on Turkey's involvement in the 2003 Iraq war shows that parliaments can constitute an effective veto point even if a single party government enjoys a parliamentary majority. This finding resonates with the research of Auerswald (1999: 475-476; 480), who argues that executives will be reluctant to use force if its decision can be hindered or overturned by the legislature, irrespective of "the convergence or divergence of executive-legislative preferences".

Integrated Model

The pattern of participation in the air campaign is expected to result from a complex interplay between the international and domestic variables discussed in the previous section. States are expected to have an incentive to participate when they consider the rise of IS a significant threat to their national interest or highly value

their relationship with the US. These incentives will however only lead to actual contributions if combined with a right-leaning executive that does not face a left parliament with a veto on military deployment. Figure 1 summarizes these expectations in an integrated model.

Although the model integrates hypotheses from the prevailing theories on military intervention, it does not incorporate every possible explanatory variable. Most importantly, public opinion is not included in the model. Unfortunately, reliable public opinion data are only available for 11 cases. Including public opinion would require reducing the sample of cases by two-thirds, significantly impeding the generalizability of the study's results. An empirical test of an alternative model that incorporates public opinion was conducted on the reduced sample (cf. appendix 1). This demonstrates that public opinion was not decisive for participation in Operation Inherent Resolve.

Research Design

This section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and discusses the measurement of the variables.

Case Selection

The analysis is confined to a specific category of cases: the democratic members of the anti-IS coalition. As argued extensively in the democratic peace literature, "democratic and non-democratic regimes behave differently in their foreign policy" (Leblang & Chan, 2003: 385). In consequence, only democracies are expected to share enough background characteristics to be comparable along the variables specified in the previous section (Berg-Schlosser & Meur, 2009: 20). Furthermore, the expectations on domestic constraints only apply to democracies. In line with previous research, states that score eight or more on the Polity IV autocracy-democracy scale are considered democracies, resulting in forty-three democratic members of the anti-IS coalition, which are presented in Table 1 (Mello, 2014: 7).

In line with the possibility principle, only cases where the outcome "participation in the air strikes" is possible are included in the analysis (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). Fourteen democracies did not have fighter jets equipped to attack ground targets. In consequence, these were excluded as possible contributors.

Figure 1. Integrated Decision Model



Additionally, Taiwan is excluded from the analysis because comparative data on partisan politics is missing. After excluding these states, twenty-eight potential democratic participants remain, all of which have combat-capable aircraft and many of which participated in recent strike operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and/or Libya. Strikingly however, only eight of them carried out airstrikes against IS. Ten months after the first US bombs struck IS targets, none of the remaining eighteen democratic members has announced it will participate in offensive air operations.

Table 1. Democratic members coalition against IS

Country [a)]	Combat Aircraft [b)]	Participate	Country [a)]	Combat Aircraft [b)]	Participate
United States	2451	Yes	Romania	36	No
France	294	Yes	Portugal	30	No
United Kingdom	223	Yes	Bulgaria	28	No
Australia	95	Yes	Slovakia	20	No
Canada	77	Yes	Austria	15	No
The Netherlands	74	Yes	Hungary	14	No
Belgium	59	Yes	Croatia	10	No
Denmark	45	Yes	Albania	0	No
Republic of Korea	468	No	Cyprus	0	No
Taiwan	416	No	Estonia	0	No
Turkey	352	No	Iceland	0	No
Japan	340	No	Ireland	0	No
Greece	262	No	Kosovo	0	No
Italy	227	No	Latvia	0	No
Germany	205	No	Lithuania	0	No
Spain	168	No	Luxembourg	0	No
Sweden	134	No	Macedonia	0	No
Poland	106	No	Moldova	0	No
Finland	62	No	Montenegro	0	No
Norway	57	No	New Zealand	0	No
Serbia	48	No	Slovenia	0	No
Czech Republic	38	No			

[a)] Allen, John, R. (2014); Marshall, et. al. (2014)

[b)] International Institute for Strategic Studies (2014)

Methodological Approach: Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Whether the integrated model explains the pattern of participation in the air strikes is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an analytical technique that allows for a systematic comparison of a large number of cases on three to eight causal conditions. QCA is an adequate methodological choice if are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon to be explained is the result of a specific kind of causal complexity", generally described as "multiple conjunctural causation" (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). Multiple causation implies there are multiple paths towards an outcome; conjunctural causation that these paths consist of combinations of conditions. In line with the notion of multiple causation, the model comprises several pathways towards participation; in line with conjunctural causation, these consist of combinations of international and domestic conditions.

This research builds on the multi-value version of QCA (mvQCA) . Although many methodologists initially took a sceptical stance on this QCA-variant, recent assessments have shown that mvQCA is a valuable technique for comparative analysis (Haesebrouck, 2013; Thiem, 2015). The choice for QCA's multi-value variant is informed by the nature of the conditions and the outcome. The latter presents itself in a dichotomous form and, therefore, cannot easily be integrated into the fuzzy set variant of QCA (Rihoux et al., 2009: 169; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 277). The original crisp set version of QCA, in turn, only allows dichotomous variables, which would entail a significant loss of information for the condition "Threat". Since mvQCA allows combining multichotomous conditions with a dichotomous outcome, it is the most suited QCA-variant for this study.

Measurement and Dichotomisation

The coding of the outcome depends on whether a country participated in the air strikes. Countries that had participated in the air strikes by the end of 2014 are assigned a score of 1 on the outcome, the other cases a score of 0 (cf. Table 1). With the important exception of the US's disproportionately large contribution, there are no decisive differences in the degree of participation among the democracies that carried out air strikes. All participating democratic allies of the US started deploying in Autumn 2014 and initially restricted strike operations to Iraq. Canada is the only democracy that expanded its operations to Syria, but only decided to do so in April 2015 (Zenko, 2015). Its contribution of six CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, which had flown 673 sorties by June 2015, is similar to the contribution of the other democracies (Canadian Armed Forces 2015). Belgium, Denmark, and the

Netherlands deployed between six and eight F-16s each, which, respectively, had flown around 600, 375 and 600 sorties by May 2015 (Ministerie van Defensie 2015; Forsvarskommando 2015; Howorth 2015). France contributed nine Rafaele and six Mirage fighter aircraft which on average flew 10 to 15 sorties a week.[1] Australia contributed six F/A-18 Hornets, which carried out around 500 sorties by the end of May 2015 (Australian Government Department of Defence 2015). The UK deployed eight Tornado fighters and four Reaper drones, which had carried out around 200 strike operations by the end of March 2015 (Norton-Taylor, 2015).

The condition "Threat" was divided into three categories, respectively corresponding to a high [2], intermediate [1] and low [0] level of threats. Countries that suffered a high number of casualties in recent terrorist acts committed by individuals tied to Jihadist terrorist groups or with at least 150 foreign fighters are coded [2]. Hereby, all countries with a high number of foreign fighters, either absolute or relative to their population, are comprised in the category that corresponds to high threat. A score of [0] was assigned to cases that had no foreign fighters or high-casualty terrorist attacks. An intermediate category [1] was created for the cases with over 50 but less than 150 reported foreign fighters. Estimates of each country's foreign fighters and casualties suffered in terrorist acts committed by Jihadist terrorist groups between 1993 and 2013 are listed in Table 2.

Two conditions are included that reflect expectations on alliance politics: "Alliance Dependence" and "Alliance Value". The former comprises the states that are dependent on the US' security guarantee, the latter the states that perceive a special relationship with Washington. The coding of both conditions builds on scholarly literature, which is very consistent on what states show a strong interest in a good relationship with the US (cf. inter alia Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Græger & Haugevik, 2009; Howorth, 2007: 146-160). Since some of the consulted studies use a state's propensity to commit forces to US-led operations as an indicator of its value for its alliance with the US, coding conditions on the basis of these studies might seem to result in tautological reasoning. However, the consulted research generally bases a state's relationship with the US on a wider set of indicators, like historical ties with the US, the explicit identification of a special relationship with Washington,

[1] This contribution was augmented significantly after the Charlie Hebdo Shooting of January 2015. Between February till April 2015, the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle was deployed in the region with an additional twenty strike aircraft. During these two months, French flew an average of 60 sorties per week.

geographical location or a preference for NATO over alternative security institutions.

Table 2. Balance of threats

	Foreign Fighters		Terrorism [c]		
Country	Estimate [a]	Per capita [b]	Attacks	Fatalities	Threat
Australia	250	10.8	0	0	2
Austria	150	17.7	0	0	2
Belgium	440	39.3	1	0	2
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	100	2.8	1	0	1
Croatia	0	0	1	1	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	150	26.7	0	0	2
Finland	70	12.9	0	0	1
France	1200	18.2	3	8	2
Germany	600	7.4	2	0	2
Greece	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	80	1.3	0	0	1
Japan	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	60	11.8	0	0	1
Poland	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0
Serbia	70	9.8	0	0	1
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
South Korea	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	100	2.1	1	191	2
Sweden	180	18.8	3	0	2
The Netherlands	250	14.9	1	1	2
Turkey	600	8	32	92	2
United Kingdom	600	9.4	5	57	2
United States	100	0.3	3	2997	2

[a] Neumann (2015)

[b] Per million population, based on World Bank (2014)

[c] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2013)

The East-European countries were assigned a score of 1 on "Alliance Dependence", since they perceive a resurging Russian threat and are dependent on NATO's collective defence provision to balance it (Menon & Lipkin, 2003; Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; Ringsmose, 2010). Similarly, Japan and South Korea are dependent on support of the US in their longstanding conflicts with respectively China and North Korea (Baltrusaitis, 2010: 39-89; Chanlett Avery, 2011; Santoro & Warden, 2015). States that are not particularly dependent on the US' security guarantee, but nevertheless perceive themselves as strong Atlanticists are coded 1 on "Alliance Value". This category comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Bisley, 2013: 403; Dobell, 2014: 395; Græger & Haugevik, 2009; Howorth, 2007: 146-160; Massie, 2014). In line with Ringsmose (2010), Norway was assigned a score of 1 on both conditions. Because it shares a border with Russia, Norway is particularly dependent on support of the US for its national security. However, it also considers its strong relationship with the US as a way "to be heard in the international arena" (Græger, 2005: 90; Græger & Haugevik, 2009: 20).

Since an ex ante veto is generally considered the strongest form of parliamentary involvement in decisions on the use of force, countries where parliament either has a legal or a de facto veto were assigned a score of 1 (Hänggi, 2004: 14; Mello, 2012: 432). Information on parliamentary veto powers was retrieved from the parlcon-dataset (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010). Since this only assigns parliamentary war powers up till 2004 and does not include South Korea, this information was cross-checked and supplemented with more recent sources (i.a. Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010; Konishi & Manyin, 2009).

The level of parliamentary involvement differs significantly amongst the cases, ranging from a legal obligation of prior parliamentary consent for all military deployments, to the absence of parliamentary involvement in actual decision-making. Three categories are situated between these two extremes. First, operations conducted under formal organizations are exempt from prior parliamentary approval in some of the cases. Since the air strikes against IS were conducted by a coalition of the willing, no such exception applied to the operation. In consequence, these countries were assigned a score of 1. Second, seeking parliamentary approval is not a legal norm, but constitutes an unwritten rule in the Netherlands, Norway and, since the government's defeat over military action in Syria in August 2013, the UK. Because their governments could not reasonably be expected to participate in the air strikes without parliamentary consent, these countries are assigned a score of 1. A

third category consists of states with ambiguous legislation, but where parliamentary veto powers are generally considered relatively weak. In consequence, these countries were coded 0. Table 3 summarizes parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions.

The coding of the ideological orientation of the cases' executive and parliament draws on the Right-Left (RILE) indicator of the Comparative Manifesto Project, which is based on quantitative content analyses of election programmes (Volkens et al., 2015). In line with previous studies (Mello, 2012: 436-437; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004), party positions (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each government party's (i) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of government seats (s), as specified in the following equation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{s_i rl_i}{s}.$$

Similarly, the positions of the parties represented in parliament (n) were aggregated into an overall measure of parliamentary ideological orientation by summing up each party's (j) ideological position on the RILE scale (rl), weighted by its proportion of the total number of seats in parliament (s). Executives and parliaments with a positive score were coded 1, since a score above 0 corresponds to

Table 3. Parliamentary war power

Score	Parliamentary Powers	Cases
1	Legal veto without exception	Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Serbia, South Korea, Spain and Turkey
	Legal veto without relevant exception	Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovak Republic and Sweden
	De facto veto	Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom
0	Ambiguous veto	Italy and the United States
	No veto power	Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Portugal and Poland.

parties that make more right than left statements in their manifestos. Table 4 summarizes the aggregated RILE-scores.

Table 4. Party politics

	Executive		Parliament	
Country	RILE [a)]	Right	RILE [a)]	Right
Australia	22,98	1	5,74	1
Austria	-9,93	0	-7,75	0
Belgium	-7,15	0	-2,63	0
Bulgaria	-33,84	0	-18,04	0
Canada	26,27	1	3,98	1
Croatia	-14,73	0	-13,55	0
Czech Republic	-18,96	0	-16,87	0
Denmark	-4,91	0	-3,53	0
Finland	-8,71	0	-8,26	0
France	-32,84	0	-21,63	0
Germany	-7,44	0	-11,41	0
Greece	23,5	1	7,08	1
Hungary	13,31	1	4,82	1
Italy	-5,05	0	-11,28	0
Japan	5,6	1	-1,89	0
Norway	10,9	1	-9,29	0
Poland	-1,71	0	5,53	1
Portugal	14,63	1	6,19	1
Romania	-32,03	0	-34,62	0
Serbia	19,47	1	7,92	1
Slovakia	1,71	1	2,49	1
South Korea	-9,73	0	-0,15	0
Spain	-3,45	0	-13,51	0
Sweden	1,46	1	-10,05	0
The Netherlands	8,59	1	5,91	1
Turkey	-8,97	0	-12,99	0
United Kingdom	15,52	1	8,46	1
United States	-6,45	0	12,06	1

[a)] Based on Volkens et. al. (2015).

Analysis and Results

The mvQCA-procedure proceeds in two steps.[1] First, the data is synthesised in a truth table, which contains a row for every possible combination of conditions. Each case is attributed to the row that corresponds to its specific combination, rows without empirical cases are considered logical remainders. The truth table is presented in Table 5.

Subsequently, Boolean algebra is used to minimize the truth table. Depending on the remainders included in the process, minimization results in different solution types. If all remainders that lead to a less complex solution are incorporated, minimization results in the parsimonious solution; if only the remainders that correspond to theoretical expectations are incorporated, it results in the intermediate formula.[2] In line with the suggestion of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 279), most recent QCA applications focus on the latter solution. However, Baumgartner (2015: 840) has convincingly demonstrated that intermediate solution formulas cannot be causally interpreted and argues that resource must be made to the parsimonious formula if QCA is applied to test causal hypotheses (Baumgartner, 2015: 854). Unfortunately, the parsimonious formula is not without flaws, since it forces researchers to introduce untenable simplifying assumptions.

This study presents both the parsimonious and intermediate solution. The former includes the conditions that distinguish combinations that are consistently linked to the outcome from those that are not. In line with Ragin and Fiss (2008: 204), the terms of the parsimonious formula are considered the "core" causal conditions. The conditions that are added in the intermediate solution are present in the cases that display the outcome and can only be removed by making assumptions about logical remainders that are at odds with theoretical expectations. In line with Ragin and Fiss (2008: 204), these are considered "complementary" or "contributing" conditions.

[1] The result in this article were generated using the R software, in particular the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (Duşa and Thiem, 2014; R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem and Duşa, 2013).

[2] If no remainders are incorporated, this results in the "complex solution". The latter is presented in Appendix 2.

Table 5. Truth table

	Conditions						Outcome	
Row	TH	AD	AV	RE	RP	PV	Strike	cases
1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	Belgium, France
2	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	Netherlands, UK
3	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	US
4	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	Canada
5	2	0	1	1	1	0	1	Australia
6	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	Denmark
7	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	Austria, Germany, Spain, Turkey
8	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	Bulgaria ,Czech Republic, Slovakia
9	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	Hungary, Romania, South Korea
10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Italy
11	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Greece
12	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Serbia
13	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Croatia
14	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	Finland
15	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	Sweden
16	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	Poland
17	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	Japan
18	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	Portugal
19	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	Norway

TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto.

Table 6 and 7 present the intermediate and parsimonious solutions for respectively the presence and the absence of the outcome.[1] Two descriptive measures

[1] The following assumptions were made for the production of the intermediate solution. The presence of a high or intermediate "Threat", "Alliance Value", "Alliance Dependence", "Right Parliament" and "Right Executive" were linked to participation, as was the absence of "Parliamentary Veto".

are used to evaluate both solution types: consistency and coverage.[1] The former provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms that the solution consistently produces the outcome and approaches unity as the data provides stronger evidence. Coverage describes the relevance of the formulas and approaches unity as a causal path becomes more relevant.

The parsimonious solution of the outcome's presence shows that the combination of a high "Threat" with either the absence of "Parliamentary Veto" or the presence of "Alliance Value" constitute core causal paths towards participation. The intermediate solution indicates that these are not linked to contributing conditions. The third and fourth path of the parsimonious solution show that the combination of "Alliance Value" and an intermediate "Threat" with either the absence of "Parliamentary Veto" or the absence of "Alliance dependence" also constitute core causal paths. Both are linked to two contributing conditions: "Right Executive" and "Right Parliament".

The analysis of the outcome's absence demonstrates that four core causal paths consistently lead to non-participation. The first core causal path constitutes of "Alliance Dependence", which is linked to two contributing conditions: "Parliamentary Veto" and absence of "Right Parliament". The second core causal path, the absence of "Threat", is linked to three (combinations of) contributing conditions: absence "Alliance Dependence" and the combination of absence "Alliance Value" with either "Right Executive" absent or "Parliamentary Veto" present. The third causal path combines the absence of "Alliance Value" with "Parliamentary Veto". The intermediate solution indicates it is linked to two sets of contributing conditions: the absence of "Threat" and the combination of absence "Alliance Dependence" with absence "Right Parliament". The combination of absence "Alliance Value" with intermediate "Threat" constitutes the fourth core casual path, which is linked to one contributing condition: absence "Alliance Dependence".

[1] Consistency and coverage are respectively calculated with the formula $\sum(\min(Xi,Yi)/\sum(Xi)$ and $\sum(\min(Xi,Yi)/\sum(Yi)$, in which X denotes the membership scores in the causal combination and Y the scores in the outcome.

Table 6. Parsimonious and intermediate solution "Air Strikes"

	Parsimonious Solution				Intermediate solution				
		Coverage		Consis-		Coverage		Consis-	
Path		Raw	Unique	tency		Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
1	TH{2}*AV{1}	0.5	0.375	1	TH{2}*AV{1}	0.5	0.375	1	Denmark, Netherlands, UK, Australia
2	TH{2}*PV{0}	0.5	0.375	1	TH{2}*PV{0}	0.5	0.375	1	Belgium, France, US, Australia,
3	TH{1}*AV{1}*AD{0}	0.125	0	1	TH{1}*AV{1}*AD{0} *PV{0}*RE{1}*RP{1}	0.125	0.125	1	Canada
4	TH{1}*AV{1}*PV{0}	0.125	0	1					
	Total	1		1	Total	1		1	

TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto. Multiplication "*" refers to conjunction of conditions; Cases in brackets are only covered by the specific path in the parsimonious solution, not in the intermediate solution

Table 7. Parsimonious and intermediate solution "No Air Strikes"

	Parsimonious Solution				Intermediate solution				
		Coverage		Consis-		Coverage		Consis-	
Path		Raw	Unique	tency		Raw	Unique	tency	Cases
1	AD{1}	0.45	0.05	1	AD{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}	0.05	0.05	1	Norway (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Romania, Slovakia; South Korea)
2	TH{0}	0.55	0.1	1	TH{0}*AD{0}	0.15	0.10	1	Greece, Portugal, Croatia
					TH{0}*AV{0}*RE{0}	0.25	0.05	1	Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovakia
3	AV{0}*PV{1}	0.70	0.25	1	TH{0}* AV{0}*PV{1}	0.4	0.2	1	Hungary, Japan, Slovakia, Romania, South Korea Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
					AV{0}*PV{1}*AD{0}*RP{0}	0.35	0.25	1	Austria, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Croatia, Finland
4	AV{0}*TH{1}	0.15	0.1	1	AV{0}*TH{1}*AD{0}	0.15	0.1	1	Italy, Serbia, Finland
	Total	1		1	Total	1		1	

TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto.; Multiplication "*" refers to conjunction of conditions; Cases in brackets are only covered by the specific path in the parsimonious solution, not in the intermediate solution.

Interpretation

Arriving at intermediate and parsimonious formulas is not the ultimate goal of QCA (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 280). Instead, solutions must be related back to the cases and theoretical expectations (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 65). The results of the QCA confirm that alliance politics, threats and parliamentary veto power are vital determinants for participation in the air strikes. In contrast, the results do not decisively demonstrate a link between partisan politics and participation in the air strikes.

The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS does not convincingly confirm that executive or parliamentary ideology was decisive for participation in the air strikes. The parsimonious solutions of the outcome's presence and absence do not include a single condition on political partisanship, indicating that ideological differences were not necessary to distinguish participants from non-participants. The intermediate solutions do include conditions on ideology. In line with theoretical expectations, the absence of either "Right Executive" or "Right Parliament" are contributing conditions of the first three paths for the outcome's absence, while their presence is a contributing condition of the third and fourth core causal path towards participation in the air strikes. The latter are the only combinations for participation that include an intermediate rather than a high level of threats, suggesting that right-leaning executives require fewer threats to resort to the use of force. However, since it was not included in the parsimonious formulas, the incorporation of "Right Executive" could be an artefact of the theoretical assumptions made for the production of the intermediate solution.

The lack of conclusive evidence that links partisan politics to participation might be related to the nature of the operation against IS, which differs significantly from the cases that are generally included in studies that link military deployment to government ideology. The latter generally focus on militarized interstate disputes or, more recently, on the 2003 Iraq war. Unlike the latter, the operation against IS does not constitute "a typical case for a conflict over which to expect partisan dispute" (Mello, 2012: 426). One of the reasons why the military operation was launched in August 2014 was the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq (Henderson, 2014: 209).[1] In a comprehensive study on the link between partisan politics and

[1] In the course of July 2014, IS had carried out horrific genocidal attacks on a range of Chrisian and Yezidi towns, forcing them to retreat to Mount Sinjar (Stansfield, 2014: 1337).

participation in peace enforcement operations, Rathbun (2004: 197, cf. also Rathbun, 2007: 399) argues that leftist parties are actually more likely to support humanitarian interventions, since they consider the promotion of welfare of other countries part of their national interest. Right-leaning parties, on the other hand, have a more exclusive conception of their national interest and, therefore, only support operations if more narrow national interests are at stake. Since the operation against IS pursued humanitarian goals and countered a threat to the participants' interests, both left and right-leaning parties had reasons to support the operation. In consequence, the air strikes definitely do not constitute a most likely case for the hypotheses on partisan politics.

The results are less ambiguous with regards to the other domestic-level variable: parliamentary veto power. The absence of a legislative veto is a core causal condition of two paths towards the presence of the outcome, while its absence constitutes a core and/or contributing condition of several paths towards its absence. In line with the expectations of Auerswald (1999) and conclusions of Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010), the analyses show it is a relevant condition, irrespective of partisan politics. However, the first and last two core causal paths demonstrate that the prospect of legislative meddling did not inhibit participation if the combination of a strong threat and high alliance value provided states a strong incentive to participate.

The results clearly confirm the balance-of-threats hypothesis. Every causal path of the parsimonious solution for the outcome's presence includes either strong or intermediate threats, while the parsimonious solution for the outcome's absence shows that the absence of threats is sufficient for non-participation. A high threat generally implied a relatively large number of foreign fighters, which suggests the latter constitutes a vital incentive for states to participate. This is remarkable, since experts have warned that Western intervention is "a great recruiting sergeant" for Islamic extremists and the air strikes increased the probability of terrorist attacks by returning IS fighters (Byman & Shapiro, 2014; Lister, 2014: 97; Witney, 2014). Nevertheless, the pattern of participation is clearly linked to the number of foreign fighters.

Anecdotal evidence further confirms that foreign fighters were an important determinant for participation in the air strikes. An official at the Belgian ministry of foreign affairs, for example, suggested that the threat of returning foreign fighters was the single most important reason why Belgium participated in the air strikes.[1]

[1] Author's interview, Belgian ministry of foreign affairs, 21/11/2014.

Similarly, British Prime Minister Cameron has called the risk of British Islamist radicals returning from Syria and Iraq to attack Britain "the biggest national security threat", while Australian Prime Minister Abbott announced that Australia would contribute fighter jets to the US-led coalition shortly after the Australian police foiled a plot by Islamic State jihadists to conduct "demonstration killings" (Feast, 2014; Winning, 2014). Conversely, when the Czech Republic announced it would not participate in the air strikes against IS, its police president announced that IS did not pose a threat to the Czech Republic and there was no information that anyone from its territory was participating in the activities of the Islamic State (Willoughby, 2014).

Finally, the results suggest remarkable inferences on the link between alliance politics and military deployment. "Alliance Value" was a causal ingredient of several paths towards participation, while "Alliance Dependence" was sufficient for non-participation. In line with theoretical expectations, perceiving a special relationship with Washington thus constituted an important incentive to participate. Strikingly however, dependence on the US' security guarantee actually inhibited contributions. This is especially surprising for the so-called "Article 5ers" (cf. supra). Because of Russia's interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the first half of 2014, the perceived threat for countries situated in Russia's vicinity was at a post-Cold War height at the time Washington was mobilizing allies to fight IS (Allison, 2014: 1255). In consequence, the "Article 5ers" should be most likely cases of the alliance dependence hypothesis. The latter expects greater tension with an adversary to increase a state's dependence on an ally, which, in turn, should increase a state's propensity to provide support to its partners (Kupchan, 1988: 330-333; Snyder, 1984: 472).

A possible explanation for the non-participation of the "Article 5ers" is the waning commitment of the Central and Eastern European states to the transatlantic alliance. While these countries loyally supported the US during the first two decades after the fall of communism, the close ties with the US began to unravel after 2008 (Longhurst, 2013; Mikulova & Simecka, 2013). The waning Atlanticism in the region was caused by the rebalancing of the United States' foreign policy priorities away from Europe and the attempt at the beginning of the first Obama administration to "reset" relations with Russia, which inflicted the fear that the US would be less prone to take the Central and Eastern European countries' security concerns seriously (Longhurst, 2013). However, at the time when the US was enlisting allies against IS, Washington announced several measures to enhance the credibility of its security guarantees. Most importantly, the US launched the European Reassurance Initiative,

which finances the stationing of military equipment and a rotating US presence in Eastern Europe (Lorenz, 2014). In consequence, countries situated in the region had few reasons to doubt the US' commitment to their security when deciding on participation in the air strikes.

A second, more plausible, explanation for the lack of Eastern European contributions is that their fighter jets were not sufficiently equipped for the intervention. According to the World Air Forces 2015 Report, the air forces of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are still comprised of outdated MiG 21s and MiG 29s (Flightglobal, 2015). Other Eastern European states did have the required military capacity to participate. Poland, for example, has a fleet of thirty-six F16s, while Hungary and the Czech Republic each have twelve Gripen-C aircraft (Bell & Hendrickson, 2012). In the run-up to the 2011 intervention in Libya, Poland and the Czech Republic claimed their pilots were insufficiently trained to participate, which could be the reason for not participating in the air strikes against IS (Bell & Hendrickson, 2012: 159; Chivviss, 2014: 75). However, Norway, the only none Eastern European "Article 5er", clearly did not face such technical obstacles, since its fighter jets accounted for a significant share of the air strikes during the air campaign in Libya (Chivviss, 2014: 190).

The most convincing explanation seems that the "Article 5ers" were not willing to dispatch fighter jets to a foreign theatre amid increasing tensions with Russia. According to Neubauer et al. (2014), this is the actual reason why Norway only provided non-lethal assistance to the international coalition against IS. Likewise, Poland's Deputy Minister of Defence stressed that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was its country's prime concern when he announced in February 2015 that Poland was still not willing to take part in combat operations against IS (Döring & Manow, 2015). Instead of deploying their military assets to demonstrate their commitment to the US, the "Article 5ers" thus chose to use them to balance Russian aggression. This does not contradict the alliance security dilemma, it only suggests there was no credible threat of abandonment. When introducing the alliance security dilemma, Snyder (1984: 474) actually argued that the risk of abandonment decreases if "the allies' interests that are in conflict with the adversary are shared". Russia's military interventions in Ukraine brought both the "Article 5ers" and the United States' interests clearly in conflict with Russia (Heisbourg, 2015). In consequence, the fear of abandonment was minimized and keeping their fighter jets at home to deter possible Russian aggression became the most rational option for the "Article 5ers".

Conclusions

Why did some democratic members of the anti-IS coalition participate in the air campaign, while others did not? This study built on integrated burden sharing models and democratic peace research to develop a multi-causal framework for explaining democratic participation in the air strikes against IS. Its results suggest thought-provoking conclusions on the determinants of democratic participation in the air strikes. First, only democracies that had reason to perceive the rise of IS as a threat to their national interest participated in the operation. Remarkably, the analysis suggests that threat perceptions are linked to the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, indicating that these constituted a vital determinant for participation in the air campaign. Second, states with a strong interest in a good relationship with the US were generally inclined to participate in the operation. Strikingly however, this was not the case for countries that are dependent on the US' security guarantees to balance Russian aggression. Given Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine, this suggests that alliance dependence does not incite contributions if the allies' interests are threatened by a common adversary. Lastly, the analysis shows that, in the absence of strong international-level incentives, a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions kept governments from participating. In contrast to inferences of prior research, such institutional constraints mattered irrespective of partisan politics.

While the results of this study apply to all democratic members of the international coalition against IS, not all conclusions can easily be generalized beyond the scope of Operation Inherent Resolve. Given the unprecedented number of foreign fighters active in Syria, the operation is a most likely case for the link between foreign fighters and military deployment decisions. Since evidentiary support from a most likely case provides only limited inferential leverage, prospective research is necessary to assert whether this inference holds in conflicts with fewer foreign fighters (Levy, 2008: 12). Conversely, since both left and right-leaning parties had reasons to support the operation, the operation does not constitute a most-likely case for partisan dispute. In consequence, the lack of support for the impact of partisan politics does not clearly contradict the results of studies that did establish a link between ideology and military intervention. However, it does confirm the conclusions of Martini (2015: 432) and Mello (2014: 38), who respectively argued that the impact of ideology is "tied to the context of the intervention" and that "political conflict does not arise equally over all types of military operations". Given the resurgent Russian threat, the air strikes against IS did

constitute a most-likely case for the alliance dependence hypothesis. In consequence, the lack of support for this hypothesis does provide substantial theoretical leverage.

In line with one of hallmarks of Foreign Policy Analysis scholarship, the study indicates that integrating variables situated at both the domestic and international level is necessary to fully understand foreign policy decision making (Hudson, 2005: 2, 6; Rosenau, 1968: 311-312). Moreover, this study showed that QCA provides a useful methodological tool to test propositions about foreign policy behaviour across political systems, allowing for "modest generalizations" on the impact of variables situated at different levels of analysis (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 11-12; Rosenau, 1968: 308). An important downside of a logical method like QCA is that it does not explain the complex processes underlying foreign policy decisions. Prospective research that assesses how alliance politics, threat perceptions and institutional constraints were "funnelled through the subjective understandings" of domestic decision-makers would therefore serve as a valuable complement to this study (Kaarbo, 2015: 20).

Appendices: Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes against Islamic State - A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Appendix 1: Analysis Public Opinion

This appendix presents an alternative analysis, in which public opinion is included as a causal condition. First, theoretical expectations on public opinion are discussed. Subsequently, the research design and the results of the QCA are presented and interpreted against the backdrop of the theoretical expectations.

Public Opinion and Participation in Military Operations

In contrast to the analysis presented in the main article, this analysis includes public opinion as an explanatory variable. Since "public opinion is central to representation, democratic accountability and decision-making", it should be self-evident that it has an impact on the contributions of democracies to multinational operations (Aldrich et al., 2006:477, Mello, 2014:40-41). Nevertheless, many scholars are sceptical on the link between public opinion and foreign policy.

In a comprehensive review of scholarly research on the link between public opinion and foreign policy, Holsti (1992) argues that public opinion was regarded as highly volatile, incoherent and not very important for foreign policy decisions during the first two decades after World War II. Since the end of the 1960s, an increasing number of scholars has challenged this pessimistic view. Results of Ostrom and Job (1986:556-57) and James and Oneal (1991), for example, show that public aversion to war is negatively related to the probability of the use of force; Baum (2004:221) concludes that public opinion had a constraining effect on the policies of the Bush and Clinton administration during the crisis in Somalia and Mello (2014:187) asserts that public support was vital for explaining contributions to the operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Other recent studies however conclude that public opinion only had a very limited impact on military deployment. Kreps (2010:191), for example, contends that "public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan", while Auerswald and Saideman (2014:21, 213) argue that public support does not covary with the pattern of participation in the operations in Afghanistan and Libya.

Risse-Kappen (1991:480-86) steers a middle ground between the sceptic and optimistic view on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. Rather than

assuming that "the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy-making process" or, conversely, that "popular consensus is a function of the elite consensus", he argues that domestic structures and coalition-building processes must be taken into account to understand the impact of public opinion. More specifically, Risse-Kappen (1991) maintains that public demands have more impact in states with "fragmented political institutions", in which executive power is not centralized in the hands of one decision-maker. In line with these assertions, studies that build on integrated models suggest that parliamentary war powers especially constrain governments in combination with popular opposition to military deployment. Mello (2014:34, 41), Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994:71) and Baltrusaitis (2010:26-27) for example argue that executives are more responsive to public opinion if the legislature yields a great deal of influence on military deployment decisions. Conversely, Dieterich and Marschall (2008:5) maintain that "only in cases of overwhelming public war aversion are parliaments expected to exercise their veto powers in order to prevent the participation in such a military mission".

Research Design and Results

The analysis only includes the eleven democracies for which reliable public opinion data is available. "Public support" was operationalized by subtracting the percentage of survey respondents who opposed participation in the air strikes from the percentage of respondents who supported participation. Cases with a positive result are assigned a score of 1, cases with a negative result a score of 0. Table 1 lists public opinion on participation for the eleven countries for which reliable data is available.

Since public opinion might be affected by public relations efforts of governments that have decided to participate in the operation, only public opinion before a state's decision to participate is taken into account. Hereby, wrong conclusions on the direction of the causal relation between participation and public opinion are avoided (Holsti, 1992:453). The operationalization of public opinion is based on the latest poll before a government announced it would participate. This is because public opinion on participation was highly volatile and influenced by events that could not have been foreseen by the governments. For example, while only 39% of the French approved participation in the air strikes at the end of August, support for intervention rose to 53% after French jets had struck their first IS targets mid September and even surged to 70% after an Algerian Islamist group beheaded a

French tourist at the end of September (Irish, 2014; Regan, 2014; Williams, 2014).

Table 1. Public support

Country	Approve	Disapprove	Net Public Support	Public Support
Australia[a)]	54	46	8	1
Canada[b)]	64	36	28	1
Denmark[c)]	42	36	6	1
Finland[c)]	26	50	-24	0
France[c)]	39	44	-5	0
Germany[c)]	26	63	-37	0
Norway[c)]	40	36	4	1
Sweden[c)]	34	44	-10	0
Turkey[d)]	52	29	23	1
United Kingdom[c)]	42	37	5	1
United States[e)]	45	46	-1	0

[a)] Roy Morgan Research (2014)
[b)] Ipsos (2014a)
[c)] William (2014)
[d)] Metrolpoll Group (2014)
[e)] Clement (2014)

Similarly, in response to the beheading of British hostages, public approval of UK air strikes rose from 37% in the beginning of August to 57% at the end of September (Dahlgreen, 2014).

Because the analysis focusses on a smaller and more homogenous set of cases, two additional adjustments were made to the operationalization of the causal conditions. First, all cases had foreign fighters. In consequence there were only cases with a high level of threats and cases with an intermediate level of threats. The former were assigned a score of 1, the latter a score of 0. Second, in order to keep the number of logical remainders at an acceptable level, the condition "Alliance Dependence" is not included in the analysis. In fact, only one of the cases had a score of 1 on this condition: Norway. The resulting truth table is presented in Table 2. The minimization of the truth table results in the parsimonious, intermediate and complex solutions for the outcome's presence and absence, respectively presented in Table 3 and 4

Table 2. Truth table

	Conditions						Outcome	
Row	AV	TH	RE	RP	PV	PS	Air Strikes	Cases
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	France
2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	US
3	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	Canada
4	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	Australia
5	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Denmark
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	UK
7	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	Finland
8	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	Germany
9	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Sweden
10	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	Turkey
11	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	Norway

TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto, PS: Public Support.

Interpretation

The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS does not convincingly confirm that public support was decisive for participation in the air strikes. Neither the parsimonious solutions for the outcome's presence or the outcome's absence include public support, indicating that it is not necessary to distinguish participants from non-participants. The intermediate solutions do include public support. In line with theoretical expectations, its presence is included in the second and third combination for air strikes, while its absence is included in the second combination for no air strikes. However, this rather seems a consequence of the directional assumption made for the production of the intermediate solution. In fact, the first combination of the complex solution for the outcome's presence shows that the lack of public support not necessarily impedes participation. Similarly, the fourth combination of the complex solution for the outcome's absence shows that public support is not consistently associated with participation.

Table 3. Analytical results "Air Strikes"

			Coverage		Consis-	
			Raw	Unique	tency	cases
Parsi-monious	1	PV{0}	0.667	0.500	1.000	France, US, Canada, Australia
	2	AV{1}*TH{0}	0.500	0.333	1.000	Australia, Denmark, UK
		Solution	1.000		1.000	
Interme-diate	1	PV{0}*TH{1}	0.500	0.333	1.000	France, US, Australia
	2	PS{1}*AV{1}*TH{1}	0.500	0.333	1.000	Australia, Denmark, UK
	3	PS{1}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*AV{1}	0.333	0.167	1.000	Canada, Australia
		Solution	1.000		1.000	
Complex	1	PS{0}*PV{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}*TH{1}	0.333	0.333	1.000	France, US
	2	PS{1}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*AV{1}	0.333	0.167	1.000	Canada, Australia
	3	PS{1}*RP{1}*RE{1}*AV{1}*TH{1}	0.333	0.167	1.000	Australia, UK
	4	PS{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{1}*TH{1}	0.167	0.167	1.000	Denmark
		Solution	1.000		1.000	

TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto, PS: Public Support.

Table 4. Analytical results "No Air Strikes"

			Coverage		Consis-	
			Raw	Unique	tency	cases
Parsi-monious	1	PV{1}*AV{0}	0.800	0.600	1.000	Finland, Germany, Sweden, Turkey
	2	PV{1}*TH{0}	0.400	0.200	1.000	Finland, Norway
		Solution	1.000			
Interme-diate	1	PV{1}*RP{0}*TH{0}	0.400	0.200	1.000	Finland, Norway
	2	PS{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*AV{0}	0.600	0.200	1.000	Finland, Germany, Sweden
	3	PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}	0.600	0.200	1.000	Finland, Germany, Turkey
		Solution	1.000		1.000	
Complex	1	PS{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*AV{0}*TH{1}	0.400	0.200	1.000	Germany, Sweden
	2	PS{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}	0.400	0.200	1.000	Finland, Germany
	3	PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*AV{0}*TH{1}	0.400	0.200	1.000	Germany, Turkey
	4	PS{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{1}*AV{1}*TH{0}	0.200	0.200	1.000	Norway
		Solution	1.000		1.000	

TH: Threat, AD: Alliance Dependence, AV: Alliance Value, RE: Right Executive, RP: Right Parliament, PV: Parliamentary Veto, PS: Public Support.

Conclusion

The pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS confirms the sceptical view on the link between public opinion and foreign policy. However, the analysis' conclusion cannot easily be generalized beyond the specific case of the anti-IS coalition. In fact, there was no strong opposition against participation in any of the participating states. There were two participants where opponents of participation outnumbered supporters: France and the US. However, this was only with a very narrow margin (cf. Table 1). Moreover, in spite of being divided or opposed towards their own militaries taking part, public opinion generally supported the air strikes (Ipsos, 2014b). In consequence, the air strikes against IS definitely do not constitute a most-likely case of public constraints on foreign policy decisions.

Appendix 2: Complex Solutions

Table 1. Complex solution "Air Strikes"

	Coverage		Consis-	
	Raw	Unique	tency	*cases*
AV{0}*AD{0}*PV{0}*RE{0}*TH{2}	0.375	0.375	1.000	Belgium, France, US
AV{1}*AD{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{2}	0.375	0.375	1.000	Netherlands, UK, Australia
AV{1}*AD{0}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{1}	0.125	0.125	1.000	Canada
AV{1}*AD{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*TH{2}	0.125	0.125	1.000	Denmark
Solution	1.000		1.000	

Table 2. Complex solution "No Air Strikes"

	Coverage		Consis-tency	
	Raw	Unique		*Cases*
AD{0}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{0}	0.100	0.100	1.000	Greece; Portugal
AV{0}*AD{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*TH{2}	0.250	0.250	1.000	Austria, Germany, Spain, Turkey; Sweden
AV{0}*AD{0}*RP{0}*RE{0}*TH{1}	0.100	0.100	1.000	Italy; Finland
AV{0}*AD{1}*PV{1}*RE{1}*TH{0}	0.200	0.200	1.000	Hungary, Romania, South Korea; Japan
AV{0}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{0}*TH{0}	0.200	0.200	1.000	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia; Croatia
AV{0}*AD{0}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{1}*TH{1}	0.05	0.050	1.000	Serbia
AV{0}*AD{1}*PV{0}*RP{1}*RE{0}*TH{0}	0.05	0.050	1.000	Poland
AV{1}*AD{1}*PV{1}*RP{0}*RE{1}*TH{1}	0.05	0.050	1.000	Norway
Solutions	1.000		1.000	

9

Article 5: EU Member State Participation in Military Operations - A Configurational Comparative Analysis

Status: Under review in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*

Abstract

Contrary to what Europe's image as a civilian or soft power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000– 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home countries for most of the post-Cold War period. Although the vast majority of these troops was active in operations with a strong European presence, there is significant variation in the member states' patterns of military engagement. This study provides a systematic analysis of the member states' contributions to military operations. More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently led to participation in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the Islamic State. Methodologically, it builds on two configurational comparative methods: Most Different Similar Outcome/Most Similar Different Outcome and Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis show that four conditions account for most of the variation in the member states' military engagements: military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade.

Introduction

Contrary to what Europe's image as a civilian or soft power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000 – 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home countries for most of the post-Cold War period (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004; Moravcsik, 2009: 409). Although the vast majority of these troops was active in operations with a strong European presence, there is significant variation in the member states' patterns of military engagement. What explains this variation? Is there a generalizable and parsimonious explanation for the member states' varying engagements in military operations?

Few studies have systematically examined what conditions motivate or block member state participation in military operations. This constitutes an important gap in the extant literature on European security policy, not at least because close cooperation between the member states is generally considered indispensable for Europe to meet the continuous demand for military crisis management (Biscop, 2015: 181). The present study aims to address this gap. More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently lead to (non)-participation in five operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the so-called Islamic State (IS). This is done through a systematic comparison of 109 member state-operation dyads with two configurational comparative methods: Most Different Similar Outcome/Most Similar Different Outcome (MDSO/MSDO) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

The results of the analysis show that a large share of the variation in the member states' patterns of participation is explained by four conditions: military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade. However, these conditions are less relevant for explaining the varying contribution to the operation against IS, which is best explained by the varying numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and constitutional restrictions. Moreover, not all variation in the member states' military engagements is explained by the aforementioned conditions, suggesting these need to be supplemented by more idiosyncratic explanations to fully understand the member states' patterns of military participation.

The structure of this article is as follows. The first section discusses the relevant literature. The second section identifies explanatory conditions. The third section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and discusses the operationalization of the conditions. The fourth section presents the

results of the sequential application of MDSO/MSDO and QCA, which are discussed in the fifth section. Finally, the conclusions recapitulate the study's major findings.

Prior Research

The extant literature on European defence cooperation has devoted relatively little attention to the conditions that motivate member state participation in military operations. Studies building on constructivist theories have attributed the member states' varying military engagements to their diverging preferences in security and defence, rooted in "idiosyncratic" strategic cultures (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Pohl, 2013b: 368).[1] If this is the true cause of the member states' patterns of military participation, any attempt to arrive at a parsimonious and generalizable explanation can only result in failure. However, research on third-party military intervention, peacekeeping operations, democratic peace theory and military burden sharing provides ample evidence that a large share of the variation in states' military engagements is explained by varying capabilities, security concerns, economic interests and domestic institutional or political constraints (cf. inter alia Bove & Elia, 2011; Mello, 2014; Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008).

Few studies have systematically examined to what extent these conditions can explain the pattern of EU member states' participation in military operations. While the member states have been included in several studies on military operations, hardly any study exclusively focusses on the EU member states. The scarce studies that do, generally only examine a single operation or a limited number of member states (cf. Davidson, 2011; Davidson, 2013; Schuster & Maier, 2006).[2] The most

[1] This research has been predominately occupied with examining whether and how norms converge into a common European strategic culture. In a comprehensive, thoroughly-researched, analysis of the drivers behind CSDP operations, Pohl (2014a: 20-24) makes a similar argument by contending that the behaviour of EU governments is grounded in 'domestic expectations of regional security and preferred foreign policy roles' (cf. also Pohl, 2013: 318; Pohl, 2014b).

[2] The member state contributions to UNIFIL II, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad have been examined in prior studies (Haesebrouck, 2015b; Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015); while some of the member states were included in studies on NATO burden sharing in Libya and democratic participation in the air strikes against IS (Haesebrouck, 2016b; forthcoming-b). However, the present study constitutes the first analysis that aims to explain the pattern of participation across the five operations.

systematic analysis of the varying involvement of the member states in military operations is presented in an outstanding study of Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling (2009: 794) on EU burden sharing in security governance, which expected military operations to rely on the contributions of the largest EU member states. This expectation was however not fully confirmed by their analysis (Dorussen, Kirchner & Sperling, 2009: 802). In consequence, a comprehensive explanation of the member states' varying military engagements has not yet been produced.

Theoretical Framework

Research on military burden sharing, third-party military intervention, peacekeeping operations and democratic peace offers a number of plausible explanatory conditions for the member states' varying military engagements. These are structured in four categories: available resources, country-specific benefits, domestic constraints and partisan politics.

Available Resources

Starting with a seminal article by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), research on military burden sharing has been dominated by collective action theory. The first collective action based models characterized defence as a pure public good and therefore expect "the 'larger' members […] to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of collective defense efforts" (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966: 268). In line with this "exploitation hypothesis", member states with sufficient resources to contribute significantly to the fulfilment of an operation's mandate can be expected to participate. Military less powerful EU members, in turn, are expected to take a free ride, since their contributions can only have a modest impact on the provision of the public good (Mello, 2014: 42; Ringsmose, 2010: 324). *The exploitation hypothesis, thus, expects that the military powerful member states are more likely to participate in military operations.*

Even the resources of the member states with substantial military capabilities can be stretched too thin to allow for new military engagements. For the last decade, European states permanently deployed around 50,000 troops. Since this corresponds to the EU capability target that was set during the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the member states cannot be expected to have a large reserve of uncommitted deployable military forces (Biscop, 2015: 174). Evidently, forces committed to simultaneous operations are unavailable for new deployments. Moreover, additional military engagements would make the remaining military assets harder to use if

other, perhaps more pressing, demands should arise (Bove & Elia, 2011: 705; Fordham, 1998: 576). *EU member states whose resources are stretched thin by simultaneous deployments can therefore be expected to refrain from participation.*

Next to military manpower, military deployment requires a budget for sending and maintaining troops abroad (Tago, 2014: 268). Since defence is "the component of the budget with the greatest flexibility to accommodate fiscal pressure", it is more sensitive to domestic fiscal pressures than other spending categories (Su, Kamlet & Mowery, 1993: 225-227). *European governments faced with budget constraints should thus be less likely to participate in military operations.*

Country-Specific Benefits

In contrast to the pure public good model, the joint products model assumes that collective defence efforts produce multiple benefits, ranging from purely public to country-specific benefits (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). In consequence, the joint products model predicts that contributions will correspond to the expected benefits of operations, rather than the available resources of the (potential) contributor. Earlier research suggests several plausible causes of variation in the benefits of successful crisis management.

First, the expected benefits might be linked to the member states' geographic positions (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2014: 91). In line with the conclusions of inter alia Kathman (2011: 863) and Perkins and Neumayer (2008: 905) on the link between geographic proximity and military engagements, *member states situated close to the target of the operation can be expected to have a strong incentive to participate.*

Second, several scholars have argued that trade ties with the area of operations give rise to country-specific benefits (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 655). Empirical support for the link between bilateral trade and military engagement is mixed. While Khanna, Sandler and Shimizu (1999: 362) conclude that "countries with greater trading interests are more supportive of peacekeeping", the analysis of Kathman (2011: 864) shows that the likelihood of intervention decreases if the level of trade between a third party and the conflict state increases. Kathman (2011, 850-53, 65) however, suggests that potential interveners can be "driven by regional, more economically consequential, interests". Member states are likely to participate in operations to avoid that "conflict spillover would detrimentally affect a third party's ability to continue its positive relationship with the region". *Member states with large trade volumes with the target of the operation or its wider region should thus be more inclined to participate in a military operation.*

Third, varying country-specific benefits are also connected to varying vulnerability to terrorist attacks (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 47, 57) The operation against IS is the only operation under investigation that was launched to avoid that its target became a safe haven for international terrorism. A recent study of Haesebrouck (forthcoming–b) provides strong evidence that the perceived threat posed by the rise of IS is primarily related to the number of nationals that have gone to fight in Syria. *Member states with a large number of foreign fighters in the target of the intervention should thus be more inclined to participate.*

Fourth, studies on burden sharing provide ample evidence that states are more likely to participate in US-led and NATO operations if they are dependent on the US' security guarantee or value their relationship with the US (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 72; Davidson, 2011: 15; Ringsmose, 2010: 330-331). The relative importance accorded to the relationship with the US varies considerably amongst the member states (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 389-390). The East-European countries accord a higher value to good relations with Washington because they are dependent on the US to balance potential Russian threats to their security. Countries like Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, in turn, consider their special relationship with the US "an important key to their security and their political clout on the international scene" (Ringsmose, 2010: 331). *Member states that accord a higher value to their relationship with the US should be more inclined to participate in NATO-operations and US-led coalitions of the willing.*

The member states' value for their relationship with the US is not directly relevant for contributions to UNIFIL II, EUFOR Congo or EUFOR Chad. Participation in these operations also give rise to benefits that are not directly related to their respective goals. A country-specific benefit that is frequently invoked in the literature on UN peacekeeping burden sharing is the status enhancement that follows from being recognized as a major promoter of world peace (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998: 182; Shimizu & Sandler, 2002: 656). Although available to all potential contributors, states that have a tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPO) can reasonably be expected to accord more importance to status gains (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997:731). Moreover, involvement in UN peacekeeping can be self-perpetuating, since it commits states to "further action by creating reinforcing roles, rules and expectations" (Lebovic, 2004: 915). The member states with a tradition of contributing to UNPOs can thus be expected to be more inclined to participate in UNIFIL II - which was deployed under the aegis of

the UN peacekeeping department- and EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, which were both deployed in support of a UNPO.[1] More generally, *member states that have a strong peacekeeping tradition should be more likely to participate in (operations in support of) UNPOs.*

Domestic Constraints

A third category of explanatory conditions is the varying constraints the member states' governments face when deciding on military participation (Pohl & van Willigen, 2015: 186). First, the degree of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions varies significantly across the member states (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 388; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010; Mello, 2014: 33). Strong parliamentary involvement significantly restricts a government's freedom of military action, since it opens up decision-making to public scrutiny. In consequence*, a high degree of parliamentary involvement in participation decisions should make participation less likely.*

Second, the level of constraints on the chief executive is also related to the nature of the ruling coalition (Reiter & Tillman, 2002: 814). Minority governments should be most constrained, since parliament is always a potential veto player in this cabinet structure (Ireland & Gartner, 2001: 548-558; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004: 561). In consequence, *participation should be less likely for member states that are ruled by a minority government.*

Third, multi-party coalition governments face more constraints than single-party majority governments, since they require members of multiple parties to agree on military participation (Ireland & Gartner, 2001: 552; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004: 16). In consequence, *member states governed by a single party government should be more likely to participate.*

Fourth, democracies show substantial differences in the type of military operations in which they are legally permitted to participate (Mello, 2014: 34-36). *Military participation should be less likely if constitutional restrictions prohibit participation* (Mello, 2014: 185-186).

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[1] EUFOR Congo was deployed to support the MONUC operation during the 2006 presidential elections; EUFOR Chad was tasked with the protection of the personnel of the MINURCAT operation and was intended as a bridging mission whilst the force generation took place for military component of MINURCAT.

Fifth, prior research suggests that states are less inclined to participate in an operation if elections are imminent. Gaubatz (1991: 232), for example, shows that democracies are less likely to start a war in the pre-election period, while Kisangani and Pickering (2007: 290) conclude that democratic leaders are less likely use military force over low politics issues when elections are less than one year in the future. *Member states can thus be expected to be less inclined to participate if elections are nearby.*

Partisan Politics

Finally, the ideological composition of the member states' government and parliament might impact their inclination to participate in an operation. Studies that examine the link between ideology and foreign policy generally expect right governments to be more likely to get involved in armed conflict (Palmer, London & Regan, 2004: 9; Schuster & Maier, 2006). However, several scholars have argued that the link between ideology and foreign policy preferences is more complex and depends on the context of the intervention (Mello, 2014: 39; Rathbun, 2004).

In a study on the impact of government ideology on participation in peace enforcement operations, Rathbun (2004: 18-21) develops a three-dimensional model that expects leftist parties to be less militaristic, have a more inclusive conception of the national interest and prefer acting through multilateral frameworks. In consequence, left-wing parties are expected to be more likely to support operations with a humanitarian goal, especially if it is deployed under a multilateral framework. Right-leaning parties, in turn, can be expected to only support crisis management operations if more narrow national interests were at stake. In line with Mello (2012), we expect that *the ideological orientation of a state's government and parliament has an impact on whether or not it participates in a specific operation.*

Summary

In sum, prior research suggests a large number of plausible explanatory conditions for the varying military engagements of the EU member states. Rather than constituting mutually exclusive explanations, participation in military operations can be expected to result from a complex interplay between the aforementioned conditions. Member states might participate in an operation for different reasons. While some states participate because they have close relations with the target of the intervention, others can decide to contribute because they are situated close to the area of operations, and still others because they believe contributing is necessary to continue receiving the benefits produced by their strong

relationship with the US. However, whether or not such an incentive will lead to participation could depend on the availability of the necessary resources, the absence of domestic constraints and the ideological orientation of the member state's government or parliament.

Research Design

This section justifies the case selection, introduces the methodological approach and discusses the measurement of the variables.

Empirical Domain

The empirical focus of the study is on the member states' contributions to five military operations. The first, referred to as UNIFIL II, is the expansion of the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War. The second and third operation are EUFOR Congo (2006) and EUFOR Chad/RCA (2008-09), which were deployed in respectively Congo and Chad and the Central African Republic under the aegis of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The fourth case is the 2011 intervention in Libya, which aimed to stop Qaddafi's repression of the Libyan uprising and, after two weeks, came under NATO command. The last case is the operation against IS, which started in August 2014 and was carried out by a US-led coalition of the willing. Given the substantial differences between the selected operations, one might question whether they are not "too dissimilar for comparative purpose" (Mello, 2014: 8). However, the cross-case variation is necessary to achieve the goal of this study: draw out a generalizable pattern of the EU member states' involvement in military operations.

The five operations were selected according to three criteria. First, in order to increase the generalizability of the findings for future operations, the study focusses on the operations that were most recent at the time of writing. The selected operations were launched between 2005 and 2015. Hereby, all operations under investigation took place after the EU's and NATO's "big bang" enlargement. Second, the selected operations involved at least five EU Member States. Third, the cases represent the largest new European deployments of the last ten years. Each operation either involved fighter jets that took part in offensive air operations, or at least 2,000 ground forces. Hereby, the focus is on operations that offered a large share of the member states the opportunity to make substantial contributions.

The basic unit of analysis are member state-operation dyads. Several member states exhibit characteristics that justify their exclusion. Croatia is not included in the

analysis because it only joined the EU in 2013, Cyprus because the role of its armed forces is limited to the defence of its territorial security and Malta because its limited military capabilities and pacifist constitution prevent it from participating in military operations abroad. Due to its opt-out from the CSDP, Denmark is excluded for EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad; Romania and Bulgaria are not included as cases for EUFOR Congo because they only joined the EU in 2007. Finally, states without fighter jets equipped to attack ground targets are excluded as possible contributors to the military interventions in Libya and the air strikes against IS.[1] This results in a sample of 109 member state-operation dyads.

Methodological Approach

Methodologically, this study builds on a sequential application of two configurational comparative methods: Most Different Similar Outcome/Most Similar Different Outcome (MDSO/MSDO) and crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) (Pattyn, 2014b).

MDSO/MSDO builds on three types of pairwise comparisons to identify the conditions with most explanatory potential (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009: 29-30; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1994; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1996; Pattyn, 2014a). First, the cases where the outcome is present and that show maximum variation on the explanatory conditions are compared. In line with Mill's method of agreement, the similarities between these most different cases are expected to explain the common outcome. Second, the most different cases where the outcome is absent are compared in order to identify their similarities, which are expected to explain the absence of the outcome. The third type of pairwise comparison focusses on the cases with a different outcome that show minimum variation on the explanatory conditions. In line with Mill's method of difference, the similarities between these cases are likely to explain the variation in the outcome.

After the most relevant conditions are detected with the MDSO/MSDO technique, QCA is used to identify the specific combinations of conditions that lead to (non-) participation (Ragin, 1987; Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). QCA is an analytical technique that allows for a systematic comparison of a large number of cases. It is particularly apt to examine a complex form of causality, generally captured under the expression "multiple conjunctural causation".

[1] According to the IISS (2014) military balance, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovenia do not have fighter jets.

Conjunctural causation implies that phenomena are often produced by a combination of conditions, multiple causation or equifinality that several of such combinations can be sufficient for the same outcome. The choice for QCA is driven by its ability to capture this complex form of causality, since participation in military operations can be expected to result from a complex interplay of conditions (cf. supra; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 77). Because the MDSO/MSDO technique makes use of binary conditions and outcomes, the study builds on QCA's original crisp set version.

Operationalization and Dichotomization

csQCA and MDSO/MSDO require the cases to be dichotomized. A score of 1 indicates that a condition or outcome is present in a given case, a score of 0 that it is absent. The dichotomisation of the outcome and the conditions is discussed below, the raw data and data sources are provided in appendix 1.[1]

The coding of the outcome*, military participation*, reflects whether or not a state contributed to an operation. In UNIFIL II, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, member states that contributed more than 20 troops are assigned a score of 1. In the operations in Libya and against IS, member states are assigned a score of 1 if they participated in the air operations.[2]

A first group of explanatory conditions is connected to the member states' available resources: military capabilities, competing deployments and budget constraints. The two commonly used indicators for operationalizing military capabilities are *military expenditures* and *military personnel*. Since prior research provides little guidance on the capabilities required for states to be less inclined to ride free on the efforts of others, the arrhythmic mean is used as the dichotomization threshold for *high* expenditures and personnel, the median for *median* expenditures and personnel (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009: 42; Thiem & Duşa, 2013: 30-31). The impact of *competing deployments* depends on the ratio between the size of simultaneous deployments and the available resources. The latter are estimated with

[1] The operationalization of some of the conditions in some operations builds on prior research (cf. Haesebrouck, 2015b; 2016b; forthcoming-a; Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015)

[2] The coding of the operation against IS reflects the situation in 2014. In November 2015, the German cabinet decided to participate in the operation after terrorist attacks in Paris and the subsequent adoption of UN resolution 2249, which provided a legal basis for participation (Muller-Neuhof, 2015).

two indicators: the number of sustainable forces and the average number of troops deployed in the ten years that preceded the operation. States are assigned a score of 1 on *above average competing deployments* if the number of deployed troops in the first year of the operation is 50% above its ten year average. A score of 1 on *sustainable forces* is assigned if more than 50% of sustainable forces were deployed. In line with the Maastricht criteria, member states are assigned a score of 1 on *budget deficit* if their deficit exceeds 3% of their GDP.

The second group of conditions focusses on country-specific benefits. *Geographic proximity* is operationalized with the minimum distance measure. In line with Gleditsch and Ward (2001: 745), the dichotomization threshold was fixed at 1,000 km. *Bilateral trade* and *regional trade* are operationalized as the sum of the member states' imports and exports with, respectively, the country and the wider region of the operation, relativized by their GDP. Since there is no external guidance as to which trade volumes are sufficient to spur contributions, the dichotomisation threshold is fixed at the arrhythmic mean of the member states' imports and exports with the region or country of operations.[1] The dichotomisation threshold for *foreign fighters* is fixed at 100. Hereby, all countries with a high number of foreign fighters, either absolute or relative to their population, are assigned a score of 1 (cf. Table A12 in appendix 1).

Since prior research has established a strong link between contributions to the US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the value a state places on its relationship with Washington, the base variable for *alliance value* is calculated as a member state's *i* average share of European personnel contributions (PCi) to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan relativized by their share of GDP, which is summarized in the following equation.

$$AV_i = \frac{(PC_i / \sum PC_i)}{(GDP_i / \Sigma GDP_i)}$$

The dichotomization threshold was fixed at 1, corresponding to a level of contributions to US-led operations fully proportional to a state's GDP.[2] The base

[1] The threshold for bilateral trade with Congo was fixed at the interquartile mean, since this is less sensitive to the outliers Belgium and Finland.

[2] The resulting scores were cross-checked with the scholarly literature, which is very consistent on which member states show a particularly strong interest in a good relationship with the US (cf. supra).

variable for *UN Peacekeeping Tradition* is based on a state's previous contributions to peacekeeping operation. However, because high absolute contributions can be a consequence of large contributions to a single operation, motivated by immediate security interests, we take the dispersion of these contributions across operations into account. A dispersion parameter Di was calculated according to the following equation (cf. Thiem & Haesebrouck, 2015):

$$D_i = 1 - \sum P_j^2$$

where P_j is the proportion of personnel contributed to operation j = 1, 2,…, k.. Subsequently, the level of prior involvement was calculated and relativized by the member states' GDP according to the following equation:

$$PT_i = \frac{(PC_i * D_i / \sum (PC_i * D_i))}{(GDP_i / \Sigma GDP_i)}$$

where PC_i is the absolute personnel contribution to UNPOs. The dichotomization threshold was fixed at 1, corresponding to a level of contributions fully proportional to a state's GDP.

Five conditions are related to domestic constraints. Cases are assigned a score of 1 on *parliamentary veto power* if parliamentary consent was required before troop deployments (Mello, 2012: 432).[1] Only five member states faced *constitutional restrictions* in any of the operations. Austria, Finland and Ireland faced legal restrictions in the intervention in Libya and the operation against IS, Sweden and Germany only in the latter operation. Austria is only allowed to participate in operations under UN, OSCE or EU framework, Finland and Ireland prohibit operations without UN authorization and cannot participate in offensive operations. Sweden requires UN authorization to participate in an operation, "German constitutional law restricts military participation to […] operations within the institutional framework of 'systems of mutual collective security'" (Mello, 2014: 80). A case is assigned a score of 1 on *coalition government* if it is governed by a coalition with more than 1 pivotal party. A score of 1 on *minority government* is assigned to cases where the government does not hold the majority of the seats in parliament. Finally, a case is assigned a score of 1 on distant elections if the next general election

[1] A discussion of parliamentary veto power is provided in appendix 1.

is more than one year away during the planning of the operation (in line with inter alia Gaubatz, 1991; Kisangani & Pickering, 2007: 287).

This study operationalizes *executive* and *parliamentary* ideology with the RILE-scale of the comparative manifesto project and the Chapell Hill Expert Survey (CHES). While the former better reflects cross-national differences within family groupings, the latter better reflects the costs parties incur for military deployment decisions (Klingemann et al., 2006: 64; Palmer, London & Regan, 2004: 20). Party positions (n) are aggregated into an overall measure of executive ideological orientation by summing up each party's (i) ideological position (ip) weighted by its proportion of the total number of government or parliament seats (s), as specified in the following equation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{s_i rl_i}{s}.$$

The dichotomisation threshold for Right Executive RILE and Right parliament RILE is fixed at 0, which corresponds to parties that make an equal amount of right and left statements in their manifestos. The threshold for Right Executive CHESS and right parliament CHESS is fixed at 5, the ideological "Center" in the expert questionnaire.

Analysis

This section presents the sequential application of MDSO/MSDO and the csQCA.

MDSO/MSDO

The first step of the MDSO/MSDO is the systematic pairwise comparison of the cases in the four categories (or clusters) of conditions (De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1996; Pattyn, 2014a; Pattyn, 2014b). This requires the calculation of Boolean distance, which corresponds to the number of conditions on which two cases differ. Subsequently, levels of (dis)similarities are calculated for each cluster of conditions. Level 0 corresponds to the lowest (or highest distance) between two cases in a cluster, level 1 to the lowest (or highest) distance plus (or minus 1), level 2 to the lowest (or highest) distance plus (or minus) 2 etc. Finally, the pairs of cases that reach the highest level of (dis)similarity in the largest number of categories are selected. In this study, we single out the pairs that reach a level of (dis)similarity level

of 0, 1 or 2 for the highest number of categories, resulting in 12 most different pairs with a positive outcome, 25 most different cases with a negative outcome and 299 most similar cases with a different outcome.[1]

Subsequently, the conditions on which the largest number of MDSO-pairs have the same values and MSDO-pairs have different values are identified. The standard MDSO/MSDO procedure counts a condition every time it is different in a most similar pair or similar in a most different pair. However, it is not always plausible that the different or similar outcome is explained by the specific value of a different or similar condition. For example, it is not plausible that the absence of military participation is explained by the presence of large military expenditures. Two most different cases with a negative outcome that have the presence of large military expenditures in common, therefore, do not provide strong evidence for the importance of military expenditures. In this analysis, we therefore only consider a pairwise comparison as evidence for the importance of a condition if it is in line with theoretical expectations that the cases' value on the condition explains the outcome.[2] The number of times each condition was represented in the expected direction across (dis)similar pairs of cases is listed in Table 1.[3]

To keep the number of possible combinations of conditions limited, the subsequent analysis starts with the four conditions that were mentioned most across the 334 pairwise comparisons: medium military expenditures (ME), large share of sustainable forces deployed (DF), UN peacekeeping tradition (PT) and regional trade (RT).

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[1] The results were produced with the MDSO/MSDO software (version 1.1 – spring 2015), developed by De Meur (available at http://www.jchr.be/01/v11.htm) Replication data is available in "replication data MDSO MSDO.txt".

[2] In line with the hypotheses above, the presence of large and medium military expenditures, large and medium military personnel, geographic proximity, bilateral and regional trade, foreign fighters, alliance value, peacekeeping tradition and distant elections were linked to military participation, as was the absence of large share sustainable forces deployed, above average competing deployments, budget deficit, parliamentary veto power, minority government, constitutional restrictions and coalition government. No directional expectations were made on the conditions related to ideology, since their impact is dependent on the context of the operation.

[3] The systematic cross-case comparison is available in "comparison MDSO MSDO.xlsx".

Table 1. Results MDSO MSDO

	Most Different Positive Outcome		Most Different Negative Outcome			Most Similar Different Outcome			
Level	0	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	
# comparisons	11	1	3	4	18	1	55	242	*Sum*
Capabilities									
Large Military Expenditures	1	0	1	2	9	0	3	18	34
Medium Military Expenditures	7	1	1	2	4	0	9	85	109
Large Military Personnel	2	0	1	2	5	0	0	6	16
Medium Military Personnel	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	27
Sustainable Forces Deployed	4	0	0	2	2	0	7	73	88
Above Average Forces Deployed	9	1	0	0	0	0	10	29	49
Government Deficit	0	0	0	0	2	0	8	42	52
Country-Specific Benefits									
Geographic Proximity	0	0	2	1	16	0	1	10	30
Bilateral Trade	0	0	0	3	6	0	1	20	30
Regional Trade	2	0	0	1	7	0	4	70	84
Foreign Fighters	0	0	3	2	14	0	2	14	35
UN Peacekeeping Tradition	1	0	2	3	9	0	23	103	141
Alliance Value	0	0	2	1	15	0	0	20	38
Domestic Constraints									
Constitutional Restrictions	11	1	0	0	0	0	1	21	34
Parliamentary Veto	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	25	29
Minority Government	3	0	0	0	1	0	5	23	32
Coalition Government	0	0	2	0	5	0	4	32	43
Electoral Distance	0	1	0	0	2	0	3	32	38
Ideology									
Right Executive RILE	2	0	0	0	1	0	13	52	68
Right Parliament RILE	2	1	0	0	5	0	5	33	46
Right Executive CHES	2	0	0	1	2	0	12	35	52
Right Parliament CHES	3	0	0	3	6	0	3	25	40

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The QCA-procedure proceeds in two main steps, which were carried out with the QCA package for R, version 1.1-4 (R Development Core Team, 2014; Thiem & Duşa, 2013).[1] First, the data is synthesised in a truth table, which is presented in Table 2. Each row of a truth table corresponds to a specific combination of conditions. Cases are attributed to the row that corresponds to their specific combination. Subsequently, an outcome-value is assigned to each row. Row 1-6 only contain cases in which the outcome is present and can thus be straightforwardly assigned a score of 1; row 13-16 only contain cases in which the outcome is absent and, therefore, are assigned a score of 0.

Row 7-12 include cases with a 1-outcome and cases with a 0-outcome. In line with the recommendation of Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 122), we take into account the degree to which these contradictory rows deviate from perfect sufficiency to orientate their outcome. This is accomplished with the consistency parameter, which provides a descriptive measure of the extent to which the empirical data confirms sufficiency. The minimum advisable consistency level for a sufficient condition is 0.75 (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 279). However, in csQCA, a consistency score below 1 is always caused by true logical contradictory cases, which makes it particularly important to take case-specific information into account. On the basis of the consistency values and case-specific information, we assigned the following outcomes to the contradictory rows.

- Row 7 is assigned a score of 1. Not only does its consistency exceed the minimum advisable 0.75 threshold, the four deviant cases can be explained by case-specific circumstances. The non-participation of Portugal in the Libya intervention was caused by a political crisis following the resignation of its Prime Minister Socrates. The three other deviant cases are non-participants in the air strikes against IS, which, as will be argued below, deviates from the other operations.
- Row 8 is assigned a score of 1. The only deviant case, Finland - EUFOR Congo, can be considered a significant contributor. Although Finland only contributed eleven troops to EUFOR Congo, these provided crucial medical support.

[1] The R-code is provided in "code.R", replication material in "replication data QCA.txt" and "replication data QCA cases IS.txt".

Table 2. Truth table

	Conditions				Consistency		Out-	
	ME	PT	RT	DF	MP	~MP	come	Cases
1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	NL_CO, GR_LE, NL_LE, BE_CH, IT_CH, NL_CH, IT_LI
2	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	PL_CO, DK_LE, PL_LE, PL_CH
3	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	SE_CO, PT_LE, SE_LE, SE_CH
4	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH
5	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	FR_CO, FR_LE
6	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	FI_LE
7	1	0	1	0	0.79	0.21	1	BE_CO, IT_CO, ES_CO, BE_LE, IT_LE, ES_LE, ES_CH, BE_LI, FR_LI, GR_LI, NL_LI, ES_LI, BE_IS, DK_IS NL_IS, *GR_IS, IT_IS*, *ES_IS*, *PT_LI*
8	0	1	0	0	0.67	0.33	1	FI_CH, IE_CH, *FI_CO*
9	0	1	1	1	0.50	0.50	1/0	BG_LE, *RO_LE*
10	1	0	0	0	0.40	0.60	1/0	*GR_CH*, *GB_CH*, SE_LI, GB_LI, FR_IS, , GB_IS, *DE_IS*, *PL_IS, PT_IS, SE_IS*
11	1	0	0	1	0.33	0.67	1/0	DE_CO, DE_LE, DK_LI, *GB_LE, DE_CH*, *DE_LI, PL_LI GR_CO, GB_CO*
12	0	1	0	1	0.15	0.85	0	AT_CH, IE_LE, *AT_CO, HU_CO, IE_CO, SK_CO, AT_LE*, *HU_LE*, *SK_LE*, *BG_CH, HU_CH, RO_CH, SK_CH*
13	0	0	0	1	0.00	1	0	*CZ_CO, EE_CO, LV_CO, LT_CO, LU_CO, SI_CO, CZ_LE, EE_LE, LV_LE, LT_LE, LU_LE, SI_LE, CZ_CH, EE_CH, LT_CH, LU_CH, SI_CH, AT_LI, CZ_LI, HU_LI, RO_LI, SK_LI, AT_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS*
14	0	0	0	0	0.00	1	0	*LV_CH, FI_LI, CZ_IS, FI_IS, RO_IS*
15	0	0	1	1	0.00	1	0	*BG_LI*
16	0	0	1	0	0.00	1	0	*BG_IS*

Note: ME: Medium Military Expenditures, PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition, RT: Regional Trade, DF: Deployed Forces, MP: Military Participation, ~ MP: absence Military Participation; Abbreviations of cases: "ISO-landcode_operation", with CO: EUFOR Congo, LE: UNIFIL II, CH: EUFOR Chad, LI: Intervention Libya and IS: operation against IS (cf. appendix 2 for full list of abbreviations). Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

- Row 9 to 11 cannot be assigned a score of 1 or 0. Their consistency suggests they are not sufficient for participation or non-participation and there is no case-specific explanation for the deviant cases.
- Row 12 is assigned a score of 0. Its consistency for the absence of the outcome exceeds the 0.75 mark. Moreover, the participation of Ireland in UNIFIL II can be explained by its long association with UNIFIL, Austria's contribution to EUFOR Chad as an attempt of the Austrian government "to show off its credentials as a security provider at a time when it geared up for a UN Security Council seat" (Pohl, 2014a: 140).

The second step of QCA is the minimization of the truth table. Depending on the remainders included in the process, Boolean minimization results in different solution types. Since there are no remainders in our truth table, only the so-called conservative solution results.

The minimized formula for the outcome's presence is presented in Table 3. Military participation results if medium military expenditures (ME) are combined with large regional trade (RT). Similarly, member states participate in (operations in support of) UNPOs if they have a peacekeeping tradition (PT) and either have medium military expenditures (ME) or do not have a large share of their sustainable forces deployed (~DF). The consistency of these three causal paths equals 0.88, which indicates that 88% of the cases that correspond to these paths have a score of 1 on military participation. The solution coverage, which shows the share of the outcome covered by the formula, is 0.79. This indicates that the formula explains 79% of the participation in the operations.

The minimized formula for the outcome's absence is presented in Table 4. Non-participation results if the absence of medium military expenditures (~ME) is combined with either the absence of UN peacekeeping tradition (~PT) or the absence of regional trade (~RT) and the presence of a large share of sustainable forces deployed (DF). The total consistency of the solution equals 0.96, the total coverage equals 0.71.

Table 3. Solution military participation

		Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	Cases
1	ME*RT	0.871	0.562	0.458	NL_CO, GR_LE, NL_LE, BE_CH, IT_CH, NL_CH, IT_LI, PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH, FR_CO, FR_LE, BE_CO, IT_CO, ES_CO, BE_LE, IT_LE, ES_LE, ES_CH, BE_LI, FR_LI, GR_LI, NL_LI, NL_IS, ES_LI, BE_IS, DK_IS, *PT_LI, GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS*
2	ME*PT	1.000	0.271	0.083	PL_CO, DK_LE, PL_LE, PL_CH, SE_CO, PT_LE, SE_LE, SE_CH, PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH, FR_CO, FR_LE
3	PT*~DF	0.909	0.208	0.062	SE_CO, PT_LE, SE_LE, SE_CH, PT_CO, FR_CH, PT_CH, FI_LE, FI_CH, IE_CH, *FI_CO*
	Solution	0.884	0.792		

ME: Medium Military Expenditures, PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition, RT: Regional Trade, DF: Deployed Forces; "~" Condition absent; Abbreviations of case have this structure: "ISO-landcode_operation", with CO: EUFOR Congo, LE: UNIFIL II, CH: EUFOR CHAD, LI: Intervention Libya and IS: operation against IS (cf. appendix 2 for list of abbreviations). Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

The four conditions explain the outcome in almost 75% of the cases. However, the pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS deviates from the other operations. Three non-contributors to this operation are covered by the combination of large regional trade and medium military expenditures, which was generally linked to participation. Moreover, the operation against IS accounts for nine of the twenty-eight cases that were not explained by the solutions. A separate analysis was conducted for the air strikes against IS. Row 7 and 10 of the truth table include both participants and non-participants in the air strikes against IS. For both

Table 4. Solution ~military participation

		Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	Cases
1	~ME*~PT	1.000	0.525	0.115	CZ_CO, EE_CO, LV_CO, LT_CO, LU_CO, SI_CO, CZ_LE, EE_LE, LV_LE, LT_LE, LU_LE, SI_LE, CZ_CH, EE_CH, LT_CH, LU_CH, SI_CH, AT_LI, CZ_LI, HU_LI, RO_LI, SK_LI, AT_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS; LV_CH, FI_LI, CZ_IS, FI_IS, RO_IS; BG_LI; BG_IS
2	~ME*~RT*DF	0.947	0.590	0.180	CZ_CO, EE_CO, LV_CO, LT_CO, LU_CO, SI_CO, CZ_LE, EE_LE, LV_LE, LT_LE, LU_LE, SI_LE, CZ_CH, EE_CH, LT_CH, LU_CH, SI_CH, AT_LI, CZ_LI, HU_LI, RO_LI, SK_LI, AT_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS; AT_CO, HU_CO, IE_CO, SK_CO, AT_LE, HU_LE, SK_LE, BG_CH, HU_CH, RO_CH, SK_CH, *IE_LE, AT_CH*
	Solution	0.956	0.705		

ME: Medium Military Expenditures, PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition, RT: Regional Trade, DF: Deployed Forces; "~" Condition absent; Abbreviations of case follow this structure: "ISO-landcode_operation", with CO: EUFOR Congo, LE: UNIFIL II, CH: EUFOR CHAD, LI: Intervention Libya and IS: operation against IS (cf. appendix 2 for list of abbreviations). Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

rows, each country that participated in the operation was compared with each country that participated, resulting in seventeen pairwise comparisons. The most common difference between these similar cases with a different outcome was

"foreign fighters" (FF), on which the cases differed in thirteen of the pairs. The four remaining contradictory cases all differed on one condition: constitutional restrictions.[1] Both conditions were added to the truth table, which is presented in Table 5 and contains no contradictory configurations.

Subsequently, the truth table is minimized. All remainders that lead to a less complex solution were included in the process, which results in the parsimonious solution. The latter was preferred over alternative solutions, because it is the only formula that is "guaranteed to reflect causation" (Baumgartner, 2015: 854).[2] The solutions, presented in Table 6 and 7, show that the combination of foreign fighters (FF) and the absence of constitutional restrictions (~CR) is sufficient for participation, while the absence of foreign fighters (~FF) and the presence of constitutional restrictions (CR) are individually sufficient for non-participation. The consistency and coverage of these solutions is 1, indicating that they explain all variation in the outcome.

Table 5. Truth table operation IS

	Conditions					Consistency		Outcome	cases
	ME	RT	DF	FF	CR	MP	~MP		
1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS
2	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	FR_IS, GB_IS
3	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	*GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS*
4	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	*HU_IS, SK_IS*
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	*CZ_IS, RO_IS*
6	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	*PL_IS, PT_IS*
7	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	*DE_IS, SE_IS*
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	*AT_IS*
9	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	*FI_IS*
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	*BG_IS*

ME: Medium Military Expenditures, RT: Regional Trade, DF: Deployed Forces, FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; MP: Military Participation, ~ MP: absence Military Participation; Abbreviations of case follow this structure: "ISO-landcode_IS" (cf. appendix 2 for list of abbreviations). Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

[1] The cross-case comparisons are available in "contradictory cases IS.xlsx".

[2] The conservative and intermediate solutions are presented in appendix 2.

Table 6. Solution military participation operation IS

		Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	*Cases*
1	FF*~CR	1.000	1.000	1.000	BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS, FR_IS, GB_IS
	Solution	1.000	1.000		

FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; "~" Condition absent; Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

Table 7. Solution ~military participation operation IS

		Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	*Cases*
1	~FF	1.000	0.786	0.714	*DE_IS, SE_IS; AT_IS, FI_IS*
2	CR	1.000	0.286	0.214	*GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS, CZ_IS, RO_IS, PL_IS, PT_IS, FI_IS, BG_IS*
	Solution	1.000	1.000		

FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; "~" Condition absent; Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

Discussion

Interpreting the results against the backdrop of the research goal and theoretical framework leads to a number of conclusions. First of all, the analysis suggests that the pattern of member state participation in military operations is not random, nor is it the result of idiosyncratic political or strategic cultures. Almost 75% of the varying involvement in the selected operations is explained by four conditions; 83% is explained by six conditions if the operation against IS is analysed separately.

Second, the results show that the availability of military resources was of detrimental importance for explaining military participation. Two of the causal paths towards participation include medium military expenditures, while both paths towards non-participation include the absence of this condition. This confirms the

collective action based expectation that small states will ride cheap on their more powerful allies. However, the link between military capabilities and contributions can also be caused by the fact that smaller member states lack the capabilities to assist in certain missions (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 48). In line with the latter conjecture, military less powerful member states only participated in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II and EUFOR Chad and only if they have a peacekeeping tradition. A very plausible reason for the former is that the fighter jets of the smaller European allies were not sufficiently equipped for the operations in Libya and against IS. States with a peacekeeping tradition, in turn, can be expected to have the military resources required to participate in the remaining three operations, irrespective of their level of military spending (Gaibulloev et al., 2015: 733).

Third, the analysis suggests that the availability of military resources must be combined with the country-specific benefits related to a strong peacekeeping tradition or large regional trade volumes. Peacekeeping tradition is included in two paths towards military participation, while its absence is included in one of the two paths towards non-participation; regional trade is included in the path towards participation with the highest coverage, its absence in one of the paths towards non-participation. However, the operation against IS deviates from the general pattern: the threat posed by foreign fighters constitutes the most important condition for explaining participation in the air strikes, but was of no importance for the other operations.

The latter suggests that the context of the operation has an impact on the specific incentives that spur contributions, which indicates that the conclusions of the present study cannot easily be generalized beyond the scope of the examined operations. Incentives that were not decisive for participation in the cases might matter in other operations. For example, the two operations for which alliance value was a plausible explanations can be considered least-likely cases for hypotheses on alliance politics. The intervention in Libya was led by France and the UK, not the US; while the air strikes against IS started after Russia's interventions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. In consequence, many of the member states that highly value their relationship with the US, most importantly the Eastern European states, were not willing to dispatch fighter jets to a foreign theatre. Since the lack of support from least likely cases does not provide strong evidence, it cannot be ruled out that alliance value will be an important incentive in future operations (Levy, 2008: 12).

Fourth, the results suggest that domestic constraints and partisan politics are not decisive for the member states' military engagements. The only exception is "constitutional restrictions", which was important for the operation against IS. Few

member states faced constitutional restrictions in the other cases, while only four faced restrictions in the air strikes against IS. This indicates that constitutional restrictions are important, but only explain a limited share of the variation in the member states' military deployments. The results suggest that the other domestic constraints are not relevant. However, theories on domestic-level variables cannot be entirely dispensed with, since studies on military burden sharing suggest that the latter are especially important for explaining the size and form of states' contributions, which is not taken into account in this study (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 73; Oma, 2012: 565).

Lastly, the contradictory cases indicate that idiosyncratic conditions interfere with the general pattern (cf. Austria's contribution to EUFOR Chad and Portugal's non-participation in Libya). Moreover, the analysis does not suggest that strategic culture can be entirely dismissed as an important explanation for the variation in the member states' military engagements. Although the solutions explain a significant share of that variation in the outcome, the cases that are not covered suggest that strategic culture might have an impact on some of the member states' military deployments. The results of the main analysis, for example, do not cover Germany's behaviour in any of the operations. This suggests that its pattern of military engagement cannot be explained without taking into account its strategic culture, which is characterized by reluctance towards the use of force and conflicts with the demands of its allies to accept a greater share of the global security burden (Junk & Daase, 2013: 146-149; Schmitt, 2012).

Conclusions

What conditions motivate or block member state participation in military operations? The present study employed two configurational comparative methods to explain the member states' varying engagements in five operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 intervention in Libya and the air strikes against IS. The analysis shows that varying capabilities and expected benefits explain most (but not all) variation in the member states' military engagements. More specifically, the results suggest that future European military operations will most likely be conducted by a coalition of military capable member states that either consider participation a continuation of their peacekeeping tradition or have economic interests in the wider region of the target of the intervention. However, these conditions do not explain all variation across the five operations, suggesting that more idiosyncratic explanations are required to fully explain their pattern of

military engagements. Moreover, the conditions that were most important in the four other operations, are not necessary to explain the pattern of contributions to the air strikes against IS, which indicates that it is difficult to generalize the conclusions of the analysis.

Nevertheless, the study's findings have interesting implications for the prospects of increased defence cooperation between the EU member states. Most importantly, the conclusion that the member states' participation in military operations is not entirely random, nor determined by unsteady domestic conditions, suggests great potential for closer cooperation in the development of military capabilities. Increased cooperation and specialization in capability development yields benefits in financial and capability terms but comes at the price of reduced national autonomy, since each member states' ability to conduct operations would depend on its partners' willingness to grant access to their capabilities (Giegerich & Nicoll, 2012: 267). However, the conclusion of this study that military participation is mostly determined by capabilities and relatively stable conditions like peacekeeping tradition and regional trade interests suggests that it should be possible for the member states to find reliable partners for far-reaching cooperation and specialization in security and defence policy.

Appendices: EU Member State Participation in Military Operations - A Configurational Comparative Analysis

Appendix 1: Data Sources and Raw Data

Table A1. Outcome

	EUFOR Congo [a)]	UNIFIL II [b)]	EUFOR Chad [a)]	Libya [c)]	IS [d)]
Austria	3	0	169	0	0
Belgium	59	358	64	Air strikes	Air strikes
Bulgaria	NA	130	2	Maritime embargo	0
Czech Republic	0	0	2	0	0
Denmark	NA	80	NA	Air strikes	Air strikes
Estonia	0	0	0	NA	NA
Finland	11	203	62	0	0
France	975	1,593	1,770	Air strikes	Air strikes
Germany	745	912	4	0	0
Greece	1	225	4	Air patrol	0
Hungary	0	2	3	0	0
Ireland	0	163	447	NA	NA
Italy	56	2,206	104	Air strikes	0
Latvia	0	0	0	NA	NA
Lithuania	0	0	2	NA	NA
Luxembourg	1	2	2	NA	NA
Netherland	44	171	71	Air patrol	Air strikes
Poland	125	319	421	0	0
Portugal	53	146	30	0	0
Romania	NA	0	2	Maritime embargo	0
Slovakia	0	0	1	0	0
Slovenia	1	12	14	NA	NA
Spain	132	1280	112	Air patrol	0
Sweden	50	41	120	Air patrol	0
UK	0	0	4	Air strikes	Air strikes

a) Source: SIPRI (2015b)

b) Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2015), data reflects situation in November 2006, when the operation reached full operational capability.

c) Source: Chivviss (2014)

d) Source: Howorth (2015)

Table A2. Military capabilities

	Military Expenditures [a)]	Military Personnel [b)]
Austria	3,450	30,151
Belgium	5,594	34,989
Bulgaria	1,006	37,500
Czech Republic	2,884	22,929
Denmark	4,611	21,708
Estonia	454	5,163
Finland	3,637	25,035
France	65,169	26,1345
Germany	47,680	233,778
Greece	8,595	149,798
Hungary	1,628	28,291
Ireland	1,345	10,002
Italy	38,153	205,643
Latvia	404	5,352
Lithuania	429	11,290
Luxembourg	307	900
Netherlands	11,658	42,624
Poland	9,109	112,667
Portugal	4,828	42,378
Romania	2,595	74,746
Slovakia	1,246	16,640
Slovenia	694	7,147
Spain	15,836	148,229
Sweden	6,656	20,168
UK	59,542	177,087

[a)] Average military expenditures 2005-2014 in constant (2011) US $ (billions); Source: SIPRI (2015a)

[b)] Average military personnel 2005-2014; Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006-2015).

Table A3. Deployed forces

	Deployed Forces				
	EUFOR Congo [a)]	UNIFIL II [a)]	EUFOR Chad [b)]	Libya [c)]	IS [d)]
Austria	1,230	1,230	1,150	1,360	1,033
Belgium	753	753	1,200	720	353
Bulgaria	NA	494	789	731	344
Czech Republic	899	899	858	814	311
Denmark	NA	1,308	NA	984	242
Estonia	221	221	197	NA	NA
Finland	706	706	616	248	572
France	9,871	10,321	10,577	7,651	6,782
Germany	7,275	8,015	6,280	6,988	2,733
Greece	1,757	1,757	11,33	447	186
Hungary	705	705	862	974	589
Ireland	624	624	174	NA	NA
Italy	5,023	5,023	7,409	6,686	3,454
Latvia	165	165	96	NA	NA
Lithuania	222	222	243	NA	NA
Luxembourg	37	37	34	NA	NA
Netherlands	2,205	2,250	1,905	292	623
Poland	4,200	4,200	2,474	2,956	696
Portugal	726	777	670	584	284
Romania	NA	1,578	1,545	2,102	486
Slovakia	633	633	509	538	479
Slovenia	312	312	485	NA	NA
Spain	1,877	2,007	2,946	2662	1,021
Sweden	792	792	581	724	99
UK	16,509	16,509	12,978	9,846	751

[a)] Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008a); Troops deployed in EUFOR Congo and UNIFIL II, according to International Institute for Strategic Studies (2007), have been subtracted from deployed units.

[b)] Source: Giegerich and Nicoll (2012: 60); Troops deployed in EUFOR Chad, according to International Institute for Strategic Studies (2009), have been subtracted from deployed units.

[c)] Source: Giegerich and Nicoll (2012: 60)

[d)] Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015)

Table A4. Sustainable forces

	Sustainable forces				
	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	860	860	880	982	1,738
Belgium	1,777	1,777	1,777	1,897	1,715
Bulgaria	NA	970	974	900	1675
Czech Republic	1,000	1,000	1,250	1,350	1,350
Denmark	NA	1,000	NA	1,000	1,000
Estonia	230	230	227	NA	NA
Finland	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,418	1,498
France	16,000	16,000	30,000	29,444	29,444
Germany	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000
Greece	3,500	3,500	3,500	2,552	3,500
Hungary	873	873	1,000	1,057	1,000
Ireland	850	850	850	NA	NA
Italy	14,900	14,900	12,000	12,000	12,000
Latvia	212	212	212	NA	NA
Lithuania	256	256	392	NA	NA
Luxembourg	51	51	53	NA	NA
Netherlands	3,056	3,056	3,056	5,050	2,275
Poland	3,600	3,600	4,580	977	4946
Portugal	1,963	1,963	1,963	2,254	2,108
Romania	NA	2,885	2,561	2,953	2,484
Slovakia	585	585	766	722	590
Slovenia	322	322	322	NA	NA
Spain	6,250	6,250	6,350	7,850	7,410
Sweden	3,122	3,122	1,966	1,966	540
UK	26,120	26,120	38,267	24,483	19,300

Sources: European Defence Agency (2008); European Defence Agency (2009); North Atlantic Council (2014) and International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008a)

Table A5. Deployed forces / sustainable forces

	Deployed Forces / Sustainable forces				
	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	143	143	131	138	59
Belgium	42	42	68	38	21
Bulgaria	NA	51	81	81	21
Czech Republic	90	90	69	60	23
Denmark	NA	131	NA	98	24
Estonia	96	96	87	NA	NA
Finland	35	35	31	17	38
France	62	65	35	26	23
Germany	61	67	52	58	23
Greece	50	50	32	18	5
Hungary	81	81	86	92	59
Ireland	73	73	20	NA	NA
Italy	34	34	62	56	29
Latvia	78	78	45	NA	NA
Lithuania	87	87	62	NA	NA
Luxembourg	73	73	64	NA	NA
Netherlands	72	74	62	6	27
Poland	117	117	54	303	14
Portugal	37	40	34	26	13
Romania	NA	55	60	71	20
Slovakia	108	108	66	75	81
Slovenia	97	97	151	NA	NA
Spain	30	32	46	34	14
Sweden	25	25	30	37	18
UK	63	63	34	40	4

Source: author's calculations

Table A6. Average deployed troops

	Average Troops Deployed				
	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	1000.9	1,000.9	1,046.6	1,091.4	1,170.8
Belgium	1,107.8	1,107.8	1,111.9	1,055.4	841.6
Bulgaria	NA	183.4	290.8	517.1	634.5
Czech Republic	746.8	746.8	776.3	837.4	719.2
Denmark	NA	1,133.9	NA	1,209.5	1,026.6
Estonia	45.8	45.8	80	NA	NA
Finland	1,115.1	1,115.1	1,037.8	865.4	623.9
France	9,423.4	9,423.4	9,685.5	10,298.1	9180
Germany	6,075.4	6,075.4	6,613.5	7,276.5	6,950.1
Greece	1,321.1	1,321.1	1,396.3	1,567	1,060.4
Hungary	742.1	742.1	782.4	934.2	970.8
Ireland	624.3	624.3	641.9	NA	NA
Italy	6,475.2	6,475.2	6,962.7	7,661.2	6,969
Latvia	81.8	81.8	100.2	NA	NA
Lithuania	106.1	106.1	119.9	NA	NA
Luxembourg	31.2	31.2	35.1	NA	NA
Netherlands	2,192.8	2,192.8	2,196.2	2,194.4	1,483.4
Poland	2,235.7	2,235.7	2,588.5	3,039.2	2,934.7
Portugal	1,080.5	1,080.5	1,004.1	977	661.5
Romania	NA	884.3	973.7	1,398.2	1,667.8
Slovakia	481.6	481.6	489.2	642.3	579.1
Slovenia	74.1	74.1	113.7	NA	NA
Spain	2,321.6	2,321.6	2,543.5	2,845.4	2,558.9
Sweden	772.9	772.9	813.6	845.5	766.1
UK	10,587	10,587	11,436.5	12,224	11,741.4

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008, 2013, 2014 and 2015); Giegerich and Nicoll (2012)

Table A7. Deployed forces / average deployed forces

	Deployed Forces / Average deployed forces				
	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	123	123	110	125	88
Belgium	68	68	108	68	42
Bulgaria	NA	269	271	141	54
Czech Republic	120	120	111	97	43
Denmark	NA	115	NA	81	24
Estonia	483	483	246	NA	NA
Finland	63	63	59	29	92
France	105	110	109	74	74
Germany	120	132	95	96	39
Greece	133	133	81	29	18
Hungary	95	95	110	104	61
Ireland	100	100	27	NA	NA
Italy	78	78	106	87	50
Latvia	202	202	96	NA	NA
Lithuania	209	209	203	NA	NA
Luxembourg	119	119	97	NA	NA
Netherlands	101	103	87	13	42
Poland	188	188	96	97	24
Portugal	67	72	67	60	43
Romania	NA	178	159	150	29
Slovakia	131	131	104	84	83
Slovenia	421	421	426	NA	NA
Spain	81	86	116	94	40
Sweden	102	102	71	86	13
UK	156	156	113	81	6

Source: author's calculations

Table A8. Budget deficit

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	-2,5	-2,5	-1,4	-2,6	-2,4
Belgium	0,2	0,2	-1,1	-4,1	-3,2
Bulgaria	NA	1,8	1,6	-2	-2,8
Czech Republic	-2,3	-2,3	-2,1	-2,7	-2
Denmark	NA	5	NA	-2,1	1,2
Estonia	2,9	2,9	-2,7	NA	NA
Finland	3,9	3,9	4,2	-1	-3,2
France	-2,3	-2,3	-3,2	-5,1	-4
Germany	-1,5	-1,5	0	-0,9	0,7
Greece	-6,12	-6,12	-9,91	-10,2	-3,5
Hungary	-9,4	-9,4	-3,7	-5,5	-2,6
Ireland	2,8	2,8	-7	NA	NA
Italy	-3,6	-3,6	-2,7	-3,5	-3
Latvia	-0,6	-0,6	-4	NA	NA
Lithuania	-0,3	-0,3	-3,1	NA	NA
Luxembourg	1,4	1,4	3,3	NA	NA
Netherlands	0,2	0,2	0,2	-4,3	-2,3
Poland	-3,6	-3,6	-3,6	-4,9	-3,2
Portugal	-4,3	-4,3	-3,8	-7,4	-4,5
Romania	NA	-2,2	-5,6	-5,3	-1,5
Slovakia	-3,6	-3,6	-2,4	-4,1	-2,9
Slovenia	-1,2	-1,2	-1,4	NA	NA
Spain	2,2	2,2	-4,4	-9,4	-5,8
Sweden	2,2	2,2	2	-0,1	-1,9
UK	-2,9	-2,9	-5,1	-7,6	-5,7

Source: Eurostat (2015)

Table A9. Geographic proximity

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	4733	2129	2599	1490	2350
Belgium	5193	2958	3057	1879	3181
Bulgaria	NA	1070	2167	939	1303
Czech Republic	4970	2164	2840	1726	2321
Denmark	NA	2777	NA	2375	2865
Estonia	6010	2623	3918	NA	NA
Finland	6232	2934	4128	2986	2781
France	4246	2434	2109	931	2737
Germany	4864	2381	2725	1569	2613
Greece	3521	717	1596	293	1025
Hungary	4653	1795	2542	1448	1976
Ireland	5792	3864	3718	NA	NA
Italy	3650	1650	1516	446	1954
Latvia	5808	2434	3707	NA	NA
Lithuania	5589	2308	3510	NA	NA
Luxembourg	5171	2921	3034	NA	NA
Netherlands	5317	3003	3179	2003	3200
Poland	5038	1923	2939	1786	2043
Portugal	4415	3728	2663	1727	4034
Romania	NA	1193	2424	1215	1352
Slovakia	4873	1907	2758	1663	2050
Slovenia	4621	2090	2489	NA	NA
Spain	4083	2842	2123	981	3149
Sweden	5730	2812	3597	2471	2826
UK	5448	3320	3335	2156	3546

Source: Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch (2010); Values for EUFOR Chad represent the lowest value of the distance of member state to Chad and Central African Republic.

Table A10. Bilateral Trade

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	0.00046	0.01358	0.00136	0.20956	0.11705
Belgium	0.26137	0.09601	0.02497	0.07184	0.03651
Bulgaria	NA	0.16047	0.0016	0.04781	0.23477
Czech Republic	0.00135	0.03686	0.00231	0.0496	0.09293
Denmark	NA	0.02634	NA	0.01185	0.01763
Estonia	0.0018	0.00545	0.00002	NA	NA
Finland	0.06462	0.03129	0.00131	0.0128	0.01731
France	0.00802	0.04882	0.00817	0.17264	0.06508
Germany	0.00305	0.02842	0.00156	0.18867	0.04671
Greece	0.00571	0.03886	0.00006	0.59362	0.64177
Hungary	0.00052	0.03605	0.00059	0.02798	0.06498
Ireland	0.00692	0.02736	0.00033	NA	NA
Italy	0.0026	0.05857	0.00117	0.88478	0.18828
Latvia	0	0.00436	0.00042	NA	NA
Lithuania	0.0008	0.00254	0.00004	NA	NA
Luxembourg	0.0036	0.00619	0.00038	NA	NA
Netherlands	0.00896	0.03644	0.00492	0.14445	0.27542
Poland	0.00048	0.00579	0.00086	0.00903	0.01931
Portugal	0.01195	0.00952	0.02743	0.36375	0.0619
Romania	NA	0.15022	0.00026	0.0572	0.06796
Slovakia	0.00008	0.03958	0.0021	0.00906	0.00708
Slovenia	0.00032	0.013	0.00208	NA	NA
Spain	0.0016	0.02315	0.00174	0.2606	0.14146
Sweden	0.0024	0.01616	0.00227	0.05099	0.04765
UK	0.00099	0.01938	0.00049	0.07087	0.01411

Sum of imports and exports member state and the operation's target, relativized by the member state's GDP, in %. The last five years before the operation are taken into account. Values for EUFOR Chad are the sum of trade with Chad and the Central African Republic. Sources: International Monetary Fund (2008, 2009, 2013, 2014).

Table A11. Regional trade

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	0.46834	0.92736	0.52982	1.54106	1.17047
Belgium	3.02607	3.53919	2.5702	3.54904	3.07541
Bulgaria	NA	1.44629	0.7112	2.25592	2.22171
Czech Republic	0.49271	0.91787	0.46856	1.00304	0.90944
Denmark	NA	0.79177	NA	0.77636	1.8283
Estonia	0.36362	0.30302	0.87971	NA	NA
Finland	0.60169	1.38377	0.67311	1.51832	0.68644
France	2.14663	1.24328	1.93486	2.34515	1.3118
Germany	0.83807	1.13294	0.79193	1.59166	1.30566
Greece	0.36962	2.07478	0.37071	2.69783	3.43838
Hungary	0.4873	1.14575	0.62112	1.58003	1.53802
Ireland	0.85943	0.82958	0.80219	NA	NA
Italy	1.43487	1.99677	1.28854	3.71301	2.50678
Latvia	0.19668	0.39335	0.21584	NA	NA
Lithuania	0.29761	0.18069	0.28551	NA	NA
Luxembourg	0.37273	0.71095	0.31386	NA	NA
Netherlands	2.3497	2.54395	2.00252	3.73039	3.06802
Poland	0.37089	0.32281	0.36885	0.49369	0.35973
Portugal	3.00846	0.81363	2.39445	2.142	0.99683
Romania	NA	1.83423	0.45308	1.62802	1.41345
Slovakia	0.22023	0.41148	0.2689	0.59968	0.26169
Slovenia	0.55114	0.99894	0.34172	NA	NA
Spain	2.25642	1.21507	1.7875	2.61297	1.78002
Sweden	0.65143	1.12973	0.65572	1.34881	0.95679
UK	0.87789	1.02444	0.77638	1.24206	1.12159

Sum of imports and exports member state and the operation's region, relativized by the member state's GDP, in %. Sources: International Monetary Fund (2008, 2009, 2013, 2014).

Table A12. Foreign fighters

	Foreign Fighters Syria	
	Absolute [a)]	Per capita [b)]
Austria	150	17.7
Belgium	440	39.3
Bulgaria	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	150	26.7
Estonia	NA	NA
Finland	70	12.9
France	1200	18.2
Germany	600	7.4
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	NA	NA
Italy	80	1.3
Latvia	NA	NA
Lithuania	NA	NA
Luxembourg	NA	NA
Netherlands	250	14.9
Poland	0	0
Portugal	0	0
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	NA	NA
Spain	100	2.1
Sweden	180	18.8
UK	600	9.4

[a)] Source: Neumann (2015)

[b)] Per million population. Source: World Bank (2014)

Table A13. Alliance value

	Libya		IS	
	Troops Afghanistan/Iraq [a)]	AV_i [b)]	Troops Afghanistan/Iraq [a)]	AV_i [b)]
Austria	9	0.02	8	0.01
Belgium	346	0.48	371	0.49
Bulgaria	502	8.15	511	7.42
Czech Republic	398	1.46	427	1.45
Denmark	685	1.4	667	1.32
Estonia	126	4.53	135	4.39
Finland	91	0.24	108	0.27
France	1,509	0.37	1,786	0.42
Germany	2,816	0.53	3,297	0.59
Greece	113	0.24	111	0.24
Hungary	405	2.03	403	1.96
Ireland	7	0.02	7	0.02
Italy	2,807	0.83	3,035	0.88
Latvia	132	3.62	129	3.25
Lithuania	166	3.18	183	3.17
Luxembourg	9	0.13	10	0.12
Netherlands	1,337	1.05	1,089	0.83
Poland	2,029	3.28	2,051	3.02
Portugal	121	0.33	141	0.38
Romania	1,214	5.71	1,317	5.58
Slovakia	155	1.46	187	1.56
Slovenia	52	0.74	58	0.79
Spain	828	0.38	937	0.42
Sweden	227	0.31	289	0.37
UK	10,202	2.43	9,904	2.33

[a)] Average troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq years before operation. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006-2015).

[b)] Average share of European personnel contributions to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan relativized by their share of GDP. Source GDP: International Monetary Fund (2015)

Table A14. UN peacekeeping tradition

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad
Austria	4.14	4.14	3.99
Belgium	0.52	0.52	0.51
Bulgaria	4.62	4.62	4.29
Czech Republic	0.63	0.63	0.61
Denmark	1.55	1.55	1.57
Estonia	0.43	0.43	0.37
Finland	5.7	5.7	5.46
France	1.37	1.37	1.36
Germany	0.09	0.09	0.11
Greece	0.2	0.2	0.24
Hungary	2.3	2.3	2.23
Ireland	4.34	4.34	4.36
Italy	0.39	0.39	0.39
Latvia	0	0	0
Lithuania	0.04	0.04	0.05
Luxembourg	0	0	0
Netherlands	0.71	0.71	0.7
Poland	9.28	9.28	9.01
Portugal	1.29	1.29	1.44
Romania	2.22	2.22	2.35
Slovakia	12.49	12.49	11.94
Slovenia	0.45	0.45	0.5
Spain	0.28	0.28	0.3
Sweden	1.68	1.68	1.67
UK	0.6	0.6	0.57

The scores take into account contribution to UNPO's since 1991 until the year before the planning of the operation started. For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, only personnel contributions since one year after their independence in 1995, 1993, 1992, 1992, 1995 and 1992, respectively, are recorded. Personnel contributions are based on the contributions in December of each year, based on data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2015). Source GDP: International Monetary Fund (2015).

Table A15. Parliamentary veto power

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	V	V	V	V	V
Belgium				V	V
Bulgaria	NA				V
Czech Republic	V	V	V	V	V
Denmark	NA	V	NA	V	V
Estonia	V	V	V	NA	NA
Finland	V	V	V	V	V
France					
Germany	V	V	V	V	V
Greece					
Hungary	V	V	V	NA	NA
Ireland	V	V	V	NA	NA
Italy					
Latvia	V	V	V	NA	NA
Lithuania	V	V	V	NA	NA
Luxembourg	V	V	V	NA	NA
Netherlands	V	V	V	V	V
Poland					
Portugal					
Romania	NA				V
Slovakia	V	V	V		V
Slovenia				NA	NA
Spain	V	V	V	V	V
Sweden	V	V	V	V	V
UK					V

V = Ex Ante parliamentary Veto

The coding of parliamentary veto power is based the parlcon-dataset (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010). Since this only assigns parliamentary war powers up till 2004, this information was cross-checked and supplemented with other sources (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013; Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2015; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010; Peters, Wagner & Deitelhoff, 2010; Strong, 2015).

- First, member states with a legal obligation of prior parliamentary consent for all military deployments are assigned a score of 1 in all operations. These are Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden.
- Second, member states where seeking parliamentary approval is not a legal norm, but constitutes an unwritten rule, are also assigned a score of 1. These are the Netherlands, Czech Republic and the UK, after the government's defeat over military action in Syria in August 2013.
- Third, parliament held a de facto veto on troop deployments due to specific political circumstances in Belgium during the operations in Libya and against IS because it was governed by a caretaker government at the time.
- Fourth, in some member states, operations conducted under formal organizations are exempt from prior parliamentary approval. This was the case for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, where deployments under the NATO or CSDP-framework are exempt from general obligation of prior approval. Similarly, Slovak Republic's parliament has to consent prior to external military deployment, except when troops are dispatched for a for a maximum period of 60 days and the deployment is part of an obligation resulting from international treaties on common defence. Therefore, it is assigned a score of 0 for the NATO operation in Libya.
- Fifth, parliament did not play a significant role in military deployment decisions in any of the operations in France, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia.
- Finally, parliamentary competences for troop deployments are not clearly defined in Italy, resulting in competing views of the legal procedures for participation in military operations (Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 63).The Italian government had many ways to deploy troops, some of which exclude parliamentary involvement. Consequently, there exists disagreement on parliamentary involvement on decisions on the use of force, with assessments ranging from very strong over medium to inconclusive (Born, Fuior & Lazzarini, 2008: 19; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2010: 26; Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010: 64). According to Marrone and Di Camillo (2013: 197), 'international

deployment authorisation is usually based on a decree law issued by the government and adopted as law by parliament within the 60-day period foreseen in the legislation.' The use of such degree laws limited the parliament's role, which gives ex post endorsement by approving these laws. Furthermore, according to Born, Fuior and Lazzarini (2008: 19), parliamentary debates usually took place after troops are deployed.

Table A16. Coalition government

	Pivotal Parties in government				
	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	2	2	2	2	2
Belgium	4	4	4	5	5
Bulgaria	NA	2	2	1	2
Czech Republic	3	1	3	3	3
Denmark	NA	2	NA	2	2
Estonia	3	3	3	NA	NA
Finland	2	2	2	2	4
France	1	1	1	1	1
Germany	2	2	2	2	2
Greece	1	1	1	1	2
Hungary	2	2	2	1	2
Ireland	2	2	1	NA	NA
Italy	3	6	6	2	2
Latvia	3	3	4	NA	NA
Lithuania	4	4	4	NA	NA
Luxembourg	2	2	2	NA	NA
Netherland	3	2	3	2	2
Poland	1	2	2	2	2
Portugal	1	1	1	1	2
Romania	NA	3	2	3	3
Slovakia	3	3	3	3	1
Slovenia	4	4	4	NA	NA
Spain	1	1	1	1	1
Sweden	1	1	1	4	4
UK	1	1	1	2	2

Source: Döring and Manow (2015); The value reflects the situation on the following reference dates: March 20th 2006 for EUFOR Congo, when an Informal planning conference took place in Berlin (Engberg, 2013: 100); July 25th 2006 for UNIFIL, the data of the first informal meeting of prospective troop contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 101); September 24 2007 for EUFOR Chad, the date of the first indicative force generation conference (Mattelaer, 2011: 61); 17 March 2011 for the operation in Libya; when the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 and 26 August 2014 for the air strikes against IS, when the US started mobilizing allies (Landler and Cooper 2014).

Table A17. Distant elections

	Days till next election				
	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	614	68	1468	926	1495
Belgium	424	297	1355	1184	1338
Bulgaria	NA	1046	620	841	40
Czech Republic	75	1409	983	1169	1156
Denmark	NA	929	NA	241	385
Estonia	347	220	1257	NA	NA
Finland	361	234	1271	31	236
France	453	327	1728	458	1026
Germany	1278	1151	725	925	1123
Greece	545	418	1453	932	661
Hungary	20	1354	928	1135	1461
Ireland	430	303	1704	NA	NA
Italy	20	1719	1293	758	1279
Latvia	201	74	1109	NA	NA
Lithuania	949	822	396	NA	NA
Luxembourg	1181	1054	628	NA	NA
Netherland	308	120	1155	1180	748
Poland	1282	1155	25	206	409
Portugal	1068	941	515	207	410
Romania	NA	857	431	624	827
Slovakia	89	1423	997	1183	562
Slovenia	928	801	375	NA	NA
Spain	725	598	172	358	451
Sweden	181	54	1090	1282	19
UK	1507	1380	954	1511	253

Source: Döring and Manow (2015); The value reflects the situation on the following reference dates: March 20th 2006 for EUFOR Congo, when an Informal planning conference took place in Berlin (Engberg, 2013: 100); July 25th 2006 for UNIFIL, the data of the first informal meeting of prospective troop contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 101); September 24 2007 for EUFOR Chad, the date of the first indicative force generation conference (Mattelaer, 2011: 61); 17 March 2011 for the operation in Libya; when the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 and 26 August 2014 for the air strikes against IS, when the US started mobilizing allies (Landler and Cooper 2014). To account for early elections, the actual date of the next general election was only used if it was less than one year away. Otherwise, the length of an electoral cycle was added to the date of the last election.

Table A18. Right executive RILE

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	-2.89	-2.89	-9.13	-9.97	-9.93
Belgium	-16.98	-16.98	-16.73	-7.57	-7.15
Bulgaria	NA	-14.1	-14.1	13.69	-33.84
Czech Republic	-4.51	20.79	16.41	7.97	-7.12
Denmark	NA	2.22	NA	-9.9	-4.91
Estonia	2.8	2.8	3.99	NA	NA
Finland	-16.3	-16.3	-18.79	-21.62	-8.71
France	-7.74	-7.74	-12.78	-11.45	-32.84
Germany	11.81	11.81	11.81	3.99	-7.44
Greece	-17.59	-17.59	-12.66	-21.58	23.5
Hungary	-9.02	1.98	1.98	-4.46	13.31
Ireland	-6.58	-6.58	-11.76	NA	NA
Italy	15.68	-17.71	-17.71	11.63	-5.05
Latvia	-2.48	1.52	1.71	NA	NA
Lithuania	-0.13	-3.54	-3.54	NA	NA
Luxembourg	-20.53	-20.53	-20.53	NA	NA
Netherland	12.12	12.43	3.06	15.42	8.59
Poland	-1.6	-1.14	-1.14	5.52	-1.71
Portugal	-10.56	-10.56	-10.56	-4.5	14.63
Romania	NA	4.41	3.8	1.99	16.72
Slovakia	8.84	-4.03	-4.03	11.68	-9.73
Slovenia	-3.66	-3.66	-3.66	NA	NA
Spain	-12.39	-12.39	-12.39	-23.22	-3.45
Sweden	-18.32	-18.32	3.46	1.46	1.46
UK	-3.09	-3.09	-3.09	15.52	15.52

Source Rile: Volkens et al. (2015); Composition parliament: Döring and Manow (2015)

Table A19. Right parliament RILE

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	-10.24	-10.24	-9.62	-8.16	-7.75
Belgium	-12.32	-12.32	-5.8	-1.45	-2.63
Bulgaria	NA	-7.17	-7.17	13.6	-18.04
Czech Republic	6.36	0.67	0.67	-1.97	-10.3
Denmark	NA	-8.7	NA	-10.18	-3.53
Estonia	0.98	0.98	-7.42	NA	NA
Finland	-14.1	-14.1	-24.33	-24.33	-8.26
France	-10.33	-10.33	-16.74	-16.27	-21.63
Germany	6.36	6.36	6.36	-4.78	-11.41
Greece	-13.55	-13.55	-15.36	-14.68	7.08
Hungary	-1.32	-3.83	-3.83	-4.45	4.82
Ireland	-10.9	-10.9	-12.66	NA	NA
Italy	5.03	11.48	11.48	6.28	-11.29
Latvia	-0.73	-0.73	-0.61	NA	NA
Lithuania	4.06	4.06	4.06	NA	NA
Luxembourg	-18.73	-18.73	-18.73	NA	NA
Netherland	6.48	6.48	4.91	7.22	5.91
Poland	-0.47	-0.47	-0.47	6.4	5.58
Portugal	-5.74	-5.74	-5.74	-2.22	6.37
Romania	NA	-9.4	-9.4	-0.39	8.19
Slovakia	16.7	-4.7	-4.7	-0.06	-0.15
Slovenia	-5.2	-5.2	-5.2	NA	NA
Spain	-2.84	-2.84	-2.84	-13.96	-13.49
Sweden	-4.33	-4.33	-9.95	-10.05	-10.05
UK	3.06	3.06	3.06	8.46	8.46

Sources: RILE: Volkens et al. (2015); Composition parliament: Döring and Manow (2015)

Table A20. Right executive CHES

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	7.24	7.24	5.39	5.11	4.94
Belgium	5.67	5.06	5.21	5.06	4.88
Bulgaria	NA	4.43	4.43	6.08	3.99
Czech Republic	4.23	7.71	7.28	7.42	3.2
Denmark	NA	7.19	NA	7.15	4.76
Estonia	5.31	5.31	6.96	NA	NA
Finland	4.67	4.67	5.91	6.02	5.44
France	7.29	7.29	7.3	7.13	3.83
Germany	5.1	5.1	5.1	6.26	5.1
Greece	6.44	6.44	6.44	4.36	6.72
Hungary	3.79	3.78	3.78	6.98	7.93
Ireland	6.37	6.37	6	NA	NA
Italy	7.28	3	3	7.73	3.97
Latvia	6.72	6.55	6.76	NA	NA
Lithuania	4	4.83	4.83	NA	NA
Luxembourg	5.58	5.58	5.58	NA	NA
Netherland	6.45	6.62	5.11	7.22	5.86
Poland	7.76	7.14	7.14	5.86	5.66
Portugal	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.17	6.91
Romania	NA	6.26	6.52	6.37	4.4
Slovakia	2.54	4.74	4.74	6.65	3.69
Slovenia	7.1	7.1	7.1	NA	NA
Spain	3.58	3.58	3.58	3.67	7.3
Sweden	3.56	3.56	6.44	7.19	7.36
UK	4.88	4.88	4.88	6.8	6.66

Sources: CHES-data: Bakker et al. (2015); Government composition: Döring and Manow (2015)

Table A21. Right parliament CHES

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	5.56	5.56	5.64	5.88	5.58
Belgium	5.06	5.67	5.7	5.54	5.41
Bulgaria	NA	5.06	5.06	5.44	5.13
Czech Republic	2.13	5.02	5.02	5.33	4.85
Denmark	NA	5.68	NA	5.7	5.48
Estonia	6.05	6.05	5.92	NA	NA
Finland	4.94	4.94	5.12	5.47	5.4
France	5.86	5.86	5.57	5.31	5.28
Germany	4.75	4.75	4.75	6.19	4.56
Greece	5.22	5.22	5.07	4.93	5.49
Hungary	5.11	5.11	5.11	6.58	7.22
Ireland	5.82	5.82	6.16	NA	NA
Italy	5.46	4.93	4.93	5.67	3.65
Latvia	5.51	5.51	6.41	NA	NA
Lithuania	5.26	5.26	5.26	NA	NA
Luxembourg	5.38	5.38	5.38	NA	NA
Netherland	5.25	5.25	4.78	5.5	5.66
Poland	6.04	6.04	6.04	6.28	6
Portugal	5.19	5.19	5.19	4.96	5.54
Romania	NA	5.01	5.01	5.22	5.27
Slovakia	5.23	5.68	5.68	5.32	5.05
Slovenia	5.66	5.66	5.66	NA	NA
Spain	5.54	5.54	5.54	5.38	5.74
Sweden	4.93	4.93	5.25	5.43	5.63
UK	5.35	5.35	5.35	5.64	5.38

Sources: CHES-data: Bakker et al. (2015); parliament composition: Döring and Manow (2015)

Appendix 2: Supporting Material Analysis

Table A22. Abbreviations cases

	EUFOR Congo	UNIFIL II	EUFOR Chad	Libya	IS
Austria	AT_CO	AT_LE	AT_CH	AT_LI	AT_IS
Belgium	BE_CO	BE_LE	BE_CH	BE_LI	BE_IS
Bulgaria	NA	BG_LE	BG_CH	BG_LI	BG_IS
Czech Republic	CZ_CO	CZ_LE	CZ_CH	CZ_LI	CZ_IS
Denmark	NA	DK_LE	NA	DK_LI	DK_IS
Estonia	EE_CO	EE_LE	EE_CH	NA	NA
Finland	FI_CO	FI_LE	FI_CH	FI_LI	FI_IS
France	FR_CO	FR_LE	FR_CH	FR_LI	FR_IS
Germany	DE_CO	DE_LE	DE_CH	DE_LI	DE_IS
Greece	GR_CO	GR_LE	GR_CH	GR_LI	GR_IS
Hungary	HU_CO	HU_LE	HU_CH	HU_LI	HU_IS
Ireland	IE_CO	IE_LE	IE_CH	NA	NA
Italy	IT_CO	IT_LE	IT_CH	IT_LI	IT_IS
Latvia	LV_CO	LV_LE	LV_CH	NA	NA
Lithuania	LT_CO	LT_LE	LT_CH	NA	NA
Luxembourg	LU_CO	LU_LE	LU_CH	NA	NA
Netherland	NL_CO	NL_LE	NL_CH	NL_LI	NL_IS
Poland	PL_CO	PL_LE	PL_CH	PL_LI	PL_IS
Portugal	PT_CO	PT_LE	PT_CH	PT_LI	PT_IS
Romania	NA	RO_LE	RO_CH	RO_LI	RO_IS
Slovakia	SK_CO	SK_LE	SK_CH	SK_LI	SK_IS
Slovenia	SI_CO	SI_LE	SI_CH	NA	NA
Spain	ES_CO	ES_LE	ES_CH	ES_LI	ES_IS
Sweden	SE_CO	SE_LE	SE_CH	SE_LI	SE_IS
UK	GB_CO	GB_LE	GB_CH	GB_LI	GB_IS

Table A23. Conservative Solution MP Analysis IS

	Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	Cases
1 FF*~CR*ME*~DF	1.000	1.000	1.000	BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS, FR_IS, GB_IS
Solution	1.000	1.000		

FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; "~" Condition absent ; Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where outcome is absent are in Italic.

Table A24. Intermediate Solution MP Analysis IS[1]

	Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	Cases
1 FF*~CR*ME*~DF	1.000	1.000	1.000	BE_IS, DK_IS, NL_IS, FR_IS, GB_IS
Solution	1.000	1.000		

ME: Military Expenditures, DF: Deployed Forces, FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; "~" Condition absent ; Cases where outcome is present are in regular font, cases where outcome is absent are in Italic.

[1] The presence of medium military expenditures, regional trade and foreign fighters were linked to military participation, as was the absence of deployed forces, and constitutional restrictions.

Table A25. Conservative Solution ~MP Analysis IS[1]

		Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	Cases
1	~DF*~FF*~CR	1.000	0.571	0.429	*GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, CZ_IS, RO_IS, PL_IS, PT_IS, BG_IS*
2	~ME*~DF*~RT*~FF	1.000	0.214	0.071	*CZ_IS,RO_IS; FI_IS*
3	~ME*~RT*~FF*~CR	1.000	0.286	0.143	*CZ_IS,RO_IS; HU_IS,SK_IS*
4	~ME*DF*~RT*FF*CR	1.000	0.071	0.071	*AT_IS*
5	ME*~DF*~RT*FF*CR	1.000	0.143	0.143	*DE_IS, SE_IS*
	Solution	0.956	0.705		

RT: Regional Trade, ME: Military Expenditures, DF: Deployed Forces, FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; "~" Condition absent ; Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where outcome is absent are in Italic.

Table A 26. Intermediate Solution ~MP Analysis IS[2]

		Consis-tency	Coverage Raw	Unique	Cases
1	~FF	1.000	0.786	0.714	*DE_IS, SE_IS; AT_IS, FI_IS*
2	CR*~RT	1.000	0.286	0.214	*GR_IS, IT_IS, ES_IS, HU_IS, SK_IS, CZ_IS, RO_IS, PL_IS, PT_IS, FI_IS, BG_IS*
	Solution	1.000	1.000		

RT: Regional Trade, FF: Foreign Fighters, CR: Constitutional Restrictions; "~" Condition absent ; Cases where the outcome is present are in regular font, cases where the outcome is absent are in Italic.

[1] The absence of medium military expenditures, regional trade and foreign fighters were linked to the absence of military participation, as was the presence of deployed forces, and constitutional restrictions.

[2] The absence of medium military expenditures, regional trade and foreign fighters were linked to the absence of military participation, as was the presence of deployed forces, and constitutional restrictions.

Part 3

Conclusions

10
Conclusions

The central objective of this doctoral dissertation is to explain the variation in the EU member states' military commitments. More specifically, it aims to unravel the conditions that motivate and block member state contributions to five military operations: EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against IS. The introduction identified a wide range of plausible explanations, which were tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the empirical tests are presented in five articles. The first, co-authored with Alrik Thiem, presents a systematic analysis of the determinants of member state contributions to two CSDP operations: EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The three subsequent articles focus on the pattern of participation in a single military operation: UNIFIL II, Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve. The last article compares the member states' contributions across the five operations.

This final chapter aims to draw general conclusions on the research question. First, the results of the five articles are interpreted against the backdrop of the plausible explanations discussed in the literature review. The second section reflects on the theoretical contribution of this dissertation and its relevance beyond academia. The last section discusses the most important pitfalls of the present study and suggests areas for further research.

Research Results

What conditions motivate and block EU member state contributions to military operations? Table 1 provides an overview of the conditions that were tested in each article and summarizes the most important results of their respective

Table 1. Analytical Results

Article 1: EUFOR Congo – EUFOR Chad	
Conditions	
PT: Strong Peacekeeping Tradition CD: Significant Competing Deployments TV: Large Trade Volumes PS: High Public Support BC: High Budget Constraints	ED: Large Electoral Distance PP: Significant Parliamentary Powers LP: Right Legislative Partisanship RP: Right Executive Partisanship
Solutions	
Overprovider 1. PT*TV*PS*ED 2. PT*~TV*~PS*ED Equiprovider 1. ~CD*TV*PP 2. ~PT*CD*TV*PS*~PP	Underprovider 1. ~PT*~PS 2. CD*PS*~LP 3. TV*~PS*LP 4. ~PT*~CD*~TV*LP 5. PT*CD*~TV*PS
Article 2: UNIFIL II	
Conditions	
MC: Military Capabilities MS: Military Stretch PI: Prior Peacekeeping Involvement GP: High Geographic Proximity	LE: Left Executive LP: Left Parliament ED: Large Electoral Distance PV: Parliamentary Veto
Solutions	
Large Contribution (LC) 1. MC*~MS *LE (**ED*LP)* 2. MC*~MS*LE (**ED*~PV)* 3. PI*~MS*LP (**LE*ED)*	Absence Large Contribution (~LC) 1. MS (*~MC) 2. MS (*~GP) 3. ~PI*~MC (*~GP) 4. ~LE(*PV) 5. ~ED (*PV)

[~] Condition absent; [*] refers to conjunction of conditions; Conditions between brackets indicate they are included in the intermediate but not in the parsimonious solution; the solutions of Article 1 represent results with GDP as capability indicator

Table 1. (Continued)

Article 3 – Operation Unified Protector	
Conditions	
LE: Large Economy	AV: Alliance Value
MS: Military Spending	RE: Right Executive
SP: Spatial Proximity	ED: Electoral Distance
Solutions	
High Burden	Absence High Burden
1. LE *MS*ED	1. ~MS*~AV*~ED
2. LE *SP*ED	2. ~MS*~AV*~SP*RE
3. LE*ED*~RE	3. ~LE
4. LE*AV*~RE	
Article 4 – Operation Inherent Resolve	
Conditions	
TH{0}: Low Threat	AV: Alliance Value
TH{1}: Intermediate Threat	RE Right Executive
TH{2}: High Threat	RP Right Parliament
AD: Alliance Dependence	PV Parliamentary Veto
Solutions	
Air Strikes	No Air Strikes
1. TH{2}*AV	1. AD{1}
2. TH{2}*~PV	2. TH{0}
3. TH{1}*AV*~AD	3. ~AV*PV
4. TH*AV*~PV	4. ~AV*TH{1}
Article 5–EUFOR Congo and Chad, UNIFIL II, Unified Protector and Inherent Resolve	
Conditions	
ME: Medium Military Expenditures	RT: Regional Trade
PT: UN Peacekeeping Tradition	DF: Deployed Forces
Solutions	
Military Participation	Absence Military Participation
1. ME*RT	1. ~ME*~PT
2. ME*PT	2. ~ME*~RT*DF
3. PT*~DF	

[~] Condition absent; [*] refers to conjunction of conditions

analyses.[1] This section interprets the results of the five articles against the backdrop of the plausible explanations discussed in the literature review. The first subsection discusses the explanatory value of collective action theory, the second of the varying direct and indirect benefits member states might have hoped to gain from contributing. Subsequently, the third subsection elaborates on whether the results indicate that the examined operations mainly produced EU-wide public benefits or primarily yielded country-specific outputs. The fourth section discusses the explanatory value of domestic-level conditions and resource constraints, after which the conclusions summarize the study's main findings.

Collective Action Theory

A first plausible explanation for the member states' military commitments is offered by collective action theory. More specifically, the collective-action-based "exploitation hypothesis" predicts that small member states will ride free on large member states if an operation mainly produces public benefits. The empirical tests presented in this dissertation provide varying levels of support for this hypothesis.

In line with the exploitation hypothesis, the analytical results of the second, third and fifth article show that (large) military commitments were associated with sizeable capabilities. The empirical analysis of the second article reveals that the presence of "military capabilities" is part of two sufficient conjunctions for carrying a high burden of the reinforcement of UNIFIL. Moreover, this condition's absence is an element of one sufficient combination for the absence of "high burden". Likewise, the results of the third article indicate that the presence of "large economy" is part of all sufficient paths towards "high burden" in the Libya operation, while the absence of "large economy" consistently leads towards the outcome's absence. Finally, the results of the fifth article suggest that the member states' military resources are vital determinants of contributions across the five operations. Here, the presence of "military expenditures" is part of two of the three causal paths towards "military

[1] The solutions generally represent the parsimonious formula, since this is the only solution type that is "guaranteed to reflect causation" and its "ingredients can be considered the core causal factors" (Baumgartner, 2015: 854; Ragin & Fiss, 2008: 202). The solution of the second article also shows the conditions of the intermediate formula, since this was at the centre of the substantive discussion of this article. In the third and fifth article, there is no difference between the parsimonious and intermediate solution.

participation", while the absence of this condition is an element of both paths towards non-participation.

In contrast, the first article suggests that the differing contributions to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad are not explained by the pure public goods model. The article assessed whether there is a rank correlation between the member states' contributions and their capability to deliver these contributions. Contrary to the expectations of the public goods model, there was no strong association between the member states' relative contributions and the indicators used to operationalize their capabilities. This contrasts starkly to the results of the fifth article, in which a large portion of the cases of EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad is covered by combinations towards military (non)participation that include (the absence of) "military expenditures".

There are several possible explanations for the diverging results of the first and fifth article. First of all, while the first article uses GDP and population as capability indicator, the fifth article uses military expenditures. However, given that the member states' absolute levels of defence spending are strongly correlated to their GDP, this is probably not the cause of the seemingly contradictory results of the articles. A more important difference between the analyses presented in the first and fifth article lays in the operationalization of the outcome. While the first article relativizes the contributions of the member states by their capabilities, the outcome variable of the fifth article only indicates whether or not a state participated in the operation. In consequence, the varying levels of support for the collective-action-based hypotheses offered by the analyses presented in these articles thus suggests that the larger member states were more inclined to participate in EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, but not necessarily made disproportionately large contributions.

Finally, the conclusion that there is no correlation between capabilities and contributions, but that sizeable capabilities are an element of several paths towards the outcome is not necessarily contradictory.[1] The solutions presented in the fifth article suggest that "medium military expenditures" only lead to military participation if combined with high "regional trade" or "UN peacekeeping tradition". If the latter two conditions are absent, sizeable capabilities can be associated with the absence of military participation. Moreover, "medium military

[1] A comprehensive discussion of the differences between the set-relations that result from QCA and correlations that result from traditional quantitative methods is provided in Ragin (2008: 13-68; 177-189) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 83-91)

expenditures" is not an element of one of the three paths towards "military participation", which covers many of the small contributors to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. The solutions of the fifth article thus indicate that there are small states that participate in these CSDP operations and large member states that do not participate, which, in turn, might explain why there is no strong correlation between capabilities and contributions to the operations.

In sum, the evidence presented across the articles suggests that capabilities are an important determinant of contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, UNIFIL II and Operation Unified Protector. In contrast, there is no evidence that the variation in the member states' capabilities had an impact on their contributions to Operation Inherent Resolve. The solutions of the fourth article fully explain the pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS without taking the size or capabilities of the democratic members of the anti-IS coalition into account. Likewise, the parsimonious solution that results from the separate analysis of Operation Inherent Resolve presented in the fifth article does not include "military expenditures", which indicates that this condition was not vital for explaining the pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS. A plausible explanation for why the differences in the member states' military capabilities were less important for Operation Inherent Resolve is that the US only started mobilizing allies a few weeks after it started offensive operations. Hereby, the US indicated that it was willing to act against IS without allied support. In consequence, all member states had the opportunity to take a free ride, irrespective of their military capabilities. As such, the analyses of the air strikes against IS are in line with the conclusion of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997) that the collective action hypothesis does not explain why states participate in military interventions that are dominated by the US.

With the exception of Operation Inherent Resolve, the results of the articles demonstrate that capabilities are an important determinant of member state contributions to the operations under investigation. In line with the exploitation hypothesis, this suggests that the operations mainly produce public benefits that are highly valued amongst the member states. There are two important caveats to this conclusion. First, the criterion for membership in conditions that reflect capabilities is generally located at the median of the included cases.[1] The analyses thus mainly

[1] In fact, the results of the MDSO/MSDO analysis that is presented in the fifth article suggest that "medium military expenditures" is a more relevant condition than "large military expenditures".

demonstrate that the small member states are generally less inclined to participate in military operations, but not that middle-sized member states take a free ride on the largest member states. This suggests that the link between military capabilities and contributions might also be explained by the fact that small member states have fewer opportunities to contribute to multilateral military operations because they lack the capabilities to participate in certain missions (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014: 48). Many of the EU member states with a small economic base, for example, do not have (sufficiently equipped) fighter jets to participate in the air campaign over Libya, which at least partially explains why "large economy" is a decisive condition for explaining the division of the burden of this operation. A second caveat to the conclusion that the examined operations mainly produce benefits that are strongly valued by all member states is that capabilities are generally combined with country-specific incentives. This suggests that the direct and indirect benefits member states might hope to gain from participating in crisis management operations varies and has an impact on their military commitments.

Direct and Indirect Benefits of Military Engagements

A second category of explanatory conditions comprises the direct and indirect benefits member states (hope to) gain by participating in operations. First of all, the second and third article assess whether the geographical distance towards the target of an operation has an impact on contributions to the operations under investigation. While the analysis presented in the second article demonstrates that "geographic proximity" is not important for contributions to UNIFIL II, the third article reveals that "spatial proximity" is part of one path towards "high burden" in the 2011 intervention in Libya. These diverging results are not surprising, given that Libya is situated much closer to the EU than Lebanon. This suggests that distance only provides a strong incentive if the target of an intervention is situated in the respective member state's immediate vicinity. Since this was not the case for the large majority of the member states in the operations under investigation, the differences in their geographical location only explains a limited share of the variation in their military commitments. The fifth article provides systematic evidence for this conclusion: the MDSO/MSDO suggests that geographic proximity was one of the least relevant conditions.

Second, the analyses presented in the articles test the explanatory value of several conditions linked to economic interests. The appendix of the third article assessed whether energy dependence was important for explaining contributions to the intervention in Libya, but did not find convincing evidence for this conjecture.

Bilateral trade fares somewhat better. The solutions of the first article link "large trade volumes" to proportional and large contributions to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad. However, the results of this article are rather ambiguous on the impact of "trade volumes": the presence of this condition is also an element of the third path towards underprovision, while its absence is part of the second path towards overprovision. Moreover, the MDSO/MSDO analysis presented in the fifth article does not suggest that bilateral trade is one of the most relevant conditions. In contrast, this analysis did identify "regional trade" as one of the four most important conditions across the five operations. In combination with "medium military expenditures", this condition covers more than half of the cases of "military participation" in the operations examined in the fifth article. This confirms the conclusion of Kathman (2011: 864) that potential interveners do not solely base intervention decisions on economic interests in the civil war country itself, but are also driven by "regional, more economically consequential, interests".

Third, the analyses presented in the fourth and fifth article provide strong evidence that contributions to the air campaign against IS were primarily linked to the member states' varying numbers of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. In the fourth article, every causal path of the parsimonious solution for the outcome's presence either includes "high" or "intermediate threat", while the parsimonious solution for the outcome's absence shows that "low threat" is sufficient for non-participation. Given that a high level of threats generally implied a relatively large number of foreign fighters, this suggests the latter constitutes a vital incentive for states to participate. Likewise, the analysis of the air strikes against IS presented in the fifth article indicates that the combination of a large number of "foreign fighters" and the absence of "constitutional restrictions" was sufficient for participation in Operation Inherent Resolve.

In the category of indirect incentives, the analyses provide very strong evidence that the member states' prior engagement in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPOs) is relevant for explaining their military commitments. The results of the first and second article link this condition to high contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and UNIFIL II. Moreover, two of the three paths towards "military participation" of the fifth article's solution include "peacekeeping tradition". The member states with a strong tradition of participating in UNPOs were thus clearly more inclined to contribute to operations that were launched in support of the UN peacekeeping system. This confirms the liberal institutionalist argument of Lebovic (2004:915) that institutional involvement tends to be self-perpetuating. However, the strong support for this condition also resonates with theories on strategic culture,

which expect historical experience and foreign policy traditions to have an impact on military commitments.

Finally, the member states that accord a higher value to their relationship with the US were expected to be more inclined to contribute to the NATO operation over Libya and the US-led coalition against IS. The results of the analyses suggest that "alliance value" was indeed an important condition in these operations, but was less decisive than suggested by prior research on NATO and US-led operations. In the solutions of the third article, "alliance value" was an element of one sufficient combination towards carrying a "high burden" in Operation Unified Protector. However, this path only covers one member state: Denmark. In the fourth article, alliance value is an element of the first sufficient combination towards participation in the air strikes against IS, which covers three member states: the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands.[1]

Many of the member states that are generally considered Atlanticists, like Poland or the Czech Republic, thus did not participate in Operation Unified Protector nor in Operation Inherent Resolve. This might indicate that the traditional division between member states with an Atlanticist and member states with a European orientation is becoming less relevant (Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013: 390). However, it is difficult to generalize this conclusion beyond Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve. The former constitutes a least-likely case for the alliance dependence hypothesis since Washington did not take the lead of the operation. The air strikes against IS, in turn, started in very specific circumstances. Because of Russia's interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in the first half of 2014, the perceived threat for countries situated in Russia's vicinity was at a post-Cold War height at the time Washington was mobilizing allies to fight IS. In consequence, the member states that were dependent on the US' security guarantees did not participate in Operation Inherent Resolve, but instead decided to keep their fighter jets at home to deter possible Russian aggression.[2]

In sum, in the category of direct benefits, "regional trade" stands out as the most relevant condition across the five operations, while geographic proximity had an impact on contributions to Operation Unified Protector and countering the

[1] The third and four sufficient combination for participation in the air strikes also include "alliance value", but only cover Canada.

[2] The fact that alliance dependence was sufficient for not participating in the air strikes provides strong evidence for this conclusion.

threat posed by foreign fighters was the most important incentive for participation in the air strikes against IS. In the category of indirect benefits, the analyses show that prior involvement in UN peacekeeping is a relevant explanatory condition for contributions to (operations in support of) UNPOs. A strong interest in a good relationship with the US also provided an incentive to participate in Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent resolve, but was less important than in earlier NATO and US-led operations.

EU-Wide Public Benefits or Member State Specific Incentives?

The previous sections argued that conditions derived from different strands of academic research are relevant for explaining member state contributions to the five operations under investigation. In line with the public goods model, the analyses suggest that larger member states were more inclined to contribute. However, the results also demonstrate that varying direct and indirect benefits have an impact on the member states' military commitments, which suggests that the joint-product model is the best description of burden-sharing patterns in the operations under investigation. It is theoretically not possible that both the pure public goods model and the joint product model explain the division of the burden of an operation, since the former applies if collective action *only* produces purely public benefits and the latter if it produces both public and private benefits. Nevertheless, the analyses clearly show that larger member states are also more inclined to participate in operations that yield country-specific benefits.

First of all, the analyses suggest that country-specific benefits that result from balancing threats to economic or security interests only lead to substantial contributions in combination with sizeable capabilities. The third article, for example, shows that the country-specific benefits related to "geographic proximity" only leads to "high burden" in combination with "large economy". Likewise, the fifth article indicates that "regional trade" only results in "military participation" in combination with "medium military expenditures". These conjunctions can be explained by the fact that balancing threats does not necessarily result in excludable benefits. In fact, states that are faced with significant threats can take a free ride if other states are willing and able to balance these threats without their assistance.[1]

[1] This has been suggested by Christensen and Snyder (1990: 141), who argue that states can fail to balance rising threats because "some states try to ride free on other states' balancing efforts". Likewise, Davidson (2011:17) maintains that states that are faced with threats can

Even if a small member state has security or economic interests at stake in an operation, it can thus still be expected to take a free ride on the larger member states.

Second, the results indicate that sizeable capabilities and country-benefits can be elements of alternative paths for large contributions. In the second and fifth article, every single path towards large contribution either includes peacekeeping tradition or sizeable military capabilities. This suggests that the only small member states that contributed to the operations under investigation had a peacekeeping tradition and were thus expected to accord more importance to the status gains that result from contributing to UNPOs. Smaller member states thus only participated if these excludable benefits were at stake, whereas the larger member states also contributed if only non-excludable benefits were at stake.

An alternative explanation for this interplay between capabilities and country-specific benefits is that smaller member states lack the capabilities to assist in certain missions. In spite of having a strong incentive to contribute, capability shortfalls can cause small member states to refrain from participating. This might explain why only the combination of country-specific incentives with at least intermediate capabilities leads to participation. Capabilities and peacekeeping traditions might operate as functional equivalents because states with a peacekeeping tradition can be expected to have the military resources required to contribute to the operations that were deployed in the framework of a UNPO, irrespective of their level of military spending.

To sum up, the analyses indicate that some country-specific benefits only lead to substantial contributions in combination with sizeable capabilities, while others can motivate contributions irrespective of a member state's capabilities. Although the results of the articles clearly demonstrate that capabilities are an important determinant of contributions to the operations under investigation, the variation in the direct and indirect benefits the member states hope to gain from contributing does have an impact on their military commitments. Member states will thus be most inclined to contribute to an operation if they have sizeable capabilities *and* specific interests at stake.

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take a free ride on the US if the latter is willing to counter the threat on its own, while the integrated model of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1994: 70) suggests that states will ride free if security is considered a "public good provided by others in sufficient quantity even if the state does not contribute".

Domestic Conditions and Resource Constraints

A third category of explanatory conditions comprises domestic-level conditions and resource constraints. First of all, the analyses presented in the articles tested whether the level of institutional constraints on member states' governments has an impact on their military commitments. The MDSO/MSDO presented in the fifth article indicates that neither the difference between majority and minority governments, nor the difference between single-party and coalition governments is decisive for the member states' military commitments. Likewise, this analysis suggests that "constitutional restrictions" is one of the least relevant conditions for explaining contributions across the five operations. The fifth article does provide strong evidence that this condition is important for explaining contributions to Operation Inherent Resolve: the presence of "constitutional restrictions" is sufficient for not participating in the air strikes against IS. However, the majority of the member states did not face legal restrictions in any of the operations. This suggests that "constitutional restrictions" is an important condition, but only explains a limited share of the variation in the member states' military deployments.

The results of the analyses are rather ambiguous with regards to a last institutional variable: the degree of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions. While the MDSO/MSDO presented in the fifth article indicates that "parliamentary veto" was amongst the least relevant conditions, the other articles suggest that legislative involvement does have an impact on contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, UNIFIL II and Operation Inherent Resolve. These seemingly contradictory results suggest that parliamentary involvement might not be decisive for whether or not a member state participates, as tested in the fifth article; but does determine the size of a participating state's contributions.[1] The results of the first article provide evidence for this conjecture, since significant parliamentary powers are linked to equiprovision, but not to underprovision. Likewise, in the fourth article, the sufficient combination that links "parliamentary veto" to non-participation in the air strikes against IS mainly covers

[1] As argued in the fifth article, this corresponds to the conclusions of several studies on military burden sharing, which suggest that the domestic constraints are especially important for explaining the size and form of states' contributions (Bennett, Lepgold & Unger, 1994: 73; Oma, 2012: 565).

member states that did make non-offensive contributions to Operation Inherent Resolve, like Germany, Spain, Sweden and Finland.

A second domestic-level condition is the temporal distance towards the next election. The first three articles provide strong evidence that executives are less inclined to participate in military operations if elections are nearby. The results of the first article suggest that the member states contributed more than expected to EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad when distant elections are combined with a strong peacekeeping tradition. Likewise, the second article shows that "large electoral distance" is a necessary condition for large contributions to UNIFIL II, while the results of the third article indicate that "electoral distance" is part of three of the four sufficient paths towards "high burden" in Operation Unified Protector.

In contrast, the articles do not provide convincing evidence for a third domestic-level condition: public opinion. The analyses presented in the appendices of the third and fourth article indicate that public support was not decisive for contributions to the military intervention in Libya or the air strikes against IS. However, this dissertation definitely does not provide conclusive evidence that public opinion does not matter for the member states' military commitments. First of all, there was no reliable public opinion data for three of the operations under investigation. On top of that, public opinion data for the Libya operation was retrieved from a survey that took place after the start of the air strikes and only includes eleven member states, while reliable information on public support for military action against IS could only be retrieved for six member states.

Results are dissimilar across the operations with regards to the impact of political partisanship. The results of the second and third article are in line with theoretical expectations on the link between political partisanship and military engagements. The analysis presented in the second article shows that "left executive" was a necessary condition for large contributions to the reinforcement of UNIFIL, while each sufficient path of the parsimonious solution of "large contribution" either includes "left executive" or "left parliament" as an explanatory condition. In the third article, the absence of "right executive" is an element of two sufficient combinations for carrying a "high burden" in Unified Protector, while its presence is an element of one path towards the absence of high burden. Hereby, both articles confirm that left-leaning governments are more likely to support operations with inclusive goals, as was suggested by Rathbun (2004).

In contrast, the first and fourth article do not provide strong evidence that partisanship had an impact on the member states' military commitments. The analysis presented in the fourth article suggests that neither executive nor

parliamentary ideology was important for explaining the pattern of participation in the air strikes against IS. However, since Operation Inherent Resolve countered a threat to the participants national interests *and* pursued humanitarian goals, both left and right parties had reasons to support the operation. A plausible reason for why the first article does not confirm expectations on the impact of partisan politics is that the operationalization of ideology is based on expert surveys.[1] In contrast, the other articles operationalized ideology with the RILE-scale of the comparative manifesto project, which better reflects cross-national differences within party-family groupings and, therefore, can expected to be better suited for cross national comparison (Mello, 2014).

Finally, in the category of resource constraints, the analyses do not suggest that "budget constraints" had an impact on the member states' military commitments. "Competing deployments", in turn, stands out as one of the most important explanatory conditions for some of the operations under investigation. The analyses presented in the first and second article indicate that "competing deployments" and "military stretch" were relevant conditions for explaining member state contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad, and UNIFIL II. In contrast, the third and fourth article explain (a large share) of the variation in the contributions to Operation Unified Protector and Operation Inherent Resolve without taking this condition into account. This suggests that military stretch was especially important for the operations that were launched at the beginning of the timeframe of this dissertation.

The results of the fifth article confirm this conjecture. The absence of a large number of "deployed forces" is an element of one of the three pathways towards "military participation", while its presence is part of one of the two sufficient combinations for non-participation. EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II and EUFOR Chad account for the bulk of the cases covered by these paths. This might be an artefact of the indicator that is used to operationalize competing deployments. The latter only takes the number of deployed ground forces into account, which is less relevant for air operations like Unified Protector and Inherent Resolve. However, it also indicates

[1] Executive ideology is not included in the solutions with the GDP-based capability indicator, presented in Table 1. The solutions with the combined capability indicator, which is presented in the text of the article, link "right-leaning executive" to "overprovision". Since few member states had strong interests at stake in the examined CSDP operations, this contradicts the expected interactions set out in the introduction.

that competing deployments had less impact on operations that were launched over the last five years, when the number of externally deployed European troops had already decreased significantly (cf. Figure 1 Introduction).

To sum up, in the category of domestic conditions, the analyses show that electoral distance and, depending on the goals of an operation and the interests that were at stake, partisan politics have an impact on the member states' military commitments. In addition, this dissertation suggests that parliamentary veto power has an impact on the size of military contributions. Constitutional restrictions, in turn, were important for contributions to the air strikes against IS, but in general, only explain a limited share of the variation in the member states' military deployments. Finally, the analyses indicate that simultaneous military engagements significantly constrained member state contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and the reinforcement of UNIFIL.

What Conditions Motivate and Block Member State Participation in Military Operations?

The results of the articles suggest that member states were inclined to participate in the five military operations under investigation if sizeable military resources were combined with country-benefits related to regional trade, geographic proximity and threat posed by foreign fighters. In addition, states with a high level of prior involvement in UNPOs were inclined to participate in operations deployed in support of the UN peacekeeping system, irrespective of their military resources. However, actual contributions only materialized in the absence of competing deployments, while proximate elections and parliamentary veto power resulted in lower levels of military support. Finally, depending on the goals of an operation and the national interests at stake, the ideological orientation of the member states' governments can also have an impact on their military commitments.

Theoretical and Empirical Relevance

Having outlined the main findings of this doctoral dissertation, this section elaborates on its most important scholarly and empirical contributions.

By examining the determinants of contributions to the five operations under investigation, this study contributes to the vast body of academic research on military intervention and crisis management operations. First of all, some of the ingredients of the articles' theoretical frameworks had not been systematically tested in earlier studies. The first, second and fifth article, for example, demonstrate that

military stretch was one of the most important determinants of contributions to EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and the reinforcement of UNIFIL. Few studies had examined the impact of this condition on military commitments. The scarce analyses that did, generally operationalized competing deployments with binary indicators of concurrent mission involvement, which do not reflect the impact of parallel operations on a country's available resources. Likewise, the fourth and fifth article showed that contributions to the air campaign against IS were linked to the level of threat posed by foreign fighters, a variable that had not been included in prior research.

Furthermore, this dissertation is one of the first studies to provide systematic evidence that left-wing parties are more inclined to support operations with inclusive goals. The analysis of the air strikes against IS, in turn, shows the limits of the alliance dependence hypothesis. More specifically, it indicates that alliance dependence does not incite contributions if both the large and the dependent ally's interests are threatened by a common adversary. Conversely, by examining operations that were not dominated by the US, this dissertation demonstrates that collective action theory can account for more than only the disproportionately large contribution of the US to military operations.

Finally, this research widens the scope of empirical research on the use of force and participation in military operations. Prior studies generally focused on militarized intrastate disputes or US-led military operations. The bulk of the academic literature on participation in peacekeeping operations, in turn, consists of empirical tests of collective-action-based models or exclusively focusses on international-level determinants. As such, this dissertation provides the first systematic study of contributions to CSDP operations, as well as the first analysis that combines international and domestic conditions to explain varying contributions to a UNPO.

Next to these scholarly contributions, the results of this study also have some empirical implications. This dissertation started by arguing that the sizeable European troop deployments of the last two decades suggest that Europe is not (only) a soft or civilian power. As Figure 1 of the introduction indicates, there is a clear downward trend in the number of externally deployed European troops after 2006. This decline can mainly be attributed to the withdrawal from Iraq and the reduced deployments in the Balkans, Lebanon and Afghanistan (Giegerich & Nicoll, 2012: 59). However, when looking at the turmoil swirling around Europe's immediate and wider neighbourhood, one can only conclude that military operations will, in all likelihood, continue to be a necessary instrument to protect the

interests of the EU member states. Given the decreasing willingness of the United States to assume a leading role in operations in and around Europe, the member states will be more and more required to meet demands for military crisis management themselves. Moreover, operations where one member state is willing and able to successfully conduct the operation with minimal support from the rest of the EU will probably not become the standard for European military intervention. In consequence, Europeans will need to collaborate to foster sufficient resources to meet the continuous demands for military crisis management.

This dissertations provides a number of reasons to be modestly optimistic on the likelihood that the member states will be able to collectively meet this demand if clear EU interests are at stake. To begin, the results of this study indicate that member states are more inclined to participate if the target of an intervention poses a threat to their economic or security interests. A large number of member states would, for example, have a specific incentive to participate if an operation was deployed in Libya to counter the expansion of IS or support a unity government. More specifically, this study suggests that both member states with a large number of foreign fighters and member states situated close to Libya can be expected to participate in such an operation. However, even in operations that clearly concern broad EU interest, some member states would probably refrain from contributing. Given their continuing concerns over Russia and the absence of specific interests, the Central and Eastern European member states would, for example, probably not participate in a possible operation in Libya. Moreover, collective European military action will be far more difficult if an operation does not clearly concern the interests of many of the member states, as was recently demonstrated by difficult force generation process of the EUFOR RCA operation.

Another reason to be optimistic about the member states ability to collectively tackle future security threats is that domestic-level conditions were not decisive determinants of their military commitments. While nearby elections and parliamentary veto power act as constraints on the member states' governments, the results of the fifth paper indicate that these domestic conditions primarily determine the level of military engagement, not whether or not a member state participates. Constitutional restrictions, in turn, only matter for a few member states, and only for specific types of operations. Finally, military stretch was identified as the most important constraint on the member states for the three operations that were launched at the beginning of the timeframe of this dissertation, but mattered less for the two other operations. Given that the number of externally deployed European

troops is still at a relatively low level, the member states' military resources are currently probably not stretched by their military deployments.

Limitations and Paths for Further Research

As is the case with all research, this dissertation faces a number of shortcomings and limitations, which offer starting points for future studies. This final section elaborates on six of the most important limitations of this dissertation.

A first limitation of the present study is that the explanatory value of several conditions is not examined in the first four articles. For example, whether or not the difference between coalition and single-party governments has an impact on the member states' military commitments is only tested in the MDSO/MSDO analysis presented in the fifth article. The results of the latter analysis suggest that the number of parties in government was not amongst the most relevant conditions. However, this was also the case for parliamentary veto power, a condition which, as the other articles of this dissertation indicate, does have an impact on the size of member states' contributions (cf. supra). Conversely, the fifth article showed that the member states' level of trade with the area of operations' wider region was an important determinant of their military commitments. In consequence, it would have been very interesting to further test the explanatory value of this condition in the other articles.

Second, none of the articles of the empirical part of this thesis test whether differences between the member states' strategic cultures have an impact on their military commitments. This constitutes an important limitation, given that this study's results do not suggest that strategic culture can be entirely dismissed as an important explanation for the variation in the member states' military engagements. The solutions of the fifth article, for example, do not explain Germany's contributions to any of the operations. Given Germany's specific history, cultural variables can be expected to be particularly important for explaining its pattern of military engagements. For example, the solutions of the third article attribute Germany's decision not to contribute to Operation Unified protector to the combination of a right-leaning government with a lack of clear interests in Libya. However, Germany's response to the Libya crisis also indicates that its strategic culture continues to demonstrate "significant reluctance when it comes to the aggressive use of military force" (Miskimmon, 2012: 393). Likewise, the results of the third article show that executive ideology is not relevant for the disproportionately large contributions of France and the UK to the Libya operation, which confirms

Matlary and Petersson's (2013: 17) suggestion that states with "military cultures that are strategic in nature" are less influenced by political factors. Cultural theories thus definitely provide relevant insights into the member states' military commitments. In consequence, a study that systematically examines and compares the member states military engagements from a strategic culture perspective would serve as a valuable complement to this dissertation.

Third, the objective of this dissertation was to arrive at a general, parsimonious, explanation for the member states' contributions to the operations under investigation. However, at times, more idiosyncratic, case-specific, circumstances offer at least part of the explanation for a member state's decision (not) to contribute to an operation. Portugal's non-participation in the Libya operation can, for example, be attributed to the political crisis that led to the resignation of the Socrates government just five days after the start of the air campaign. Spain's decision not to participate in the air strikes against IS, in turn, was probably influenced by the analogy with the 2003 intervention in Iraq (Di Stefani Pironti, 2014). Given that the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were seen as a consequence of Spain's participation in the Iraq War, this might explain why it refrained from conducting air strikes against IS. However, in spite of not taking such case-specific explanations into account, the analyses managed to explain a large share of the variation in member state contributions to the operations. This suggests that the member states' military commitments are to a large extent determined by more structural conditions.

A fourth limitation is related to the method that was used in this dissertation: QCA. Applying QCA allowed to identify the combinations of conditions that consistently led to participation and non-participation. However, QCA-results do not provide an account of the complex causal processes underlying decisions (not) to contribute. More in-depth case-based knowledge would have shed additional light on some of the hypotheses of this dissertation. A detailed account of the negotiations over troop commitments that preceded the operations would, for example, provide information on whether the small member states were indeed attempting to take a free ride. Moreover, the main problem for most of the operations was finding specific capabilities, like tactical air transport in EUFOR Congo and medical facilities in EUFOR Chad. It would have been interesting to focus on the member states that disposed of such capabilities, and examine which of them eventually agreed to make them available to the operation. In depth case-studies of the decision-making process that took place within the member states' governments and parliaments would also complement the present research. For example, it would, have been

interesting to examine whether left-wing parties of coalition governments were more inclined to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations than their right-leaning coalition partners.

While the previously discussed shortcomings concern the limitations of this study for explaining contributions to the operations under investigation, there are also some limitations related to case-selection. As mentioned in the introduction, this study does not include some of the largest operations that involve a significant number of European forces, like the Multinational Force in Iraq and the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. However, given that these have been thoroughly examined in other studies, analysing member states' contributions to these operations does not constitute an interesting avenue for future research. A more interesting case for further study is EUFOR RCA, the most recent military CSDP operation that involved ground forces. In contrast to the operations examined in the this study, two small member states that do not have a peacekeeping tradition made a sizeable contribution to this operation: Estonia and Latvia. It would be interesting to examine why these member states decided to participate in this operation, which, at first glance, did not provide them specific benefits. Other interesting cases for future research are the two naval operations deployed under the aegis of the CSDP: EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUNAVFOR Sophia. Since the composition of these operations changes constantly due to the frequent rotation of units, this would require a different research design than the one applied in this dissertation.

Finally, the empirical part of this study focussed on operations to which at least five member states made sizeable contributions. To arrive at a more complete understanding of the determinants of the member states' military commitments, such operations with a relatively large European presence could be compared with cases of member state inaction.[1] Likewise, it would be interesting to examine what determines whether and to what extent member states cooperate to address security challenges. For example, why did the bulk of the member states participate in the military operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, but not in the interventions in Iraq and Libya? Why did France act unilaterally in Mali in 2013, while it pushed for a CSDP-operation in Chad in 2007 and cooperated with the UK for the intervention in Libya? A comparative study of the diverging European reactions to international and internal crises could shed light on these issues and, hereby, serve as a valuable complement to this study.

[1] The studies of Kreutz (2015) and Pohl (2014b) shed some light on this research question.

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Statement of contribution

The first article of this PHD is co-authored with Alrik Thiem. I came up with the original idea of using QCA to explain the division of the burden of CSDP operations and presented it in a paper at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Antwerp 2012. After the Joint Sessions, Alrik and I decided to collaborate on the paper. The theoretical framework of the article was developed in close cooperation and we each collected half of the data. Alrik carried out the analyses in the paper, while I interpreted the results. In the end, I think we each carried around 50% of the burden of this paper.